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MEMOIRS
OF
SIMON BOLIVAR,
PRESIDENT LIBERATOR
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA;
AND OF HIS
PRINCIPAL GENERALS;
SECRET HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION, AND THE EVENTS
WHICH PRECEDED IT, FROM 1807 TO THE PRESENT TIME.
WITH AN
INTRODUCTION,
CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF THE STATISTICS, AND
THE PRESENT SITUATION OF SAID REPUBLIC;
EDUCATION, CHARACTER, MANNERS AND
CUSTOMS OF THE INHABITANTS.

BY GEN. H. L. V. DUCOUDRAY HOLSTEIN,
*Ex-Chief of the Staff of the President Liberator, and now a citizen of the United
States, Professor of Modern Languages at the College in Geneva, N. York, &c.*

“ Il n’y a que la vérité qui blesse
Et—elle blessera.”

BOSTON—S. G. GOODRICH & CO.
1829.

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, *to wit :*

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"Memoirs of Simon Bolivar, President Liberator of the Republic of Colombia; and of his principal Generals: Secret history of the Revolution, and an account of the events which preceded it from 1807 to the present time. With an Introduction, containing an account of the Statistics, and the present situation of said Republic; Education, Character, Manners and Customs of the Inhabitants. By H. L. V. Ducoudray Holstein, ex-chief of the staff of the President Liberator, now a citizen of the United States, and Professor of Modern Languages in the College at Geneva, New-York, &c.

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Et—elle blessera.

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JNO. W. DAVIS, { *Clerk of the District of
Massachusetts.*

WAITT & Dow, *Printers,*
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P R E F A C E.

The author of these memoirs has been constantly attached to the cause of liberty in both hemispheres. He served in France during the whole time of the French revolution, and was after the year 1800 attached to the particular staff of Napoleon Bonaparte.

Attracted by the sacred cause of the Spanish Americans, he came to Carthagena, where the government offered him service, and conferred on him the highest military rank in its power to grant, that of *Geefe de Brigada*. He had the fortune to be commander-in-chief of the forts of Boca Chica. What other service he rendered in Colombia will be related in the course of these memoirs.

He, as one of the chieftains of the Republic, had a good opportunity to be well informed of facts, whether secret or open, and to study at leisure the character and talents of the chiefs, who were his daily companions, and many of them his subordinates. He particularly admired general Bolivar, with whom he lived in such intimacy, that he slept on various occasions in the same room with him.

After he had left this service and retired to private life, in which he supported his family by instruction,

and literary occupations, some friends suggested to him the idea of writing a history of Colombia, as he had been an eye witness of so many interesting facts. He complied with this suggestion, but, not satisfied with his own observations, he consulted many of the most distinguished leaders of both parties, (Spaniards and Patriots) opportunities for which were frequently offered to him during his long residence in Hayti, Curacao, and St. Thomas; and accordingly he derived from them information upon certain facts, to which he had not been personally knowing. He afterwards diligently and faithfully compared the various statements, and adopted what seemed to him to be the plain intermediate result. He thinks, therefore, he has *approached* as nearly as possible to a correct and impartial relation of facts. He has, besides, kept up an active correspondence, collected the bulletins, the proclamations, the manifestoes, as well as memoirs, both of Spaniards and patriots, and compared them with each other; and lastly, he commenced, and has continued to make short notes, after consulting distinguished and well informed gentlemen, to whom he has been indebted for information.

He has been occupied in pursuing this subject more than five years; and as these memoirs, now respectfully submitted to the public, contain a great many facts hitherto unpublished, the author hopes they will not prove to be without some interest to the reader.

Geneva College February 4th, 1829.

INTRODUCTION.

SECTION I.

STATISTICAL ACCOUNT OF COLOMBIA.

Geographical divisions and former government of the countries at present comprehended within the limits of Colombia—Revolution from 1810 to the present time—Extent of territory—Number of inhabitants—Debt and revenue—Forts and fortifications—Seaports—Judicial administration—Form of government—Slavery—Indians—Common schools, colleges, universities—Roads—Rivers—Mines—Diseases—Burial places—Poor-houses and beggars—The clergy—Executive influence, provincial officers—Obstacles to the establishment of a regular efficient free government, and to improvements and prosperity in Colombia.

The Spaniards gave the name *Costa o' Tierra Firma* to those provinces which now form the territory of the Colombian republic. By *Tierra Firma Del Oriente*, was understood the captain-generalship of *Venezuela*. By *Tierra firma Del Occidente* was understood the viceroyalty of *New Grenada*. Under the name *Tierra Firma* were included the provinces of *Vergua* in North America, and of *Panama* and *Darien* on the Isthmus.

Venezuela was governed in the name of the king of Spain, by a captain-general, who presided in the *Real Audiencia*, or great council, in civil matters. This officer was invested, with great powers, and accountable only to the king, through

the council of the Indies. He decided in the last instance on all legislative, judicial and military affairs. The ecclesiastical concerns were regulated and conducted by a tribunal, composed wholly of ecclesiastics, in which the archbishop of Caracas presided. The captain-general had no authority to interfere in any manner whatever, with this tribunal.

The time of the captain-general's remaining in power was limited to a period of from four to six years. Very few of these governors returned poor to Spain.

The captain-generalship of Venezuela was divided into eight provinces, and, in 1809, consisted of Cumana, Barcelona, Caracas, Barinas, Maracaybo, Coro, Guayana and the island of Margarita.

The ancient vice-kingdom of *New Grenada* was governed by a viceroy, who presided over the Real Audiencia, and was accountable to the king alone, through the council of the Indies, in which the king was supposed to preside.

New Grenada, in 1809, stood divided into three audiencias, and twenty-two provinces.

Under the *Audienria of Panama*, were the provinces of Veragua and Panama.

Under that of *Santa Fe de Bogota*, were the provinces Coro, Sinu, Carthagenas, Santa Martha, Mariquita, Santa Fe, Antioquia, Neyva, Popayan, Pamplona, Tunja and Locono.

Under the *Audiencia of Quito*, were the provinces of Quito, Quijos, Maynas, Atacames, Guayaquil, Cuenta, Loja and Jaen De Bracamoros.

No intercourse was held between Venezuela and New Grenada. A traveller wishing to pass from one to the other, was obliged to submit to all those tiresome and humiliating formalities required on entering Spain. The government and laws were quite different in the two countries, as were the character, habits, manners and customs of the inhabitants.

The Spanish colonial system is so generally understood, that it would be superfluous to speak of it here. But the following particulars of the *Philippine Company*, are little known.

This was a society of merchants and other wealthy individuals of the province of Biscay in Spain, who purchased of the king the privilege of importing and exporting, to and from his colonies, merchandise of every description, and of fixing the prices of all kinds of produce and merchandise. On the Main, neither the captain-general or the viceroy could alter any price fixed by the company. Capital punishments were ordained against every one who traded with the inhabitants without being authorised by the company. The natives were forced to sell their produce at the price fixed. The company had armed vessels called *Guarda Costas*, employed to prevent the intercourse with any vessel or individual not authorised by the company.

Their net profit was about three hundred per cent, and this mode of conducting their trade may, alone, serve to show the wretched condition of the Main.

The following are the principal revolutions and changes of government on the Main, from April 19th, 1810, until December 1819, when Venezuela and New Grenada united under one government, which took the name of the republic of Colombia.

In Venezuela the Spanish government was changed by a revolution which took place at Caracas 19th of April 1810, when the captain-general Eanparan and the Real Audiencia, were arrested, and a provisional Junta was formed under the name of "Junta established for the preservation of the rights of His Majesty, the king Ferdinand VII."

On the 2d of March 1811, the congress of Venezuela opened their sessions at Caracas. It was composed of the deputies of the following provinces: Margarita, Caracas, Merida, Cumana, Barcelona, Barinas and Truxillo. By an act of July 5th 1811, congress declared the republic of Venezuela free and independent of Spain. On the 21st of December of the same year, it sanctioned a constitution which bound the provinces together by a federal act, like that of the United States of America. But these several provinces being exposed, both to internal faction, and invasion from without, were scarcely

able, separately, to bear the expense incurred for their own preservation, so that the expenses of the general government, and the support of the army and navy, fell chiefly upon Caracas. Congress was in a prosperous state, when the dreadful earthquake, together with the loss of Porto Cabello, and the capitulation of Vittoria, between general Miranda and Monteverde, ruined the government, and destroyed the congress and republic of Venezuela, (July 1812.) The country was left to anarchy, and subjected to the power of the sword.

On the 14th of August 1814, general Simon Bolivar entered the city of Caracas as conqueror, and assumed the title of "*Dictator Liberator of the West of Venezuela*," and established an arbitrary military government. General San Iago Marino had done the same before, in the provinces of Cumana, Barcelona, &c. under the title of "*Dictator Liberator of the Provinces east of Caracas*."

The 17th of July 1814, the Spaniards again entered the city of Caracas. In consequence of the battle of La Puerta, where the two dictators were beaten by Boves, the Spaniards, shortly after, took possession of the provinces which the two dictators and their troops had evacuated. In the night of the 24th and 25th of August, the dictators embarked at Cumana.

Venezuela became again subject to the bayonet, and each military chieftain governed despotically the territory occupied by his troops.

May 5th 1816, Simon Bolivar, with some armed men, entered again the territory of Venezuela, (the island of Margarita,) and assumed the title of "*Supreme Chief, Captain-General of the forces of Venezuela and New Grenada*," &c. &c.

On the 6th of July of the same year, he lost that title, and Venezuela, when he suddenly embarked at Ocumare, for the Dutch island of Buen Ayre.

On the 31st December, 1816, general Bolivar landed again at Barcelona, and reassumed the title of "*Supreme Chief Liberator of the Republic of Venezuela, Captain General*," &c. &c. He had been called through the powerful influence of Admiral Louis Brion; but under the express condition that he

should, upon his arrival, assemble a congress at Barcelona. He not only neglected to do so, but he persecuted the members of the congress at Cariaco, May 1817.

In consequence of general Bolivar's very unfortunate campaign in 1818, against Morillo, the general dissatisfaction of the inhabitants of Angostura with that campaign, his manner of government, (which was the same as under his Dictatorship at Caracas) and the strong representations of Brion, Zea, Manuel Torres, Doctor Roscio, Doctor Carli, and other patriots, the Supreme Chief was compelled, at last, to assemble a Congress at the city of Angostura, under the name of the Congress of the Republic of Venezuela. Bolivar was chosen President of the Republic; and we shall see, in the proper place, in what his power consisted.

New Grenada was, during that time, the theatre of various commotions and changes. A Junta was established at Bogota, the 20th of July, 1810, in which the viceroy presided. Soon after the same Junta deposed and arrested their president, and exiled most of the members of the Real Audiencia, (as the Junta at Caracas did, April 19th, 1810.)

The Junta, in their manifesto, declared that they no longer recognised the authority of the Spanish regency, and they invited the twenty-two provinces to send their deputies to Bogota, in order to fix, in a general assembly, the form of this new government; but only *during the time of the captivity of their beloved and adored King Ferdinand VII.*

The deputies of the provinces Tunja, Pamplona, Neyva, Carthagena and Antiochia, assembled at the city of Bogota, where they concluded, November 27th, 1811, a federal treaty, in sixty eight articles, by which congress united the legislative and executive powers. But the inhabitants of the province of Cundinamarca, disapproved of these articles of union, and convoked a general assembly of the deputies of those of the

*The name of Santa Fe of Bogota, was from that year, changed to *Bogota*, and its province called *Cundinamarca*.

twenty-two provinces which had not met at Bogota. This assembly took the name, *El Collegio Electoral Constituyente*. They proposed a project of a constitution, which was approved in general assembly, April 17th, 1812. This project, in twelve great parts, treated of a limited monarchical government.

Francisco Naroni, president of the junta in the province of Cundinamarca, revolted against Congress. This body not confiding in the favorable opinion of the citizens of Bogota, suddenly resolved to leave that capital and establish the seat of government in the little town of Tunja. This change was the origin of a civil war, which began between the leaders of congress, and the partizans of Narino, in 1812.

After many troubles and much bloodshed, the congress at Tunja, decreed September 10th, 1814. that an executive power called, the *Executive Council*, should be established, consisting of three members.

In November 1814, general Bolivar arrived at Tunja, and was promoted to the rank of captain-general of Venezuela and New Grenada, and instructed to put an end, by force of arms to these troubles. He marched with a strong body of troops against Bogota, which he subjected without bloodshed, the city having no fortifications and very few troops.

Congress returned again to Bogota; but was soon after compelled to dissolve and fly, in consequence of the siege of Carthagená, by general Bolivar himself, in the beginning of 1815. By this siege he lost his army, the congress, the strong fortress of Carthagená, and the independence of New Grenada.

From that time the provinces of New Grenada were left in a state of anarchy, each military leader ruling the territory occupied by his troops, as he pleased. And when general Bolivar reconquered New Grenada in 1819, he established at Bogota, a provisional government, nearly the same with his dictatorship in Venezuela in 1813 and 14.

After all these commotions and changes, New Grenada and Venezuela were at last united under one government; by a

decree of the congress at Angostura, called the *Fundamental Law*, dated, "city of St. Thomas, Angostura, in the province of Guayana, December 11th, 1819*." This new government assumed the title of the *Republic of Colombia*. The fundamental laws was a provisional and unlimited treaty of union between the inhabitants of both New Gerenda and Venezuela. It was sanctioned by the general congress convened at the city Del Rosario De Cuenta, 12th July, 1820.†

The government of Colombia was declared to be a central, and not a federal government; such is the late constitution of Colombia.

In the debates upon the subject, the deputies of Venezuela advocated a central government. Those of New Grenada contended for a federal union. The first opinion was that of general Bolivar, who in his private conversation at Aux Cayes, Barcelona and Angostura, told his friends, that a central government would give much more force and promptness in the execution of the laws. His enemies accuse him of being in favor of a central government, in order to preserve in himself the power which he would have lost by a federal union. We shall see in the course of this work, how far this accusation was just. In order that neither party might be deprived of an opportunity of expressing their mature opinions on this point, an article was inserted in the constitution,‡ in these words: "After an experiment of ten or more years, shall have discovered all the inconveniences or advantages of the present constitution, the congress shall convoke a grand convention of Colombia, authorised to examine, (revise) it, or to reform it altogether."

The territory of the Republic of Colombia, extends from the mouth of the Orinoco river to the northern frontiers of Peru and Brazil, or to the province of Meynas on the limits of the Amazon.

*See Appendix. Document No. 1.

†See Appendix. Document No. 2.

‡Article 191.

Baron Humbodst says, in his "historical account of a voyage to the equinoxial regions of the new continent," that the republic of Colombia is, with Mexico and Guatimala, the only state in Spanish America which occupies coasts opposite to Europe and Asia. From Cape Paria to the eastern extremity of the province of Veragua, were counted 400 maratime leagues; from Cape Burica to the mouth of the river Tumbez, were 260. The sea-shore which the Colombian Republic possesses on the sea of the Antilles, and on the Pacific ocean, is equal in length to the coast from Cadiz to Dantzic, and from Ceuta to Jaffa.

Mr. Bouchon, in his American Atlas, asserts that the Republic of Colombia contained 91,952 square leagues;* others say 126,000; and the same author affirmed its population in 1823 to be 2,785,000 inhabitants, which I think too many, considering that war and emigration have been so long operating against these countries, and that the government has done so little to encourage the settlement of foreigners in the country.

By another calculation, the population, at the commencement of 1822 was as follows.

	<i>Whites.</i>	<i>Colored.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
In Venezuela,	80,000.	480,000.	560,000.
In New Grenada,	110,000.	900,000.	1,010,000.
	<u>190,000.</u>	<u>1,380,000.</u>	<u>1,570,000.</u>

These calculations, differing so widely, were made within the space of one year. But it is to be noted that a census was never taken under the Spanish government. Each priest had his register, in which he inserted christenings, marriages and burials, and nothing else; and these were not published. The present government of Colombia has not yet taken a census.

*In conformity to this article, the general assembly was convoked in Colombia, at the end of 1827.

†The second article in the *fundamental law* says, the republic contains 115,000 square leagues.

The finances of Colombia are in a very low state, the expense greatly exceeding the revenue. The national debt is greatly increasing, and the interest of the English loan is not punctually paid, as will be shown by documents. By a law of congress, dated Bogota June 23d 1824, the territory of Colombia is divided into 12 departments, 49 provinces and 218 cantons.

The seat of government has been fixed, provisionally, at the city of Bogota; of which the inhabitants of Quito and Caracas are very jealous. The new city of Bolivar, which, in conformity to article 7th of the fundamental law of Colombia, is to be established in a central place, has not yet been established, probably for want of the necessary funds.

The city of Bogota contained, in 1806, about 80,000 inhabitants; now, not 50,000. Caracas, the same year, had 36,000, and has now less than 25,000.

The fortresses in Colombia are Carthagena, and the four forts of Boca Chica, to protect the entry of its port at 12 miles from Carthagena, Santa Martha and Porto Cabello. The cities of Maracaybo, Coro, Laguaira, Cumana, Barcelona, Guayaquil and Pompatar, are in part fortified, having forts to protect their harbors. All these are seaports. The city of Angostura is fortified, but is not a seaport, being situated on the river Orinoco, about 80 leagues from its mouth.

There are other seaports protected by small forts, batteries or redoubts, as Carupano, Ocumare, Guiria, Juan Griego, &c. In the interior, the cities of Quito, Pastos, San Fernando de Apure, San Carlos, &c. which have forts or batteries. But the cities of Bogota and Caracas, that are situated in the interior, are not fortified. All the merchandise sent to Bogota, must be embarked on the Magdalena river for Honda, where it is loaded upon mules, and, crossing a large chain of the Cordilleras, arrives at the beautiful valley of Bogota in 3 or 4 days. Goods destined for Caracas, are transported with

more facility. They are carried by land from Laguaira or Porto Cabello.

Bogota is not protected by forts on any side. Caracas is protected on the sea side by Laguaira and Porto Cabello, and on the land side by the fort of La Cabrera, which lies in a very narrow defile, enclosed, on one side, by the fine lake of Valencia, and on the other, by a high chain of mountains.

The port and fortress of Carthagena are protected by the four forts of Boca Chica.

The twelve departments of Colombia are divided into provinces, cantons, or counties, and parishes.

Each department has an intendant, entrusted with its administration. The president of the republic appoints him for the term of three years. There are, besides, two or three lieutenant-assessors, lawyers, a secretary-general, and other officers of the intendency. Each department has a commander of the land forces, a major-general, a staff and its officers, besides the commandants of the different places, of the engineers, of the artillery, the inspectors of the artillery, infantry, cavalry, &c.

Each province, except that where the intendant resides, who at the same time is governor, has a governor, and a lieutenant-governor-assessor. They hold their offices for three years. The last are generally lawyers, and decide the civil causes. Each province has a secretary-general of the province and his clerks, a commander of the place, a director of the custom house, and other officers.

Each province being divided into cantons and parishes, each of them has its cabildos, or municipal officers, elected for one year, but without any salary.

For the twelve departments of Colombia, there are above 200 political judges, who have no fixed salary, or, if any, it is a trifle, which is not sufficient for their support.*

* A *juez politico* is entrusted with the decision of small civil causes.—See the report of the secretary of the interior, T. M. Restrepo, made to the Congress of Colombia, assembled on the 23d of April, 1823.

To each canton is a notary who receives no salary.

The coasts of Colombia are divided into four maritime departments, viz:

The 1st. department including the coasts of Guayana, Cumana, Barcelona, and of the island of Margarita :

2d. Those of Caracas, Coro and Maracaybo :

3d. Those of Rio Hacha, Santa Martha and Carthagena :

4th. The territory of Arato, as far as to that of the Aragua.

A commandant-general, an auditor of the marine and other officers, are entrusted with the administration in each of the four departments. The president of the republic appoints them all.

The popular representative government of Colombia has been superseded by the formal military despotism under Simon Bolivar, who assumes the title of "*Supreme Chief of the Republic of Colombia.*" Many of the laws passed by the congress, during the existence of the popular government, still remain in force.

Slavery has been abolished by an act of congress; but the act is limited, extending only to those who have borne arms, or are able to pay 200 dollars to the masters.

The civilized aborigines are in a wretched condition. Under the Spanish dominion they were the slaves of the priests, or the alcaldes. Both were their tyrants, forcing them to cultivate a certain portion of land in common. This disheartened the laborer, and is one cause of the low state of agriculture. These slaves merely vegetated, and were so miserable, that, with the greatest difficulty, they had paid their yearly tax, of from six to nine dollars, which the law imposed upon each male from 18 to 50 years of age.

October 4th, 1821, congress decreed that all these taxes should be abolished, and the Indians have the same rights and privileges with the other citizens of Colombia; that they should no more be obliged to work in common; that each should have his own lot of ground, and cultivate it as he

pleased ; and that this partition should be made within five years.

By the law of March 14th, 1822, it was provided, that in each of the seminaries established in the cities of Bogota, Caracas and Quito, four young Indians should be admitted to the course of studies there pursued, and that two young Indians should, in the same way, be admitted into each of the colleges of the four other departments. The want of funds obliged them to limit the number. Each of these Indians receives a pension of ten dollars a month. Those who distinguish themselves are to be clergymen, or have some government offices.

Besides these christian Indians, there are in Colombia, various tribes of savage, heathen Indians. These inhabit Goagira and its environs, and also the coasts of the rivers Orinoco, Meta, Amazon, and other rivers, which water the large valleys in the east part of the republic. They are known under the name of *Indios bravos*.

The inhabitants of the valleys of Casanare, Tuy, Apure, Arare, Cumana, Barcelona, &c. were christian Indians, known under the name of *Llaneros*. They are ferocious and cruel, but have rendered the greatest services to the republic.

Public instruction is very much neglected, government not having the means of paying good teachers, and the inhabitants of the counties and parishes being too poor to bear the expense of educating their children. Moreover, there cannot be found teachers sufficiently able and enlightened, nor enough good elementary school books.

Article XV of the law of the 2d of August, 1821, concerning the *Primary Schools*, authorises the executive to establish in the principal cities of Colombia, *Normal Schools*. These are established at Bogota, Caracas and Carthagena. But the absolute want of funds and elementary books, and the prejudices against this method, united with the great influence of the priests, who are generally attached to old Spanish methods, confine this system to learning in prayer books, and catechisms, too abstract for the entertainment or the conception

of children. There were primary schools for females, but as government had not the necessary means, it was obliged, by the law of July 28th, 1821, to establish these schools in the convents of the nuns. But these having represented themselves to be in want of a great hall, and destitute of means to construct it, very few have been yet established. We may easily conceive how miserable all these schools must be, since, we know how narrow and filled with prejudices of every kind, the minds of all those were, who were educated by friars and monks in the convents, of both sexes, under the Spanish government on the Main. These are at present, generally, the instructors of the rising generation. What must be the result of such an education!

The famous professor Lancaster, after having spent some years on the Main, for the purpose of bringing into use there, his highly approved method of teaching, was obliged to leave the country, displeased, disgusted and ruined, as he has stated in his letters and memoirs, by which we learn, that the twenty thousand dollars, granted by Bolivar, have never been paid. The colleges and universities are like the primary schools, in their infancy—in a vegetating state; not for want of the best intentions in congress, but absolutely for want of the necessary means.

The congress, when assembled at Cuenta, ordained by a law of June 28th, 1821, that a public college should be established in each province of Colombia. There are such colleges in the provinces of Tunja, Ibagua, Medellin, Popayan, Loja, &c.; and, besides, government has preserved the old colleges, so that the cities of Quito, Bogota and Caracas, have two, and the provinces of Popayan and Merida, one each. But all suffer for want of funds to maintain them, and to pay good professors.

In Bogota there is a school of Anatomy for the use of the students.

Colombia has four universities, viz: at Quito, Bogota, Caracas and Merida. That in Bogota is exclusively for students in thology; the three others, for students in the other

branches. Bogota and Caracas have libraries for the use of the students of the colleges and universities; but they are not extensive, and are composed chiefly of old theological works, not conducive to science. Arts, sciences and literature, are all in the same state of infancy, and cannot flourish until the schools shall be in a better condition.

The country of Colombia has chains of large and high mountains, known under the name of Cordilleras de los Andes, which have more than a hundred branches extending through the whole republic, so that very many of the roads are laid over mountains, impassable by carriages. Over a distance of 80 or 90 miles, therefore, travellers must pass, on horses or mules, or by water. Mules are safer than horses. In the rainy season many roads are so overflowed with water that it is dangerous to pass them: the intercourse with the interior is then greatly hindered. There are no turnpikes, and few bridges or ferries in Colombia. Rivers must be crossed by swimming or in small canoes. Here, as every where else, the want of means and hands, opposes the necessary establishment of turnpikes, bridges &c, and hinders and embarrasses commerce exceedingly. The chains of mountains have in them many dens, affording shelter for bands of robbers, who under the name of Guerillas infect, particularly in the present times, the departments of Venezuela, Julia, Boyaca and others. Travellers and mails go well armed and escorted.

The two largest rivers in Colombia are the Orinoco, and the Magdalena. Both these are navigable for ships. Others may be navigated by small craft; the principal of which are the Catatumbo or Julia, forming with some others, the large lake of Maracaybo, the Atrato, the Cruces, Aranca, Patia, Vemecaldas, and there are many others. Congress intended to unite several of them, by means of canals, cut from one to another.

On the Magdalena and Orinoco rivers, steam boats are now used for the transportation of passengers and merchandise.

On the first they go from Santa Martha to Mompox, where the passengers land; and with horses or mules, cross large mountains, before they can arrive at the large plain of Bogota, the present seat of the Colombian government. On the Orinoco, they go from one of its seven principal branches, which pours its waters into the Atlantic, to the city of Angostura.

The provinces of Antochia, Coio, Popayan, and some parts of Neyva and Pamplona, furnish gold in grains. Others produce silver, iron, copper, &c.

Among the maladies which reign in Colombia, are the yellow fever, black vomit and dysentery; but these prevail only at certain seasons, and sometimes the two first appear not in the course of whole years. Another very grievous and contagious malady known by the name of *el mal de la elefancia* (leprosy) exists on the Main. The inhabitants believe that this plague is incurable, and that it is communicated by touching or taking the breath of a leprous person. Such an one is consumed by sores and ulcers, which produce poignant pains, and destroy the sufferer as soon as the vital parts of his body are infected. The eating of too much fresh and salt pork, the filthy manner of living, and the burning sun, are probably the principal causes of this plague. The Spanish government had established, in the island of Boca Chica, in the province of Carthagena, a hospital for lepers, where a great many of both sexes were treated. To prevent any communication from abroad, they were guarded by a cordon of troops, and capital punishment was ordained, for attempting to force the guard, or tresspassing on the limits prescribed. When Carthagena was declared a republic, its government preserved this institution, the more carefully, because this province had, in proportion to its population, a greater number of leprous persons than any other province in New Grenada. Whilst I commanded the forts of Boca Chica, I frequently visited this hospital, then immediately under my direction. It was a hard—a horrid duty to visit these

miserable beings, among whom I found promising youths of both sexes, whose parents were wealthy and powerful. It was dreadful to see them secluded by force from home and society forever, to perish, by long and excruciating pains, in misery and despair. I did all I could do to alleviate their condition; but the low state of the funds would not enable me to do what I wished, and what was requisite for them.

The province next to Carthagena, in number of lepers, is Socorro. In 1826, the government of Cundinamarca, desired that a hospital should be erected for leprous persons, in the little town of Curo, where these persons of the province of Socorro, Pamplona, Tunja, Casanare, Bogota, Neyva and Margarita, should be collected and cured. But the funds assigned were so deficient, in proportion to the great number of lepers, that this plague continues to make great ravages in these seven provinces, as well as in that of Carthagena. The leprosy exists in the provinces of Panama, Choco, Guayana, &c, but not to so great a degree as in the eight former provinces.

Another less dangerous disease, attacks many of the inhabitants of Colombia. It is the *wen*, a large swelling under the throat; it is not mortal, but deforms the visage, particularly of females. It hinders respiration, and makes children imbecile and stupid. This disease is often to be found in the temperate valeys; but the inhabitants of the Cordillera mountains, and those of the plains bordering on the rivers Magdalena, Meta, Apure, Orinoco, &c. are not exempted. This malady progresses daily, and will, as is feared, spread throughout the whole country.

Various projects have been devised for removing it. But the want of funds for the payment of professors and practitioners, and for the building of hospitals has been the principal obstacle to so beneficial an enterprise.

Vaccination is introduced into families, and the nicest care is taken in the city of Bogota, Quito and Caracas, to preserve

active virus, to be sent into the provinces where the small pox makes its appearance.

But it is not carried to all the provinces, for want of funds. The civil and military hospitals are for the same reason, in a miserable condition.

Many small cities and villages have their cemeteries without, at some distance from them; whilst at Bogota and other great cities the dead are buried in churches and church-yards in the centre of the population.

Houses of refuge for the poor are established in the cities of Bogota, Quito, and Caracas, where beggars and vagabonds are kept at work for their maintenance. Government has established a fourth house of this kind, in the city of Pamplona, which abounds with poor; but all are in a wretched state, for want of money; and beggars are met with in the streets of almost every city, town and village in Colombia. But few die for want of food, the soil being very fertile, and the population small in proportion to the extent of territory. The mass of the people subsist chiefly upon bananas, rice, fruit, and roots, which grow with little or no culture; and as they remain a great part of the day in their hammocks, or stretched upon mats, this scanty food is sufficient, at least to prevent their starving with hunger.

The clergy are very numerous in proportion to the people over whose minds they hold a vast influence. The highest ecclesiastical dignity is that of archbishop. There are two; one resides at Bogota, the other at Caracas. It has been said that a third was to be established at Quito. The treaty with the pope, and the declaration which precedes the constitution of Colombia, *that the catholic religion is, and shall be the religion of the state*, are sufficient proofs of the influence of the clergy. There are ten bishops, viz, at Quito, Cuenca, Maynas, Panama, Carthagena, Santa Martha, Merida, Guayana, Medellin, and Antioquia. The *religious and regular orders* in Colombia, are divided into 3 provinces: Venezuela, Bogota and Quito. These provinces administer and govern themselves, independently of each other. The superior, or central

power acknowledged by each under the Spanish government, was the vicar of the orders residing at Madrid, who was himself the immediate dependant of the generalissimo at Rome. The impolicy of continuing this communication with Madrid, a capital inimical to independence, was suggested to congress, together with a plan for rendering these regular orders altogether independent of Spain by giving them a central place in the territory of Colombia, whence they might afterwards communicate directly with the Holy Father; and this has been done. The first congress of the republic of Colombia, which assembled at the city of Rosario de Cucuta, in 1820, ordered the suppression of all the convents which contained not, at least, eight monks, and destined their monasteries and other depending buildings, with their property and revenue, to the education of youth in public schools. In consequence of this order, about three hundred monasteries of both sexes have been sequestered.

The establishment of a congress of the republic is essential to the freedom of the country, and proves an expansion of intellect and information in the county, which, a few years ago, could scarcely have been contemplated. But it is to be feared, first, that the immense extent of territory may greatly weaken, if not annul the guaranty by government, of liberty and individual security and peace. In many instances, a department has one chief, who unites in himself the civil and military authority, under the title of Intendant. But in some, there is a general, who commands the troops in the department, but who, by law, is subject to the intendant. Now, in some departments, envy and jealousy are found to exist between the two, having a pernicious influence upon the common welfare. This has been the case in the department of Venezuela, whilst Charles Soublette was intendant there in 1821, '2, '3. General Paez, who commanded the troops in the department, held Soublette in such contempt, that he often refused to receive orders from him, and to obey any except those which came directly from the president, S. Bolivar, or the vice president, Gen. Sanander.

Paez came one day from Valencia to Caracas for money to pay his troops. He went directly, without permitting himself to be announced, into the cabinet of the intendant, and demanded from Soublette an order on the treasury for a certain sum. Soublette answered, in a hesitating manner, that he would grant the request with a great pleasure, but that the little cash in the treasury was devoted to very important purposes, and would be called for in two days. Paez turned upon his heel, shut the door with violence, walked to the treasurer and ordered him to hand the sum required; and in spite of his remonstrances, forced him to do so, and rode off with the money. This rivalry between Soublette and Paez, actually prevented the effect of the combined military operations; and left Morales the power of making such progress, after the battle of Carabobo, when every one thought the war would be quickly ended. Soublette's administration lost the provinces of Coro and Maracaybo, and, as well informed men have assured me, was the cause of Morales' increasing his power, and of his staying so long in Maracaybo. I am also informed, and, I think it probable, that the cowardice and incapacity of Soublette, were what rendered the blockade and siege of Porto Cabello, ineffectual.

There is in truth no check, I mean constitutional check, upon the power of the intendant. These intendants are generally military chieftains, used to exercising absolute power, which men under arms absolutely require, but which men, as citizens, as absolutely forbid. The intendants are under the immediate orders of the president, they are named and installed by him. He changes, and removes them; and knows beforehand whether congress will approve or disapprove. The president-liberator is therefore the *only* power by and through whom all is done.*

* The President Bolivar published, under the date of Bogota, 24th of November, 1826, a decree with the following title: "Decree uniting in the departments and the provinces the military command in the same person entrusted with the civil authority." He begins with the following introduction: "As it is convenient to the consolidation and the honor of the republic, to avoid expenses in the present state of the public revenues,

It is true that, by the representative system the voice of every alien is heard in the hall of the legislative body, which gives him an appearance of guaranty for his individual liberty. But the most important thing is, that the responsibility of agents to their principals, be well assured ; and above all that of the most powerful and influential agent, viz, the Executive ; because this power is the soul of the legislative body, and is placed between that and the people.

Experience has shown that the influence of the Executive power is able to subdue, to absorb, every other power, legislative and judiciary. But Colombia, having decided against a federal system as too weak for her present circumstances,* has now no other chance but to pursue the course she has marked out for herself.

The central government gives undoubtedly, more strength and energy to the executive. But is it likely to render the people more prosperous and free ; especially when we contemplate the union of such complicated, and often jarring elements ? The character of the Venezuelan, and his manners, customs, and habits, differ altogether from those of the Grenadan ; and the laws of one country are at variance with those of the other.† The jealousy and hatred existing between the inhabitants of the two countries have already been the source of great troubles, in Colombia. They were, indeed, the cause of the revolution at Valencia, Caracas, &c. in 1826, under general Paez. With a federal constitution, both Venezuela and New Grenada would have

which are not sufficient to cover those of the administration of the republic ; and being desirous to put an end to the differences which fetter the public service, the good administration, &c. I decree, article 1st, that in all the departments where government judges are necessary, the military and civil power shall be united in the person of the latter," &c. See Appendix No. 4.

* This was the objection of general Bolivar, strongly expressed when the articles of the fundamental law of the republic were discussed at Angostura, and when a great many of the deputies inclined to adopt the federal system. Some insist that Bolivar's opposition sprung from his fear of losing his supremacy under such a constitution. It is certain that he has retained it to the present time. He is again dictator, by his own decree, of Bogota. 23d of November, 1826, under the plausible pretext of the civil war, and the danger of a Spanish invasion. See Appendix No. 5.

† See section II. of the character and manners of the inhabitants of Colombia.

been enabled to establish laws better adapted to their situation, to the character and habits of the people of each country. With such a constitution, following the brilliant example of these United States, they might have formed a consistent, and perfect federative union.

To trace out the several steps, and the manner of proceeding in the two governments, would afford new and interesting matter to an impartial enlightened observer, and there may be difficulty in deciding between them. The most dangerous part of the system adopted by Colombia is, that it combines local with general agencies, thus accumulating excessive power in the hands of a single man. The federal system is free from this danger.

France is now under this concentrated government, and so is Colombia. Both may be kept in subjection by the concentration, unless some change take place in the charter of the former, and in the constitution of the latter.

3. The influence and power of the clergy are far too great in Colombia. They are members of congress. They hold places in all the public offices; in the departments, provinces, counties and parishes, in the municipalities, as cabildos, and as officers in the army and navy, while they are also priests of the parishes. They are paid in preference to others. By means of tithes and other contributions, they live a very comfortable life, while the people are poor and miserable. The catholic religion is that of the state, and the public worship of any other is strictly prohibited. Advocates of religious toleration are not wanting; but no actual step has been taken towards so beneficial a measure.

The prohibition of all other religions except the catholic is not only impolitic, it is pernicious. It is a phenomenon in the history of states, that such an article is found in the constitution of a people who declare themselves the friends of freedom. This fact alone is sufficient to excite well grounded fears for the success of sound and rational liberty in Colombia.

4. The jealous, envious, suspicious, egotistic and ambitious character of the greatest part of their chiefs, will be a great obstacle to the freedom and prosperity of the inhabitants. Observe their early education, their very limited knowledge, their vanity, their prejudices against foreigners, their habits of power increased by 15 years of war, their propensity to act according to their own arbitrary notions, their passions, and a judicious observer will see that this picture is not over shaded. I speak of the majority of these chiefs, and there are not many exceptions.

4. The finances are so low that none of the public officers, are regularly paid. In some parts of the republic there have been, and are still, great complaints and dissatisfaction with regard to heavy taxes and the multiplicity of contributions.* The famous *Alcavala*, against which so many complaints were made in America, during the Spanish dominion, has been abolished, as late as the end of 1827, in Colombia. The paper money, the *vales*, the patents, the direct and indirect taxes, the heavy duties at the custom houses, and others were so multiplied as to have become a heavy burden to the people of Colombia.

And in what consists the present system of finance and custom houses in Colombia, called the Ravenga System?†

* The President Liberator says, in his decree, dated Bogota, 24th of November, 1826, signed by him and the Secretary of the interior, Joseph M. Resrepro: "As the revenues on land or grounds in the different counties of the republic are not sufficient for the ordinary expenses, and it being not convenient at the present moment to over burden the citizens with new taxes, which provoke complaints from every quarter; I decree," etc. See Appendix No. 6.

The following will also show the very low state of the finances. The President Liberator says, in a decree, dated as above: "The public revenues being insufficient to cover the expenses, so that public credit has lowered, and is in the greatest danger of being lost entirely. I decree," etc.

† These decrees were 1st, "Of the management and government of the intendancies, and other public offices, in the direction and the administration of the revenues in the four departments of Maturin, Venezuela, Orinoco and Julia. Caracas March 8th, 1827." Signed Simon Bolivar and T. Rafael Ravenga, Secretary of State and General of His Excellency the President Liberator. Article 172 says: "Every one, of an industrious class, is liable to pay a tax of alcavala, in proportion to the patent granted him to trade, or to exercise any other occupation. And the principal administrators, their subalterns or deputies, are to collect these taxes upon the following tariff." Here follows a list of the different classes, called *industria*, divided into 33 branches, which were liable to patent. The banker, the merchant and the commissioner, for instance, paid a patent of 400 dollars each, which has been increased to 600, and lately (December 1827) to 1000 dollars a year. The apothecaries, 200 dollars; the lawyers, physicians and surgeons, 36

Both decrees were published during the stay of general Bolivar in Venezuela, at the beginning of 1827, and were attributed to Mr. Ravenga.

The President Liberator has ordered all duties to be collected one year in advance, and such has been the urgency of this collection, that by his decree, dated Bogota Nov. 23d, 1826, he enjoins that these taxes be wholly collected in December of the same year.*

The administration, in all branches, is in frightful disorder; the natural consequence of the entire want of money. Therefore it results that the officers, except those of the treasury, are not paid, and most of them, in order to subsist with their families, yield to fraud, corruption, and smuggling.†

This want of every thing prevents the payment of the navy and land troops, and hinders the execution of all combined operations. A great part of the soldiers were known only by their chacos and muskets; all were in a pitiful condition. The officers themselves are badly clothed; they seldom wear epaulettes, and some of them neither shoes nor boots, and very seldom have any money.

In 1822, '23, when Soublette was intendant of the department of Venezuela, hundreds of officers were seen begging from house to house, in the streets of Caracas and Lagunaira, for some assistance!

dollars. The owners of houses pay half a month of the rent received each year. Those who inhabit their own houses with their families, are liable to pay five per cent more than the sum, at which the rent of the house *may be estimated*, if that exceeds 120 dollars. This expression, *que se estime que genaria*, is very vague, and subjects all owners of houses to the arbitrary decision of any officer the government appoints to estimate them. (See an extract of this long decree, in Appendix under No. 10.) The title of the 2d decree is, "Of the management and government of the maritime custom houses." Caracas, March 9th, 1827. Signed Simon Bolivar and Ravenga, as above. See Appendix No. 11.

To this decree is annexed the tariff of the entry duties to which merchandise imported into the seaports is liable—in alphabetical order. On perusing this decree, from which its contents renders it impracticable to give an abstract, the reader will be convinced how commerce and industry are liable to suffer by such regulations.

* This decree is entitled, "Decree to urge the execution of the law of May 22d, 1826, in regard to the public credit." See Appendix No. 7.

† The Liberator commences his decree to repress frauds in the public revenues, dated Bogota, 23d of November, 1826, by saying, "As frauds exist in the public revenues, and are so common and scandalous, and as it is necessary to put an end to a disorder which relaxes morality, and diminishes so considerably the revenues of the treasury, I have judged convenient to decree," &c. See No. 9, in the Appendix.

The name of battalion or regiment is often given there to a collection of armed men that cannot possibly number 200 fit for action. The, so called, armies of Colombia, are neither well instructed, drilled, nor disciplined. The service is performed with great carelessness, and desertions to the interior are frequent; the natural consequences of the neglect with which the soldiers are treated.

5. The military rules and ordinances in Colombia are those of the Spaniards. They are in use both in the navy and among the land troops. Their custom house duties are so heavy and arbitrary, neither inspiring confidence, nor affording encouragement to commerce and industry.

6. By the ancient colonial system, which was powerfully supported by the clergy, the Spanish crown fearing that the Americans might come to feel their strength and know their rights, took great care to prevent the growth of industry and knowledge in both Spanish Americas. Their immense ignorance, (the growth of the Spanish system,) will greatly retard the welfare and prosperity of Colombia.

The apathy of the people, resulting from the climate, and from a slavery of 300 years, united with this ignorance, will render a speedy introduction of industry, light, and liberal feeling, among them, very difficult. These blessings may, perhaps, not be attained until two or three generations have passed away.

Public and private education are extremely defective, where they are not totally neglected. Nothing is well learned or thoroughly understood. All studies have been very limited, and intercourse with foreigners strictly prohibited.

7. Agriculture, the only road to a flourishing and profitable commerce, is in the same low state with every other source of profit or comfort.

The scarcity of hand, the apathy of the people, and the discouragement to foreigners, from settling in the country, operating with a government which permits the military to commit daily depredations upon the peaceable inhabitants,

are great discouragements to all industry, to every effort towards prosperity.

The fertility of the soil is so great as to produce yearly two harvests. But, at present, both harvests afford not half as much as one of them did under the Spanish dominion. The army, which contains many thousand slaves, absorbs the laboring classes. The chiefs, neglecting the order, comfort and discipline of the soldiers, think only of increasing the strength of their armies by numbers, which they are anxious to augment. Their armies are growing more numerous, less and less capable of resisting invasion, and more and more burdensome and oppressive to the inhabitants. So it happens that agriculture is neglected.

A million of dollars was appropriated to the encouragement of agriculture, and assigned by congress to the executive, for that purpose. This was part of the loan of ten millions made in England. The history of this loan is well understood; and it is not necessary to enquire the fate of the one million. But at best, it is, as has been often said, a single bottle of water drawn up in a sandy plain.

8. The judiciary power remains, together with the legislative and executive, in *one* hand, that of the Dictator-liberator. He prefers military tribunals to civil courts; these are too slow for him; and so his will is the law of the land.

9. Were the Dictator the great man he has been taken for, yet one man cannot be every where, cannot do every thing. Bolivar must necessarily leave to his subalterns the greatest part of business in the departments and provinces. There are military chieftains, little bashaws, so called, who rule and vex the citizens of Colombia by deciding according to their own understanding and will.

What is to be the result of such a state of things in Colombia? Are these people free? Or is their welfare deferred for years, perhaps for centuries? Where is protection to be found for persons and property; for the culture of arts and sciences for liberal institutions, schools, industry, agriculture, the train of blessings necessary to the existence of prosperity and

freedom? Were the inhabitants in a worse condition under the dominion of Spain, bad as it was, than they are now, under the bayonets of the Dictator-liberator? These questions will be decided, according to the view that may be taken of the subject.

SECTION II.

EDUCATION, MANNERS, HABITS, CHARACTERISTICS.

Education of the Colombians—Their vanity, ambition, contempt of trades and mechanic arts—Classes and ranks in society—Marriages—Intrigues and dissoluteness—Women, their manners, character, education—Dress—Those of Bogota as distinguished from those of Caracas and Carthage—Houses, furniture—Luxuries, and extravagance—Superstition—Influence of the Priests—Characteristic habits, traits—Llaneros, their dress, equipments, &c.; Paez, Zaraza—The Margaritans—Religious ceremonies—Former punishment, for murder, robbery—Instance of the public punishment of a young female at Bogota, for an attempt to steal the jewels of the image of the virgin Mary.

The crown of Spain, for the purpose of keeping its subjects from the lights and improvements of the modern nations of Europe, carefully prevented their intercourse with all other nations, as far as was in their power. The Spanish government labored under the continual apprehension that the Americans would become acquainted with their own oppressed condition, and seek the means of breaking their own yoke. The king reserved to himself the exclusive right of granting passports to go to the Spanish colonies. Before such a passport was granted, a Spaniard was obliged to submit to many humiliating examinations and formalities. It was more difficult still for a foreigner to obtain such permission, which

was granted only to those who were powerfully recommended to the king.

After the peace of Badojar, France alone was permitted to send agents or consuls to the Spanish Americas ; and their actions were pretty closely observed.

A Spanish American, desirous of coming to Spain, was obliged to submit to the same formalities as the European Spaniard who wished to go to the colonies. The viceroy, and the captain-general only, could give them their passports.

Capital punishments were ordained against all masters of vessels, not Spaniards, who should attempt to enter any harbor in the Spanish colonies, and against all merchants not licensed to trade with the colonists. These measures rendered it impossible for the inhabitants to have intercourse with foreigners.

The clergy felt a deep interest in seconding the views of government. Their system to perpetuate the ignorance and superstition of the people, procured for themselves the greatest temporal advantages. In the pursuit of these they were utterly regardless of the spiritual welfare of the people, and of their own !

The education of youth was therefore much neglected. Boys were sent to school at the age of four years, and the age was the same for going to a convent.

Since education to a man is what culture is to a plant, it may be proper to enter into some details, to show that such education as the greater part of the generation now living in Colombia have received, under the Spanish dominion, could not possibly form men of knowledge and of liberal minds. This will best inform us what kind of men they are who now stand at the head of the government, and how those powerful chieftains were formed, under whose control the various departments are placed, and among whom they are divided. There are, it is true, in Colombia, and in other parts of the Spanish Americas, men of talents and knowledge ; but they

are much more scarce in Colombia than in other countries, and their political existence is crushed and destroyed by an arbitrary military despotism. Where bayonets are the general rulers, liberty, knowledge, civil rights, and all political welfare are completely banished. To turn the bayonets against the defenceless country and its inhabitants, requires neither knowledge nor talents.

The greatest part of the schools, colleges, and universities have been, and still are, in the hands of the clergy, and the friars. This body of catholic clergy must not be confounded with those in other countries. These were full of prejudices and had very little knowledge. The friars were not much better, and in some cases worse. They filled the heads of the school boys with histories of extraordinary and incredible miracles, with sketches taken from the lives of their saints. The boys learned by rote, and recited a great number of Latin prayers, of which they could not know the sense. They were taught to sing litanies and masses, and were subjected to exterior forms of piety. Thus were they formed to early habits of dissimulation and hypocrisy, under the influence of which their heads and hearts remained during life.

On leaving school, they entered a college, where they learned Latin and Greek very superficially. Their memories were charged with an obscure and diffuse scholasticism, and with some superficial knowledge of geography, history, &c. Instead of being taught the principles of true religion, or of a sound and pure morality, they were instructed in the different ranks and classes of society; in the advantages of being born a nobleman, or of belonging to families in the service of the king, or the church. Their self-love and vanity were thus excited and made predominant over every other principle and motive. This education was ordinarily finished at the age of fifteen or sixteen years. M. Dupons gives a correct and minute account of their instruction, in his work, which affords the most full information on the state of education on the Main before the revolution at Caracas.

Since the revolution of 1810, the new government has, however, not had much time or money to devote to the subject of education. Though peace has afforded more leisure for attention to this subject, they have been deficient in both funds and talents, and this deficiency has stood in the way of the formation of good primary schools and colleges, and able teachers. Will Bolivar establish such institutions? It is very doubtful whether he has the power to do so. And with his military and absolute government, can he desire that knowledge should be diffused among the Colombians?

In Venezuela, to arrive at the title of marquis, count, or baron, was the height of human felicity. I have known different Caraguins to expend large sums of money in getting one of these titles from the Spanish government. Others obtained orders, or stars. In Spain all might be obtained, particularly under the corrupt government of Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace.

This rage for titles existed not in so high a degree in New Grenada as in Venezuela. No title of nobility was known there among the natives. The European nobility preserved their titles after leaving Spain. In Venezuela there existed a Creolan nobility, unknown in New Grenada, under the name of Mantuanos, of whom I will speak hereafter. But in both provinces, all mechanic trades and employments were much despised, and left to colored and black people. The honorable occupation of cultivating land, belonged exclusively to slaves. In Caracas and in Bogota, no mechanic, even now, can be found, who is not a colored or a black person. It would be a disgrace to a man of good family to touch any of these occupations, or to gain an honest living by his own industry. He would like much better to have a brilliant uniform, or a friar's or clergyman's frock, to sing and serve at mass in church, or to obtain the title of doctor, that he might be regarded as belonging to the highest classes of society. He would prefer the laziest life, to obtaining subsistence by industry.

This vanity, the effect of early education, was the source of many dissensions, and of a ridiculous and childish jealousy among families. From this each one derived an opinion that he was a more important man than his neighbor, and was anxious to be distinguished by his birth, rank, titles, and wealth. This was often the cause of jealousy, envy, and bitter enmity between two families, occasioned, by mere trifles.

The officers of the Spanish government and the clergy saw these dissensions with pleasure, and adopted the maxim, *Divide and Govern*. The numerous class of lawyers and attorneys joined the two first, because their own subsistence depended upon lawsuits, which of course they endeavored to excite.

Before the revolution, society was divided into different and very distinct classes. To the first class belonged the Royal Audiencia, or highest council of government in civil matters, and in which the viceroy or captain-general always presided; and to which belonged the regent, the auditors and the judges of the highest court of justice. The governors of the different provinces, the generals, the intendant, the treasurer, the inspectors of the army, and the colonels, were reckoned in this class. It was composed of European Spaniards, who were authorised to bear the titles of Excellency, or Usted (gentry.)

The second class comprised the most wealthy and noted families of high birth, all Creoles. In New Grenada there was no term to distinguish these from other families, and they were designated by the phrase, "he or she is of high birth." In Venezuela, they had a name, that of "las familias Mantuanas." This was a kind of American nobility, commonly mixed with European blood.

The third class was formed of the judges of the ordinary courts, the municipal, and military officers from the lieutenant colonel to the second lieutenant, the members of the bar, the public notaries, the lower officers of government, that were Creoles, the doctors, professors, &c.

In the fourth class were reckoned the merchants, the capitalists, or lessees of a lower birth, the bankers, &c.—all white. The other classes were formed of men of color and black men—all free—and Indians and slaves.

The clergy, regular and secular, belonged to none of these classes. They were highly respected, and had their separate jurisdiction, their ecclesiastical council, of which the archbishop was president. They had their separate privileges and were entirely independent of both viceroy and captain-general.

I shall here speak only of the customs and manners of the highest American class, designated under number 2, as that which is distinguished for its wealth and independence. All the rest being dependent on the government, or on some of the nobles; so that they were obliged to conform to their manners, customs and usages. They do not exhibit a character sufficiently prominent, to be worth a drawing. But where there is a characteristic difference, I will mention it. I will endeavor to compare the character of the Caraguin with that of the Grenadan, and particularly with that of the inhabitants of Carthagena, as forming the most prominent points of difference; and will afterwards speak of the Llanero and the Margaritan.

The families of Mantuanos in Venezuela were divided, like the Grandees in Spain, into different classes; as Sangre Azul, Sangre Mezclada, &c. These classes were formed for the purpose of marking distinctions of birth, as, Sangre Azul, (blue blood) designated the most opulent Creolan families, descended from Spanish ancestors, the first conquerors of the country, who had established themselves definitively there, and whose children, born in the country, were there established from generation to generation. Those of the Sangre Mezclada, (mixed blood) were of a later date; and had intermixed either with Spanish or Frenchmen.

It was very common among the Mantuanos for a young man to marry as soon as he left college. His parents would consult together about choosing him a companion for life; in

which they regarded chiefly, (and particularly the lady's) birth, rank, fortune, and family connexions, as is customary among the nobility in Europe. All being settled with her parents, she was taken, at the age of 12 years, from the convent where she had been placed at four; and married to a young man of the age of 16; frequently to one under that age. It was common to find such a couple whose ages put together amounted to less than thirty. I knew a handsome young lady of Mantuana, who, at the age of eighteen had seven children living. Another had a daughter sixteen years old, who appeared to be the sister of her mother; who was not over 27 years of age. Such a couple, without any experience, not yet knowing even how to behave themselves, were placed at the head of a large household, and surrounded by flatterers, and a numerous train of servants, who sought to dupe them. Having had neither opportunity nor judgment to know the character, each of the other, they believed they were in love, because their parents assured them of it. At first all was happiness and joy. But they soon began to discover faults; and to feel, in the company of each other, a certain vacuity and listlessness. They began their differences by disputing, and then quarrelling; and ended them by hating each other. The husband amused his fancy abroad. The wife consoled herself by other means. In this manner they lived, choosing separate courses of life, and would have been divorced, but for their dread of certain humiliating formalities, which require that witnesses shall testify publicly to their dishonorable private conduct. Their divorce was prevented, only by their pride and vanity.

Whether it is owing to manners and character, a far more temperate climate, or whatever cause, marriages are not made at so early an age, at Bogota as at Caracas. Here families are more united and happy. They are not so ostentatious and showy, but their households are more orderly, and they have more solid riches. They are less fastidious, and more cordial in their manner of receiving strangers, than at Caracas.

A rich family of high birth in Bogota, seldom expend the whole of their annual income, whilst the Mantuanos anticipate theirs, and contract debts.

Among the Mantuanos in Venezuela, the conduct of married people, in general, has a most pernicious effect upon their children. These must know the irregularity of their father, and the intrigues of their mother. What children learn in these schools of vice, they early begin to practise; even before their moral or physical powers approach maturity, these boys practice vices which in most other countries, at their age, are not attempted. There were to be seen many who, by excesses, had lost their vigor, at an age, when others begin to enjoy life. They fall victims to many diseases, and their pale and meagre faces were emblems of pain and suffering. In the midst of every advantage afforded by birth, wealth, and a delightful climate, their health was visibly declining. These living spectres approach an early grave, deploring a vicious life; which is often transmitted from one generation to another.

It is, therefore, not surprising that all travellers who of late have visited Colombia, and particularly Venezuela, talk so much of the general corruption of manners. Among all the rest, Caracas is distinguished.

It was not strange to hear a lady complimented, in presence of her husband, upon changing her *guerido* (gallant.) The husband spoke of his mistress with the same freedom. The festivals and holidays, in these countries, afforded convenient occasions for intrigue between the sexes; as, the grand mass of midnight, the evening before christmas, the whole time of carnival, the numerous evening meetings in honor of the holy virgin, or the saints, &c. Many passionate declarations, verbal, and written, have been made in churches and chapels. I appeal to all who have been in these countries. To all this, must be added the private conduct, and corrupt principles of priests and monks, who, under the mask of religion, have seduced a great many young females. On the other side stands the military officer, whose brilliant

uniform, and the idea of vigor and courage attached to his character, render him peculiarly attractive. By considering all these things, one may form a correct opinion of the manners and customs on the Main.

Among the clergy in Caracas, the canonicii were distinguished for their wealth and libertinism. Even the monks and friars generally kept their mistresses. A friend of mine, at Caracas, surprised his young and beautiful mistress with a stout and handsome friar. He dared not say a word for fear of the friar's vengeance, who would not have failed to do him mischief. This discovery, however, cured him of mistresses, and he soon after left the country.

The priests in the villages, small towns and boroughs, generally have their female housekeepers, and a number of children.

Passing one day through Aqua del Pablo, a large village in the interior of New Grenada, I rested with my retinue, at the house of the priest, with whom I had been acquainted in Carthagená, and who expected me to dine with him. His house was one of the largest and best in the country, and surrounded with various other buildings; proving, at least, great ease, if not wealth. I found a large table well provided with silver spoons, plates and forks. We sat down gaily and dined. After dinner, the officers belonging to my family, retired. I remained alone with the priest, who was a good and benevolent man, generally beloved, and a father to his congregation. He was a patriot, and one of the most enlightened persons of the catholic church. He sat with his back to the door, and I with my face towards it. After a while, the door was cautiously opened, and a beautiful female head appeared. I rose from my seat to tell her she need not fear, and to request her to come in. But the door was hastily shut, and she disappeared. The priest asked what had befallen me so suddenly; I told him what I had seen. "Oh, said he it can be no one but my wife, (*mi muger*), the fool, she was anxious to send us some sweet meats made with her own hands." I requested him to call her, but he declined, saying,

she was not dressed well enough to appear before me. I then asked, as a favor, to be introduced to her. He laughed at my curiosity, as he called it, but, at length, brought her into the room. I saw in her a young lady about eighteen years of age, well educated, and very amiable. She was the mother of two beautiful children. I was much pleased with her conversation, and particularly with the unassuming manner of it. The priest and his wife, as he called her, solicited me to stay with them until the next morning, which I declined, with reluctance, and only because my duty pressed my return to head quarters.

The houses of the Mantuanos were generally governed by an intendant, or major-domo, who has many servants of both sexes under his command. As the master and mistress of the house considered it beneath their dignity to meddle with household affairs, they left every thing to the intendant, who received and paid as he pleased. When the master or his lady were in want of money, they asked it from him. After a few years the intendant became rich, and advanced money upon high interest to his master, who supposed he was using his own property.

The author of Gilblas of Santillane, has not at all overcharged the picture he draws of these intendants, and of the Spanish viceroy in America—their luxury, corruption, &c.

The education of young ladies in Caracas was much neglected. They were taught, but not thoroughly, to read and write. They were also taught music and dancing. Playing on the guitar, some needle work, and dressing themselves, were their favorite and principal occupations. To attend to any part of house keeping, would have been considered so far below the dignity of a Mantuana, that it would have rendered her ridiculous. She occupied herself with a little embroidery, or reading some book of devotion, or some tale. Such were their occupations when they were not at church, at the promenade, on visits, or at balls.

The inhabitants of the same class in Bogota were more reserved and cautious in society. The fair sex were, in general more modest and timid. The ladies in the capital were

distinguished by their clear and fine complexion ; commonly supposed to be the effect of a temperate climate, and pure water. Some, nevertheless, are found with wens, a disease very common in the province of Cundinamarca. Their manners are more reserved, sweet and agreeable, and they interest by that timid candor which characterises the sex. The ladies in Caraeas are not so fair in their complexions, nor so reserved in their manners. They fascinate by their brilliancy, their wit, and their easy manners, by what may be properly termed coquetry. The ladies of Bogota improve upon acquaintance more than those of Caraeas. The education of the ladies in Bogota was much the best ; more strict and more solid. The greatest part among the first class, were educated in convents of nuns, in schools established expressly for that purpose. Such a boarding school house was enclosed within the walls of the cloister, but had no communication with it and the nuns generally. Three or four nuns were named by the abbess to take charge of the school. These directed all the economical duties of the boarding school and instructed the scholars. One was directress, whom the others were obliged to obey. They were, like their pupils, excluded from communication with the convent, and passed through a small door to go to church, or to call on the abbess by her order, or to pass an evening with the nuns on extraordinary occasions.

The pupils entered, commonly, at the age of four years, and were not permitted to go out, but by order of their parents at the time of their marriage, or completing their education. It was very seldom that a young lady obtained permission to go out and see her parents ; but they were permitted to visit her at the parlor, surrounded and separated from their children by iron grates. This permission must be asked from the abbess of the convent, and was granted upon condition that one of the nuns be present at the interview, at the appointed day, and hour. This permission was often refused.

The pupils were taught to read, write, calculate, (cypher,) the elements of history, geography, natural history, chanting religious songs, dancing, playing on the piano forte, or the

guitar, or harp, sewing, embroidery and working clothes. They were taught to cook and to make various kinds of sweetmeats and cakes. Each of those, more advanced in age, had, during her week, the charge of the household. They were taught how to govern a family with order and economy; things of which the young Caraguin ladies were destitute.

Those who stayed at home for private education, which seldom happened at Bogota, were never allowed to go out without being accompanied by one of their parents, or a trusty servant. They were always dressed in black; so that they were not distinguishable from the common classes; but by the finer texture of their clothing; or their mantillas (veils) garnished with fine watches, or by their diamonds, pearls, or their golden chains, at the end of which was suspended, a golden or ivory cross, richly garnished with pearls or diamonds.

Before the revolution, it was not unusual to see ladies at a ball or other festivals wearing more than 200,000 dollars in watches, diamonds, pearls, &c, in their dresses, without appearing to be overloaded. When going to mass, all dressed in black satin. Their faces were veiled with costly notched mantillas; and the upper parts of their frocks were also garnished with the same. They wore no hats, but their hair was ornamented with costly combs, set with diamonds, pearls, &c. They were followed, often, by 20 or 30 servants of both sexes, free and slaves, very neatly dressed; and each of them carrying something for the use of their mistress; as books, umbrellas, fans, &c. The husband never accompanied the wife to church, either in Bogota, or at Caraeas.

Children were taken to church as soon as they could walk, the sons with the father, and the daughters with the mother. Mass was said every day; and on Sundays and holidays, it continued from three o'clock in the morning until noon; and during that time, every one had his choice of going at what home he pleased, or was most convenient. The military mass was at 11 o'clock; at that time the viceroy, or most of those who were attached to the Spanish government, attended.

In New Grenada, there were, among the slaves, more colored than black people. At Venezuela, it was the reverse. In the former, slaves were never permitted to appear abroad with shoes or stockings, though the weather there, particularly in Bogota, is sometimes so cold that ice is found in the streets. This custom was begun and continued, for the purpose of distinguishing slaves from free persons. Thus were the slaves constantly reminded of their degraded condition! In every other respect, they were perfectly well clothed, well fed, and in every other way well treated, and had very little labor to perform. The wealthy families had from one to two thousand, and more, slaves. Forty or fifty were selected to serve in the house; the rest were put to cultivate the soil.

At the public walks, which are commonly called *Almedas*, in Bogota the ladies usually rode in coaches; and here, as in all other public places, they were dressed in black. On great festival days, the ladies of the governor, generals, or other officers, in both capitals, rode out on horseback,* dressed in Amazonian habits, with the epaulettes, galoons, brodices, or other badges distinctive of the rank of their husbands. They had a brilliant and numerous retinue. The wife of the viceroy, or captain-general, was preceded by a number of *aid-de-camps*, and followed by the staff and the civil and military officers of the government. Their husbands were never with them on these occasions. These ladies were addressed and spoken of by the titles of their husbands, as, "Her Excellency the Vice Queen, the Captain Generala, the Governess, &c." The wife of a colonel is called *Ussia*, [*Siegnora*] &c. This old Spanish custom is kept up by the Colombians of the present day.

The ladies of Bogota did not wear their black frocks in the interior of their houses. When at a wedding, a baptism, or ball, they wore colored and white dresses; generally following the newest French fashion.

* It is common for ladies to ride on horseback, throughout the Spanish dominions.

The ladies in Caracas and Carthagena were dressed in black, only when they went to church, or assisted at the public processions.

The plates, candlesticks, pitchers, and other utensils, were of pure silver, or overlaid with gold. A poor man in Bogota would have felt himself disgraced without his silver spoon, knife and fork. Steaks, pies, &c, were set upon the table in large golden plates.

The household furniture was very rich and sumptuous ; and when we consider that all their articles were purchased at 300 per cent profit upon their cost, reckoning transportation and exorbitant duties, we may have some idea of the wealth of these people.

The houses of the wealthy classes at Bogota, may properly be called palaces. They were built of stone, were large and massy, and generally three stories above ground. But Bogota has suffered greatly by the dreadful earthquake of November 25th, 1827. So did Caracas in March, 1812.

All this wealth, comfort, and agreeable society have now disappeared. The greatest part of these distinguished families in Venezuela, and in New Grenada have left the country ; and the few that remain, are ruined. The bad administration of the chieftains in Colombia, the party spirit and the civil war, operating with other causes already mentioned, have spread anarchy and misery over this beautiful country. Grass is growing in the streets and public squares of both Caracas and Bogota. The most frequented streets of both are full of beggars and miserable wretches, covered with rags, vermin and sores, who persecute you at every step, entreating, or rather commanding you to give them something "*por l'amor de Dios.*" The officers and soldiers, generally, were badly clothed and fed. The commission of theft, burglary and murder during the night, was frequent, and was done with impunity. All who have know both cities before the revolution, will agree with me, that under the government of the dictator liberator, misery and crimes are much more frequent than under the Spanish administration. I state these facts without any apprehension of being thought a friend to

the Spanish system, or an agent of the "holy alliance," for a place in which general Bolivar is far better qualified, than he is to be at the head of a Republic; unless that were composed of despots and slaves.

Libertinism is a strong, perhaps the strongest characteristic of the Creole. He will spare nothing to obtain the last favor from the female he happens to fancy. Luxury in furniture, houses, jewels, dress, the table, and mistresses, at Caracas, was most extravagant.

Their jealousy, vanity and desire to surpass each other, was extreme, and before the revolution, had ruined many families, I saw one of these Creoles wearing a golden repeater which cost a thousand dollars. Instead of the 12 numbers, he had upon its face, the twelve letters in his name, *Juan Elisondo*.

Soon after this watch was received, two neighbors of this gentleman sent for similar ones, and paid cash, the same sum, for them.

Creoles of the higher classes are generous, or rather prodigal of money; but the common people are very mean and sordid, and are readily induced to commit any crime, for money, particularly in Caracas. The higher classes expended a great deal to gratify their fancy. Foreigners who obtained permission to come to the Spanish Americas, obtained a good deal of money, in a short time. The most successful in this way, were the physicians and surgeons, the musicians, mountebanks, charlatans, rope dancers—all who could contribute to amusement and the gratification of fancy. But, as Mr. Depons, in his work upon the Main, says, "a stranger who tried to be a merchant, or a farmer was exposed, to be regarded with an envious eye; and if he was prosperous, he was persecuted, and many times exposed to lose all. It was with much regret that the natives suffered him; and they did all they could to reduce him to beggary." At the same time the Creole is not destitute of compassion, and it seldom happens that a man in want does not receive considerable relief immediately. I once saw a gentleman (happen-

doublons and gave them to a beggar. Five of us were standing in the street talking together; so that there was no doubt ostentation in this act of charity. But, before the revolution it was a rare thing to find a beggar in the streets of Caracas or Bogota. If any were found they were taken, by the police officers, to an *hospice*, provided for that special purpose. These places were either convents or houses built expressly for this purpose, by the charity of private persons. The Spanish government did nothing towards such establishments.

The Creole is devout, superstitious, credulous and ignorant. The ladies of the first class were more so than their husbands, many of whom had acquired information by travelling. The ladies have each their own particular saint, to whom they are greatly devoted; always by night and by day carrying in their bosoms his image, suspended by a golden chain. Another image is hung over their pillow, another under the looking glass of the drawing-room; and others, in their books of devotion. I have often known them to have at least a dozen images, of different sorts, of the same saint, fixed in different parts of the apartments. Besides these, they were well supplied with crosses, holy virgins, and other saints, and angels, &c. The reign of priests and monks, in the country was powerful, and their influence is still very great. The patriot chieftains have never dared to be severe against any priest, even when he was known to be an enemy to their cause. The archbishop of Caracas was known to be inimical to the cause; and yet, at Bolivar's entry into Caracas, he was not molested; but during the reign of Bolivar, was treated by him with the highest respect. The bishop of Carthagena, it is true, was exiled; but his place was supplied by his great vicary, known by the title of father Provisor, who detested the Patriots; and who, in August 1814, some days after the president of the government of the province of Carthagena, the Secretary of the state (himself a priest) the general-in-chief, and various distinguished gentlemen of the city of Carthagena, were received free masons, ex-communicated publicly the whole order, by a formal decree affixed dur-

ing the night, by his order, to all the church doors of the city. In spite of this spirit of public opposition, he remained in the quiet possession of his office, and has never been troubled on account of his political principles, and measures.

As one of the first cares of the Spanish sovereigns was to propagate the Catholic faith in their immense provinces, they established tribunals of the Inquisition, successively, in the cities of Mexico, Lima and Carthagena. But in the latter part of the reign of Charles IV, this formidable tribunal was not much feared. This influence was exercised, chiefly, to watch and keep out of the country all free literary productions; by them styled *philosophical* books.

In the year 1826, a book-seller sent from New-York, various boxes of valuable Spanish books, to Carthagena. Among them weresome copies of Voltaire's famous *Dictionaire philosophique*. The boxes were opened, and by the influence of some priests, the greatest part of the books, among which was the Dictionary, were refused admittance, and were sent back to New York. I have this fact from the book-seller himself.

Don Vicente Pazos, in his letters to Henry Clay, on South America, says, that before the revolution in 1810, from Lima to Monte Video, an extent, including Peru, Chili, and Rio de La Plata, of more than three thousand miles, and a country of cities, towns, and villages, with many universities, schools, courts of justice &c, there was but one printing press; and that a miserable old thing, belonging to the Jesuits of Cordova.

To show to what an extent the superstition of the people and authority of those whose spiritual power they acknowledge, are frequently carried, I will relate one example furnished me by the individual who came near being its victim. Lieutenant-colonel Callot, a French officer who had served in France under Napoleon in the artillery, came, as many others did, over to the Main, and served in his rank as an artillery officer, in the army of the patriots.

Becoming much disgusted, he asked his dismissal from general Urdaneta, with whom he was serving. His request

was refused. Soon after, he obtained leave to go from the environs of Tunja to Carthagena where he had some private business to settle. He travelled on horseback, with a guide, a servant, and a few dragoons, all well armed. After travelling a number of days under a burning sun, he arrived at a large borough in the interior of New Grenada, called Fa——, before the largest inn of which he dismounted. As soon as he came into the house he was suddenly seized with great pain and a violent fever; insomuch that he cried aloud. The people of the inn, put him to bed, and called in their priest, in great alarm. This man was versed in the arts of curing; and believing the stranger to be in the last extremity, came with the viaticum. He sat down before the stranger's bed, and made various enquiries about his malady; and then told him it was not of a dangerous nature. He ordered the numerous bystanders to retire. When all were gone out, he rose from his chair, and carefully locked the door. He then resumed his seat, and in an interested manner enquired if he was a christian; meaning a roman catholic, which, in these countries, the word signifies. Mr. Callot understood him, but answered not his question; but supplicated for a glass of water. The parson repeated the question in a louder tone. The sufferer again urgently asked for water. The parson told him he should first answer to his God, of whom he was the representative, whether he was a christian? The patient under the suffering of pain and thirst, (having been born a catholic,) answered that he was. The parson then opened the door; and at his call, some excellent lemonade was brought in a short time, which in some measure relieved him. The priest then renewed his questions about the disorder; and told him he had an Indian, not far from the borough who could cure him perfectly; but as you are a christian, added he, "it is necessary to confess you before; and that you receive the sacraments, which will be half your cure." The colonel replied, saying that this was surely a jest; that the Indian might come and cure him, after which he would confess himself with great pleasure. No, no, my friend, it is ab-

solutely necessary to begin with the confession, and receiving the sacraments. Mr. Callot, seeing his obstinacy, told him to go out. The parson jumped from his seat in a violent passion, saying well sir, as you deny your God, I can give you no help, and so saying he went out, shutting the door with violence.

A miserable night lamp was in the room, and he saw what they call a Christ, suspended under a small looking-glass, upon the wall. Mr. Callot remained some time in a state of stupefaction; then raising his head, he perceived that silence reigned through the house. After suffering in this condition for about half an hour, with pain and fever, he called as loud as he could, for assistance. The door half opened and a woman demanded in a harsh and stern voice, what he wanted, "assistance for God's sake," he answered, "help, help, for I am deadly sick." He spoke in good Spanish; but the door was shut immediately. He received no answer, and silence again reigned over the whole house. Notwithstanding frequent calls for a glass of water, no one came to him. It was expressly enjoined upon his servant, who was very much attached to him, to remain with the people, or he would incur the vengeance of the Holy Father, as they called the priest. The servant was a native of New Grenada; and was so terrified by these words, that he did not dare to go to his master's assistance. The priest, in his curse, had distinctly declared that no one, under pain of excommunication, should enter the room of "that perverse sinner who denied his God." Colonel Callot, at last asked, as a great favor, that the landlord would come to him for a minute. After a long time the landlord appeared, half opened the door, and harshly demanded what was wanted of him. "Come nearer my friend," said he, "I want to speak with you." "What," said the landlord, "will you confess yourself? Shall I call the reverend father priest! Oh, do so; it would make me happy above any thing." No sir, I do not speak of confesion, I wish ——." "I cannot hear you then," said the landlord; good bye sir, may heaven assist you." So saying, he shut the door, and disappeared. The colonel

in his distress made every exertion to move their compassion, but in vain. They absolutely refused to do any thing for him.

The apprehension of dying in that condition at last compelled him to declare that he would be confessed and take the sacrament. The parson came, after four hours absence, at 11 o'clock at night; and the colonel confessed and received the sacraments. All was now changed around him. The Indian perfectly cured him, in the following singular manner. He stripped him naked, annointed him with a decoction of indigenous plants, and, laying him on the ground upon some blankets, he handled him just as a baker kneads bread; so that he cried out with pain. The Indian continued the operation until his patient was in a proper sweat. He then wrapped him in a blanket, and put him to bed. The next day the operation was repeated; and the colonel was perfectly cured. When he was quite recovered, he was scarcely suffered to depart. He and the priest became close friends, and he was treated by all the inhabitants with the kindest hospitality. When he insisted on going, and asked the landlord for his bill, he was told that so good a christian owed nothing. He could not prevail on them to receive any thing. On the contrary, at his departure, a mule was laden with excellent provisons and choice fruits for his journey.

The character of the inhabitants of New Grenada is very different from that of those of Venezuela. A striking difference also exists among the thirty seven provinces of Colombia in this respect. The Margaritans, for example, differ in many points from the Llaneros; so do those of Cumana and Barcelona, from those of Caracas, &c.

The Caraguin is much quicker, more petulant, and more sanguinary than the man of Bogota. He is also more enlightened. But he is more corrupt, vicious, false, cunning, jealous, and inclined to vengeance, than the Grenadan. The latter having given his word, will keep it. The Caraguin will give his word promptly, and will add protestations, and even oaths. And after he has deceived you, he will laugh at your

credulity. The Caraguin will sacrifice every thing for pomp and show, and especially for a brilliant retinue. The Grenadan is more modest, more prudent in his expenses, and has far more order, in the interior of his establishment. The Caraguin, when observed, will give handfulls of gold to a beggar. The other will give secretly, but not profusely, and will enter into the feelings and sufferings of the object of his charity ; while the Caraguin gives, and thinks of him no more. In almost all the convents of Bogota, there was a house for the poor, maintained by the charity of private persons. There was besides a large hospital for men, and another for women.

The Creoles generally are jealous of all foreigners, and dislike to be commanded by any but their own countrymen. They will obey a foreigner, in their necessity, but as soon as they cease to feel their need of his services. they obey no longer ; and use every exertion to turn him out. Duty and gratitude have little or no weight with them. In Venezuela, where no foreigner has ever been admitted to the chief command, there have been repeated instances of their being displaced. In New Grenada various foreigners have been entrusted with distinguished commands ; and have generally been perfectly well received and treated ; and still are so. The Caraguin, as he hates all foreigners, despises the Grenadan and submits with great reluctance to be commanded by him ; and takes every opportunity, in his absence, to render him suspected or contemptible.

The uncultivated and ignorant Llaneros, will admit no stranger, extending their aversion to Europeans, Caraguins, Grenadans ; to every one not born in the plains of their country.

The antipathy and hatred existing between the inhabitants of Venezuela and New Grenada, is strongly expressed, though no good reason can be given for them. It is well known to have existed for centuries ; and continues in full force to this day. It has produced consequences dreadful to the cause of independence ; as I shall show in the course of this memoir. The vain and proud Caraguin, has never ceas-

ed to despise and ridicule the more ignorant Grenadan, who, whilst he feels his own inferiority, secretly and bitterly hates the other the more on account of it. The native of Caracas distinguishes himself by his gesticulations, his continual talk, his boasting, and biting wit. He has a sovereign contempt for all who are not born in his own province. It has been said by well informed persons, that the Caraguin has all the vices of the native Spaniard, without any of his virtues.

New Grenada still continues her laws, customs and privileges, as she possessed them before the revolution. Institutions that would be useful in one of these provinces, might be of no avail in the other. A viceroy of Grenada had no authority whatever over a captain-general of Venezuela. These rulers were as distinct from each other, as were the characters and customs of their subjects. Each rendered his account to the king, and received orders directly from him.

The Colombians have all the manners and customs of the old Spaniards, their festivals, civil and religious, their society, manner of living, eating and drinking, and dress, laws, institutions, &c, all are like those of the European Spaniards. In the army and navy of Colombia, the old rules and ordinances of the king are strictly followed. A ball must be opened by the most elevated in rank of the society, before any one else is permitted to dance. They are passionately fond of fighting-bulls and game-cocks—as in Spain. Their theatres were, like those in Spain, poor and miserable. The fandango and boleros were and are still the favorite dances of the Colombians, and next to them waltzes, and English country dances. Their music is that of old Spain; and so are their concerts. The guitar is the favorite national instrument. But in Caracas, they have some good patriotic songs and marches, distinguished for harmony and expression; which I have often heard with great pleasure,

The character of the province of Carthagena differs greatly from that of both Caracas and Bogota. License of manners is greater than in either of the two other provinces; the women are generally pale from the insalubrity of the climate,

the morasses, lakes and stagnant water surrounding the fortress of Carthagena, with a beaming sun, soon produce putrefaction, and cause contagious and putrid fevers. The water they drink, is unhealthy, and of a brackish taste. People of fortune alone drink rain water, which is collected in large cisterns and sold at high prices.

The number of poor people and beggars is greater here than in any other province of Colombia, in proportion to the population. The causes of this are a ruined commerce, the oppression of high duties, both of import and export, and the absolute sterility of the soil. Under the presidency of Torrices, in 1812, 13 and 14, Carthagena flourished, and was the only province where foreigners were received with kindness; and were secure and highly respected. But under the intendency of general Mariano Montilla, they have been exposed to high duties, by his arbitrary and vexatious measures. Most owners of foreign vessels and others coming from the place, have confirmed this fact.

Besides these putrid fevers, the Carthagenans are affected with swollen feet; and above all a kind of pestilential maldy, called "el mal de San Lazaro," which I have before mentioned.

The inhabitants of Carthagena, are desirous of imitating the easy and natural manners of the Caraguins, and they do it in such an awkward manner, that the latter laugh at, and despise them. The women do the same, but they have neither the grace, beauty nor wit of those of Caracas. The inhabitants of Caracas do not much like those of Bogota; and ridicule them by mimicking their drawling tone and manner of speaking the Spanish language. But they hate the Caraguins; there has, at no time, been a good understanding between them. Ignorance is more prevalent in Carthagena, than in Bogota or Caracas.

I have already spoken of the immense plains of Venezuela, and their excellent pasture. These plains are generally inhabited by converted indians, who are distinguished by their cruelty, their cool ferocity, their ignorance, preju-

dice and superstition. They are known under the general denomination of Llaneros (people of the plains.) Their favorite and exclusive occupation is, and ever has been to take care of their numerous flocks and herds, of every description. They are half savages; and have multiplied rapidly, by the richness of their pasturage and their mode of existence. From their childhood, they are accustomed to catch and mount wild horses, which run by hundreds upon the savannas. They may almost be said to be born horsemen.

When at war they are generally armed with a long lance, and very often, have neither swords nor pistols. They have no regular uniform or boots, or shoes. They have a few rags upon their bodies; with a kind of large mameluke pantaloon. All have their blankets (mantas) and many their hammocks. I may here be permitted to copy the curious and just description of the people, by colonel Hippisley.

“Sedeno’s cavalry (Llaneros) were composed of all sorts and sizes, from the man to the boy; from the horse to the mule. Some of the troops with saddles, very many of them without. Some with bits, leather head-stalls and reins; others with rope lines, with a bite of the rope placed over the tongue of the horse as a bit; some with old pistols hung over the saddle bow; I cannot call it the pommel, either incased in tiger skin, or ox hide holster pipes; or hanging by a thong of hide; one on each side. As for the troopers themselves, they were from thirteen to thirty six or forty years of age. Black, brown, sallow complexions, according to the casts of their parents. The adults wore coarse large mustachios, and short hair, either wooly or black, according to the climate or descent. They had a forocious, savage look, which the regiment they appeared in, did not tend to harmonise or improve. Mounted on miserable, half starved jaded beasts, whether horse or mule; some without trowsers, small clothes or any covering, except a bandage of blue cloth, or cotton, round their loins, the end of which passing between their legs, fastened to the girth, round the waist; others with trowsers, but without stockings, boots or shoes, and a spur generally, gracing the heel on one

side ; and some wearing a kind of sandal made of hide, with the hair side outward. In their left hand they hold their reins, and in their right, a pole from eight to ten feet in length, with an iron spear, very sharp at the point and sides and rather flat ; in shape like our serjeants halbert. A blanket of about a yard square, with a hole, or rather a slit, cut in the centre, through which the wearer thrusts his head, falls on each side of his shoulders, thus covering his body, and leaving his bare arms at perfect liberty to manage his horse, or mule, and lance. Sometimes an old musket, the barrel of which has been shortened twelve inches, forms his carbine, and with a large sabre, or hanger, or cut and thrust, or even a small sword, hanging by a leather thong to his side, together with a flat hat, a tyger skin or hide cap, on his head, with a white feather or even a white rag stuck into it. Those troopers of the legion, of Sedeno, appeared complete and ready for action. My picture is a perfect transcript from the original, and by no means too highly coloured.

Paez's cavalry was much superior in point of dress, appearance, and the management of their horses, but they were not uniformly clothed, though none of them are so naked as many of Sedeno's legion, but they consist of some without boots, shoes, or any body covering except the blanket, which is a necessary appendage of the general uniform. They wear trowsers or loose drawers, and their arms are similar to those of the other corps of cavalry. Many of Paez's men are clothed in the spoils of the enemy ; and hence are seen in helmets bound with brass and plated metal ; and large sabres with silver hilts and buckles. I actually saw one horseman whose stirrups were made of silver.

The Llaneros are active, and even brave, in defending their valleys, and in gaining booty ; and the more so when general Paez is at their head ; who in their view is the greatest hero in the world ; far greater than Napoleon. Because Paez was born in their valleys smokes with them, sleeps on the ground as they do, in his blanket, eats a banana, drinks with them, and speaks their corrupted and savage language.

In truth Paez is, in every respect, a complete Llanero. Their manner of warfare is very like that of the Cossacks. Like them, they attack their enemy with loud cries, and never in ranged files; they fly to form and attack again. They surround their enemy on all sides, and never suffer him to keep them together. They follow an isolated corps, fall on its rear and kill their prisoners without mercy. They plunder the wounded and fatigued. In fine, in their war, they are complete savages.

It is difficult to subject them to discipline. Their organization is, therefore, different from that of any other troops in Colombia. They select their officers from among themselves, and turn them out at pleasure, sometimes killing them, and putting others in their places. They never suffer themselves to be commanded by a stranger, some of their own generals have been in danger of being killed by them when they were suspected of cowardice, or treachery. This was the case with generals Sedeno, Roxas, and Monagas. Paez, however appeased them, and protected these chieftains. He is their supreme commander, and he only is adored by them. They care not much for general Bolivar; and, on various occasions have been heard to say, that they never see him in the fire, nor at the head of a charge; and that he is too far from the camp and battle field, to be able to judge for himself how the action should be conducted. General Paez embittered by the loss of a battle, told general Bolivar, in presence of more than 40 officers, that, where Bolivar commanded in battle, he caused the loss of it, but that when he himself commanded alone, he had beaten general Morillo, but that under Bolivar's orders, battles were lost.

After Paez, general Zarasa has the greatest authority and most influence over the Llaneros. He is brave, intelligent and humane, and is, in every respect superior to Paez, who is jealous of him. The Spanish chieftains, particularly Morillo, have repeatedly attempted to gain him over, but his firm character defeated their efforts; enraged at this they avenged themselves upon his wife and children, who were murdered

The Llaneros have undoubtedly rendered very great services to the republic, and in this long and bloody war have distinguished themselves among all the inhabitants of the Main except the Margaritans of whom I shall speak hereafter. The Llaneros have been constantly and entirely, devoted to the patriotic cause, whilst the people of Caracas, Bogota and Carthagena, have frequently changed their political opinions. This wild race, far more raw and ignorant than any other people in Colombia, have nobly adhered to the republic. In 1813 they contributed powerfully to the success of the Dictator Bolivar, who dislikes Paez, but treats him publicly with great regard, for the purpose of managing him. The truth is, if Paez had been a different kind of man, he might at various times, have displaced Bolivar. Three distinct offers have been made him to that effect.

The inhabitants of the small and rocky island of Margarita, which forms one of the provinces of Venezuela, had, like the Llaneros, their favorite commander. This was general Arismendi. But he lost his influence by being too arbitrary with his countrymen, the Margaritans. But I will speak further of the characters and talents, both of Paez and Arismendi in my biographical sketches of them.

The Margaritans are much more cultivated and humane than the Llaneros. Their maritime coasts enable them to carry on a trade, notwithstanding the laws, with the inhabitants of St. Thomas's, Curacao, &c. Margarita has many small bays where vessels may enter; and which are not so closely watched by the Spanish vessels of the king or the company, as the larger ports of Cumana, Barcelona, and the larger cities belonging to the inhabitants of the plains. Intercourse with foreigners was easier and more frequent at Margarita than any where upon the Main.

It is well known that the Margaritans, since the beginning of the revolution (1810,) have been supporters of independence; and could, never since, be reduced, by the most powerful efforts of the Spaniards, whilst a great part of the plains have been in possession of Boves, Morales, and Morillo.

They are true Republicans, industrious, brave, and hospitable. - If any of these provinces have deserved freedom and independence, Margarita is the first; and all who have known her people will agree with me in this opinion.

The catholic religion is rendered the more imposing by the observance of its followers; and no city on the Main had so many, or so brilliant religious festivals, as Bogota, the capital of New Grenada. Caracas, Carthagena, and other cities, had the same ceremonies, but in a less imposing style. The cause of this difference is to be found in the greater wealth and devotion of the people. Bogota being the seat of the viceroy, governor of twenty-two provinces, with a numerous and splendid retinue, and a strong garrison; whilst the captain-general had only eight provinces. Besides, the Grenadans are less enlightened, and more rich, numerous, and powerful.

From Lent Monday to Holy Friday, in passion week, there was every day a solemn and numerous attended procession, which passed through the principal streets and squares of the city of Bogota.

Before I close this introduction I will relate an extraordinary punishment inflicted for robbery, burglary and the like, characteristic of the manners, under the late viceroy of New Grenada. Between the condemnation and punishment, two or three weeks intervened, that the country people might be notified, and witness the punishment.

A convict was condemned to receive, with a kind of whip, long in use among the Spaniards, a certain number of lashes upon his back and posteriors, to remain in prison, or to work in the mines, or gallies, a certain number of years, according to the degree and aggravation of the offence. The punishment was rigorously inflicted, without regard to age sex, or rank. At the appointed hour the criminal was stripped of all clothing, except a strip of colored cloth about his middle, and placed upon an ass with the reins in his hands, so as to present his posterior and back to the executioner; his hands and feet were so tied, that the reins were in his

hands. In this position he was taken under a guard of soldiers from the prison to the public square ; the whole halted, and the officer read, with great emphasis, the judgment, together with the christian and family name of the criminal, his name, native place, office, and the names of both his parents, and their place of abode. He was then whipped at the four corners of the square, and at the corners of the principal streets. As the city of Bogota is large, it was sometimes more than three hours before the prescribed places were passed, and the number of blows given. In 1805 this punishment was inflicted in Bogota, under the following circumstances. A beautiful girl, 18 years of age, whose parents were both European Spaniards, who had received a good education, and was much esteemed in Bogota, assisted at the festival of the purification of the Holy Virgin, in the church of San Francisco. This day, the waxen figure of the Virgin was ornamented in an unusually splendid manner, with pearls and costly diamonds and surrounded with many hundred waxen tapers. The girl, totally blinded by the splendid exhibition, took the sudden resolution to become possessed of the jewels. She afterwards said, in her confession, that the idea was given her during the sermon, by satan himself, who completely succeeded in tempting her. She hoped this excuse would save her from punishment. She succeeded in the following manner : Instead of going out with the crowd she absconded in one of the dark corners of the church, behind a saint. The sexton not doubting but all were gone out, extinguished the waxen tapers, went out and locked the door. She came out of her corner, and by the light of the eternal lamp, so called, which is kept burning in catholic churches, she succeeded in despoiling the virgin of her jewels, and selected them at leisure.

While she was in the church her parents sought her every where, in the most cruel anxiety. Early the next morning, the sexton, on entering the church, was astonished to find her fast asleep upon one of the steps of the main altar, having the jewels in her hand and frock. He hastened back cautious-

ly shut the door, and made his declaration before a magistrate. She was convicted, the jewels being found upon her. It would be in vain to attempt to describe the feelings of her parents. They, and the most respectable and wealthy families, even the judges and members of the royal audiencia, warmly besought the viceroy to spare her. The parents repeatedly kneeled at his feet, imploring his pity. The viceroy's wife herself interceded. The parents, who were in very good circumstances, secretly offered to sacrifice their whole property. All was in vain. The viceroy replied that he could not alter the laws; that if he prevented their execution in the case of an European Spaniard, the natives would have reason to be dissatisfied, particularly as the crime was of such a horrid nature. Don Antonio Amar was a good and sensible man. He pitied all the sufferers, but did not feel himself at liberty to relieve them.

In this case the punishment was inflicted, as in every other respect, except that the executioners received a secret order to strike lightly. The surrounding crowd of citizens and country people was immense, and eye witnesses have assured me, that not one was seen to enjoy the spectacle; but that all were deeply moved. Her sufferings lasted about five hours.

Her parents went eight days before to Mompox, never to return to the place of the shameful punishment of their only child. As a special favor, she was released from prison the next day, she rejoined her parents, and died of a lingering illness two months after. The miserable parents followed her to the grave.

This barbarous punishment exists no longer. A thief is now punished with a certain number of stripes, or at the public works.

After what I have said of the education character and morality of this people, the reader may form his own opinion with regard to their existing ignorance and prejudices. He may now also be enabled to judge whether Bolivar and the other chieftains of Colombia, can confer on its inhabitants, light

liberty and freedom. The rulers of Colombia have naturally adopted the manners and customs of the Spaniards. But they are far less advanced than the latter, not by their own fault, but as a natural consequence of the Spanish system, which was designed to keep them in darkness and ignorance.

By means of this pernicious system, the Colombians are, at least 150 years behind the people of the United States, in the science of government. Experience will prove, whether my opinion, advanced in July 1824,* is just.

* See Atlantic Magazine for July 1824, No 3, published by Bliss and White in New-York, p. 167.

MEMOIRS OF BOLIVAR.

CHAPTER I.

Causes of the present imperfect knowledge and erroneous opinions respecting the political events and leading characters in Colombia.

To trace with justice and impartiality, the history of powerful men who have not yet finished their career, is by no means an easy task. Burke says "that death canonizes a great character." In the political and military life of Gen. Bolivar, many traits have already appeared, which give a correct knowledge of the character and talents of the Liberator.

The most extravagant and contradictory opinions, have, at different times, been given of Gen. Bolivar. Some say : "He is a great, an extraordinary man ; a man of transcendent knowledge and talents ; the hero of South America ; the benefactor of his country ; its Washington ; its Napoleon." Others assure us "He is the Cromwell, the tyrant, the oppressor of his country." Truth is rarely to be found in any extreme.

That such various opinions should have been received of this man, is not at all surprising, when we consider that the majority of mankind are inclined to admire splendor, power and success, and that the more, when the object of their attention is beyond their own sphere : Moreover, they blame or approve, according to their own interest or feelings. Rarely is their opinion formed from the evidence of truth, or with the spirit of impartiality. But the defender of freedom and the rights of man, naturally attracts our attention more and more intensely, by every successful event.

The actions of Gen. Bolivar have been considered as being in accordance with the wishes of all liberal and enlightened men ; nay, with those of every oppressed and enslaved being. His smallest successes have given general satisfaction, and every eye has been

fixed upon him and his proceedings. But without any exact and positive knowledge of facts, each individual has formed of Gen. Bolivar, his own idea, in conformity with his own wishes, and with his confused and incorrect notions of events on the Main. Public opinion was soon captivated to such a degree, that whatever accurately informed and impartial men could say against the Liberator, was disregarded, and treated as mere calumny, or as coming from agents of the Holy Alliance, from enemies of the cause of freedom, or from rash adventurers. The majority of the public have been prevented from judging for themselves, and have continued to contemplate Gen. Bolivar, as the hero, the father, the liberator of South America.

Various causes contributed to form these opinions, in the commencement of Gen. Bolivar's career: First,—The great difficulty of procuring exact information from the Main, because every one possessing it, had his own opinions, his own views, his own interests, while corresponding with his friends; others concealed the real state of facts, or circumstances which might enlighten, fearing their letters might be intercepted or miscarried, or that their names should be mentioned by their friends, and so their interest affected on the Main.

Secondly,—The bulletins and proclamations of the rulers in Colombia, on many occasions, have been very extravagant and partial, as is generally the case with documents of this description, in every army throughout the world, where war and armies have existed. These bulletins and proclamations have been faithfully translated, without comment, without any of the particulars which would give a correct idea of the events, and have naturally inspired gigantic notions of the power of *armies* in Colombia; and of the heroic bravery, and of deep military skill of the leaders of these armies. Besides, the Spanish language is distinguished from all others, by its pompous phrases, which give it an agreeable and high sounding expression. The effect of the language, too, is enhanced by the Caraguin character, which is generally vain and boasting. And so it happened that a skirmish, in which, in fact, only a few men were killed or wounded, was given out as a regular, and bloody battle.*

* When I was chief of the staff at Campano, on the Main, in May 1816, Gen. Bolivar, then *supreme chief* of the republic of Venezuela, ordered a detachment of about 75 men to take possession of the village, and the little fort of Santa Rosa, which lies upon a hill, and commands the harbor. No enemy was found in it, but twenty five half naked and badly armed men; and these retired, after having twice discharged a twenty four pounder, the only piece of ordnance then in the fort. Not a man was killed, wounded or taken. The next day I was not a little surprised to find a printed bulletin signed with my name, in the proper place; in which is said, "The independents landed under the immediate command of the supreme chief, in four *divisions*, and the divisions of Gen. Piar took,

Thirdly,—We are in absolute want of a good, detailed, and exact history, of the events of the revolution, and of the contending parties on the Main, from 1810, to the present time. It is a fact, that the people of the United States know little or nothing with certainty, of what has passed, and is still passing in Colombia. Our Gazettes give some accounts, but they are few, and exceedingly imperfect.

The imperfect and erroneous statements which have been published, and the exaggerated proclamations and bulletins have chiefly influenced public opinion; the *habit*, too, of thinking Gen. Bolivar, a great and extraordinary man, a hero, has been growing since 1813, and has increased to such a degree, that it will be a difficult task to convince men of the exaggeration of their ideas, and extravagance of their notions respecting him.

So far as I am concerned, I am able to declare, that I have neither desire nor interest to flatter, or calumniate Gen. Bolivar, I vouch for the correctness of all the facts contained in these memoirs, well knowing that this work will obtain only that degree of credit with the public which it may appear to merit by its accuracy and candor.

CHAPTER II.

Birth of Bolivar—His family—Visit to Europe—Marriage. Errors in the biographical sketch of his life in Ackerman's Magazine.

SIMON BOLIVAR was born in the city of Caracas, July 24th, 1783, and is the second son of Don Juan Vicente Bolivar y Ponte, a militia colonel in the plains of Aragua; his mother, Dona Maria Concepcion Palacios y Sojo; and both were natives of

after great resistance, and a heavy fire, the *strong* fort of Santa Rosa, by storm. The division of Gen. Marino distinguished itself by its bravery and coolness," &c. &c. The fact is that Gen. Piar, with his twenty five men, jumped over a low wall of this *strong* fort, and found it empty; the Spaniards had fled as soon as Piar approached, and could not have been taken or killed, being already more than four musket shots distant from him.

When I saw this pompous bulletin, signed with my name, I asked Bolivar how my name came to such a paper, a real and ridiculous satire upon our forces, which did not exceed 800 men, but from which 75 divided into *four divisions* were sent, *three* sent to drive 25 enemies from Santa Rosa. He answered laughingly that Bolivar (on paper) was anxious to finish the bulletin before midnight; and that he ordered Capt. Chamberlain, his aid de camp, to write it, under his dictation, and that, I not being at home, he

Caracas, and were Mantuanos.* They died ; the first in 1786, the latter in 1789.

Young Bolivar was sent to Spain at the age of 14, in compliance with the customs of the wealthy Americans of those times, who usually spent in one year in Europe, the amount of several years income at home ; seeking offices and military decorations, that were often put up to the highest bidder, under the administration of Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace. The young Americans were likewise accustomed to go to Spain, to complete their education, and to pursue their studies in the profession of law, physic, or theology ; for, according to the laws of the times, no American was admitted to the bar, and allowed to practise in his profession in the Universities of old Spain, nor could he exercise his profession at home. Without a diploma from a University in Spain, no American could, at least in New Grenada, have the honor of being a Capuchin Friar ! But as the object of young Simon was, to see the world, and not in any manner to study seriously, he paid little attention to any pursuit, other than that of pleasure, and of satisfying his desire to witness the different scenes of life. He, however, devoted some time to the study of Jurisprudence.

He was at this period lieutenant in the corps of militia in the plains of Aragua, of which his father had been commander. He had an elder brother, who died in 1815, and two sisters, who enjoyed an annual income of from 40 to 50,000 dollars, the produce of several considerable estates, and particularly of an extensive *Hato*, on which were raised large herds of cattle. These estates were at no great distance from the city of Caracas ; and at one or other of them, Bolivar and his family usually resided. San Mateo, was, however, the place he always preferred. It was the largest of his possessions, where between 1000 and 1500 slaves were regularly kept, before the revolution. His residence in the valley of Aragua, not far from the lake of Valencia, was beautiful and striking. The famous Boves destroyed it in 1814.

sent it, with my name as chief of the staff, to the printer." This bulletin may be found in many Gazettes, particularly in the *Curacao Courant*, July 1816, with my name. Neither Bolivar nor myself were present at this skirmish. He remained quietly on board Admiral Brion. I arrived in another vessel, a brig, after all this was done.

Sometime afterwards I handed to Gen. Bolivar a Gazette from Baltimore, in which was repeated this *famous and glorious victory*, and in which was added that Gen. Bolivar's army was 7000 men strong in infantry, and 3000 in cavalry. I could mention many other cases of a similar description.

* Los Mantuanos, or los familias Mantuanas, were, in Caracas, a kind of nobility, and this is the distinctive title there of rich families of birth. In New Grenada, the opulent families of high birth, were never called Mantuanas ; this distinction existed alone in Caracas.

From Spain Bolivar passed into France, and resided at Paris, where he remained a number of years, enjoying at an early period, all the pleasures of life, which, by a rich young man, with bad examples constantly before him, can, there, easily be found. I have remarked that whenever Bolivar spoke to me of the Palais Royal, he could not restrain himself from boasting of its delights. It was on such occasions, that all his soul was electrified; his physiognomy became animated, and he spoke and acted with such ardor as showed how fond he was of that enchanting abode, so dangerous to youth.

His residence in Paris, and especially at the Palais Royal, has done him great injury. He is pale, and of a yellowish colour, meagre, weak and enervated.

I have spoken of Bolivar's residence in Paris; and I ask, if such a school could inspire him, or any other young man, with an inclination for continued, deep, and laborious study; to that school I apprehend it to be in a great measure owing that he cannot attend with assiduity, to business, for more than two or three hours in a day; during the greater part of which he is sitting, or laying down upon his hammock, talking about indifferent matters with his favorites and flatterers. The answer of aids de camp on duty, to those who wished to speak to him, while he was thus occupied, generally was, that he was very much engaged in his cabinet. He scarcely ever writes at all himself, but dictates, or indicates to his secretary, what he wishes to have written. In consequence, as I apprehended, of the flattery, to which he had been accustomed since his residence in Paris, he is greatly inclined to adulation, and is very vain. But in the school where he acquired these two faults, (I mean those circles in Paris which call themselves *bon ton*,) he learned also the dissimulation to conceal them.

Bolivar returned in 1802 to Madrid, where he married one of the daughters of Don Bernardo del Toro, uncle of the present Marquis of this name. His father in law, who was born in Caracas, resided in Madrid. Bolivar was but 19 years of age, and his lady 16. They returned in 1809, to Caracas, and lived in a retired manner on their estates. Shortly after, his lady was taken ill and died, without leaving any offspring.

Bolivar acquired, in the course of his travels, that usage of the world, that courtesy and ease of manners, for which he is so remarkable, and which have so prepossessing an influence upon those who associate with him.

In the year 1823, Mr. Ackerman published in London, a very interesting monthly periodical in the Spanish language, under the title of "El Mensagero." It is entirely devoted to the affairs of the new Spanish republics. It contains, among other articles, a

Biographical Sketch of Gen. Bolivar, in which the author asserts that the young Bolivar, during his residence in Paris, gave himself up to all the possible amusements of young men of his age: "Still," said the author, "he was assiduous to obtain the dear object he has had always in view, as the accomplishment of all his wishes, and his ambition, namely, *that of making with eagerness, all possible acquaintances which might have been useful to him for the emancipation of his country!*"

I must beg leave to assert, that shortly before the revolution of the 19th April, 1810, at Caracas, the names of Gen. Miranda, Don Manuel Gual, the Corregidor T. M. Espana, Narino, Fea, and others, appeared on the list of those who declared their intention to liberate their country from the Spanish yoke. On the memorable day of the 19th April, when the Capt. Gen. Emparan was deposed, and his functions performed by a patriotic Junta, the chiefs of this revolution were the Alcalde [Mayor] Don Martin Tobar, Don Francisco Salias, Carlos Manchado, Mariano Montilla, Joseph Felix Ribas, and others; but the name of Simon Bolivar is not among them; he was at his ease, on one of his estates, in the valley of Aragua, and refused to take any part in it, although his cousin, Joseph Felix Ribas, labored to engage him as an active associate. Shortly after, the Junta gave him his option of a civil or military post, under the new patriotic government. Their offer was refused, and the pressing solicitations of his friends and relations were of no avail. Finally, he accepted the appointment of a commission to London, with the grade of Colonel in the militia. M. Luis Mendez y Lopez, who, during several years, was the agent of Venezuela at London, was at this time, his colleague in the mission.

If Bolivar, as stated in Mr. Aekerman's Magazine, had from his youth formed the idea of liberating his country, he would have seized this opportunity of joining the chiefs of the revolution, and would have accepted a post under the government of the Junta, and the Congress: He did neither, although the members of these two bodies in 1810 and 11, offered him any post that might suit his views. On his return from London, he retired to his estate, without taking any part in public affairs.

Mr. Aekerman's Magazine says, secondly, that Bolivar, *from* the time of the earthquake, came to join Miranda, who had then his head quarters at Vittoria, and that he was a colonel in the army. This is a mistake. Bolivar was named *eight months before* the earthquake, governor of the fortress of Porto Cabello; but he came not to join Miranda at Vittoria. After his secret departure from that fortress, and his leaving his garrison in the night, he dared not appear before Miranda; because he justly feared that

he should be tried before a Court Martial, for having secretly in the night, together with some of his officers, and without leave or orders, left the strongest place in Venezuela, which Miranda had confided to his care. He sent Thomas Montilla, one of the officers who embarked with him, to Vittoria, with the news of this event, and with his excuses to Gen. Miranda ; the particulars of which I mean to give in their proper place. Bolivar was then Lieutenant Colonel in Miranda's staff.

It is also asserted in the same article, "that the loss of Porto Cabello, diminished, in nothing, Bolivar's influence over the army." This is another mistake. Soon after the loss of Porto Cabello, which, in consequence of Bolivar's secret departure, fell into the hands of the Spanish commander, Don Domingo Monteverde, (June 1812) the republican general Miranda felt so depressed by this unexpected loss, that he capitulated with Monteverde at Vittoria, in July 1812. In virtue of the capitulation, Congress, the Republic, and the army of Venezuela, were entirely dissolved, and members of each saved themselves as well as they could. What, therefore, could be the influence of Bolivar over a disbanded and dissolved army ? The author of the biographical sketch, appears to be ignorant of a well known fact, viz. the arrest of Gen. Miranda, at Lagaira, by Simon Bolivar, Doct. Miguel La Pena, and the military republican governor of Lagaira, Lieut. Col. Manuel Maria Casas ; and that Lieut. Col. Bolivar embarked soon after, with a passport signed by the Spanish general Monteverde, and with a letter of very high recommendation from the latter, to a merchant then at Porto Cabello, with his own brig ready to sail for Curacao, requesting, nay, urging him to receive the Lieut. Col. Bolivar on board of his vessel.* If, therefore, Bolivar could have had, at this time, any influence with the patriotic army, how would he, how could he have obtained a passport, and moreover, the letter, from the Spanish general in chief ?

These and many other particulars, prove clearly that in a great part of the accounts given and published of Bolivar's life, the writers have endeavored to attribute to him qualities and motives, which he himself had never thought of before.

All that can be said, with truth and impartiality, of Gen. Bolivar's patriotism, is, that it began with his being at the head of the army and the government ; or, to speak more plainly ; Gen. Bolivar began from 1813, to be a zealous and ardent patriot, because, from January 7 that year, until the present day (July 1828) he has not ceased to have, either, the three powers, legislative,

* I have these particulars from the merchant himself.

executive and judiciary, united in himself,* or to have, together with the executive power, the direction of all civil and military operations: the congress of Colombia and Peru, having been entirely submissive to the wishes of its President, Liberator or Protector, as will be shown more particularly in the course of this Biography.

CHAPTER III.

Events previous to the entry of Boliver into the regular army of Venezuela—First causes of the revolution at Caracas—Napoleon's invasion of Spain, and its influence upon the Spanish Colonies—Propitious movement for the Americans to rise against their oppressors—Policy of the Cabinets of St. Cloud and St. James's, in regard to the Spanish Colonies—years 1807 and 1808.

It will be necessary to give some account of the state of Europe, and of the West Indies before the revolution; and to shew the primary causes of a revolution which undermined the colossal power of Spain, and promised freedom and prosperity to the Spanish Americans.

Napoleon, the Spanish government, and the Holy Alliance, have contributed to provoke and foment the bloody war between Spain and its colonies; and have powerfully assisted the latter to become free and independent: Napoleon, by his invasion; the Regency and Cortes, by sending to the Main chiefs remarkable for ignorance or weakness, or for cowardice, duplicity, and cruelty. The want of a steady and well planned system of moderation, and of a policy adapted to these critical circumstances, have done more harm to Spain than to America. Millions of Americans have suddenly awakened from their lethargy of three hundred years; have been forced to defend their property and their lives, and have at last succeeded in driving their oppressors from their territory, and in declaring themselves free and independent. If Spain had

* The following historical facts will prove it; as *Dictator* at Caracas in 1813 and 14; as *Supreme Chief* in 1816, 17, 18, and 19, in Venezuela and New Greneda; as *President Liberator* of Colombia, as *Protector* in Peru and Boliva from 1820 until 1826. And again, from the 23d of November 1826, until the present day (July 1828,) he holds the *Dictatorial* power in consequence of the commotions in Venezuela, at Valencia, under Gen. Paez. [See his decree dated Bogota, Nov. 1826, in the *Appendix*, among the documents under No. 5.]

adopted more justice and moderation towards her colonies, she would probably have succeeded in keeping them much longer in slavery. Events, related in the course of this history, will confirm my assertion.

The Holy Alliance, and particularly the French government, in coalition with Ferdinand, the Spanish clergy, and the army of the faith, invaded Spain in order to replace upon the throne Ferdinand, a prince noted for bigotry, bad faith, cruelty, and despotism. That short-sighted, crowned association were not aware of the consequences of such a step. They were not aware that, by ruining Spain, they deprived her of all ability to reconquer her colonies. By enslaving eleven millions of Spaniards, they contributed greatly to enable fifteen millions of Americans to proclaim their liberty and independence. A policy worthy of a Metternich and a Villele !

Before the year 1810, various attempts were made to give independence to America. Tupac Amaru, Jose Antequera, Ubade, the brothers Llanzas, and others, were put to a cruel death. All similar attempts were suppressed by terror.

It is an admonishing fact, that when the propitious moment arrived to declare their independence, to free themselves from the Spanish yoke, without bloodshed, and with little or no sacrifice, the Spanish Americans suffered this propitious moment to pass by unheeded. They remained loyal, and in careless security. To prove my assertions, it will be necessary to give some account of the original causes of this eventful revolution.

In consequence of the treaty of Fontainebleau, 27th of October, 1807, between Napoleon and the *Prince of the Peace*, in the name of Charles IV. King of Spain and India, the French legions crossed the Pyrenees, and penetrated to the heart of Spain, under the pretence of shutting her seaports against the commerce of Great Britain.

The conquest of Spain and Portugal appeared to Napoleon an easy task, and the object of one, or at most, of two campaigns. Beside the secret wish to create some more kings out of his own family, he had undoubtedly formed the plan of extending his dominion over their colonies in both Americas ; and so to counterbalance the great colonial power of England in the East Indies. The weakness of Ferdinand and Charles enabled him to mature these views. Some days previous to the departure of the latter from Madrid to Bayonne, Prince Murat was named his Lieutenant General of the kingdoms of Spain and India. He, by the secret order of his master, sent out one hundred and fifty chosen grenadiers, with a colonel, and many artillery and other officers. These debarked at Lagaira, and passed to Caracas, to remain

there. They met with a very kind reception from Don Juan Casas, the Captain General, and the inhabitants. This happened in 1808, when the Machiavelian principles of Napoleon were not known on the Main.

Napoleon would have succeeded on the Peninsula, if he had acted openly, and declared war against Spain and Portugal before he entered these countries. His conquests, his victories, and his wonderfully brilliant and rapid successes, had excited universal admiration. Not only was he admired by the populace; there was formed in his favor a strong and numerous party among the most enlightened and liberal men in Spain, who wished to change their weak and corrupted government. Napoleon, too, was admired and cherished by the greatest part of the inhabitants of the Spanish colonies. His portrait was found in palaces and in huts. Woe to those who should have offered to speak against him before 1808!

But Murat's manner of taking possession of the fortresses, particularly Barcelona, in Catalonia; his disuniting the royal family; and, as soon as it was known, his favoring the escape of Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace, changed the admiration of the Spaniards into the most bitter hatred. The whole nation rose against their oppressors, and Spain, heretofore peaceable and quiet, began now to be the theatre of a bloody and obstinate war; the horrors of which were extended to the immense possessions of the colonies. The Americans and Spaniards were united in their hatred and detestation of Napoleon and his family, and in persecuting their agents.

The Kings Charles, Ferdinand, Joseph, the Emperor of the French, and the Juntas, Regencies, and Cortes, now strove to extend their influence and dominion over the Spanish colonies. The Junta of Seville treated the legitimate and central Junta, assembled at Cadiz, as a band of fugitives and traitors, and as the authors of all the mischiefs that had been brought upon them. Agents and commissioners were sent to the colonies by the former, with manifestoes and proclamations, in which they stated that Spain recognized their authority, and that the common welfare required peremptorily that the Americans should follow the good example. The Junta installed by King Ferdinand, before his departure to Bayonne, had also sent similar manifestoes and proclamations to the colonies. The Prince Murat, as Lieutenant General of Spain and India, had done the same in the name of Charles IV. Some months afterwards similar proclamations were distributed in the colonies in the name of King Joseph and Napoleon. The Junta of the Asturias claimed the same authority, the same submission to its decrees, as the other; and Spanish America was filled with

manifestoes and proclamations, which only proved that Spain was divided into so many factions; all striving to command.

The moment was propitious for the declaration of American independence. The principal Spanish authorities were disunited; Spain occupied by French armies; King Ferdinand absent and a prisoner; Napoleon, with his brother Joseph, master of the greater part of the peninsula; not a Spaniard able to take the reins of government; the Spanish administration and finances gone to wreck; her marine ruined; her troops occupied with the defence of the country; the fortresses and new troops in the colonies in a bad and destitute condition—how propitious the moment for the colonies to declare finally their freedom and independence!

Was it apathy, or devotion to the mother country, or want of good leaders? or was it generosity that induced the Americans to refrain from taking a single step against Spain? The fact is, that they distinguished themselves by their attachment—their enthusiasm for their beloved monarch Ferdinand VII! and, when the Vice Kings and Governors endeavored to distribute proclamations from the councils of India or of Castile, in which the Americans were admonished to recognize the new King Joseph Napoleon, the majority were strongly opposed to the measure. They burnt publicly, in different places, the proclamations of Napoleon, and drove his agents out of the country.

When at Bayonne, Napoleon constantly kept the Indies in view. He sent an armed brig (the *Serpent*, Capt. B.) from Bayonne to Lagaira, bearing secret instructions, proclamations, and other papers, for the Captain General Don Juan de Casas. He gave also to the Captain verbal instructions.

The brig touched at Cayenne, and was observed by the English frigate *Acaste*, Captain Deaver, who gave chase. The Frenchman arrived in July, 1808. The frigate came some hours afterwards. The English captain, observing from his deck the French commander going on shore, followed him. Captain B. arrived at Caracas about an hour before the English officer, and was immediately admitted to the presence of the Captain General. Don Juan de Casas received the French captain very graciously; but when the English captain presented himself, he was received coldly, and told, in a tone of ill humor, that he had come at a bad time, and that he might call again in two hours. During this time Captain Deaver walked in the streets of the capital, a crowd of people surrounding him. He told them how the French government were going on in Spain, and that the Spaniards there were ardently opposed to them. Some hours afterwards the French captain observed a change in the manners of the inhabitants; but he persevered in executing his commission,

and remaining at Caracas. He took lodgings in a public hotel, filled with strangers, and began to read to them one of Napoleon's manifestoes, directed to the people of Venezuela. After some minutes' reading, a Spanish officer caught the paper from his hands, tore it in pieces, and roared out like a madman, "that he and his companions in arms would never suffer a French king; that they were good Spaniards, and faithful to their beloved and legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand VII." He spoke and gesticulated with such vehemence, that all present caught his feelings; and the Frenchman dared not utter a word.

The news brought by Captain Deaver struck the inhabitants of Caracas with astonishment, and excited their deepest indignation. The people assembled by thousands, and bore in triumph the portrait of their adored King Ferdinand; proclaiming that they recognized *him alone* as legitimate sovereign of Spanish India! They placed it with great solemnity in the government House, where it was to be seen, illuminated, during the whole night. The people, enraged against the French captain, hurried towards his hotel, and would have cut him in pieces, if he had not escaped in time, and sheltered himself in the house of Don Joachim Garcia Torre, who generously advised him of his danger, concealed him, and assisted him to depart the same night for Laguaira. The English captain followed soon after; and descrying the brig under sail, he pursued and took her at sea, not far, however, from the coast.

Napoleon, shortly after Joseph's nomination as King of Spain and India, at Bayonne, ordered the great councils of India to send circulars to the Vice King and Captain Generals, notifying them, in an official manner, of this nomination. He offered the inhabitants his powerful support in officers, ammunition, warlike stores, &c. if they would declare their independence. He was confident that he should easily gain the suffrages of the Americans.

The numerous agents of King Joseph and Napoleon offered the Americans independence and great privileges; such as the continuance of the civil and military officers in their respective offices, &c. if they would make a treaty with him, and acknowledge him king. But in vain. The Americans declined having any thing to do with Napoleon or his brother Joseph, and persecuted their agents, some of whom were taken and put to death.

The failure of these negociations, and the advantageous offers of the Emperor and his brother, compared with subsequent measures, afford a proof of the ignorance, mistrust, and versatility of this people in their politics. Three years afterwards, (in 1811 and 1812,) they sent deputies to the same Napoleon, imploring his assistance. But it was too late; the Emperor had too much to do at home, and could not attend to the affairs of Ameri-

ca. He was, moreover, displeased with the first refusal of its inhabitants, and placed little confidence in the sincerity and good faith of their application.*

Napoleon possessed ample power to send to the Main (through the United States of America) money, arms, &c. and a sufficient number of experienced officers; and the consequences of refusing his powerful assistance, were greatly injurious to the patriots. The British government became provoked; the forces of the Spaniards were increased; the Mexican republic, and the cause of liberty in Venezuela and in Grenada, were ruined. Torrents of blood were shed in the long protracted war, and, in the intervals, troubles excited in opposition to a government, under which the inhabitants found security at least, and a shadow of freedom and felicity, of which they are at present totally deprived.

The British government, seeing the rapid progress of Napoleon in Spain, became apprehensive of her yielding at last. They feared, also, that the news of these successes, when received on the Main, would give him a predominant party there likewise. They saw the necessity of strong and speedy measures to prevent these evils. They despatched a fast sailing sloop of war to the island of Curacao, (at that time in the possession of England,) with orders to its Governor, Sir James Cockburn, to depart, without delay, for Lagaira and Caracas. His secret instructions (which I have from good authority) were to employ every imaginable means to diminish and destroy the influence of the French party. Secondly, to watch and prevent this party from getting the upper hand, and wresting the colonies from Spain. Thirdly, to endeavor to establish a provisional government favorable to King Ferdinand VII, without engaging himself in any other concerns relating to the administration and interior affairs of the government of that country.

The Captain General, Don Juan de Casas, having been made acquainted with the intended voyage of the English government, came, with a numerous and brilliant retinue, to Lagaira, where Sir James, on coming ashore, was met with great solemnity. The inhabitants received him with demonstrations of joy and respect, and even with regal honors. Public opinion was entirely changed in favor of England. The aversion to Napoleon was so great, that I saw many gold and silver French coins, which had the bust of Napoleon, pierced with the point of a dagger or knife, and his portraits cut in pieces.

The ringing of bells, the discharge of cannon at the public square and the forts of Lagaira, announced Sir James's arrival on

* A friend of mine heard him say, "*Je ne me fie pas trop sur les belles paroles de ces Messieurs; je ferai cependant ce que je pourrai pour eux.*"

shore; and his passage from Lagaira to Caracas was like a triumph. His entry into the capital was not less solemn than would have been that of the King himself. All was joy, bustle, and enthusiasm; the city was spontaneously illuminated; dinners, festivals, balls, &c. succeeded during the whole time of his stay; and the exclamations, "Long live our beloved, our cherished King Ferdinand VII, and the English, our good and generous allies," were heard throughout the streets. The fickle people of Caracas were certainly sincere in their joyful reception of Sir James. After some secret interviews, the Captain General published a long proclamation, exhorting the inhabitants of Venezuela to recognize the authority of the new King of Spain and India. This was done immediately with loud shouts and the utmost enthusiasm.

Sir James, highly pleased with his reception, returned to Curacao, and sent a full and detailed report of his mission, to the British Government. Convinced now, that the Venezuelans, left to themselves, would be perfectly harmless, both to the politics and commerce of the English nation; the British ministry did not take much notice of the claims of the patriots; which they certainly would have done, in case of any rivalry with, or acceptance of the proposals of, Napoleon.

All their attention could now be directed to one point, driving the French from the Peninsula. This would secure the great object of the British government, the extension of their commerce to the prejudice of other nations. This alone caused their alliance with Spain, and excited their aversion, their hostility against whatever favored the independency of the Spaniards in both Americas: and the refusal of Napoleon's offers, left in an insulated condition, the cause of the independents in Spanish America.

Since the beginning of the revolution, its different governments have looked to England, and have put equal trust and confidence in her, though she never offered to assist them. This proves clearly, that in the beginning of their revolution, the Americans had not conceived the idea of a separation from Spain. If they had, they would have accepted the brilliant offers of Napoleon and Joseph, and would never have implored the aid and assistance of the most faithful ally of the Spanish government.

The hope of effectual aid from the cabinet of St. James, arose, partly from the knowledge of the famous plan of William Pitt, who intended to render the West India colonies free and independent; and upon the instructions of the British minister of the colonies (Dundas) in 1797, to the governor of the island of Trinidad, Sir Thomas Pictou, by which the government formally engaged to supply the Venezuelans with every support, in case they would declare themselves free and independent. The instructions were

sent from the island of Trinidad, but had not the expected effect. They were even forgotten, until the revolution at Caracas, 1810; when the new Junta, remembering these circumstances, sent Dons. Luis Lopez Mendez and Simon Bolivar to London, to request assistance. But the British ministry did nothing. On the contrary, they sent orders to their governors in the West Indies, to observe the strictest neutrality between Spain and her colonies, as long as the new government should act in the name, and by the authority of king Ferdinand. The plan of the minister, William Pitt, to render the colonies in the West Indies *not* belonging to England, free and independent, was pernicious and dreadful. Considering the great number of slaves and colored people, who could soon have become masters of the country, it is plain that the object of his plan was, not to give freedom and independence to the inhabitants on the Main, but to ruin the country. Nearly the same scheme was afterwards put in execution in St. Domingo, and the British government took an active part in it. The ruin of the West Indies would have conduced greatly to the prosperity of the vast British colonies in the East Indies. Upon such facts did the leaders of independence in Spanish America, ground their sanguine hopes of support from England.

After Ferdinand ascended the throne of Spain (1814) the prince regent of England concluded a treaty with him, in which it was formally stipulated that "hoping the king of Spain would make peace with the colonists; his royal highness would promise not to send the least support to the insurgents, and would employ his best exertions to hinder any of his subjects from doing it.

After the earthquake at Caracas (1812) many inhabitants left Venezuela, and embarked in such haste and consternation, as to forget the necessaries of life. The British governments in the West Indies offered them not the least support. Many perished for want of food. The Congress of the United States, informed of their miserable condition, generously hastened to give the necessary orders for their supply, and saved the miserable remnant from starvation and wretchedness.

The Spanish Americans, nevertheless, hesitated, in the hope of being supported by the British government. Buenos Ayres sent in 1814, Don Manuel Sanatea, and the Congress of New Grenada, Don Tomas Maria del Real, to London, with ample powers, and an order to conclude an exclusive treaty of commerce, in favor of England, for twenty years. All was in vain. The deputy Real made, at different times, attempts to obtain a private audience of the British minister of foreign affairs, but was not admitted. Their mission ended with obtaining only license to export, for ready cash, and the payment of heavy duties upon them—some arms!

Since that time the agents of the new American republics, have been tolerated, but not recognized in their diplomatic character. Don Mendez y Lopez and Revenga, the former Agent, and the latter Charge d'Affaires, of the Republic of Colombia, were imprisoned in London for debts. Don Hurtado, Minister of Colombia, and lately Charge d'Affaires at London, was arrested in the island of Jamaica, in May, 1828, for a debt of three thousand pounds sterling, but was released on furnishing bail.

Such has been the conduct of the British ministry towards the Spanish Americans. But as soon as these republics had succeeded in driving the Spanish forces out of their respective territories, and had gained some stability, the British government changed its policy, and was anxious to recognize, officially, their agents and ministers. England, by her ambiguous policy, had gained what others, and particularly the French government, had lost under the too well known Count Villele, to the great detriment of the commerce of France.

The British government has been highly applauded as the saviour and protector of Spain and Portugal; and also as having greatly contributed to the freedom and independence of Spanish America. But by developing facts, and closely examining the tortuous policy of Lord Castlereagh, when prime minister of England, we shall see that this applause has not been fully merited.

The situation of England relative to France, in 1808, '9, '10, was that of Carthage in relation to Rome. Napoleon's continental system, supported by his numerous legions and his colossal power, menaced the total ruin of the British commerce and industry, and even its political existence. The wealth of England, in productions and merchandize, could be of no avail without a market. Contraband trade, even in all its multiplicity and extent, was of very little importance compared with free, active, and direct commerce. The European ports of Spain and Portugal only remained open for England. If Napoleon had conquered the Peninsula, Europe would have been shut against their direct commerce with her inhabitants. England was driven to a desperate game; all possible sacrifices were employed, not to deliver Spain and Portugal only, but principally to preserve these countries for the commerce and safety of Britain.

Napoleon, it is true, was afterwards no more to be feared; but a rupture between Great Britain and Spain, in 1814, and for which the latter had given more than one cause, would have been very favorable to the commerce of the United States of America.

The neutral system, or rather the tortuous course pursued by the British government previous to the too short ministry and the lamented death of Mr. Canning, has cost millions of dollars, and

the lives of more than 600,000 souls in America, and has ruined the Spanish colonies for a long course of years. But British commerce has gained by the destruction, the misery, and the ruin of others!

Every well informed politician must remember the active part which the British ministry took during the French Revolution; their conduct in the last events in Naples, Savoy, Piedmont, and Spain; as also at Verona, at Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli; in Greece, in Brazil, and Buenos Ayres: and time will discover the policy of the famous Duke of Wellington in regard to Portugal, Russia, and Turkey.

This neutrality during the civil war of Spain and her colonies, has given to England not only wealth and an extensive commerce, but the name of having saved and protected the new established republics!

It is just, however, to mention that the English nation highly disapproved of these ministerial principles of Pitt and Castlereagh, and took an active interest in favor of the independence of these republics. So did the opposition in both houses of parliament; and this will never be forgotten by any enlightened friend of rational and well established freedom and independence.

CHAPTER IV.

Situation of Venezuela in 1808—Arrival of Capt. Gen. Emparan, Lieut. Col. Simon Bolivar, at Laguaira, from Spain—Emparan's Administration—Details of the Revolution at Caracas, 19th April, 1810—Venezuelan Junta—Spanish Regency—Conspiracy of Liarez—Commencement of Hostilities—Marquis del Toro—Miranda's arrival at Caracas—Congress—Executive Power—Patriotic Society—Islenian Conspiracy—Declaration of Independence—Military Operations of Miranda—Project of a Constitution—Situation of the Republic in 1811. Years 1808—1811.

After having given a short account of what had passed in Europe in relation to Spanish America, and particularly to Venezuela, it will be necessary to give a general idea of the situation of the eight provinces, which, at that time, formed the captain-generalship of Venezuela.

Capt. Gen. Don Juan de Casas was, in secret, in favor of what was then termed the French party ; and much inclined to favor the views of Napoleon, and his brother Joseph.

As no vessel, other than those under Spanish colors, could enter any seaport belonging to the Spanish crown in America ; and as all letters, pamphlets, gazettes, and books, of whatever description, coming from Europe, were ordered to be collected, and sent directly to the captain general at Caracas, before they could be delivered to the persons to whom they were directed, under heavy penalties upon the master of the vessel on neglect to comply with the order ; it was easy for the governor to open the letters, to examine the papers and gazettes, and to deliver or suppress, what he thought proper. He retained all the proclamations, orders, &c. coming from the different authorities in Spain (of which I have spoken before) in opposition to the French invasion. The inhabitants of Venezuela were kept in total ignorance of the events in Spain, particularly of the revolution of Aranjuez, the escape of Manuel Godoy, of the bloodshed of the 1st May in Madrid, &c., until the arrival of the English captain Deaver, in July 1808, mentioned in the preceding chapter.

Capt. Gen. Casas not having it in his power to prevent this English officer, as he did every Spaniard arriving on the Main, from communicating freely with the inhabitants of Caracas, they now became informed of the real state of things in Spain. The effects of his communications, which I have already mentioned, placed the captain general Casas in a very delicate situation. Moreover, some of the most influential men in Caracas, secretly insinuated that he might have been interested in concealing the truth.

This news made a deep impression on the minds of some few liberal and enlightened inhabitants of Caracas, who could not conceal their fears, that by the critical and miserable situation of Spain, their own country would be left unprotected and helpless, in case of a sudden hostile invasion. Their fortresses were ill provided, and poorly garrisoned. Their troops were half clothed and half fed. The inhabitants were divided in their political opinions ; and the government and its officers were corrupt and indolent. These persons were convinced that the establishment of a good Junta would give more energy and activity to the government, and would well suit the time. They therefore made out a short memorial, in which they showed the advantages of such a measure ; and proposed that the captain general should still retain his authority, and act as president of the Junta. They also, therein, formally recognised their beloved Ferdinand, as king. They caused this memorial to be

circulated among their friends, in order to collect their signatures.

They recommended, first, that measures should be taken at once to quell the fears of the inhabitants of Venezuela, respecting the measures taken by the Spanish government in regard to them : Second, that a more effective government should be given to the province of Caracas : Third, that efforts should be made to restore the abandoned state of Venezuela.

Notwithstanding this plain and frank exposition was necessary for the interests of both Venezuela and Spain, and that it was made without any intention of changing, or shaking the authority of the captain general, he ordered the arrest of the authors, and of the signers of it, and threw them into prison. But public opinion was in favor of the measures proposed by them ; nothing criminal appeared in their conduct, and they were released. The real causes of their release were, the strong remonstrances against such arbitrary conduct, and the fear that it might produce serious consequences—perhaps a revolution. Among them were the Marquises del Toro and Casa Leon, both very wealthy and influential men ; the son of the count de Tobar, and various other young gentlemen of the first families in Caracas.

The arrival of Sir James Cockburn, governor of Curocao, at Laguira and Caracas, and the formal recognition of the authority of king Ferdinand, relieved the captain general from his critical position. He saw plainly that the majority was openly in favor of the Bourbons, and he changed his policy accordingly. But the members of the great Junta, assembled at Madrid, having received some hints of Gen. Casas's secret inclination (suspected, rather than clearly proved) resolved to send another more openly devoted to their views.

Meanwhile, Ferdinand being proclaimed king of Spain and India, the authority of the captain general was fully established as his representative. But his administration was unpopular with the inhabitants.

Such was the situation of Caracas, when on the 24th of March, 1809, three Spanish men of war, and above twenty transports, with the new captain general, Don Vincente Emparan, the brigadier general Fernando del Toro, the lieutenant colonel Bolivar and lady, and a great many civil and military officers and others, arrived at Laguira. The new governor, some days after his arrival, was solemnly installed in office. Gen. Emparan was a man of some talents and knowledge ; he was good, just, and of easy manners, and very humane. He began by putting in order the finances, and the other departments. He embellished Caracas, maintained a good police, which attended promptly both to neatness

and the security of the streets and public market ; and by his good and popular qualities, soon rendered himself beloved and respected. His great defects as chief, were, that he was too confident, and too obstinately attached to the regency of Spain.

Soon after his arrival, news reached Caracas, of the flight of the Spanish Central Junta from Seville to Cadiz, of its dissolution, and of the nomination of a regency entrusted to govern Spain and her colonies. This regency sent a proclamation to South America full of flattering promises, in order to gain its inhabitants. The same vessel brought tidings of the rapid progress of king Joseph in Spain, that the regency possessed no more than Cadiz, the Villa of Leon, and a part of Galicia and Catalonia. The inhabitants became convinced that no reasonable hope could be entertained of protection from Spain, and of preserving a good understanding with the captain general Emparan, who surrounded by bad counsellors, imperiously demanded a blind submission to every thing coming from the regency. They were also convinced, that Cadiz and the remainder of the Spanish territory would soon be forced to submit, and that the regency would then, of course, be regarded as an unlawful authority. But as Gen. Emparan was active, vigilant, jealous of his authority, and, as yet, very powerful, they could not act openly against him, and were obliged to use some stratagem.

The leaders of the revolution, having fully ascertained the general discontent, which, indeed, was now strongly expressed against the governor, fixed upon the Maunday Thursday, 19th April, 1810, for the execution of their plan. Among them were the Alcalde [Mayor] of Caracas, Don Martin Tobar, Francisco Salias, Mariano Montilla, &c. On that day an immense crowd of people were assembled in order to witness the procession, which departed from the cathedral, and passed through the principal streets of the city. Before the procession began, the captain general had summoned a council of the Royal Audiencia, at which he always presided.

On that day the leaders assembled in the public square, with their arms concealed, determined to strike the blow. They were sure of a majority of the inhabitants, many of the officers of the queen's regiment of the line, and nearly the whole battallion of veterans, composed of 800 chosen men, formed in lines, and then in waiting for the procession ; so that 3000 armed men were assembled, and ready to act at the first signal.

When the captain general, having dismissed the royal audiencia, came out of the chapel to join the procession, with his retinue, Don Francisco Salias, one of the most determined of the leaders, came forward and told him he had a matter of the highest impor-

tance to reveal, on account of which he requested his excellency to go back to the chapel, where he would explain himself before the council of the royal audiencia. The general replied, "he could not grant him his request at present, because the procession was waiting for him, but that he would be ready to hear him as soon as the procession was ended."—"No, no!" objected Salias vehemently, "your excellency cannot delay a moment; you must absolutely hear me, without waiting a single minute." His numerous companions now exclaimed, all at once, that it was a matter of the highest importance, which admitted not of the least delay. During this time, the leaders surrounded the governor so closely, that he could not advance a step. One of them, by accident or otherwise, coming close upon him, touched his arm; the governor, greatly incensed, treated him very rudely before the eyes of his companions. But perceiving the mob to increase every minute, he became embarrassed, and at length yielded, and ordered the council to reassemble.

Salias entered the council room alone, and addressed the president Emparan in the following singular manner:—"Your excellency is an honest man; your excellency is a respectable and worthy magistrate, sincerely devoted to his majesty, our beloved sovereign, Don Ferdinand VII; but your excellency has been induced to insult publicly one of my friends; and nobody else could have advised you to commit such an act of injustice, but this hypocrite, this impostor and miserable auditor, who sits next you," (pointing to the Auditor, Vicente Anca, who was really one of the most unworthy Spaniards, and generally detested.) The governor, confused by such language, nevertheless nodded his head at every flattering expression of Salias, and protested that he was correct in saying that he, the governor, was faithfully attached to his beloved king and master, Ferdinand. Anca being his private counsellor, to whom he was much attached, and in whom he placed the greatest confidence, he attempted to defend the auditor. But Salias interrupted him, and repeating his compliments, added, "that he came in the name of more than ten thousand of his countrymen, to demand justice, and the immediate arrest of this hypocrite; and that he, Salias, and his friends, had placed such confidence in the probity and uprightness of character of the governor, that they were persuaded that his excellency neither would nor could any longer suffer that such a notorious enemy of the people should be seated at his side," &c.

The governor, intimidated by the boldness and firmness of this speech, and perceiving that Salias was powerfully supported, abruptly ordered the arrest of Anca, who tried to speak, but without

success. He was sent to prison; passing through the square amidst the huzzas of an immense crowd of people.

Encouraged by this first success, Salias demanded the arrest of various other members of the royal audiencia, which was effected in the same manner. During this, some of the numerous friends of Salias entered the council room, and surrounded the governor and the rest of the counsellors, who were forced to submit to the wishes of the leaders. They had beforehand prepared a written declaration, in form of a decree drawn up in the name of the royal audiencia, and its president the captain general Emparan, in which was stated, 1st, That he, Don Vincente Emparan, with all the other members of the royal audiencia *voluntarily* abdicated their functions, and were resolved to retire from public affairs: 2d, That the royal audiencia, should be succeeded by a Junta, which should take care of the administration and the government, &c.—Each member of the royal audiencia, after signing his own destiny, was separately confined in his own house, with liberty to go out of the country when, and whithersoever he should think proper.

The new government was proclaimed and installed the same day, under the name of “Provisional Junta of Venezuela, Conservatrix of the rights of his majesty king Ferdinand, VII.” As the principal members of this Junta were Don Jose de Las Llamosas, a native Spaniard, President and first Alcalde, Don Martin Tobar, second Alcalde, Baltazar Padron, Andreas Moreno, and Diego Tugo, members. They commenced business by sending the ex-captain general Emparan, the Regent, the Auditors, the members of the high court of justice, the ancient Cabildo, and various other persons, to jail; whence they were sent, by sea, to the United States of America.

The Junta abolished the toll money and duties in the custom-house, the capitation upon the Indians, and the impositions upon slaves. They occupied themselves with the freedom of commerce and the national industry. They decreed to give to the provinces of Caracas, and to the British Ministry, official information of the change of government. As soon as this change was known in the provinces, a similar Junta was installed in each of them.

The Junta of Guiana recognised, at first, the authority of that of Caracas; but soon afterwards, refused to recognise any other authority than that of the Regency at Cadiz. This change was attributed to the influence of the European Spaniards who formed the majority of this Junta. Those of Cumana and Barinas sent deputies to Caracas, demanding the convocation of a congress, and refusing to acknowledge the supreme authority of the Junta in the capital.

The Spanish governor, at Maracaybo, Don Fernando Millares, greatly dissatisfied with what had taken place at Caracas, ordered the deputies sent to him by this Junta, with strong menaces, out of his presence. They passed from Maracaybo to Coro, the governor of which province, Cevallos, arrested and shipped them for Porto Rico, where they were put in irons. The earnest representations of the English Admiral, Sir Alexander Cochran, at last, effected their liberation.

The provisional Junta at Caracas, thought proper to notify, officially, the Regency at Cadiz, of the change which had taken place in the government of Venezuela, and declared, at the same time, its *cordial wishes for the welfare of the mother country, and the conservation of the royal authority on the Main, &c.* The Junta said nothing of submission to the Regency. Their declaration was in conformity with the laws of the Indian Codex, in which it is expressly said, "the Americans shall know no other authority than that of the king, as president of the council of India." As the king was a prisoner, the Regency treated this omission as high treason, deserving exemplary punishment. After having consulted the great council of Castile and that of India, they published against Venezuela, a violent Manifesto, dated Cadiz, August 3d; and they decreed that these provinces should be treated as rebels and revolutionists, and declared their coasts in a state of blockade, with the exception of the provinces of Maracaybo and Coro, which formally recognised the authority of the Regency, and took no part in the revolution of Caracas.

The Regency, soon after, received despatches from various other American Juntas expressing the same sentiments of submission; and some offered to assist the Spaniards in their struggle against Napoleon. None declared an intention to separate from Spain.—But meanwhile, none spoke of recognizing the authority of the Regency. This uniformity of opinion throughout the vast provinces of the Spanish colonies, deeply embittered the members of the Regency. All proposals of accommodation or negotiation were rejected. They talked only of rebellion, and demanded implicit and blind submission to *their* laws and decrees!

Civil war was now declared, and, in the public papers of Cadiz, the inhabitants of Spanish America were treated, by the Regency, and at later periods, by the Cortes, as rebels, who must be subdued by force of arms.

Don Ignacio Cortavaria departed from Cadiz for Porto Rico, authorised to employ every means to subdue the Venezuelans.—He said in one of his proclamations "that the inhabitants of the Main should *first* depose their existing government, and promised *then* to hear every complaint, and to do them justice *afterwards.*"

He endeavored, by intrigue, to induce the clergy of Venezuela to send agents in order to spread discord and trouble. In one word, he neglected no means to fulfil his commission.

The Junta of Caracas, soon after, felt the effects of Cortavarias's intrigues. Mellares, the new captain-general, residing at Maracaybo, and Cevallos, governor of Coro, joined him, and excited several riotous disturbances.

A Spaniard living at Caracas, Don Francisco Gonzales de Linares, was designated as the leader of the counter-revolution party, whose object was to drive out the provisional Junta, and replace it with a new one, composed entirely of native Spaniards. But, at the decisive moment, Linares hesitated; instead of giving, at midnight, the expected signal, he remained inactive. The conspiracy was detected; he and a number of his companions were arrested without any noise, the same night, and put in irons.

Hostilities now began, and the Junta were obliged to put themselves in a state of defence. The Marquis del Toro was named general in chief of the army. Every where, recruits and arms were collected, and soon after, the Marquis marched upon Casora, to suppress a revolt, and maintain order. After various operations and combats of little importance, the campaign of 1810 was closed, when the news reached Caracas, of the sudden arrival of general Miranda, at the island of Curacao.

At the end of 1810, general Miranda arrived at Curacao, from London. He had letters of introduction from the duke of Cambridge, and Mr. Vansittart, to the English governor of that island. He came under the name of *Martin*; and after a short residence, he embarked on board of an English vessel for Lagaira, where he debarked and came to Caracas, in spite of the secret orders of the provisional Junta, to its agents in London, to hinder his coming to Venezuela, his native land. Miranda being informed of this secret order, changed his name, and came without any attendants. In giving this secret injunction to their agents, the provisional Junta were actuated by a dread of the great talents and patriotism of the general. It is said by some that the order was given to prove the moderation of the Junta, in regard to Spain.

Miranda was received with great enthusiasm and solemnity; the festivals of every description lasted through many days; and he was every where followed and surrounded by a crowd of people. His influence decided the question of having a Congress; and the provisional Junta, in conformity with this decision, ordered the election of deputies in each province separately.

The Junta, before the convocation of the Congress, had designated a committee to draw up a project of a Constitution, to be

submitted to Congress. The majority of that committee agreed to propose a federal government ; as best adapted to present circumstances. Miranda, who was a member of that committee, sent another plan, which he proposed at the time of his expedition against Carthagená in 1806. This plan differed very little from the Spanish mode of governing its colonies. It was, as instructed and able men have assured me, adapted to the spirit and character of that people. But it created him many enemies. As soon as he arrived at Caracas, some individuals began to fear his popularity and influence. But the true friends of a wise and moderate liberty, were sincerely attached to him, and publicly disapproved of all the intrigues and secret murmurs against him. Miranda himself despised them ; and, in spite of all opposition, he was nominated commander in chief of the land and sea forces, and member of the congress, which opened its session, the 2d March, 1811, under the presidency of Doct. Philip Paul.

On the 4th of April, the congress appointed three of its members to form the executive power ; but fearing that this executive commission, composed of Dons Juan Escalona, and Mendoza, and the Doct. Baltazar Padron, might make too great encroachments upon the rights and privileges of the people, the congress gave them but very limited power.

The anniversary of the revolution of Caracas, 19th April, was solemnly celebrated by festivals and illuminations. The public spirit was excellent.

But this state of things did not subsist long. After a while, the government sunk into indolence, the natural result of a too greatly restrained executive power. It had neither authority nor energy. The congress was perplexed, and uncertain what means to employ in order to give more strength and consistency to its government. During this time, a great number of the European Spaniards, dissatisfied with the government, formed a very serious conspiracy, known under the name of *the conspiracy of the Isleños*, (men born in the Canary Islands.) This conspiracy was denounced in the moment of its explosion : but the people contemplating it, observed at the same time the apathy of the members of the government ; and their confidence in their government daily diminished.

The friends of independence thought the moment favorable for action. The sittings of the patriotic society were more frequent, and its powerful members declared publicly that nothing could save the country but to declare it free and independent of Spain. the impolitic conduct of the Regency and the Cortes, afforded sufficient reasons for such a declaration ; and the inhabitants of Caracas, many of whom were people of color, listened to such a

question with joy ; because they conceived from it, great hopes of a more secure and honorable existence. The measure was generally supported ; and some members proposed the question of independence, in the congress then assembled.

After long and animated discussions, the question was decided, and *Venezuela* was declared to be a *Republic, free and independent of any foreign dominion*, (by a decree of July 5th, 1811.) In the manifesto, congress mentioned the persecutions suffered during three hundred years, and developed the reasons which determined them to this resolution, which they declared to be sincere and irrevocable.

On the same day the Spanish colors were cut in pieces, and exchanged for a three colored flag. The portraits of Charles IV, and Ferdinand VII, were taken down, and trailed through the streets of Caracas, with the outcry of "Long live the Independency !"

This event greatly discouraged the other conspirators, without extinguishing the machinations of the *Islenos*, who being resolved to strike a heavy blow, assembled in great numbers, on the 11th of July, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, in one of the suburbs of Caracas called *las Teques*, in order to march thence, united and well armed, against the government. Their design was to put to death the three members of the executive power, and the most influential members of the congress, and to arrest the others, and embark, and deliver them to the Regency at Cadiz. They intended, afterwards, to reinstate the old Spanish government.

Gen. Miranda hesitated not a moment. He united some armed men, and marched against the rebels. The government would not trust the regular army, knowing that many of them were native Spaniards, they had reason to fear some understanding with the rebels. Gen. Miranda, after an obstinate battle, surrounded and disarmed them, and confined a great many in gaol. Sixteen of the principal ring-leaders were shot in the course of the same month.

This conspiracy had various ramifications. The inhabitants of Valencia, dissatisfied because congress had refused to grant their request to form a separate province, revolted openly. Miranda again marched against the rebels, and, after great resistance, took possession of their city, and condemned ten of the leaders to death.

Government, strongly supported by the military operations of Gen. Miranda, acted with more energy, and inspired confidence. The army was in a good state, and strong enough to defend the new republic. Commerce began to flourish, and every thing was going on well.

But this happiness was soon dissipated by an event which I shall relate in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V.

Earthquake at Caracas and its consequences—Particulars of Bolivar's entry into the army, and of his nomination as governor of Porto Cabello—Capitulation at Vittoria—Dissolution of the Republic—Arrest of Miranda at Lagaira—Anarchical state of Venezuela under the government of Monteverde—Cruelties of the Spaniards—Monteverde's solemn entry into Caracas. 1812.

The clergy of Caracas, a secret and powerful enemy to the republican form of government, (because congress had reformed many of their oppressive and pernicious privileges) took this occasion to revenge the supposed insult; and a great many friars, monks and priests, raised their voices and preached in the streets, to the terrified people, that this was a punishment well deserved by the authors of innovations so impious and criminal. One who was present, assured me that he had never before heard such rhetoric, from clergymen, the ministers of divinity, of moderation and of clemency. The impression was so profound, and the terror so general, that all who had not confessed or received the sacraments for some time past, were now anxious to do so; others who had lived in concubinage, prostrated themselves before the priests in church, supplicating to be united in marriage before God. Monteverde had, some time before, increased the number of his corps; and, happening to be before Carora on the day of the earthquake, he attacked and took it.

Public confidence was destroyed; the paper money of the republic, which, before the earthquake, had depreciated, was now reduced to nothing; and the situation of congress became extremely difficult and perplexing; not less so than when, some time afterwards, Miranda received the news that Porto Cabello had fallen into the hands of the Spaniards.

It is proper to insert here, all that I have yet to relate, concerning Lieut. Col. Simon Bolivar, so as not to interrupt the course of events that, in rapid succession, took place, after his arrival, from Spain, at Caracas.

Bolivar retired, with his lady, to San Mateo, one of his country places, in the valley of Aragua. He had the misfortune to lose her soon after their arrival on the Main. At the beginning of 1810, the principal leaders of the intended revolution were desirous to see Lieut. Col. Bolivar amongst them; and his cousin J. Felix Ribas, offered to sound and gain him over. He was a brave, daring and high spirited young man. He was rich also, and he was intimate

with Bolivar. As the latter was rich, and his father had great influence with the regiment of militia of the plains of Aragua, the leaders expected a powerful support in gaining over the son, who was beloved for his generosity. Ribas had an interview with Bolivar, who treated the attempt as a foolish and impracticable one.—After various private conversations, Ribas found that Bolivar was not to be gained over. The resolution of the 19th April, therefore, was made without Bolivar's participation. During that, and the following days, as is known to all who were there at the time, he came not at all to Caracas, but staid at San Mateo.

When the patriotic Junta assembled at Caracas, its members, among whom Bolivar had various friends, were anxious to see him taking an active part in their new government; and proposals were made to him to choose a civil or a military office, with the assurance that his choice should be complied with, but in vain. He declined every office, under the pretext of the state of his health. At last the Junta proposed to him a mission to London, with the rank of colonel in the militia, and in company with his friend Louis Lopez y Mendez. This offer he accepted; and they both departed for London in June, 1810.

The patriotic Junta hoped, in vain, for the powerful support of the British cabinet. The two deputies could obtain nothing, but leave to export some arms, at a great price, as I have before related. Bolivar much disgusted, after a short stay, left London and came with these arms to the Main; leaving Mendez in London.—Shortly after he retired again, and declined all military service under the orders of the general in chief Marquis del Toro.

On the arrival of General Miranda, and his nomination as commander in chief of the army of Venezuela, he prevailed on Bolivar to accept the grade of lieutenant colonel of the staff, in the regular army, and the command of the strongest fortress in Venezuela, Porto Cabello, which is a fine seaport. He assumed this command in September, 1811.

Miranda sent his prisoners of war, regularly, to Porto Cabello, where they were confined in the citadel. In June, 1812, these prisoners revolted. They succeeded in killing their guards, and in taking possession of the citadel, which is separate from the city. Some of Miranda's officers censured Bolivar, because he had not carefully enough inspected the guard specially entrusted with the prisoners, and because he had not promptly rallied his numerous garrison, and endeavored to subject the prisoners, which, as they were unarmed, they said might easily have been done. Bolivar, however, secretly left his post, embarked precipitately with eight of his officers (among whom was Thomas Mantilla, a brother of the then intendant at Carthagena) and withdrew in the night without the

knowledge of his garrison. He embarked in an armed schooner, commanded by a Danish captain, at that time in the service of Venezuela, and arrived at day break at Laguira, leaving behind his garrison, large magazines of powder, arms, military stores, &c.—From Laguira he retired to San Mateo, and sent Thomas Mantilla to Gen. Miranda to notify him of this event.

The garrison at Porto Cabello, waiting in vain for orders, saw at daybreak, that the commander had departed, and judging that all was lost, retired in good order, leaving the place to its fate. Monteverde, though astonished with the news of the evacuation, seized the occasion and took possession of Porto Cabello. This event increased his forces. He had been destitute of every thing, and had not a single strong seaport where he could receive the necessary supplies from abroad. Porto Cabello gave him about 1200 prisoners of war, now liberated, vast stocks of munitions of war, arms, &c. and one of the best harbors in Venezuela.

When the news arrived at Vittoria, the head quarters of General Miranda's army, that Porto Cabello was lost, every one was astonished, and dispirited. Miranda soon felt the effect of this loss.—Many of his brave officers left the service, and a great number of the men deserted.

Monteverde wrote to Miranda a letter, which the latter sent to the congress, and received from them authority to treat with the Spanish general. In virtue of the treaty (of the 26th July, 1812, ratified at Vittoria) it was stipulated, "1st, That the constitution presented by the Cortes to the Spaniards, should be introduced in Venezuela, and recognized by its inhabitants.

2d, That no person, to whatever class or rank he might belong, should be persecuted or troubled for his political opinions, and a general amnesty was solemnly promised.

8d, That all private property should be sacred and respected.

4th, That any one might leave Caracas and Venezuela, and retire where he pleased without the least obstruction."

In consequence of this treaty, Caracas came again into possession of the Spaniards. The republican congress was dissolved; and the republic of Venezuela no longer existed!

Gen. Miranda passed from Vittoria to Caracas, intending to leave the country and embark on board the English corvette *Saphire*, the commander of which, Capt. Haynes, was ready to receive him. This circumstance connected with the secrecy of his arrival at Curacao from London, his assuming the name, of Martin, his letters of recommendation from the Duke of Cambridge, and Mr. Vansittart to the Governor of Curacao, (at that time in possession of Great Britain,) his constant correspondence with the English government through Curacao, and his frequent interviews with the

commanders of English men of war, who delivered him numerous letters from England, rendered him suspected; and many Venezuelans believed that he had treacherous views against his country.* His enemies were increased by his own conduct; and he became very unpopular. He answered various interesting questions in a dry and short manner.

He preferred English and French officers to his own countrymen—saying that these were ignorant brutes, unfit to command, and that they ought to learn the use of the musket, before they put on their epaulettes &c.

These circumstances induced his enemies to prevent his voyage to England, and were the cause of his arrest. The following facts, being little known, deserve to be mentioned here, as colonel Bolivar was one of the three, who took a leading part in the arrest.

In the afternoon of the 30th July, general Miranda arrived at Laguira, at the house of the military commandant, the republican lieutenant colonel Manuel Maria Casas, who, every moment, expected to be relieved by a Spanish garrison, which should take possession of the city and ports of Laguira, in conformity with the treaty of Vittoria. Miranda met a great company, and among them the English commander of the Saphire, Doct. Miguel Pena, civil governor (Jefe Politico) of Laguira, and the lieutenant colonel Simon Bolivar. All the company expected Miranda. He arrived, fatigued by the heat of the day, and, after having refreshed himself, was invited to stay at supper, and to sleep that night on shore. Capt. Haynes strongly objected, and urged Miranda to go with him on board, where he would find every comfort, his secretary, servants, trunks, &c. He added that he wished to sail immediately, that the land breeze would soon rise &c. But, Bolivar, Pena, and Casas told the Captain that the General was too tired to be able to embark that night, and that the land breeze arose not until ten o'clock in the morning, so that he might be on board in due time. Miranda hesitated; but he consented to remain. Capt. Haynes took leave, visibly dissatisfied, but promising the General to send his boat and take him on board.

The company sat gaily at supper; and Bolivar, no longer fearing the authority of his commander in chief, commenced an apology upon what had happened at Porto Cabello: But Miranda would not hear of past events, but talked on indifferent topics, with him, and the rest of the company. Miranda, aged and fatigued, begged leave to retire to rest; and took an affectionate leave of all the three.

* Miranda was born in Caracas

By order of Casas, a bed was prepared for Miranda in a closet, which could not be locked. While he slept, the triumvirate were contriving their plan, or rather, the best mode of executing it. The plan, as I am well assured, was formed by Doct. Miguel Pena, a member of the congress, and a great enemy of Miranda. The steps of Miranda were carefully watched. Information of his being about to embark, as is stated above, being obtained, Doct. Pena, on his way from Caracas to Laguira, called on Don T. C. at his seat, lying between the two cities, and proposed to him to join in the plot, and aid the arrest of Miranda, who, he said, was a traitor to his country in signing the treaty of Vittoria. That honest man told Pena that the plot was abominable ; and entreated him, but in vain, to desist from it. Pena left him in a hasty and irritated manner ; and soon after the arrest of Miranda, Don T. C. was arrested, put in irons, and thrown into one of the dungeons of Laguira. This, he never doubted, was the result of the doctor's vengeance.

Bolivar arrived first, at the house of the commandant Casas, where he was some hours after joined by Pena. They communicated their project to Casas, and he joined them. Miranda had yet too many friends to render his arrest practicable in the day time.

Capt. Haynes afterwards told some of his friends, from whom I had these particulars, that he had a certain foreboding that mischief would happen to Miranda ; and therefore urged him to go on board ; but that he feared to speak more plainly, lest the others should understand him.

Miranda was arrested in the following manner. Having ascertained that the general was sound asleep, the three leaders, after a short consultation, determined to seize him that night, and give him up to the Spanish commandant Monteverde. Casas, as military commandant at Laguira, ordered a strong detachment from the principal guard. This detachment he commanded to surround his own house in perfect silence, to suffer no one to pass, and to kill any one who attempted to escape. Not a word was said of Miranda. When all was ready, Pena, Casas, and Bolivar, at two o'clock in the morning, with four armed soldiers, entered the unlocked room of general Miranda. He was in a profound sleep. They seized his sword and pistols, which he had placed before him. They then awakened him, and abruptly told him to rise and dress himself quickly, and follow them. Miranda, in surprise, asked them why they awakened him at such an early hour, it being not yet daylight. Instead of answering the question, they told him he was a traitor, who deserved to be hanged, &c.

Miranda, unable to resist, dressed himself, and was forced to follow. They escorted him to the fort called San Carlos, at some distance from Lagaira, and situated upon a strong hill, where he arrived, exhausted from fatigue and chagrin. Having borne all the invectives they chose to load him with on the road, which he was obliged to walk, as soon as they were come to the fort, they ordered him to be put in irons, and notwithstanding his pathetic and fervent expostulations, he was locked in one of the darkest dungeons, and treated like the vilest criminal.

The three chiefs returned, with their guard to Lagaira, and the same night, despatched an express with a letter to the Spanish general Monteverde, informing him of the arrest of Miranda. This commander was surprised at the intelligence ; but instead of ordering the immediate release of Miranda, and so preserving inviolate the faith of his own treaty, he received the news with his accustomed indifference and apathy, and took no step in favor of Miranda, or against him.

The day after Miranda's arrest, a Spanish column arrived in the fort of San Carlos, to relieve the independents. Its commander was surprised to find Miranda in irons, and sent him immediately, with an escort, back to Lagaira, where he was again shut up in a dark mephitic prison, made in one of the walls of this place, where he remained in irons during several months. The Spanish commandant Don Francisco Xavier Cerveres, who had relieved the patriot commander Casas, gave orders to send Miranda to Porto Rico. He was thence transported to Cadiz where he remained in irons, in the fort of La Caraca for some years, and perished.

Such was the miserable end of Gen. Miranda. Without entering into any political controversy ; without enquiring whether Miranda was a traitor to his country, (which well informed men affirm to have not been the case,) history will demand what right Dr. Miguel Pena, Don Maira Casas and Simon Bolivar, had to arrest their former chief and superior. That they did so without order, information, or participation of the Spanish general in chief Domingo Monteverde, is an undoubted fact.

The earthquake, the weakness of the captain general Millares, and the treaty with Miranda, in a short time rendered the midshipman Domingo Monteverde, master of a beautiful province, general in chief of an army, and sovereign arbiter of about a million of souls. Monteverde was weak, apathetick and superstitious. The friars, monks and priests, had the greatest influence over him. So also had the Islenos, inhabitants of the Canary Islands, where he was born, and of whom many were established at Caracas, La-

guira and Valentia. These all, persecuted their enemies, abused their power, and ruined many thousand inhabitants.

When the particulars of Gen. Miranda's arrest were known at Caracas, and it was ascertained that Monteverde acquiesced in it, all the friars, monks and Islenos gave a loose to their passions, and Venezuela again became the theatre of frightful scenes. The following are selected out of thousands of facts. Monteverde had with him two favorites, both distinguished by their cruel and sanguinary conduct. He tolerated, and never punished their most daring atrocities. Both were colonels—Joseph Antonanza, and Juan Suasola.

After the treaty of Vittoria, 26th July, 1812, many troops—whole corps—passed from the republican to the Spanish army, and presented themselves to Monteverde, whose head quarters were then at Valencia. The 30th of July, some forty of these soldiers came to the Spanish general and offered their services. Monteverde received them with kindness, and ordered Col. Suasola to take an escort and protect them on their road to Caracas, where new Spanish corps were to be formed. Suasola was displeased at being obliged to leave Valencia, (where it is said he had an intrigue.) He obeyed, however, and selecting a strong detachment of men entirely devoted to him, he departed with his charge. After some hours march, he ordered a halt, and a circle to be formed by his troops, and the patriot soldiers to be placed in the centre. He then drew his sword, and in few words, exhorted his troops to kill these “d——d rebels,”—to follow his example. He then fell upon them with his sword, and, assisted by his troops, murdered with swords and bayonets, every individual of the republican soldiers. Not a man of them escaped.

Suasola, gay and satisfied, returned to Valencia. Monteverde, knowing that he could not have made his journey in the short time of his absence, enquired in surprise, what was the matter. “Oh general,” replied Suasola, laughing, “I have found out an excellent way to shorten my voyage,” giving him to understand by an unequivocal sign, that he had murdered the men placed under his care. “Oh! very well, very well,” said Monteverde, “I did not know; it is well done, very well done.” Suasola, it need not be told, remained unpunished, and free as before.

The same Suasola, encouraged by this criminal weakness, entered, sometime afterwards, the city of Aragua, where the inhabitants came out in solemnity, some distance, to meet and honor a man who was known to be one of the favorites of their new commander in chief. He arrived at the public square, where refreshments were beforehand prepared for him and his troops. After having spent merrily more than an hour, he gave a secret order to his troops

to seize men, women and children, and cut off their ears, and bring them to him. This savage order was executed notwithstanding all the cries, supplications and resistance of the inhabitants. He ordered some trunks to be filled with these sanguinary trophies which he sent to his companion and friend colonel Antonanza, then governor at Cumana, with a pathetic letter, requesting him to "accept this present as a proof of his zeal in the cause of his beloved king Ferdinand VII." This conduct was highly praised by his friend, and a part of the trophies were sent by him to Caracas. Some of them he wore in his hat by way of cockade, and painful to relate, his vile example was followed by various inhabitants of Cumana. But I must add, many did it through fear, it being the practice of the Spanish troops, to threaten all who did not follow their example.

The colonel Antonanza, as well as Suasola, committed the most barbarous and cruel acts throughout the provinces of Cumana and Barcelona, in which they commanded. The first having heard that the inhabitants of Araura were distinguished in the last war, by their patriotism, and their zeal for independence, resolved to punish them in an exemplary manner. In violation of the solemn promise of amnesty, he marched with a numerous body of troops upon the city of Araura. Many of the inhabitants, well aware of his cruelty, fled hastily, but the greater number remained, being assured by his emissaries, that he was coming with specific intentions, and that he would faithfully observe the amnesty. After this a great many persons, particularly women and children, came to welcome him, offering whatever their poor and wretched circumstances could afford. He took the refreshments, and suddenly gave orders to murder every man, woman, and child. Of this horrid massacre, many circumstances are known, which my pen refuses to describe. Antonanza and his troops plundered and burnt the city, and Monteverde remained quiet.

His government was in reality, nothing but the most complete and sanguinary anarchy. Each commander of the smallest detachment followed his own will and caprice. The vast territory of Venezuela was again the theatre of murders, cruelties, and all sanguinary deeds, committed without the consent of Monteverde, who, if he heard of them, if some few dared to complain, could not afford them any redress, his authority being usurped by these chiefs who despised his weakness, and did every thing according to their own will and pleasure.

In consequence of this weakness, not a single article of the treaty of Vittoria was fulfilled. Each Spaniard or Isleno became an accuser or a tyrant; and the prisons were soon so crowded, that at Caracas and Lagaira, the commanders were obliged to convert various large houses into prisons. Want of air and of food

caused various maladies, and many thousands fell victims to their confinement.

One evening, while a stranger was with Monteverde, upon some business, the secretary handed him some papers to be signed. He took, and signed them one after another, and handed them back to the secretary. While the latter was in the act of withdrawing, Monteverde, in the manner of one waking from a dream, inquired their contents, "they contain" answered the secretary with a smile, "orders to arrest some mischievous individuals," and he departed with them, without another word from the general in chief. The stranger who was on good terms with Monteverde could not repress his feelings, but, with frankness and warmth, pointed out the consequences of such proceedings. "What can I do sir," replied Monteverde, "to know their crimes, is it not necessary first to secure their persons? afterwards they will be tried and judged!" No inquiry was made relative to their supposed crimes, and a great many arrested for political opinions, perished miserably in prison.

Monteverde, anxious to retain his ill acquired authority, consulted his friend and countryman, the post captain in the navy, Don Jose Antonio Tiscar, how he should act in these critical circumstances. The captain advised him to write to his legitimate chief the Capt. Gen. Don Fernando Millares, (whose cowardice had frightened him from Maracaybo to Coro, and thence to the island of Porto Rico,) inviting him to come and take into his hands the civil authority and the command of the army. Such was the weakness of Monteverde's character, that he followed this advice in spite of his own wishes and intentions. As soon as Millares received this letter, he hastened to embark with a numerous suite, and landed at Porto Cabello. Monteverde was then at Valencia; whence he wrote a second letter to Millares, telling him that Venezuela, being not entirely pacified, it would be detrimental to the cause to instal him at that moment. That all had best remain as it was, for a short time, when he would put into his hands the power which properly belonged to him. He added, that he himself should then depart for Spain, where he hoped to be rewarded by the Cortes for his zeal and services.

Millares, believing he should take possession of his new and brilliant charge, without having done any thing to deserve it, came over from Porto Rico with a number of civil and military officers, all anxious to be employed. Among the latter were the Mareschal de Campo de D. T. Cagigal and the brigadier general Fierro. The friends of Millares, of stronger and more courageous minds, advised him to march, without delay, to Caracas, where the Spanish government was already established, and to take possession of the of-

fice which the regency and Cortes had entrusted to *him*, and not to Monteverde. But Millares refused to follow this advice, and preferred sending the brigadier Fierro to negotiate with Monteverde, and learn definitely his intentions. Fierro arrived at Monteverde's head quarters, and had various conferences with him; but he was obliged to return with the simple verbal answer, that Monteverde neither could nor would change his last determination not to deliver the command into the hands of the captain general before all was pacified.

Millares humbly submitted to the will of his subaltern, and departed for Maracaybo, where he waited several months for the expected message from Monteverde. Perceiving at last, that he was the object of ridicule, he left the Main, and his supposed grandeur, forever, and returned, as paymaster (countedor) to Spain.

As soon as Monteverde was sure that the captain general had departed, he proclaimed himself captain general, and commander of the naval and land forces of Venezuela; and leaving Valencia, made his solemn entry into the capital of Caracas, on the 9th August, 1812.

Before this, he issued a proclamation full of the highest promises. He said, "Caraguins! the time has at last come, when you can enjoy perfect tranquility and security, from which you were driven, two years ago, by seduction and crimes. I promise—I pledge my oath now to you, that I can, and will protect your felicity. Let us forget all that has passed. For my part, I will give you a proof, in forgiving your errors, and in maintaining, in all its vigor, the treaty of Vittoria, and never shall you have reason to complain of me."

But, on the very day of his entry into Caracas, the people, both there, and at Lagaira, committed the greatest disorders. All strangers, established in the time of the republic, in both cities, were very ill treated; the mob took all they possessed—plundering their houses and stores. Many of them were arrested and thrown into prison, whence they escaped with the greatest difficulty.

Such was the anarchical state of Venezuela under the government of Monteverde. Before I close this chapter, I will relate some particulars yet unknown to the world, relative to the origin of his usurped power.

When the revolution began, and Emparan was arrested, the regency appointed Millares, then governor of Maracaybo, captain general of Venezuela. He was proclaimed as such in the provinces still in possession of Spain. And when hostilities began, he came from Maracaybo to Coro, where he ordered the sea forces to assemble, in readiness to assist him in the military operations.

Among the officers of the navy was Domingo Monteverde, an inhabitant of the Canary Islands, without education, and possessed of

very little knowledge ; but ambitious and enterprising. He begged leave to come on shore, and presented himself before the new captain general Millares. He was poor and badly clothed. The general received him with a haughty and disdainful air, asking him abruptly, what he wanted. The lieutenant Monteverde answered, that he wanted his excellency's permission to raise a corps, of at least a thousand men, for the purpose of driving the insurgents out of the country, or subjecting them to their duty. Millares, astonished at his request, replied that he was an audacious subaltern, that he should immediately return to his duty in his vessel, and that he must not come again to trouble him with such demands, and dismissed him. Monteverde was not intimidated by the ill humor of the general, but continued, in such an original kind of way, to represent to him the usefulness of such a corps, that the general could not help being diverted ; and, at length, very graciously granted the order so perseveringly sought by the lieutenant, who now obtained orders to take from the vessels of the squadron, old muskets, swords and uniforms, and, in a few days, the new commander found himself at the head of 200 vagabonds, who afterwards increased to the number of as many thousands.

Such was the origin of the power of Domingo Monteverde ; and we have seen how he afterwards treated his chieftain and benefactor.

CHAPTER VI.

Departure of Lieut. Col. Bolivar from Caracas to Curacao, and Carthagena—Expedition of Bolivar against the Spanish in Venezuela—His entry into Caracas—His nomination as Dictator—Year 1813.

We left Lieut. Col. Bolivar with Doct. Miguel Pera and commandant Casas at Lagaira, after, having arrested Miranda in the port of San Carlos. Bolivar returned quietly to his country seat where he resumed his usual occupations. But he soon observed that vexations and arrests became more and more frequent, so that he felt not assured of his own safety. Soon after the entry of Monteverde into Caracas, he had an audience of this Spanish commander, who received him most graciously, and expressed to him his satisfaction that he, Bolivar, had been an instrument in punishing the traitor Miranda, that rebel to his king. He readily granted him a passport to leave the country, and hearing it was his wish to go to Curacao, he gave him a letter of strong recommendation to the same English merchant of whom I have already spoken, and who was on his departure from Porto Cabello; urging him to take Col. Bolivar as passenger in his own vessel. Bolivar joined him, and found him on board, ready to sail. As soon as Mr. F. L. opened Monteverde's letter and found that the name of the bearer was Simon Bolivar, he expressed, in strong terms his disapprobation of his conduct towards Miranda, and, without permitting him to offer a word in reply, ordered him to leave the vessel, telling him that no consideration would have induced him to receive him on board. Bolivar attempted in vain, to justify himself. He was compelled to leave the vessel and go on shore. But, soon afterwards, finding another vessel, he embarked with his cousin Joseph Felix Ribas, for Curacao, where he passed some time, devoting himself to gambling and other amusements: the two cousins, possessing a large amount in gold. After about six weeks, they left Curacao for Carthagena, where they were well received.

At that time (1812) Manuel Rodriguez Torrices was president of the republic of Carthagena; an honest, good, and liberal man;

by profession a lawyer; who received every stranger with kindness. He promoted the two cousins Bolivar and Ribas, (who offered their services in the republican army under the order of a Frenchman, Peter Labatut) at the instigation of the latter, to the rank of colonels. Previous to their arrival, a great number of Caraguins, who had served under Miranda at Venezuela, came to Carthagena, and all were anxious to hear news of events in their own country.

The colonel Ribas, brave and patriotic, the same who was one of the leaders of the revolution in Caracas, inspired them with his own zeal and ardor, and proposed to them to form an expedition against the Spaniards in Venezuela, for the purpose of delivering his countrymen from their yoke. He told them they could not fail to be joined by great numbers, as soon as they arrived on the frontiers of Venezuela. All the Caraguins, and a number of strangers who had served under Miranda, received this proposition with rapture; and Ribas immediately proposed Bolivar, then a colonel, as commander of the expedition. Bolivar was not beloved, and his vanity, pride, and coldness, rendered him unpopular. He was known also to have left his garrison at Porto Cabello, and to have participated in the arrest of their beloved old general Miranda.—However, Ribas, who was sincerely attached to his cousin, managed affairs so well, that they consented at last to name colonel Bolivar their commander in chief, with the express condition that colonel Ribas should be his major general and second in command. So did it happen that Bolivar was elected.

These circumstances, trifling as they may appear, were the origin of the subsequent grandeur and military power of general Bolivar; who, as I shall prove by facts, has ever had the fortune to profit by the bravery, skill and patriotism of others. When Ribas was killed, Bolivar fled. Piar conquered Guayana in the absence of Bolivar, and was condemned to death; Brion died in poverty when Bolivar was at the head of the government; Paez was victorious when Bolivar was not with him, and beaten when the latter directed the operations; Sucre gained the battle of Ayachucho in Peru when Bolivar was sick.

The plan of an expedition against the Spaniards in Venezuela, was immediately communicated to the president of Carthagena, who highly approved of it, and authorised such officers as would follow this new expedition, to quit the service of that province and join it. He gave orders that they should be provided with money, arms, amunition, provisions, transports, &c. and persuaded his cousin, colonel Manuel Castillo, to join Bolivar, with about 500 men from the garrison of Carthagena, to assist him in his enterprise.

Bolivar, assisted by Ribas, Briceno and others, enlisted about 300 men, and with these and colonel Castillo's troops, he departed in the beginning of January, 1813.

But after some days march a dissention relative to the right to command, arose between Bolivar and Castillo, and increased to a great height. Colonel Castillo pretended to the exclusive command of the troops from Carthagena, because the president had entrusted to him the 500 men. Bolivar represented that the same president had authorised him to command in chief the whole expedition. An inveterate hatred, as is well known, has long existed between the inhabitants of Caracas or Venezuela, and those of Grenada. The former generally despise the latter. This division was soon established between these two parties. The troops of Castillo, all Grenadans, and the most numerous party, began to insult the Caraguins, who very properly recognised Bolivar as commander in chief of the expedition. The strangers took the part of the latter, and every thing foreboded a general and serious conflict. It was plainly the duty of Castillo to declare himself under the orders of Bolivar, and to soothe and appease his troops; instead of which, he suddenly departed, and returned with them to Carthagena. He excused his defection by saying that the haughty and despotic character of Bolivar could never agree with his; and, strange to relate, this desertion remained unpunished.

This conduct of Castillo was the ground of bitter and lasting hatred between him and Bolivar, who, as soon as he was informed of the nomination of Castillo, as commander in chief of the army of Carthagena, in 1815, warmly remonstrated with the government of Carthagena, on the subject, as we shall see hereafter.

Bolivar remained with about three hundred men, and was so discouraged, that he thought to go back to Carthagena, for the purpose of obtaining a further supply of troops, fearing that the expedition might otherwise fail entirely. But colonels Ribas and Briceno, persuaded him, at length, to pursue his course, at least, as far as Bogota, at that time the seat of the congress of New Grenada, where, they assured him, they should find support. He consented, and embarking on the river Magdalena, they arrived at the city of Mompox, where they were perfectly well received, and supplied with money and provisions, and some hundred recruits. Besides receiving more troops and large supplies for his expedition, Bolivar had the satisfaction of being received, with his small corps, by the congress at Bogota, with great distinction.

The inhabitants of New Granada, having heard of the vexations and cruelties committed by Monteverde and his subalterns in Venezuela, were excited to such a pitch of indignation, that Bolivar named

general, with his cousin J. F. Ribas, met volunteers wherever they passed, so that his troops, in a short time increased to the amount of more than two thousand men. Having passed the Andes in the provinces of Tunja and Pamplona, he crossed the river Taihira which separates New Grenada from Venezuela.

Every circumstance favored the splendid enterprise of general Bolivar: the farther he advanced, the greater were his resources. As soon as he had crossed the river Jaihira, his proclamations, spread throughout the country, united many thousand of his countrymen, who saw in him their deliverer from destruction and despair. He was now able to divide his forces into different corps, and to detach colonel Briceno to Guadalito for the purpose of organizing there a strong body of cavalry, of which he was in great need. This was done in a short time; for the richer classes in the neighborhood were so anxious to serve in the expedition, that they voluntarily armed, equipped, and mounted themselves, at their own expense.

Bolivar marched directly against the enemy, who, by his sudden appearance, were surprised, astonished, and discouraged. The Spanish army, being composed, as usual, of three fourth's Creoles, these deserted by hundreds; entire corps—battalions—regiments—came over to the independents, so that Bolivar found but a very feeble resistance, wherever he appeared. He beat his enemy at La Grita, and took possession of that small place, as he did afterwards of Merida and the whole district of that name, and also of the province of Barinas.

The Spaniards having rallied and reinforced themselves, fell suddenly upon the corps of Briceno, and beat him completely. He and seven of his officers were taken; and the governor of Barinas, Don Francisco Tiscar, ordered them to be shot. Eight of the most respectable inhabitants of Barinas, being suspected of having assisted colonel Briceno in his organization, were also shot! From that time, the war became much more bloody and murderous. Not only was every prisoner shot, but various Spanish chieftains extended this system to the peaceable inhabitants, without distinction of sex or age!

The reason the governor, Tiscar, gave for ordering the death of Briceno and his officers, was, their having been the principal instigators and signers of the proclamation of January 10th, 1813; in which they declared that they would put to death all Spaniards and Islenos (inhabitants of the Canary Islands) that might be taken prisoners.

Of that sanguinary document, the following are the true causes: "Bolivar and his companions, while upon their march from Carthage to Venezuela, heard that the Spaniards and Islenos committed

the most barbarous acts upon the peaceable inhabitants in Venezuela, who, in virtue of the convention between Miranda and Monteverde, had confidently resumed their former occupations." It will be remembered that Monteverde was born in one of the Canary Islands. Surrounded, as he was, by numbers of his countrymen, he was weak enough to concede altogether to their passions, and their hatred against all who took an active part in the revolution at Caracas. This news so embittered all the Caraguins, companions in arms of general Bolivar, that they published a solemn declaration in form of a manifesto, in which they proclaimed the "war of death" against all the European Spaniards and the Islenos. The manifesto was signed by Antonio Nicolas Briceno, (the same who was shot at Barinas,) Antonio Rodrigo, Joseph Debraiue, and others, all officers under the orders of general Bolivar in his expedition against Venezuela. The Spaniards accused Bolivar of signing this sanguinary declaration, and said he began the proclaiming of the "war of death;" but he never did sign it. To be sure, he should not have suffered the publication of a paper, so strongly characteristic of the bitterness of both parties. But it is true, on the other hand, that the European chieftains put to death, not only various American prisoners of war, but peaceable inhabitants also, before the manifesto was published; and that the officers of general Bolivar, acted in retaliation of what these Spaniards had done to their countrymen at Venezuela. Whether such retaliation be justifiable or not, is left to the reader.

We will now occupy a moment with a personage who has been for several years the colleague and rival of general Bolivar; and who has acquired one of those equivocal reputations which it is the province of history to set in their true light.

Soon after the conclusion of the capitulation at Vittoria, and when the cruelties of the inhabitants of Venezuela had begun, a weak and ignorant, but very ambitious young man, assembled about 100 of his fellow citizens out of the city, at Cumana, where they held secret meetings. In these, he excited them to rise against their oppressors, and to arm themselves in favor of liberty and independence. His speech was received with enthusiasm, and he was unanimously named general in chief. This is the military origin of *San Yago Marino*, who, from a student, rose suddenly to the station of general in chief of the army of the province of Cumana, which counted not 150 soldiers. The cruelties of the Spaniards soon brought him many adherents, which were the more attached to him, as he was of a mild, polite and humane character. He established his head quarters at Maturin.

As soon as general Monteverde heard of this, he ordered general Cagigal to join him with his strong brigade, appointing the day

when, and place where, they should form their union, to attack the troops, posted at Maturin, under general Marino. Monteverde took no more than 200 men, and having arrived at the place of rendezvous, he found neither Cagigal nor his troops. Monteverde anxious for the combat, positively refused to listen to any prudent counsel, and in a fierce tone, gave orders to attack "these traitors and rebels." The patriots were six times as strong as he, and advantageously posted. After a short conflict, he was totally routed, as his officers had predicted. His horse being killed, he would have fallen into the hands of the patriots, if the presence of mind of a reverend capuchin, named Father Coronel, hadn't saved him. Coronel was fighting bravely at his side; when the horse fell, he seized the general, and, with his nervous arms, without dismounting, placed him upon his own vigorous horse, and made full speed from the field of battle.

When general Cagigal, who arrived 24 hours after the defeat, learned how imprudently his commander had acted, his indignation was excited. But instead of attacking with his own strong corps, an enemy weakened and fatigued by the recent combat, he was discouraged, thought all was lost, and that the whole province of Venezuela must become the prey of the patriots. He declared publicly, that he would take refuge in the province of Guayana, to save himself and his troops. His strange declaration so exasperated one of his captains, Joseph Thomas Boves, who heard it, that, forgetting the respect due to his commander, he boldly remonstrated against so base a step. But seeing that the panic of his general rendered him incapable of listening to reason, and that he had resolved at all events, to depart, Boves told him plainly and bluntly, that the general would act as he liked, but that, for his own part, he was firmly resolved to remain in Venezuela, and there combat the enemies of his king and country, as long as one of them should exist! Cagigal, seeing that Boves was inflexible, authorised him to organise a body of troops, for his purpose, as numerous as he could collect, and then departed, with a strong escort, for the purpose of putting himself in safety in the fortress of St. Tomas de la Angostura, in the then subdued and quiet province of Guayana.

Boves having rallied as many as would follow him, came in April, 1813, to the city of Calabazo, where he established his head quarters. He soon organised his corps of infantry and cavalry, which amounted to about 500 men. This was the origin of that famous partizan, who was distinguished afterwards during the war, by his astonishing activity, bravery and skill, but still more by his barbarous cruelty, of which I shall have more than one instance to relate.

Marino, proud of his little success, now took the title of general in chief, and dictator of the eastern provinces of Venezuela. He imposed great contributions, established a luxurious mode of living, created generals, officers of the staff and others, and a great many civil officers. But he had no fixed territory, nor any well instructed officers, and still less had he any well disciplined soldiers. He had, as is usually the case, where troops are hastily raised, a band of armed men, without uniforms or instruction.

During these events in the provinces of Cumana and Barcelona, general Bolivar entered the western provinces of Venezuela. He was joined by many thousands of his countrymen, who driven to despair by the cruelties of the Spaniards, had no choice but to fight, or perish. He divided his forces into two strong corps, gave the command of one to his major general Ribas, and put himself at the head of the other. Both proceeded by forced marches, through different roads to Caracas, crossing the department of Truxillo and the province of Barinas. The Spaniards were beaten easily at Niquitao, Betioque, Barquisimeto and Barinas. At the last place, governor Tiscar, like general Cagigal, thought all was lost, and deserted his troops. He fled to St. Tomas de la Angostura, in the province of Guayana, where, like the other, he found himself in safety.

As soon as general Monteverde was apprised of the rapid progress of the patriots, he rallied his best troops at Lostaguanes, where general Ribas attacked him soon afterwards. The attack had but just commenced, when the greatest part of his cavalry, composed of natives, passed over to the patriots and soon decided the victory in their favor. Monteverde lost some hundreds of his men, and was obliged to shut himself up with the remainder, in the fortress of Porto Cabello.

General Bolivar advanced rapidly upon Caracas, and found very little or no resistance on the part of the enemy, who had concentrated his forces against the column of general Ribas. As soon as governor Fierro heard of the approach of general Bolivar, he hastily assembled a great council of war, in which it was concluded to send deputies to Bolivar, proposing a capitulation. This was made and signed at Vittoria, about a year after the famous capitulation between general Miranda and Monteverde. By this treaty Bolivar promised that no one should be persecuted for his political opinions, and that every one should be at liberty to retire with his property from Venezuela, and go whithersoever he pleased.

While the deputies were assembled at Vittoria, governor Fierro, seized, like Cagigal and Tiscar, by panic terror, decamped in the night time, secretly, and so hastily that he left, as was afterwards ascertained, a very large amount of silver money. He left also

more than 1500 Spaniards, at the discretion of the enemy. He embarked at Lagaira, and arrived in safety at the little island of Curacao. The flight of their governor, of which the inhabitants and the garrison were not informed, until day break the next morning, left the city in the greatest trouble, for he left not a single order. The Spanish party being dissolved, every one was left to provide for his own safety. Its principal chiefs, Monteverde, Cagigal, Fierro and Tiscar, acting in conformity, each to his own will, had all placed themselves in safety indeed, but without the least union or vigor : Monteverde remained in Porto Cabello without sending forth any order ; Cagigal remained with Tiscar, at Angostura ; and Fierro in the island of Curacao.

It was therefore an easy task for Bolivar to enter the capital of his native land, and to take possession of the greatest part of Venezuela. His entry into Caracas, (August 4th, 1813,) was brilliant and glorious. The friends of liberty, who had suffered so severely, surrounded him from every corner of the country, and welcomed his arrival with many signs of joy and festivity. The enthusiasm was universal, reaching every class and sex of the inhabitants of Caracas. The fair sex came to crown their liberator. They spread the ground with many flowers, branches of laurel and olive, on his passage through the streets of the capital. The shouts of thousands were mingled with the noise of artillery, bells, and music, and the crowd was immense. The prisons were opened, and the unfortunate victims of liberty came forth with pale and emaciated faces, like spectres from their graves. But notwithstanding this appalling sight, the people indulged not their sentiments and feelings of vengeance against the authors of such cruel deeds. They committed no disorder. No European Spaniard, Isleno, friar or priest, was dragged from his hiding place, nor even sought for ; all were happy, and thought only of rejoicing.

The entry of Gen. Bolivar into Caracas, was certainly the most gratifying event of his whole military career. And notwithstanding his enterprise and his victories were greatly facilitated by the astonishing pusillanimity of his enemies, he deserves great praise for his perseverance, and for the conception of such an undertaking, in which he sacrificed a considerable part of his fortune, to furnish his troops with the means of following him. But here, I cannot omit to mention a singular and characteristic trait of that vanity of which I have already spoken. Previous to his entry into Caracas, a kind of triumphal car was prepared, like that which the Roman Consuls used, on returning from a campaign, after an important victory. Their's was drawn by horses ; but Bolivar's car was drawn by twelve fine young ladies, very elegantly dressed in white, adorned with the national colors, and all selected from the first

families in Caracas. They drew him, in about half an hour, from the entrance of the city to his residence; he, standing on the car, bare-headed, and in full uniform, with a small wand of command in his hand. To do this, was surely extraordinary on their part; to suffer it, was surely much more so on his. Many thousands were eye witnesses of the scene. To them I appeal for the truth of this account of it.

The enthusiasm of the inhabitants of Caracas lasted but a short time. Bolivar, inflated with his sudden successes, assumed, in the capital, after a few days, the title of "Dictator and Liberator of the western provinces of Venezuela," in emulation of Gen. Marino, who had taken the title of "Dictator of the Eastern Provinces." The denomination of Eastern and Western, arises from the geographical situation of the provinces of Cumana and Barcelona, which lie east from Caracas, of which Marino was entire master. Bolivar gave the name of "liberating army" to all those troops which came with him; and established an order of knighthood, called "the order of the Liberator," which exists to the present day, with this alteration, that the singular, "del Libertador," has been changed into "la orden de los Libertadores" in the plural. He established a choice corps of troops, called his body guard, expressly and exclusively destined to his personal service, named to it a great many officers of the staff and others, and was soon surrounded with flatterers and sycophants.

Various true friends of liberty, and of the Dictator's glory, advised him to assemble a Congress, and to establish a representative government, like that of the first congress at Caracas. Among them was the late admiral of Colombia, Louis Brion, who died at the island of Curacao. I might mention various othes. Bolivar answered them that he wished to consider this advice, but that it would be inconvenient, for the present, to assemble a congress.

Meanwhile he organised his government, in which he united in himself, the three powers, legislative, executive, and judicial; in virtue of which, he became absolute master of the liberty, property and lives of his countrymen. He named to offices, those who could flatter him most. This dictatorship was nothing more nor less than an absolute, despotic, military government.

The eight beautiful provinces of Venezuela, were now divided between three military chieftains, viz. Gen. Monteverde, commander in chief of the Spanish forces which occupied the provinces of Guayana, Maracaybo, and Coro; Gen. Bolivar dictator in the provinces of Caracas, Barinas, and Margarita; and Gen. Marino, dictator in those of Cumana and Barcelona.

Each of these chieftains had his governors, generals, commandants, civil and military officers, and troops; who all lived,

at the expense of the inhabitants. Each of them raised, armed, organized and equiped troops; issued proclamations, manifestos, and decrees. These bulletins were often so inflated and involved, that it was extremely difficult to ascertain their meaning; and what was worse still, they frequently interfered with each other, in-somuch that it was impossible to decide which ought to be obeyed. To day, a city, town, or village, was occupied by troops of one of these chieftains; to morrow, by those of another. The subalterns and soldiers were, of course, masters of the inhabitants; and they ordered immediate supplies of money, provisions, and all other necessaries. There were no laws, no regulations, no order: bayonets, and the caprices of each little armed band of soldiers, so called, were, for the time, rulers of the citizens. A stronger band drove them out, and new vexations, new demands, new provisions, were the order of the day. This anarchy rendered the inhabitants of Venezuela so miserable, and so doubtful on which of these governments to rely, that many of the most distinguished natives realized what they could of their fortunes, and embarked with their families, in search of another country, where security of person and property could be found. The United States of America, and the West India Islands received many thousands of them.

It is a curious and astonishing proof of the imbecility of general Bolivar's character, (of which I shall give more than one proof) that, powerful as he then was, he suffered a young, inexperienced and ignorant individual, San Yago Marino, to raise himself to be his rival, when he might have brought him to act under his orders. This Eastern Dictatorship was nothing but a division of the territory of the republic of Venezuela, as already established by the congress assembled at Caracas, in 1811. The provinces of Cumana and Barcelona, then made an integral part of its territory, had been always governed by the first congress, like the other provinces of Venezuela, (except Guayana, Coro, and Maracaybo) and ought never to have been separated from them. This division of power, this rivalry between the two dictators, had the worst effects upon the welfare of the inhabitants, and upon the righteous cause of liberty. It lessened, considerably, the strength of each, and increased the power of the enemy. It was the cause of the extraordinary duration of the war; and the loss of the lives of so many human beings more.

When the inhabitants of the other provinces heard of general Bolivar's arrival at Caracas, a new hope arose for their deliverance and freedom, and numerous volunteers, from all quarters and corners, came to offer their services to the new dictator.

The funds found in the royal treasury, and those voluntarily offered, united to the revenues, should have been sufficient to

organise these volunteers into corps, and to discipline them, so that they should have been able to expel their discouraged and diminished oppressors, from their territory forever. If general Bolivar had possessed common talents in the arts of war, and for civil government; nay, if he would have followed the advice of able and experienced men, it would have been an easy task, in the space of three months, to finish this bloody war, and give freedom and happiness to his unfortunate countrymen.

In the month of August, 1813, Bolivar was far more powerful than any sovereign now living in the world, in proportion to the country, and the resources of the people. Both sexes, of every color and description, (and among them many Spaniards, Islenos, monks and priests,) were anxious to assist him, who, so solemnly promised them freedom and prosperity. The enthusiasm of the times, spread its sacred light through the whole country; it awakened the indolent inhabitants of those immense steppes and plains, known under the name of the Llaneros, who, afterwards, so singularly distinguished themselves under the orders of Paez, Sedeno, Jarasa, Roxas, Monagas, and others. Money, merchandise, horses, mules, cattle; even jewels, pearls, diamonds, golden chains, and other ornaments of the fair sex, were offered, with the kindest readiness, to Bolivar, to assist him in his glorious enterprise.

Nothing, therefore, was wanting but ability to unite, classify and direct these vast materials and resources, and skill and inclination to surround himself with men of probity, experience, knowledge, talents and prudence. To them he might have confided the direction of the different and complicated branches of his new government. All these they would have simplified, establishing the strictest economy in each department. The most successful, the most brilliant results, would have been obtained, and Bolivar himself would have deserved to be compared with Washington.

But to the great detriment of his country, and the cause of freedom, Bolivar rejected the advice of the friends of rational liberty. They advised him to a course of prudence and to the enacting of wise laws, and for the purpose of introducing economy and order into his new government. He formed a government of his own, such as it was. It consisted of four secretaries of state, one at the head of each of the departments, of the interior, of justice and mercy, or pardon, [*de justicia y gracia*] of the finances and of war. All received their orders and instructions directly from the dictator, with whom they wrote in his cabinet, when he had the leisure and pleasure to receive them. Every thing was submitted entirely to him, and his decision rendered a person the most fortunate, or the most wretched being.

He alone directed all military operations, by sea and land ; issued proclamations, and made regulations and laws. He united in himself all the powers and attributes of an absolute and despotic sovereign. Anxious for his authority, he never suffered another to decide in any case. Wishing to do all himself, he confused every thing, for every thing was done in a hurry. Moreover, Bolivar, like most of his countrymen, loved ease and his pleasures, better than exertion. His favorite occupations were, being in the company of his numerous mistresses, and lying in his hammock surrounded by his flatterers. They amused him with their stories, and their satirical and witty sallies, on absent persons who had had the misfortune to displease the dictator. The most important business was placed and left in the hands of these flatterers, particularly of Segnorita Josephine M., his acknowledged mistress, who had the greatest influence over him, and who was extremely intriguing and vindictive. I have seen her more than an hundred times, and must confess that I could hardly account for the dictator's predilection for her. It lasted, however, until 1819.

These occupations consumed much of his time ; the remainder was spent in riding out and in business. Each of his secretaries of departments made to him a summary report of what had been transacted in his office, and also a summary proposal of what ought to be done. In one word, he wished to imitate Napoleon Bonaparte, and was highly pleased when Charles Soublette told him, in my hearing, at Campano, in May, 1816, that he was the Napoleon of South America.

Bolivar's manner of governing was very prejudicial in its consequences. Its defects were soon felt in the army, in the navy, in every branch of the public administration. The public revenues were insufficient, and the want of money was felt every where.—The dictator had expended large sums upon his mistresses and his flatterers ; other large sums were employed in the purchase of arms, amunition and warlike stores from abroad. But a great part was spent upon the companions, flatterers, or relations of the dictator. They took the money, departed, and returned no more.

This want of money was not easily supplied. The measures adopted by the dictator to procure money, were a greater evil than the want of it. These measures justly made him many enemies. Amongst others, may be cited the extraordinary taxes, arbitrarily laid upon individuals designated by him, and demanded at his pleasure without order or system. Some one, for example, told him that Don N. had sums of money concealed, or that he was an enemy to the common cause. Bolivar immediately sent a detachment of his body guards, in the night, to the house of N. They surrounded it, and, in the name of the dictator, penetrated sudden-

ly to his bed chamber, where the officer notified him that his master wanted money, and named a sum to be given into the hands of the officer. At another time, the sum demanded, was required to be paid within a certain number of days. If the inhabitant, for whatever reason, did not comply, he was put into prison, and harshly treated, until, by the help of friends, or in some other way, he obtained the means of complying with the demands of the dictator.

When the impartial reader recollects what happened at Laguiria and Caracas, in April and May, 1827, upon the seizure of some American merchants, that they were put into prison because they would not pay an extraordinary tax imposed upon them by the president Liberator, although they alleged that the government owed them a much larger sum which they had advanced, for which they held treasury obligations, (vales) and that Bolivar refused these, and persisted in demanding their cash; he will not be surprised on hearing what the same Bolivar did in 1813, at Caracas.

Were I to relate all that happened during the twelve months of the dictatorship of Simon Bolivar, I should form another large volume. It will suffice to say, that the anarchy of Monteverde gave way to another anarchy more insupportable to the inhabitants of Venezuela, because they expected from their countryman any thing but what he actually brought upon them.

In August, 1813, the dictator sent a body of troops, under the command of colonel Giraldat, to besiege the castle of Porto Cabello, the same which he himself, as its governor, had deserted a year before. General Monteverde, after his defeat at Maturin, had shut himself up in this place, and he was again defeated by general Ribas, at Lostaguanes. He was greatly embittered against the dictator Bolivar, whom he had so kindly received, and so strongly protected, after the active part he had taken in the arrest of general Miranda. Monteverde not only gave a passport to Bolivar and his cousin Ribas, but recommended him strongly to a merchant of Curacao (Mr. Fr. L——,) who was ready to sail; being fully persuaded that Bolivar would retire and take no further active part in this war, he said publicly, that he had been betrayed by the dictator, and would have nothing more to do with him. In truth, Monteverde never would treat with Bolivar afterwards; but twice sent back his negociators without admitting them, or their letters, into his presence.

The inhabitants of Porto Cabello, were exceedingly exasperated against Bolivar, on account of his deserting that fortress, while in command of it, and learning that he had sent a strong body of troops to force them to surrender, they made every effort in their power to resist him. They first set an example of resistance to the garrison, by organizing and arming themselves at their own ex-

pense, and by openly declaring that they would make every sacrifice in their power, before they would submit to be placed again under the power of that commander.

The dictator,* apprised of what passed in the interior of the place, gave orders to blockade it by sea and land. But the squadron could not intercept the five transports from Cadiz with 1500 chosen troops, under the command of colonel Salomon, besides a great supply of arms, ammunition and other warlike stores.

Before the arrival of this convoy at Porto Cabello, it directed its course towards Laguira, which its commander supposed to be still in the possession of the Spaniards; but general Ribas had taken it some time before. He had only 400 men, and these poorly equipped and disciplined. He was a skilful, brave and active man. When the squadron was descried, he truly supposed them to be Spanish vessels, and immediately ordered the Venezuelan, to be exchanged for the Spanish colors. This convinced the squadron that the place remained under the power of Spain. It approached and anchored about half a gun shot from the batteries of Laguira. The proper dispositions were made to land the troops, which consisted of the fine strong regiment of La Granada, commanded by colonel Salomon, and of some artillerists.

Ribas meanwhile had disposed every thing so to receive them as to destroy, with one blow, the hopes of the enemy. He set at liberty some Spanish officers who had been made prisoners of war; and, among them, the former governor of Laguira, Don Felix Marmon. These he compelled to put themselves in full uniform. Ribas then made a short and energetic speech to his own troops, who were frightened and discouraged by their situation, and believed they should all be taken and lost. This speech inspired them with confidence, and every one repaired with spirit to his post. Moreover, Ribas, having with him an intelligent, cunning Isleno, named Don Jose Antonio Maloni, as soon as the squadron had weighed anchor, he sent this man on board, promising him great rewards in case of his fidelity, and the success of his stratagem. He instructed Maloni to present himself before the Spanish commodore, as the secretary of the Spanish governor, Marmon, and to invite him and his principal officers, to do his master the honor of coming on shore, and partaking of a dinner prepared for them, where the governor was anxious to receive his good friends and companions in arms. The commodore on hearing the name of Marmon, was highly pleased to find that his good old acquaintance was on shore; and gave the necessary orders to put out the long boat. Meanwhile, colonel Salomon came on deck, and examined the place, (Laguira,) with his spy glass. He wondered at seeing so few people on the quay and in the streets, as he

had been told by some officers on board, that this port was crowded with busy people. He communicated his observations to the commodore, and advised him to take the precaution of first sending some officers on shore, who might ascertain the true state of the place, and return immediately and report it to him. The commodore followed the advice.

When Ribas saw the boat approaching, he sent the commandant Marmon dressed in full uniform, upon the quay, to receive his countrymen. He had instructed Marmon how to act, and what to say to the strangers, and had assured him of instant death in case of his deviation. He also dressed a number of his own officers, on whom he could rely, in Spanish uniforms, belonging to the officers who were his prisoners of war, and sent them to accompany Marmon, as a kind of staff. He gave them particular orders to watch his movements, and to kill him, upon the least suspicious action or sign; and, with these orders, he took care to acquaint Marmon. The boat arrived at the quay, but none of the officers landed, notwithstanding the reiterated and pressing invitations of Marmon to them, to come on shore, where he said a good dinner waited for them at *his* house, and that he would send *his* long boat on board the commodore, and bring him to join the party. The officers replied, only by desiring the commander's order, to take him on board the commodore, who would be very glad to see him. After some other conversations from among the crowd assembled, voices were heard to say "It is a treachery!" The officers pulled instantly from the quay, and arrived in great consternation, on board the commodore, to whom they made their report. The batteries of the place, and the surrounding forts, previously prepared for action by general Ribas, now opened a heavy fire upon the squadron, which greatly damaged their vessels, and killed about 200 of their men.

In one of the sorties of the garrison of Porto Cabello, colonel Giraldat, commander of the patriots, was killed by a musket shot. His death spread such terror among his remaining troops, that they hastily raised the siege, leaving behind them, their artillery, ammunition, baggage, &c.

Considering the death of colonel Giraldat as an ordinary occurrence of war, every one was surprised, when the dictator Bolivar, ordered extraordinary funeral services to be performed in honor of him. Many songs (which exist at the present day) were composed in honor of Giraldat, representing him as a most extraordinary hero.

Monteverde gave the regiment of Grenada some days rest, after its arrival at Porto Cabello. Col. Salomon, on learning the origin of the usurped power and grandeur of Monteverde, became jeal-

ous and offended against a commander whom he considered far inferior to himself. This had fatal consequences, for the Spaniards in Venezuela. When Monteverde ordered Salomon to put his regiment in readiness to join him, that they might march their united troops against Bolivar and Urdaneta, who were posted at Valencia, Salomon refused to give him a man from the corps under his immediate command, and declared publicly that Monteverde was not worthy to give him any order. And such was the weakness of Monteverde's character, that, instead of punishing him, he condescended in the kindest and humblest manner, to beseech him that he would be so good, at least, as to follow with his regiment. Salomon consented, but, as we shall see, from that time, more heartily despised him.

Monteverde took from his garrison 500 very badly armed and disciplined militia men, and marched them, by the road of Agua Caliente, towards Valencia. He was followed by Salomon's regiment, about 1300 strong, upon which he relied entirely. He advanced to Naguanagua, a small village not two leagues distant from Valencia, without the least rencontre; but without any care whether he was followed by colonel Salomon or not. The dictator, apprised of the approach of the enemy, gave order immediately to evacuate, where he was with the strong division of general Urdaneta, and to retire toward the defiles of La Cabrera. There he entrenched himself. He ordered this hasty retreat, believing that all the forces from Porto Cabello were coming together upon him. But no sooner was he apprised with certainty, that it was Monteverde with no more than 500 militia men, and that the regiment of Grenada was yet remaining very quiet at Agua Caliente, seven leagues distant from Naguanagua, than he came back and gave orders to attack Monteverde. The latter not only resisted a force three times as strong as his own, but began to repulse them. Bolivar was, as usual, at some distance behind, and could not therefore rally his troops. But general Urdaneta, putting himself at the head of his division, attacked and routed the enemy. Monteverde received a musket shot in the neck, which fractured his jaw, and in part caused the loss of the action. The Spanish general retreated, with the remainder of his troops, towards Porto Cabello.

Bolivar and Urdaneta, now marched upon the regiment of Grenada, which they encountered in a place too narrow to admit the display of the whole force, on either side. The Spaniards, after some exchange of musketry, drove the patriots back; but Salomon, instead of pursuing his advantage, ordered a retreat.—He entered Porto Cabello, with his regiment, on the 5th October; and received the well deserved reproaches of Monteverde. The

latter, being unable any longer to command the former, being next in rank, took command of the Spanish army.

Several other actions were fought, which cost many lives on both sides, without any important result. Bolivar being informed that Monteverde no longer commanded in Porto Cabello, sent a new negotiator to colonel Salomon. He chose for this military commission, Don Salvador Gauia, a *priest*. After the usual formalities, the priest was introduced before the council of war, which assembled for the purpose. He began a long sermon, as if he had been in the pulpit. "What are you doing gentlemen?" said he, "would it not be better for you to surrender, and to live in peace and quietness, than to expose yourselves to the horrors of a siege, during which, you would have to struggle against hunger and all kinds of misery," &c. &c. Who would have imagined that such a singular and ridiculous speech, delivered to soldiers, would have made such an impression upon the officers present, as to gain three fourths of them in favor of the proposal to capitulate? But, one present, who was commander of the militia, and a merchant at Porto Cabello, was so shocked with the thought of capitulation, that he rose from his seat, and spoke vehemently against it. He ended his speech by saying, that "those who were afraid to defend the place, might go whithersoever they pleased to go." He brought over the majority to his opinion, and the proposal of the Dictator was rejected. The clergyman thought proper to remain, and left Bolivar and his cause, and embarked, afterwards, with general Monteverde, for the island of Curacao.

The patriots, after having defeated the Spanish forces under Cevallos and Yanes, directed their attention against Boves, who had considerably augmented his forces. Since he received the authority of general Cagigal, to raise a separate corps, without limiting its number, he had assembled a great many slaves, and colored vagabonds, had opened prisons, and other places of confinement, had armed them, as well as he could, and had organized them in bodies of different arms. It was a confused assemblage of vagabonds and criminals of every description, who engaged themselves in the hope of plunder; in the prospect of committing every possible crime with impunity. Morales was the second in command of these troops, which afterwards increased to 8000 men, and which the Spaniards themselves commonly designated by the name of (*la division infernale*) the infernal division. These two chiefs, with their subaltern commanders, Puy, Rosette, Marchado, and others, in all their marches, constantly left traces of blood, and of the most barbarous cruelties, of which I will relate some shocking instances, in their proper places.

When Boves left general Cagigal before Maturin, he retired to Calabozo, whither Marino went with 1000 men to attack and surprise him ; confident of destroying this new enemy. But Boves, with his 500 men, not only repulsed him, but routed him after a short conflict, on the 13th December, 1813.

Boves now took very active measures to augment his forces. He levied heavy taxes, and extraordinary contributions upon the inhabitants of the surrounding countries, threatening them with fire and sword, in case of refusal to pay them. He acted as if he had been absolute master and commander in chief. He took no advice. He entirely disregarded the authority of Monteverde, whom he considered as a usurper, and despised as a weak man. He organised a great number of guerillas, which procured him money, men, horses and mules ; and began his operations by attacking Camacagua, where he made some prisoners. He marched upon Vittoria, Rosette, Mumara, and the town of Chaguaramas, where he routed the enemy.

He again established his head quarters at Calabazo, whence he sent out different parties, which took possession of the positions of Charaguave, in the neighborhood of Caracas.

CHAPTER VII.

Discontent of the inhabitants of Venezuela with the Dictatorial Government—Convention held at Caracas—Skirmish of Flora—Execution of 1200 Spaniards by order of Bolivar—Action of San Mateo—Sending of Deputies to London by order of the Dictator—Victory of the Patriots. 1813—14.

The rapid and unexpected success of Boves, and his sudden appearance in the neighborhood of the capital of Caracas, the insurrection of various towns and places of the interior not distant from Caracas, in favor of the Spaniards, the vexations of the agents of the dictator, and his arbitrary measures, by which the public misery increased daily, made a very unfavorable impression on the minds of the Caraguins. The majority loudly imputed the fault to the dictator, Bolivar. They accused him of establishing a military and despotic government, putting the finances into the greatest disorder, neglecting to organize and discipline the troops, which were in a miserable condition, of having constantly

opposed the formation of a Congress, of uniting and zealously retaining the three powers in himself, in spite of the advice of the true friends of liberty.

They complained that he acted as a sovereign and absolute master, in following no other law than his own will, and many times his caprice. The fair sex, and particularly his favorite mistress, Segnorita Josephine Ma——, commonly called Segnorita Pepa, had the greatest influence in many nominations. Many young men, relations and friends of these female favorites, and who had no other merit, obtained grades in the army, and lucrative offices, in preference to others. One of them, Charles Soubllette, had, as I was assured, risen in a very brilliant and rapid career.

The dictator was soon apprised of the general dissatisfaction, and perceiving his delicate situation, he followed the advice of some friends in assembling a kind of junta, composed of the most influential inhabitants of Caracas, which was held in the convent of San Francisco, in the capital, January 1st, 1814. His intentions were to soothe the spirit of discontent, by appearing to comply with the general wish, by establishing a congress, and by rendering a favorable account of his administration during the dictatorship. He appeared on the 1st of January, 1814, in this well attended assembly, surrounded by a numerous and brilliant retinue of his officers, the secretaries of state, war, and justice, and followed by a strong body guard. The square before the convent, and the streets through which he had to pass, were occupied by the troops. The three secretaries read long memoirs, in which each one gave an account of the transactions of his department. After this, the dictator, placed upon an elevated armed chair, rose and spoke as follows.

“Citizens, The hatred vowed to tyranny caused my departure from Venezuela, when I perceived my country a second time in chains; and the love of liberty called me back from the distant banks of the Magdalena. I have overcome all obstacles which opposed my march to liberate my country from the cruelties and horrors of the Spaniards. My efforts have succeeded; the colossal power of the enemy has been destroyed, &c.

“I have consented to accept and keep the supreme power, in order to save you from anarchy, and to destroy the enemies who would have supported the party of tyranny. I have given you laws; I have organized an administration for justice and the finances; finally, I have given you a government.

“Citizens, I am not the sovereign; your representatives will give you laws. The revenues of the government are not the property of those who govern you. Judge now, yourselves, and

without partiality, if I have sought the power to elevate myself above you, or if I have not sacrificed my life, my soul, every minute of my time, to constitute you a nation, to augment your means, or rather to create them."

"I now aspire to transmit this power to the representatives which you will choose, and I am convinced, citizens, that you will give me leave to resign an office which many among you are competent to occupy, and my only request is, that you will leave me the only honor to which I aspire, that of continuing to combat your enemies; then I will never rest until I see liberty established in my country."

This speech was greatly applauded, and various motions were made. In one, the orator proposed to erect a statue to the dictator, which he had the good sense positively to decline. But another, Don *Hurtado de Mendoza*, the same who was lately sent by the president liberator, minister plenipotentiary to London, and who, in May 1828, was arrested at Kingston, in the island of Jamaica, for a debt, contracted in London, of £3000 sterling, and was released upon bail. This person made a long speech, exerting himself to prove the *necessity of leaving the supreme power in the hands of general Bolivar*, until the congress of New Grenada could meet, and the two great provinces, the latter and Venezuela, be united under one government.

This proposal, in direct opposition to the sentiments of the assembly, was, nevertheless, adopted, because no one dared to oppose it in the *presence of the dictator*, and his powerful retinue. Bolivar was therefore confirmed dictator of the western part of Venezuela, and nothing further was ever mentioned of the convocation of a congress, nor of any change in the present government.

I have translated a great part of the speech of general Bolivar, for the purpose of making a short comment. This, like the greater part of his speeches and proclamations, contains the same sentiments, and about the same protestations; all are filled with high phrases of devotion to the cause of liberty, and of love and attachment to his country, of profound submission to the will of the people, and above all, of a desire to resign his office, and to enter into the common class of simple citizens. From 1814 until the present day, (July 1828,) he has offered his resignation on every occasion. But in fact general Bolivar has never ceased to possess the supreme power. A man who firmly resolves to resign power, is always able to do it. What did general Washington? and what has the present liberator done from 1813, to the present day?

Some well informed persons are confident that Bolivar, through some friends, suggested to Don Hurtado the idea of making this proposal in that assembly, for the purpose of sounding public opinion. If we compare this fact with what has happened in Angostura, in Lima, in Bogota, in Carthagena, and now in Ocana, the ground of such confidence will be by no means doubted. General Bolivar, in his last message to the national convention, assembled at Ocana, in the province of Carthagena, containing four closely printed columns of the *Gazeta del Gobierno*, dated Bogota, February 29th, 1828, speaks much more plainly, and gives us to understand that the military power is the support of civil society. He calls the members of the assembly, the legitimate representatives of Colombia, delegates from the people, "that sovereign authority of which he is the subject and soldier," and resigns into their hands the *mace* of the president, and the sword of the general." He draws a most appalling picture of the disorder, and dangers of the republic. The main suggestions of the message, are, that rights and selfish interests were alone heeded, but duties forgotten; that the public credit was threatened with utter ruin; that the government was essentially ill constituted, all power being concentrated in the legislature; that the right of suffrage was too cheap, and too much diffused; that the jurisdiction of civil authority in military cases, ought to be no longer tolerated; that the want of a general system of police produced great confusion, and the grossest abuses; that the spirit of the army was sensibly deteriorated, owing partly to its subjection to the civil tribunals, whose doctrines are fatal to the strict discipline, the passive submission and blind obedience, which form the basis of *military power, the support of the whole society*; that subordination and discipline had been greatly relaxed too, by the obloquy which was cast upon the head of the party by the writings of subalterns, and by the application of political principles to the military law or police; *that the army did not receive half its pay*; that all the public officers, except those of the treasury, *had suffered the greatest misery and distress*; that Colombia could not expect to be regarded or valued by foreign states, unless her internal affairs were well managed—in short, that a new distribution of power, inexorable laws, were imperatively demanded; that *a stronger executive is indispensable*, a firm, vigorous and just government is the cry of the country. The liberator finishes this long message by representing himself *as a simple citizen*, no longer distinct from the multitude, and imploring from the convention, a system under which the laws should be obeyed, the magistrate respected, and the people free.

We see in this remarkable and characteristic document, the secret wishes of the president liberator, expressed in very clear and distinct terms. But to return to Caracas.

The dictatorial power was, in consequence of Hurtado's proposal, continued for the government of those provinces of Venezuela in the power of Bolivar and Marino. Meanwhile the Spaniards gained more ground and greater forces. Among the latter, Boves was most formidable in regard to his skill, his activity and audacity. Boves departed February 1st, with 600 infantry, and 1500 horse, from Calabozo, surprised the advance guard of the patriots at Flores, and put every one of them to the sword. He marched afterwards against the corps of general Campo Elias, posted near the village of San Juan de los Morros, routed him, and killed all the prisoners. Boves was wounded, and forced to establish his head quarters in the city of La Villa del Cura. He detached from thence two columns, one under the command of captain Rosette, and the other under Morales, with orders to march upon the city of Caracas.

The inhabitants of this capital, alarmed at the approach of the enemy, raised, in the greatest haste, 1000 men, entrusted them with the defence of the city, and gave them two field pieces.

The Spanish division, under Yanes, beaten on the 5th December at Araura, was totally routed. He retired to Nutrias, and from thence to San Fernando de Apure, where he recruited quickly, so as to be enabled to take the field. He attacked the city of Ospino on the 2d of February, but in the midst of the action, a republican column returning from Tugule, attacked suddenly his right flank; Yanes came up in support of this wing with a company of carbiniers, and received two musket balls which killed him. The Spaniards came in disorder, but Calzada took the command, rallied them, attacked the enemy, and forced its retreat.

Calzada established his head quarters the 19th at Araura. Col. Cevallos marched Feb. 3d towards Morituco, arrived March 7th at Tacaraqua, and on the 9th surprised the enemy before Barquisimeto, under the command of general Urdaneta, and colonel Villapol. They fought bravely, but their position having been turned by the regiment of New Grenada, they were beaten, with the loss of about 200 men. The Spaniards entered Barquisimeto, where they committed many cruelties upon the remaining inhabitants; Cevallos marched from thence towards Quibor and Tocuyo.

The dictator, Bolivar, having been informed that the Spanish chieftains, particularly Boves and Morales, had committed great cruelties wherever they passed, and had put to death prisoners, peaceable inhabitants, nay, even women and children, and all who appeared to them not attached to their cause, ordered the arrest of

all the Spaniards and Islenos settled at Caracas and Lagaira, and published, the 8th of Feb. 1814, a manifesto, in which he announced this arrest, and his intention to put all these individuals, together with the Spanish prisoners of war, *to death*, as a retaliation for the victims who had fallen by the cruelty of the Spaniards. He announced the execution of this sentence to be at Caracas and Lagaira, the 14th, 15th, and 16th of February.

This bloody sentence was effectually executed upon 1253 Spaniards and Islenos, prisoners of war, merchants, and others, who had never taken arms against the dictator, and who were established in Curacao and Lagaira. Of these, 823 were shot at Caracas, and 430 at Lagaira. These executions lasted the three appointed days, without any other trial or judgment. The dictator would hear no representation, no entreaty. Nothing could save them.—Amongst these victims, were men unable to walk by reason of infirmity or age, many of them being 80 years old and upwards.—They were put into an arm chair strongly tied, drawn to the place of execution, and shot!—Those who at that time lived at Caracas or in Lagaira, have assured me of this notorious fact. It can also be found in a printed manifesto, which the Spanish Junta ordered to be published, after the evacuation of Caracas by the dictator, (July 1814,) together with the details of this horrid butchery, and of some very pathetic scenes between these victims and their surviving families.

Boves soon recovered from his wound, and on the 12th of Feb. attacked the patriots under Ribas, not far from Victoria, and was totally routed. In this bloody conflict, neither party kept any prisoners, all were killed after the action. But Ribas, instead of pursuing his advantage, and endeavoring to destroy the forces of Boves, left the command of his troops to colonel Campo Elias, who remained quiet at Valencia, while the general returned to Caracas. Bolivar, observing with anxiety the rapid progress of the Spaniards, united at Valencia, all his disposable forces, and marched against Boves on the 19th of Feb. He marched towards San Mateo, while a small squadron of armed boats and transports, loaded with troops, were passing along the shores of the beautiful lake Valencia, to protect the plantations of tobacco, much of which was raised in this district.

Boves having promptly rallied his routed troops, with the remainder of his division, marched to San Mateo to meet the dictator, and while the latter was at his country seat, occupied all the surrounding hills. Boves expecting Bolivar to come and attack him, was disappointed. The dictator remained quiet in his head quarters. He tried to surprise Bolivar, but was repelled. He now made a *ruse de guerre*, which succeeded. He tried to de-

ceive the Patriots in the valley, by attacking their posts, which were soon supported by the remander of the troops. By feigning a retreat, he drew them into an ambush of a strong body of cavalry, having black colors at the ends of their lances, which fell suddenly, with loud cries, upon the rear and wings, while Boves assailed them in front. Very few of Bolivar's troops were able to escape. The dictator and some of his officers saved their lives by the speed of their horses.

The dictator and his staff were just called to dinner, when the attack commenced. A few hours after, Boves and his officers entered, gaily, and sat down to the dinner prepared for the former. Boves on leaving San Mateo burned the house, and destroyed its appurtenances. The military operations, on both sides, were directed with so little order, that continual changes took place in the occupation of cities and ground. No one could depend upon continuing to possess even a small farm, far less a town or a province. Daily skirmishes took place, followed by cruelties upon the defenceless inhabitants, who were daily in danger of being vexed or murdered. To relate all these little actions, which ruined the country, without any benefit to either of the contending parties, would be increasing the pages of this limited work, without any advantage to the reader. I will, therefore, relate here no transactions but those of the greatest interest.

The Spaniards, whose forces increased rapidly, saw the necessity of having more union in their operations, and particularly of having a commander in chief. Monteverde having, in consequence of his wound, embarked from Porto Cabello for the island of Curacao, where he spent, during several months, one hundred dollars daily, for the expense of his table. This fact alone,* affords convincing proof of the vexations and the plunder committed on the Main during the command of Monteverde, who had been, as I have mentioned, a poor and destitute subaltern.

General Cagigal received his nomination as captain general and commander in chief of the Spanish army, in April, captain general Millares having retired. He arrived from Angostura with a numerous retinue, at San Carlos, where Cevallos and Calzada were waiting for him with their troops. He took the command in chief, ordered large supplies of ammunition and other warlike stores from Porto Cabello, also 400 horses from other parts of Venezuela, and recruited a large number of men.

Meanwhile, the dictator made an attempt to gain the protection of the British government. On the 12th of May, he sent off the

* I have this fact, from the mistress of the boarding house at Curacao, where he lived.

colonels Linode Clemente and John Robertson, for London, in order to obtain favorable treaties of commerce, and other supports. They embarked at Laguira, in the English frigate Palma, the commander of which offered them passage. On their arrival at St. Thomas's, the Danish governor refused to admit them in their diplomatic character, and they returned to Laguira and Caracas. The dictator, occupied with more important concerns, relinquished the plan, and thought of it no more.

Laguira, being besieged by a strong body of Boves' troops, general Piar marched in support of the city. The besiegers were attacked, and routed with the loss of 400 men; and were compelled to raise the siege.

The Gazette Extraordinary of Caracas, published the 31st of May, 1814, stated that

"A general artillery salvo, fired at 8 o'clock this morning, announced to the inhabitants, the brilliant and decisive victory gained by the republican army over the Spaniards, on the plains of Carabozo. The following is the official account."

"I have the satisfaction to inform your Excellency of the complete victory of our army over that of Spain, under the command of general Cagigal and colonel Cevallos, in the savannas of Carabozo, at six leagues distance from this city, (Valencia.) Their troops have been totally destroyed, with little loss on our side. They left on the field of battle, all their artillery, munitions, baggage, a great many dead, 2000 horses, all that had belonged to them, colors, drums, arms, forges, &c. included. The few remaining soldiers fled into the woods, and were pursued on all sides, Sixty or seventy horsemen, with Cevallos, barely escaped; our squadrons pursuing them with ardor, &c. &c.

• (Signed) ANTONIO MUNOS TEBAR.

Head Quarters at Valencia, 29th May, 1814."

From this time, which was the *ne plus ultra* of the patriot achievements under the dictatorship, their star declined, and that of Spain once more gained the ascendant. The misfortunes of the patriots were the natural result of the inactivity in which their leaders indulged, who, instead of pursuing the advantages they gained, and making every exertion to destroy the remnant of the Spanish forces, particularly by attacking Boves, relied too much on their partial successes, and gave the enemy time to recruit, and to supply all their losses.

Moreover, the dictator, Bolivar, had made himself many enemies by his haughty manner, his arbitrary conduct, and his contradictory decrees and regulations, given one day and revoked another.

er; but especially by having never taken a single step towards convening a congress, and carefully avoiding every occasion to comply with the wishes of a majority of the people. The still heavy, extraordinary taxes, and the forced contributions, paid from the beginning of his dictatorship, were increased, to defray the public expenses; commerce and industry being greatly reduced by the heavy duties paid at the custom house; and by the protracted war, in which the slaves were called to take arms, upon the promise of their liberty.

The army, if such a band of badly clothed, ill armed, and poorly disciplined men, can be so called, were neither regularly paid, fed, nor drilled. Those who belonged to his staff and to his numerous body guard, were much better treated than the rest. This created great jealousy and disaffection among the others. The effect was, that when, some months afterwards, the Spaniards again took possession of Caracas, Lagaira, Valencia, &c., thousands of these troops passed over to the Spanish army.

During the inactivity of Bolivar, the enemy had full time to repair his losses. Captain general Cagigal was by no means a good military officer, but he was an excellent administrator, a good politician, a man of great humanity and feeling, polite and popular—and these qualities gained him many partizans.

After his defeat, he retreated to San Carlos, and Cevallos to Barquisimeto; at which places they both employed their utmost exertions to rally their scattered troops, remount their cavalry, &c.

Such was the state of things in Venezuela, that in spite of daily fighting, nothing had been gained by the republicans, for want of able and skillful leaders, as will be shown in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VIII.

Boves—Battle of La Puerta—Defeat and flight of the two Dictators—Caracas in the power of the Spaniards—Bolívar and Marino embark at Cumana—Their reception at Margarita and Carupano—Their arrival at Carthagena—Memoire justificative—Secret history of their conduct at Carthagena—Factions and party spirit in this city—Particulars of what happened in the assembly of the legislative body at Carthagena—Persecutions of the author. Year 1814.

Amongst all the Spanish enemies of the dictator, at that time, Boves was undoubtedly the most dangerous ; the bravest, and most powerful. A short account of his life and actions may, perhaps, be interesting.

Joseph Thomas Boves was one of those partizan chieftains, distinguished by his activity, audacity, bravery, skill and cruelty, which, a time of civil war raises from a low station, to the summit of power, for the terror and the torment of those, who unfortunately fall within their reach.

He was a Castilian by birth, and of very low extraction. He came to the Main before the revolution, as a serjeant of the Marine corps, and obtained the command of a gun boat, employed in watching the coast, to prevent fraud upon the customs. Instead of seizing the smugglers, he was gained over, and protected them ; and being detected and denounced, he was cashiered, and punished with some months confinement. He had acquired some money, and had began to be a pedlar, travelling from the plains to the capital, and back to the plains ; and in this way gained his livelihood. When the revolutionary war began, his ambition awoke, and he intrigued so well that he was named captain of militia. As such, he accompanied general Cagigal in 1813, in his march against Maturin, of which an account has been given in a preceding chapter.* Many instances of his barbarous cruelty, which rendered him the terror and the scourge of the Venezuelans, have been also related. He received in the action of the 5th December 1814, a wound with a lancet, and died soon after, a brigadier general.

*See Chapter VI.

In the last chapter, some account was given of the condition of the contending parties. Amongst the Spaniards, Boves was decidedly the most powerful in numbers and in military daring. His *infernal* division, as the Spaniards called it, was a band of black and colored people, who, animated by the hope of plunder and the prospect of committing all crimes with impunity, and by the highest expectation of reward in case of success, fought with perfect desperation.

Boves having speedily united his forces, marched in June, from Calabozo against the two dictators, Bolivar and Marino, who had formed their junction at *La Puerta*, a small place between La Villa de Cura and the city of San Juan de Los Morros. The Spaniards attacked them the 14th of the same month, routed them completely, killed and took from them over 1500 men, seven guns, their baggage, &c. Bolivar fled in full speed towards Caracas, and Marino to Cumana. Colonel Diego Talon was made prisoner, and hanged the day after the battle, in the city of Cura; more than 60 officers were shot by order of Boves.

By this victory, the latter became master of the beautiful plains of Aragua; he also intercepted the communications of the capital with the interior, with the corps which besieged Porto Cabello, and with the garrison in the fort of La Cabrera. He marched without loss of time against the latter, routed a party of patriots, and marched upon Valencia, where the independents had fortified themselves; Boves forced them to retire into the principal street, which was strongly barricadoed. He left a strong corps to besiege them, and marched with the remainder of his division to force the patriots to raise the siege of Porto Cabello. These, advised of his approach, retreated in the night of the 20th of June, and marched towards Ocumare, where they embarked for Laguaira.

Boves entered the fortress of Porto Cabello the 1st of July, where he received the news of his advancement to the grade of colonel in the Spanish army. On the 2d, he again marched against Valencia, with the resolution to order an assault and to force the patriots in their entrenchments. They were compelled to surrender by capitulation. He detached two columns to march through different roads upon Caracas. One commanded by colonel Ramon Gonzales marched through Los Cocuisas, where he attacked a patriot corps which had retired precipitately towards Los Teques, upon Bolivar's sending advice to its commander, general Ribas, that the enemy, with a second column, had entered the other road and directed its march towards Los Teques. This was the other column of Boves, led by colonel Mendoza. The column of Gonzales followed its march almost to San Pedro, in order to call off

the attention of the enemy, and in case of need, to assist colonel Mendoza.

General Ribas, instead of the dictator Bolivar, rallying all the disposable forces in the capital, marched at the head of the division against Gonzales, who had not 500 men, whilst Bolivar and Ribas were more than 1200 strong, in order to rout him, and then to fall upon the second column and save Caracas. But Bolivar, quite discouraged, listened to the advice of some weak friends, and held various conferences with the archbishop, (who, during the dictatorship, had remained at Caracas,) to advise with him "whether it would not be best to evacuate the city and to leave it in the power of the Spaniards?" General Ribas was invited to these conferences; he indignantly refused, and preferred putting himself at the head of the troops, to consulting a prelate who was generally known to be secretly in favor of Spain.

The spirit of the inhabitants was by this time much changed. Their confidence in the dictatorial government was of course greatly diminished, by their seeing, that in spite of their great sacrifices during a whole year, the state of Venezuela still remained miserable and defenceless; Caracas having no money, no provisions, no ammunition, the army, so called, no clothing, nor good organization or discipline. The dictator himself felt it necessary to abandon the place, and he did so in great haste.

Colonel Gonzales, who marched through Vittoria towards Antimano at two leagues distance from Caracas, found the remainder of the discouraged division of Ribas, which he attacked. Ribas himself fought bravely, but his division could not withstand the force of Gonzales, and he was obliged to retreat. This excited great consternation among the inhabitants, who confided in the military skill and bravery of general Ribas, rather than in the dictator.

Caracas and Lagaira were evacuated in haste, and Bolivar retired with the remainder of his troops upon Barcelona and Cumana, ordering the vessels lying in the harbor of Lagaira to follow him.

The inhabitants of Caracas were again left in the power of the Spaniards. Bolivar requested the archbishop to preside in the Junta entrusted with the affairs of the city, and left them to their miserable fate. The Junta sent some deputies to colonel Gonzales, commending to him the care of the city and its inhabitants. He entered Caracas the 17th July, 1814.

The Patriots had some hopes in the division of general Urdaneta and the troops which the dictator might rally in his retreat on Barcelona; but the former, after having occupied Barquisimeto, and

reinforced his division, arrived from Truxillo, and was attacked by colonel Cevallos; and Bolivar found himself suddenly besieged and surrounded by the inhabitants of Barcelona and its environs, who revolted, and declared in favor of the Spaniards. They marched against him, with a strong body of cavalry in the retreat upon Cumana and Maturin, whilst a column of the division of Boves pursued and harrassed his rear guard. The dictator retreated with his troops to Arguita, not far distant from Barcelona, where Boves attacked and routed him the 8th of August. The dictator lost four field pieces, about a thousand muskets, and his baggage and more than 1500 men were killed and wounded.

Bolivar seeing no longer any hope of safety, secretly, in the same night, left his troops, and departed with his cousin, general Ribas, some aid de camps, and good guides, who conducted him through by roads in safety to the city of Cumana, where he arrived the night of the 24th. He remained a few moments, and then immediately embarked on board the Bianchi, where he judged himself safe. Marino, with some of his officers, followed him soon after.

General Ribas had in vain employed all his exertions to prevail upon the dictator not to despair so soon, but to remain, to rally the troops, and to fortify Cumana. He told them that by embarking, they would discourage their countrymen, and ruin the cause of liberty. But his expostulations were of no avail; the two dictators were so anxious to depart, that they ordered the commander of the squadron, Joseph Bianchi, to cut his cables, and to sail without the least loss of time. Ribas, and some other officers, were highly displeased with this departure. They preferred to remain, and to die in the cause of liberty and independence.

As soon as Bolivar and Marino arrived at the sea port of Juan Griego, in the island of Margarita, the general, Arismendy, sent them word "that he was surprised to find them both coming there like fugitives; and that, if they departed not immediately to join their brave countrymen, whom they had left in so cowardly a manner, he would treat them like deserters, and shoot them, as they deserved."

As the decided character of general Arismendy was perfectly known to them both, they thought it not proper to go on shore, and departed precipitately for Carupano, a large burrough and harbor on the Main, not far distant from Juan Griego. There they met colonel Bermudes, who, with some patriots, occupied the fort and the burrough. Bermudes astonished to see them, after some conversation, abruptly asked general Bolivar what he had done with his troops, where was general Ribas? &c. Bolivar, some-

what confused, answered that he had left them at Cumana.—Bermudes replied, Well, sir, return then, immediately, to join your troops; if not, I will treat you like deserters, and try you before a court martial.

Rebuked and disgraced by their own countrymen and subalterns, and feeling their forlorn situation; instead of returning to the Main, they tried a last essay to put themselves in safety. They steered towards Carthagena, where every one was astonished to see them arrive, the 25th September 1814.

The cities of Cumana and Barcelona were occupied by the Spaniards the 29th August, and Venezuela fell again into the power of its tyrants. Ribas and Bermudes assembled some troops and marched towards Maturin, where they were joined by all who remained faithful to the patriots.

Bolivar and Marino were received at Cathagena in a manner beyond their most sanguine hopes. The governor, at that time called the president of this province, was a generous, honest, and enlightened patriot; all those who have known *Manuel Rodriguez Torrices*, will agree with us in saying he was one of the most distinguished Grenadans. He received every stranger with great attention, and during his being at the head of the government of the province, Carthagena was flourishing, and the only spot on the patriotic Main, where security and liberty were to be found. As soon as he left the province, to be president of the executive of New Grenada, at Bogota, consisting of three members, Carthagena declined in its prosperity and commerce, and became the theatre of factions.

The two ex-dictators were now anxious to excuse their precipitate flight from Cumana, and published, in the official Gazette of Carthagena, of the 30th of September, a kind of justificatory memoir, too remarkable and characteristic not to be translated literally. It has the following title:—*Arrival of Generals Bolivar and Marino, and Exposition of the motives which obliged them to leave Venezuela, and to seek a refuge in New Grenada.*

“After the army of Venezuela, under the orders of these two officers, had suffered, the 14th of June last, at La Puerta, an unexpected defeat, in consequence of which, the enemies of liberty remained masters of the fertile plains of Aragua and intercepted the communication between the capital, and the cities in the interior, with the army of the east, the besieging corps before Porto Cabello, and the fortification of La Cabrera, the fate of the republic was decided. The cities in the neighborhood of Caracas, which alone supported the struggle, fell suddenly into the power of the enemy, and Caracas, insolated, and without resources, even

deprived of the necessary food, was no longer able to resist the efforts of the numerous forces which assailed it from all sides.

"In spite of all these inconveniences, the chiefs were nevertheless resolved to defend Caracas, and for this purpose organised, in haste, all the forces which they could assemble; but as the want of every thing daily increased, the enemy approached. The enemy, hoping to be reinforced, appeared to suspend his march, and to assume again the defensive, in order to receive them. Gen. Bolivar was now forced to order a sortie against the enemy, who had advanced to Antimano, thinking that this division could, not be the principal corps of Boves, who was occupied in besieging Valencia.

"He marched on the 6th July, with his small army, but returned the same night to Caracas; all his cavalry and a division of his infantry, having been beaten the evening of the same day by a numerous body of troops, which were, according to the report of eye witnesses, more than 2000 men strong, whilst the republican army amounted not to 600 infantry and 400 horse. The first, all composed of recruits, neither disciplined nor experienced; the latter, having the same deficiencies, were badly mounted. The worst was to find these two bodies, spiritless, without confidence, and discouraged by the exaggerated accounts given them of the superior forces of the enemy, by individuals interested to hinder the sortie of the troops. It would have been imprudent to persist and to die in the place, without munitions or provisions, when by effecting a retreat towards the eastern provinces, the army could have been reorganised, and put in a state, not only to keep the field, but to reconquer the lost ground, which they would be compelled to leave for the moment. These considerations determined the general in chief to evacuate the capital, and to retire with the troops which were in garrison, with all the inhabitants, and what belonged to the government, towards the province of Barcelona, where some other forces could be assembled.

"Preparations were begun the 7th July to put in execution the proposed plan, but the prodigious number of emigrants which followed the army, whom it was incumbent on us to protect; the great quantity of baggage which belonged to the army, the want of horse for its transportation, and the very rough and bad roads, offered so many difficulties and inconveniences, that in spite of all speed, it was not possible we could arrive in less than twenty days, at Barcelona.

General Marino, dictator of the east of Venezuela, had already united in the city of Aragua, on the borders of the plains of Caracas, all the troops which could be furnished by the provinces to continue the war; but these recruits were also raised in haste and

totally undisciplined ; it was therefore necessary to begin to drill them before the opening of the campaign. He was occupied with disciplining them when he received the advice of the enemy's having taken possession of Chaparro, a village 10 leagues from Aragua. The republican army was less than 1500 men strong in infantry, and 700 cavalry, while the enemy, from the reports received, had more than 3000 men of all arms.

“The republican army protected the city of Aragua, covered by the river of the same name, which was at this time of year so deep, as to render it impossible to ford it. Gen. Bolivar, relying upon these advantages, waited not for the arrival of more troops, which were in march to reinforce him, but principally for cartridges, of which he was in great need, when on the 17th of August, he received a report that his main guard posted to defend the principal post where the river could be crossed, had retired, and that the enemy had immediately crossed it. The battalion of chasseurs, which was sent to take possession again of the post, missed unluckily the road, and left a free passage to the enemy, who soon came very near to the guards, which protected the entry of the city. The action began with a very dreadful and destructive fire of musketry, which lasted more than four hours ; but the cartridges of the defenders of Aragua, (who had no more than 60 thousand,) were entirely exhausted, at a moment when the principal corps of the enemy (composed of more than five thousand men) was not yet come to action. In those circumstances, nothing was to be done, but to try to save some of the troops by any possible means. Gen. Bolivar advanced at the head of a piquet, of cavalry, to open himself a road to Barcelona, which, as he was told, was intercepted ordering the remainder to follow in the same direction. But his troops were recruits ; having suffered a loss of more than 600 men in killed and wounded, a panic terror having seized them on seeing such a numerous body of enemies, it was impossible to perform this retreat with order and coolness. Many commanders of battalions had been killed, which increased the difficulty of the retreat, which was effected in great disorder upon Barcelona and San Mateo. Thus were totally destroyed all hopes of raising again the forces of the republic of Venezuela.

“Gen. Bolivar arrived at Barcelona, which he found in insurrection. There he united the few troops which had taken this road, and directed his march towards Cumana, in the rear of the families which had emigrated from Caracas. Terror had seized every one, and each was thinking how best to fly. The troops which had perceived the danger, were the first who fled. The confusion

was so great that of 700 infantry which departed from Barcelona, there were not 200 men left in a body.

“As soon as general Marino heard of the loss suffered by the army of Aragua, he took some measures for security; but he saw himself forsaken by his troops, and even by the commandant of the fort of Cumana, who had embarked on board of the squadron, and that without the permission of the general, before general Bolivar’s entry in the night of the 25th August. The unexpected news that the perfidious commander of the marine, Joseph Bianchi, had the intention to sail that same night, without asking or waiting for leave from government, [or speaking more plainly, of general Marino,] who had given him the command and the treasury, with the small quantity of ammunition left, forced the generals of Venezuela to embark themselves *in order to save their property!*

“When they arrived at Margarita, and afterwards at Carupano on the Main, they found these countries in anarchy, in consequence of the seditious views of some military chieftains, who were anxious to raise themselves to the high station of first magistrates!

“After having tried every means of conciliation which prudence could dictate, being convinced of the obstinacy of these seducers, in order to avert a civil war, which would have been unavoidable if the two generals had tried to maintain their own dignity* in remaining in that country, they adopted the moderate resolution of quitting Venezuela, and coming to this capital (Carthagena) to go farther on, and take the command of the army of general Urdaneta, who occupies the western provinces of Venezuela, and to co-operate in their way to the complete liberation of New Grenada.”

Notice here this justificatory memoir. It is, for those distant readers who know nothing about the circumstances, very sufficient, to give a plausible coloring, to a dark, and, in itself, a very bad picture.

Having been perfectly able to examine minutely all the circumstances of the events related in this memoir, and having not the least interest to mislead the public, I will truly and faithfully relate the facts.

Credible eye-witnesses of *both parties* have assured us positively, “that the column of colonel Gonzales exceeded not 550 men, that the second under colonel Mendoza was less.” It is therefore cautiously said in the memoir: *according to the reports of eye-witnesses*, the division of Gonzales *alone* was *two thousand men* strong!

* We take leave to ask what sort of dignity can be attributed to any person who leaves his post without permission?

They avow that the capital had no provisions; that when they took the sudden resolution to defend it, the recruits, raised in haste, stood in want of every thing.—But how came this want? Bolivar and Marino possessed, from August 1813 until July 1814, a large part of the provinces of Venezuela; the sea ports of Laguaira, Cumana, Barcelona, Ocumare, Carupano, of the Island of Margarita, and many others, offered them every facility from abroad; the great enthusiasm of the inhabitants, in the beginning of their honorable enterprise, gave them more than sufficient means to bring it to a close. All contributed to facilitate and to consolidate their conquest. Instead of using these powerful means for the benefit of their cause, they ruined the country by a bad administration and arbitrary measures. And when they thought that all these means were exhausted, they lost all hopes and strength of mind; they finally put themselves in safety, and left thousands of their countrymen, who had placed the greatest confidence in them, in misery and despair. The precipitate flight of the two dictators would have destroyed forever the sacred cause of freedom, if their subalterns, Ribas, Villapol, Urdaneta, Paez, Piar, Arismendy, Bermudes, and many others, had not acted better than they did! And when the two latter gave them well deserved reproaches, they stigmatized them in the memoir, as *sedition men, who were anxious to assume the power of a first magistrate!*

What has happened with the victorious troops at Carabobo? How did they lose the precious time to pursue their victory gained over Cagigal and Cevallos? Why did they leave them time to reorganize their forces? Why not at once fall upon Boves, or at least organize Guerillas to harrass and intercept the means of their enemies? These had to struggle against public opinion and all the difficulties which climate, the nature of the territory, want of every thing, put in their way. Instead of this, Bolivar had all the advantages united, which required no more than an ordinary capacity to give them a fair direction. The besieging of Porto Cabello was confided to the hands of young men without experience and military talents, like Giraldot and d'Alugar. We have known very well the latter, and can answer for him, that he was much fitter for intrigues, as he showed at Carthiagena in 1815, then to command fifty men!

The siege of Porto Cabello lasted from August 1813 until July 1814, and wasted much money and many men, who, however, died not in battles, but mostly by maladies and the unhealthiness of the environs of that fortress. These men, and the money for all the necessary warlike stores, could have been much better employed any where else, as, moreover, the least check spread such a panic

through their camp, that they left cannon, baggage and every thing more than once, and raised the siege, which continued to last until 1824, at which time Porto Cabello was finally taken by capitulation.

The two dictators began by saying "that the unexpected defeat of the 14th June, at La Puerta, *decided the fate of the Republic of Venezuela!* and that the communication between the capital and the eastern *army*, the corps which besieged Porto Cabello, and the garrison of the fortifications at La Cabrera, was intercepted. And they despaired when they publicly acknowledge the existence of *an army*, (that of Marino,) a besieging corps, and a garrison at La Cabrera; when further they say, that Bolivar had, on the 6th July, 600 infantry and 400 cavalry, and that he determined to march to the eastern provinces, *where the army could have been reorganized and put in a state to reconquer the lost ground.* And we may ask the reason which compelled the dictator Bolivar to return the same evening of the 6th July so quickly to Caracas? Where left he his 1000 men? It appears by the report of some well informed eye-witnesses, that he acted *here* by the same motives which caused his sudden embarkation at Cumana, at Ocumare, (in 1816;) his desertion from Porto Cabello, (in 1812;) his flight from Barcelona, (in 1817;) his going from Carthagená to Kingston in Jamaica, (in 1815;) &c. &c. Moreover, have the Spaniards not sufficiently proved that the dictators left behind immense means, by which they have carried on the war upon the Main ten years longer? What shall we think of such a confession? It can only mislead strangers totally unacquainted with the want of capacity, the ignorance of military operations, and in the administration, of these chieftains.

The dictators complain of the too great quantity of baggage, the prodigious number of emigrants, and the want of transports in their retreat. May we ask a simple subaltern officer, of the least experience, if he would not have burnt or destroyed that prodigious quantity of baggage, which opposed the quickness of a retreat on similar occasions? Bolivar would have been then in time to quell the insurrection at Barcelona, would have made his junction with Marino, whose army was about 2000 men strong, and probably have repulsed, if not beaten, the enemy. And what has been the fate of all these emigrants, who put their last hopes upon Bolivar? The memoir says clearly enough, "that it was impossible to perform this retreat with order and coolness." It states further, "terror had seized every one, and each was thinking how best to fly." The troops which had perceived the danger were the first which fled, and we see clearly, that the dictator provided himself

with good guides and horses, and arrived with a few officers safe at Cumana, &c. From this, can be easily drawn the consequences of the miserable fate of these emigrants, of whom the memoir speaks not a word, in spite of the great protection promised by the dictator.

What signify the following words: "As soon as general Marino heard of the loss suffered by the army of Aragua, he took some measures for security?"—when, some paragraphs before, it is stated, "that general Marino, dictator of the east of Venezuela, had already united in the city of Aragua, all the troops which could be furnished by the provinces, to continue the war?" By these words it should appear that Marino left Aragua before the attack, or that Bolivar came after the retreat of Marino, with his recruits, from Aragua to Cumana. And in what consisted these same measures for security, taken by Marino? Was it in ordering the ammunition to be embarked, which would have been so serviceable to Bolivar's troops? or was it in embarking hastily his trunks and baggage, and the money of the public treasury? And what shall we say of the singular reason given in their memoir: "that the news of the intention of commodore Bianchi to make sail &c. *compelled* the dictators to embark, *in order to save their property*"—of very little importance is indeed the loss of some two or three vessels, and the small sum which is called so pompously the public *treasury*, in comparison with the life, liberty, and prosperity of their countrymen, who placed full confidence in the skill, the virtue, and the bravery of the two dictators, who deserted, in order to save such a trifle! The truth is that the only cause of this unexampled desertion, lay not at all in the salvation of that property, but in *themselves*, as Ribas and thousands of others did not act so *prudently*, as Bolivar and Marino did in Cumana. If there was something to be saved on board the vessels, Marino was *alone* enough to save it; but Bolivar, so anxious to be compared with the greatest heroes of antiquity, who entered in triumph eleven months before into Caracas, who published so many promising proclamations—Bolivar, at least, should have remembered that posterity will look sharp upon his actions, and place them in their proper light. But *fear* is stronger than reason and reflection; and Bolivar forgot every thing and embarked.

That the sacred cause of liberty was not at all extinguished in Venezuela, and that their flight was very improper, will be seen by the events of which we shall speak hereafter.

We must now enter into some particulars which will throw more light upon the character of Bolivar, and show how grateful he was to Carthagená, to that little republic, which assisted him so power-

fully in his first expedition against Monteverde in 1813, and which received him with so great hospitality and unexpected honors, in September 1814, where Arismendy and Bermudes (both Venezuelans and his subalterns) had treated him literally as I have related. The particulars which follow, make a distinct and characteristic *picture* of the *secret* history of Simon Bolivar, *totally unknown*, but of which, I vouch for the truth as an eye-witness, having served, at that time, in the army of Carthagena.

When four years since, an article in the American of New York appeared, announcing that I was preparing a history of the Republic of Colombia, some *good* friend took the alarm, fearing I might publish *the truth*, and used every exertion to preoccupy public opinion against this work, by trying to disparage my private character, and services at Carthagena. The article referred to appeared in the *Aurora* at Philadelphia, about four years ago.* I have always despised an anonymous writer in such cases; there is a cowardice in aspersions of this nature against a man, who came, as a stranger, to an hospitable and generous country, where alone freedom and the sacred rights of mankind are to be found in the full extent of their vast signification. After some mature reflection, and the suggestion of my friends, I suspected that the article against me came from a certain personage at Washington, who was at that time a great partizan, and an intimate friend of the brothers Pineres at Carthagena, and whom I could, if necessary, name.

The poor Mr. M. consul of Colombia at New York, has rendered himself ridiculous, in the eyes of many of my friends, acquainted with the transaction in a certain trifle, which showed clearly how much he feared me.

All these obscure manœuvres shall never silence me, nor hinder me from telling and shewing *the truth* by facts and not in words only; those facts, related by me, who have given my name, and can vouch for all I say, will never be erased; the public and posterity will best judge them, and not the selfish and interested writers of some anonymous criticisms. Napoleon used to say, *Il ny a que la vérité qui blesse!* The more the public shall hear speaking against me, the better will it be convinced that this *vérité les a blesse*. I declare here that I never will take the trouble to answer any of these attacks as unworthy of me, and my established and well known character.

* I have never attached any importance to such an attack, and therefore cannot precisely tell in what number the article appeared. When I twice pressed the then Editor of the *Aurora*, to give me the name of his correspondent *Americanus*, he never answered my letter!

At the time of the arrival of generals Bolivar and Marino at Carthagea, (September 1814) Manuel Rodriguez Torrices was at the head of the government of this province, as he had been when Bolivar served in 1812 and 1813 as colonel. He was an attorney at law, an honest and upright man, with liberal principles and very humane and moderate ; but he had a great defect, for a man of such high standing ; he was too weak, too indolent and too fearful, and but little fit to govern a province agitated by war and factions. This weakness had encouraged, a year before, various intriguers to attempt getting themselves into the office of president ; he hesitated to arrest and to try them before a court of justice. At the head of that faction were the brethren *Pineres*. The elder, *German*, was president of the high court of justice of the province ; the second, *Gabriel*, vice-president of the government of Carthagea. Both were without transcendant merit, but since the revolution have become rich and powerful. They committed great vexations, and lived in a high and luxurious way. The soundest part of the inhabitants hated and feared them, as being audacious, very intrigueing, cunning, vindictive, and as having a strong party with the mob and all those who had nothing to lose. The president and his friends were well aware of these intrigues, but feared taking severe measures against them, lest the mob should openly take part in their favour, and, revolting, commit great depredations. This weakness rendered them of course more audacious.

Such was the interior state of Carthagea, when Bolivar arrived from Cumana. He immediately united himself very closely with these two brothers, because they flattered him greatly, but more because they were great enemies of Manuel Castillo, the general-in-chief of the army of the province who was a relation and an intimate friend of the president Torrices.

I have related in a preceding chapter how Castillo behaved with Bolivar in 1813, and the reasons on which was afterwards grounded the hatred between these two ambitious chieftains. Bolivar, very vindictive but perfectly dissimulating, was very glad to find a good occasion to avenge himself against Castillo ; and as the time of an election of the president was near, Gabriel Pineres proposed confidentially to general Bolivar the office of general-in-chief, if he would assist him to be chosen president. The latter accepted the proposal, with the secret intention, as well informed persons say, to put aside Pineres and to name himself dictator of Carthagea, in order to employ all the means which the province had at that time, to march a second time against the Spaniards. This assertion gains much credit, as it is well known by those who know the character of Bolivar, that he would never have consented in

earnest to accept a subaltern rank, after what he had been at Caracas.

General Bolivar, on arriving at Carthagená had taken his quarters at the palace of the bishop, who had emigrated, where Mrs. Soublette and her two pretty daughters were established a fortnight before Bolivar's arrival. The two sisters, whom I visited various times, talked always with the greatest enthusiasm of general Bolivar, whom they designated, even then, by the name of *poor Simon*, (in relating to me the events at Caracas, where they had formerly resided with their mother and their brother Charles,) and to whom they appeared to be uncommonly and tenderly attached. The inhabitants of Caracas and Lagaira, those of St. Tomas de La Angostura in Guayana, and every stranger, who resided at the latter city in 1818—19, will confirm this fact, the source, as they say, of the high standing of Charles Soublette, the present secretary general of the president liberator.

When the two Pineros had settled every thing with general Bolivar, they had very frequent secret conferences with him and their partizans. Marino, and a great many Caraguin officers were initiated; the former living in the house of Gabriel Pineros. The latter gained about twenty deputies of the most intriguing and noisy class; and the money which the dictators had brought with them, served to gain more adherents.

At that time were assembled at Carthagená more than 800 strangers, counting the owners and the crews of privateers. Among them Pineros had a strong party, because Torrices had laid heavy duties on the prize merchandise, and had limited the privateering business, by which Carthagená subsisted in a great measure at that time. Pineros, knowing the persons concerned in the privateers were not much satisfied with those restrictions, employed every means to ferment this dissatisfaction. One of these means was to post up a libel against the existing government, in which he said that the majority of the strangers were on the side of the vice president Pineros; that they should open their eyes upon the vexations and the tyranny of Torrices, and promising formally that all would change in their favour, if they would support him in the approaching election, &c.

The police officers seeing these libels on the church doors and at the corners of the streets, the next morning, showed them to the president and the general-in-chief, Castillo. I was some time previous to this event in the service of the army of Carthagená at the solicitation of the president and the general-in-chief. They could not offer me more than the grade of colonel, in virtue of the constitution, by which the Congress of New Grenada sitting at

Tunja had reserved the exclusive right to name and to confirm all the generals; but as I had not come to seek any grade, but to serve the sacred cause of freedom as I did at the beginning of the French revolution, I contented myself with the solemn promise of these two gentlemen, to deliver my brevet of general to the president Torrices, who took upon himself to send it to the Congress of New Grenada to be confirmed, and I accepted provisionally to serve as colonel in this army, until the return of my commission. Since then I have heard nothing more of it. Castillo and his superior, general Cortez of Campomanes, were no more at that time than colonels, but were called generals.

The president, Torrices, on seeing this libel, sent immediately for the general-in-chief and the corregidor, as chief of the police, and communicated to them the paper. Castillo, after some conversation, suggested the idea of calling on me as a man whom they could rely on and consult with. We were intimate, and so he came to my house. I had seen the libel and was much better acquainted with the facts, than he and the president could be. I assured him that the government could count upon the firm resolution of a great majority to support it. They departed together to the palace where Ducoudray repeated to the president Torrices, yet pale and agitated, what he had said to Castillo. Ducoudray spoke then with some of the owners of the privateers; amongst them was Mr. Charles I. from New Orleans, an enterprising, wealthy, and very determined man, who had a great ascendancy over the other captains of the privateers. He convoked them, and, in a short speech, persuaded them to rally round the existing government, and oppose any faction that should try to overthrow it, &c. This had a very good effect, and amongst them was, I must say to their honor, not a single dissenting voice. Every measure was taken with the general-in-chief, to whom Ducoudray was called. The latter was named the commander of all the strangers residing in the fortress. The numerous crews of the privateers were secretly debarked, armed, and organized in companies, and divided into the different quarters of the city, and at the most important posts on the wall, at the batteries, &c. The day before the sitting of the legislature, all was in the greatest activity. Ducoudray and Castillo went about the whole night, busy in visiting the posts and giving the necessary orders. All the captains of privateers, the foreign officers and merchants, French, English and German, and the commanders of a good armed Battalion of coloured French people, cannot be too much praised for their exertions to maintain a very severe discipline amongst such an assemblage of men from different countries, and of different colour; and what is much more to be

admired, is, that during the two days and three nights of their being under arms, not a single excess was committed, not a single complaint of disorder was brought before Ducoudray or Castillo. The inhabitants of Carthagena will, if they ever see this account, confirm what is here stated. Such was the good behaviour of these strangers, so generally hated by the Colombians ! Should we have seen a thousand of these latter, or of their troops, behave so quietly, as did these 800 strangers, on a similar occasion ?

Meanwhile the brothers Pineros, Bolivar, Marino, and their adherents, were busily employed in preparing their means to strike a decisive blow in the assembly, which was to assemble the next morning at eleven o'clock. I was that same evening at the house of Bolivar, to visit the Soubllette family, and found there a large assembly of Caraguins ; but Bolivar was busily engaged with the Pineros in his private room. I saw going into and out of his cabinet, a great many gentlemen, and amongst them the personage mentioned before, but he remained not a half hour in the house. This resembled very much one of the most active head quarters, of which I have seen some during my military career. I could say in truth that the moving in and out of all these, not naturally very sitting Caraguins, would have filled with awe and fear, any one not initiated into the secret, as the presage of some extraordinary event, as if the enemy was to besiege the place ; while the palace of the president was quiet and deserted, and himself sick, and in bed !

The following day, the representatives of the legislature of the province of Carthagena assembled at their usual place, in the palace of the now abolished inquisition. All the members were present except the president Torrices, who had, during the night, a strong fever, the effect of his anxiety of mind. Pineros, his antagonist, was highly pleased on hearing this news, as it now belonged to him to preside in the assembly. His retinue, as President on this occasion, assembled at his residence, to escort him with great formality to the assembly. Ducoudray arrived with his adjutants, a little later than the appointed hour, and found a very large company assembled in the saloons. Don Pineros saw him enter, rose from his seat, came to meet him at the door of the saloon, took him by the hand, and told him very obligingly, they were then waiting for him, and that he was welcome ; he took his hat to put it upon a table. Ducoudray, surprised at such unusual attention from the chief magistrate of the government, suffered it not, but threw it himself upon one of the tables. Pineros assigned him a seat opposite to himself, near to the open piazza, inquired with apparent interest after the state of his health, and obligingly

reproached him for not having yet called to see him. He asked him a number of insignificant questions, but in an awkward manner, and with a mind very much preoccupied and distracted, looking at intervals towards the door, and then at the piazza, which faced the great square; his whole behaviour showed clearly great uneasiness of mind and anxiety. Neither Bolivar, Marino or any of the Caraguin officers, not employed in the army of Carthagena, were present.

Soon after Ducoudray's arrival, they told the vice president, Pineres, "all was ready to receive him at the assembly. The numerous retinue, consisting of the civil and military officers of the province, and some distinguished strangers, was obliged to cross the public square filled with troops, in order of battle, and paying him the usual honors, and with a great crowd of people. Pineres appeared to wish to harangue these troops, but Castillo and Ducoudray being on his left and right side, and observing all his movements, were ready to oppose such an unusual and dangerous step. He appeared to have observed it, then after having looking some minutes at them, he turned abruptly towards general Castillo, who was at his right, and told him *Vamos, Vamos!* (let us go, let us go.) In saying these words, he made a motion with his left arm, and saluted with the right hand, in which he held his hat, being uncovered*.

As the assembly was a public one, seats were reserved in its interior for the general in chief, and the other officers, and for some distinguished strangers. About half an hour after the opening of the sitting, Gabriel Pineres presiding, one of the representatives belonging to the faction, a great friend of Pineres, rose, and made a motion to convert the sitting into a secret one, to treat and debate upon a subject of the highest consequence, in which it was important to leave to the deputies the liberty to speak, *without being influenced by military authority, AND STILL LESS BY STRANGERS*†. The president, Pineres, rang immediately his bell; then there were heard various murmurs among some of the members opposed to this strange motion. Some rose to speak, but Pineres called to order, and silenced them. He ordered the serjeant at arms to invite every one not belonging to the assembly, to clear the room, and to close the doors; that was done, and astonished all, as being an unusual and extraordinary measure; no president

* I enter into all these details in order to show the character of these rulers in their true light, not by *reasoning*, as so many writers have done, but by *facts*.

† These were the expressions of Dr. S. The same personage who resided some years ago at Washington, as Minister of Colombia, and who is one of the greatest partisans and flatterers of the dictator.

of an assembly in a free state having the right to take upon himself to put in execution a measure, without having been supported by the majority, when a motion of such importance is made.

Ducoudray, who sat next to Castillo, when he heard this strange and insulting motion of Dr. S. said to him, laughing, that it was a forty eight pounder directed against them, and remarked to him the concert which was visible between Pineros and S. as the former silenced with his bell and his cries, every opposing voice. Castillo informed him that S. had, the evening previous, very frequent and long conferences with the vice-president, and afterwards with general Bolivar, and was seen passing three or four times from the residence of the one to the other. General Ducoudray, as soon as he came from the assembly, sent the order to the commander of the arsenal to deliver the four brass field-pieces, which he had designated the day before, with their batteries; ordered a larger number of cartridges to be distributed to the different posts, and sent word to their commander to be ready at the first signal given. Every column had received, the night before, the necessary instructions, and the most severe orders were given to suppress any riotous act, and prevent bloodshed, and to leave the most perfect freedom to the deputies. But as the president Torrices had signified in his conversation with Ducoudray and Castillo, that his friends would be intimidated from acting in his favor, by those of the faction, he requested from both, a respectable armed force, to support these friends when they should call for assistance.

While the two generals were on the floor of the assembly, they saw enter in the Corregidor, Elias Lopez, being called to the bar as the director of the police. The friends of Torrices, well informed that a respectable armed force was ready to support their independence, were not to be moved by the hostile attempts of the friends of Pineros against the existing government, and a large majority voted for Manuel Rodriguez Torrices to be continued as president, and another large majority elected Don Juan de Toledo as vice-president, so that Gabriel Pineros was entirely excluded. Enraged at this defeat, they announced that an armed force was assembled, in order to influence the assembly, and moved the Corregidor might be called to confirm the fact. He was asked, "if it was true that an armed corps of strangers were assembled? by whom commanded? and upon what authority they acted &c.?"

The faction had now good opportunity to avenge themselves upon Torrices, in accusing Ducoudray, who acted by the former authority of the president, and the general-in-chief. But as Torrices had not explained to his friends in the assembly, that Ducoudray had received full authority from him to act as he did, the

deeree against him, passed without any opposition. The substance of this decree was, that this commander, a *stranger*, (as they designated him,) should be called before the Corregidor, and that his trial should commence in twenty-four hours after this session, as having committed an act of high treason against the representatives of the people. To this decree was wanting a little trifle, viz: the sanction of the president, to whom alone the executive power was confided.

In the course of the next morning, general Ducoudray received a written invitation from the Corregidor, Elias Lopez, to call at his office, where he, the Corregidor, had to communicate to him some business concerning the said Ducoudray. As the latter was not at all acquainted with the existence of such an accusation, he was surprised to receive an invitation of this kind, and told the bearer to be so good as to tell the Mr. Corregidor that if he had some communication of importance to make, and would take the trouble to do it personally, or in writing, and call on him, he would receive him with pleasure. Some minutes after Ducoudray received an official letter from the same Corregidor in which he compelled him to give a detailed account of his (Ducoudray's) conduct during the night of the 1st and 2d October, and that by *superior order*! Ducoudray answered him in his letter, "that as he did not show any authority superior to him, other than that of the president and the general-in-chief, he was very sorry to decline positively giving to *any body else* an account of his conduct, demanded through the channel of Mr. Corregidor."

In receiving this answer, the Corregidor, in a great rage, called immediately on the president, and denounced general Ducoudray formally, showing him the letter. When Torrices had understood the whole affair, he reproached the Corregidor with having acted too rashly, in serving, as an instrument of a faction, which had tried to change the government, and assisting them to ruin an officer, who did nothing except to *obey his instructions, and who acted only by his* (president Torrices') *formal authority*! That he, the Corregidor, must first begin by impeaching him, the president, before he could take any further steps against this officer, &c.

The president sent his aid de camp to general Ducoudray and communicated to him all that had happened between him, the president, and the Corregidor, and expressed his satisfaction with Ducoudray's services. The Corregidor came some days after to pay a visit to general Ducoudray, and they were, and have since remained, very good friends.

The faction was silenced, and Torrices remained in quiet possession of the presidency.

CHAPTER IX.

Situation of New Grenada—Arrival of General Bolivar at the Congress of Tunja—His reception—His march against Bogota and Carthagena—His stay at Mompox—Correspondence between him and General Castillo—Bolivar's secret motives in besieging Carthagena—Details of this siege—Bolivar embarks for Kingston in the island of Jamaica. Years 1814–15.

The twenty-two provinces of New Grenada rose about the same time, then, the eight of Venezuela; and after many commotions the provinces of Casanare, Pamplona, Tunja, Neyva, Popayan, Carthagena, Mariquita, Antiochia, Choco, and Socorro, formed an union, and on the 27th November 1811, at Bogota, adopted a federal compact in 68 articles; whereupon a congress was assembled, which united in itself the legislative and executive power. But this compact was not approved of by the leaders, in the province of Cundinamarca, (Santa Fe de Bogota,) which was the origin of a long and bloody civil war between Marino, as president of the latter province, and the congress of New Grenada.

Bernardo Alvarez had succeeded Antonio Marino, as president of the province of Cundinamarca. The former refused obstinately to unite his province with the others, notwithstanding congress had sent on various occasions commissioners to represent to him all the fatal consequences of his obstinacy.

These internal divisions had the most fatal consequences on the prosperity and liberty of this beautiful and rich country. Out of twenty-two provinces, ten only had sent deputies to the first congress, who removed its residence from Bogota to Tunja, in consequence of the ambitious views of its president, Antonio Marino, who caused the convocation of some deputies of the other provinces not in the possession of the Spanish troops. These proposed a *monarchical constitution* in their assembly, held at Bogota, but without success. Guito Pastos, Santa Martha, and other provinces, remained yet in the power of the Spaniards. The congress at Tunja had very limited power. Cundinamarca, the richest and most populous province of New Grenada, having refused to join the union, and impeded by its example the union of six others.

Such was the internal situation of New Grenada, when general Bolivar arrived from Carthagena at Tunja, on the 22d November 1814, where the congress was then assembled.

The name of Bolivar was already so generally known, and his reputation so highly established, that he was received by congress with distinguished honors. The members of this assembly, admired in him his successful march from Carthagena to Caracas, a year before, and regarded him as a hero, a skilful soldier, and one of the greatest patriots on earth. Those few, fully acquainted with the leading circumstances, which united in his favor to raise him to power and fame, those who saw in him an ambitious and selfish leader, who tried to abuse his power, without having the capacity required to sustain such a station, were of course silenced by the great majority, and dared not oppose the enthusiastic reception of general Bolivar.

We have seen that these leading facts were 1st, the proposal of Felix Ribas, to his companions assembled at Carthagena, at the end of 1812, to unite to avenge the cruelties of Monteverde and his subalterns, committed in Venezuela after Miranda's arrest. 2d, Ribas nomination as commander-in-chief of this expedition, no confidence being placed in his cousin Bolivar, after his having clandestinely deserted the fortress of Porto Cabello, entrusted to him by general Miranda. 3d, How Ribas at last succeeded to prevail over his countrymen in obtaining the nomination of colonel Bolivar as their commander in his place. 4th, How Bolivar proposed, after the defection of colonel Manuel Castillo's forces, to abandon the enterprise, and to retreat again to Carthagena, and how Ribas, colonel Brizeno, and some few others, persuaded him to go forward. 5th, How the cruelties of the Spaniards had driven the Venezuelans to despair, who rallied by thousands under the standard of their countrymen, Bolivar and Ribas; how the Creole troops, in the beginning of some combats, deserted the Spanish colours and joined the patriots; how Bolivar was borne by the force and union of the most favorable circumstances to a fortunate grandeur and glory!

We have seen further how easy it was for him to force Marino to unite, and obey him, and to drive the scattered and discouraged remainder of the Spanish troops forever out of his country; to assemble a congress, and to give liberty and prosperity to his countrymen. He did nothing of all this; his aim was power, absolute power, in prosperity, and when the time had arrived to show his skill, courage, and superiority in that adversity which befel him after the loss of the battle of La Puerta, he suddenly despaired, and left his deceived countrymen in the greatest misery, and em-

barked hastily at Cumana, anxious to save himself. We have seen how Ribas and others remained, how the two dictators were received and treated by Arismendy and Bermudes, &c. These leading facts were totally unknown, or disregarded by the mass of the people, who only admired the brilliancy and the rapid successes of Bolivar's entry into Caracas.

The critical situation of the congress at Tunja, increased by the tidings of the formidable expedition preparing at Cadiz, under command of general Morillo, ready to cross the ocean, and to destroy them. They felt the necessity of acting more vigorously, and of being better united. Two measures were adopted as the most important and pressing : 1st, to force the president of the province of Cundinamarca to unite that province with the congress ; 2dly, to march against Santa Martha, the only fortified seaport in New Grenada, remaining in the power of Spain. Its possession was very important for the republic, lying at the mouth of the large river Magdalena, which opened the way to the internal provinces, and the city of Bogota.

The arrival of general Bolivar gave a greater activity to these projected measures, and he was entrusted with both. Every exertion was made to collect troops and to provide for their wants ; general Urdaneta was ordered to join Bolivar with his strong division, which retreated after the battle of La Puerta in Venezuela, to the city of Cucuta in the interior of New Grenada, and Bolivar was proclaimed commander-in-chief of the three forces under the title of *captain general of Venezuela and New Grenada*.

He departed from Tunja in December 1814, and marched with his troops against Bogota, to force the president, Alvarez, to join and obey the congress. The city was surrounded, and attacked by order of Bolivar ; and as some entrenchments made in the hurry two years ago, in the time of a civil war with Marino, were almost totally ruined, the inhabitants could not resist, with their few armed men, against, at least, two thousand. Bolivar received a deputation from the president, Alvarez, who had ample powers to sign a capitulation, which was granted. By it, the province of Cundinamarca consented to join the union, and to obey and acknowledge the authority of the congress, with the condition that they might enjoy the same privileges as the other provinces, which was granted. But notwithstanding this capitulation, signed and ratified by Bolivar, he permitted the pillage of a part of this beautiful and large city, during forty-eight hours ; a fact notorious and known to many eye witnesses of this strange proceeding ; and when Alvarez and many other inhabitants of Bogota made him the strongest representations against such a behaviour, he replied

in an angry tone, that he was authorized by the laws of war to act as he did, because the inhabitants of the city had resisted his troops, and deserved punishment. This act was greatly disapproved of, it being against all laws of war in civilized countries, to plunder a city after a capitulation signed and approved by both parties. The excesses and cruelties committed, particularly against females, were great and horrid, and his troops loaded themselves with gold, silver, and jewels, of every kind !

The Junta of Bogota invited congress to assemble again in their city, which invitation was complied with ; and soon afterwards the deputies once more assembled in this capital. Congress now had means and power to act, and its measures gained more energy, and were more efficient. They made some salutary reforms in the administration, and named an executive power of three members, consisting of Manuel Rodriguez Torrices, the late president at Carthagena, Garcia Rubera, and Manuel Pey, men well known for their unfeigned patriotism and talents. The title of president, as leader of the Provincial Government, was changed into that of governor, and all the governors of the federal provinces were subjected to the authority of the congress, and required to give a direct account of all that passed in their respective provinces to the Executive Convention, which had very extended power.

The union of Cundinamarca and the changes made by congress had a very favorable influence upon the inhabitants of New Grenada, who were further pleased, as various aggravating laws were abolished, and many strangers called to settle amongst them by a decree of congress of the 13th July 1814, by which protection and assistance were promised to them. A manufactory of arms was established at Antiochia and another of hats at Bogota. The liberty of the press was unrestrained and a great many clergymen distinguished themselves in the most sacred cause of liberty and independence.

A great many strangers came to establish themselves at Carthagena, where they met with a kind reception, and were strongly protected by congress, and the provincial government. Others entered the service in their army. Pierre Labat and Jean Castellux were named to command in chief the forces of the land troops, and Luis Aury those of the marine. Ducoudray Holstein received the command of the fort of Boca Chica in very critical circumstances, and was at the head of the troops by land and sea.

In comparing this true and honorable manner of acting by New Grenada, with that of the dictators, we regret to say that the government of the two dictators, Bolivar and Marino, in Venezuela in

1813 and 1814, was the reverse of the former. The dictators had neither laws nor fixed rules in their republics, so called; the security of persons and property depended on their will, and decree; the liberty of the press was a mere name; a single phrase which an editor would have published in his paper against the rulers would have been punished instantly; taxes and contributions were increased, and misery, ruin, and death, were the fruits of their memorable dictatorial government. They destroyed what the congress in New Grenada had created, and the presence of general Bolivar, in the latter province, was as pernicious as his appearance was in Venezuela.

We have seen already how he acted in Venezuela as dictator; now we will see how far his presence in New Grenada was pernicious to the welfare of the latter. After some stay at Bogota, general Bolivar departed with his troops, and arrived at Honda, where large barges were in readiness to embark them on the river Magdalena, which they descended. He arrived at the beautiful city of Mompox, which was on a large and elevated island in the midst of the river. Its inhabitants were rich, and have distinguished themselves in the revolution by their enthusiasm for liberty, and their courage. This spirit extended to the fair sex; they killed, in one night, 400 well drilled and armed Spaniards, which Morillo sent as a garrison, and declared again in favor of freedom and liberty. This courageous deed was done by the advice, and the participation of the women at Mompox, in the night of the 16th June, 1816.

As soon as the Spanish governor at Santa Martha, general Montalvo, was informed that general Bolivar had descended the river at the head of a numerous body of troops, and had arrived at Mompox, he suspected its destination, and felt very much alarmed. The fortress was in a pitiful miserable state for defence, badly supplied, and not having 200 men to defend it. All those well acquainted with the miserable state of this fortress, and the bitter secret hatred with which the inhabitants of Santa Martha suffered the arbitrary and sanguinary actions of the too well known Montalvo, agree in opinion that if general Bolivar had presented himself with his army, as he was ordered to do, the majority of the inhabitants would have forced the feeble garrison to open to him the gates, and would have received him as their liberator. Montalvo, sanguinary and cruel, was a great coward, and had already bespoken a French vessel, in which he caused his most valuable effects to be embarked secretly, and was ready to fly at the first alarm. Such was the state of Santa Martha at the arrival of general Bolivar at Mompox.

But general Bolivar preferred to sacrifice the welfare of his cause, and to forget the sacred engagements taken with the congress to conquer Santa Martha, as he promised the day before his departure from Tunja to various of its members, in order to avenge himself of a personal insult, received of colonel Manuel Castillo, as I have stated in another chapter, where the latter left him with his troops on his march against Venezuela in January, 1813.

Here are the true particulars of this not much known action of general Bolivar, which was the cause of the total ruin of New Grenada in 1813.

The inhabitants of Mompox received Bolivar and his troops with open arms, well persuaded that he was going to take Santa Martha, possession of which was highly important for the commerce and welfare of the former. This, and his principal officers' assurances, that such was his intention, increased the general satisfaction. Some respectable and well informed men have assured me positively, that such was his first and firm intention, and it is just to mention it here; but unluckily for him and New Grenada, general Bolivar has not strength of character enough to pursue a settled plan with vigour and energy; unless his own personal interest is particularly concerned. In this latter case he will perform every thing, except feats of personal danger and daring, to gain his aim. He prefers circuitous roads and dissimulation to frankness, or loses his fortitude as soon as he feels himself destitute of assistance, or the weaker party.

At the head of the municipality (city common council) of the city of Mompox, was, at that time, Mr. Celedonio Pineres, as corregidor, or mayor. He was the eldest brother of the two Pineres, of which Gabriel (vice-president of Carthagena) tried to remove Manuel Rodriguez Torrices, the president of that government, in union with general Bolivar, as I have related before. This Celedonio Pineres had very frequent opportunities to converse with the general, as the latter lived in his house. He communicated to him all that had happened after his departure from Carthagena, where his two brothers, during the absence of Manuel R. Torrices, who was called to Bogota, as one of the commissioners of the executive named by congress, were trying again to get the upper hand. Castillo, at that time, with his army at St. Stanislaus and Baraquilla, hearing of what was going on in Carthagena, assembled his principal officers and proposed to them to march against his native place, to restore the legitimate governor of the province to his office, and to re-establish order in the public affairs, having received various letters from his friends calling on him and his troops for assistance. I was, at this time, with general Castillo

and intimate with him, so that I was acquainted with all the particulars which I relate, and could name, if necessary, the friends of order which wrote to Castillo. I saw all these letters which he communicated to me. In this private council of war, held by Castillo, it was determined to march against Carthagena, and to defeat the whole faction. This was done very easily, having the majority of the inhabitants on our side, who opened the outer land-gate, called the *half-moon*, at two o'clock in the morning, without any resistance on the 5th of January 1815, and Pineres, Delhagar,* and about twenty others, of the ringleaders, were arrested, and put into the prisons of the Inquisition. But general Castillo not satisfied, condemned to deportation all these leaders, and remained in quiet possession of Carthagena, where Juan de Dios Amador was elected governor of the province.

Caledonia proposed now to Bolivar to avenge his brothers, and to force Castillo to recal them and their friends. The captain general, who hated Castillo mortally, saw a welcome occasion to avenge his personal insult, changed his mind, and followed the perfidious suggestions of Caledonia Pineres. Bolivar flattered himself with the hope that the strangers might be now in his favour, knowing that they were much displeased with the haughty manners, and arbitrary measures of Castillo in Carthagena. He imagined that these strangers, united with the numerous secret friends of the banished brother Pineres would leave him no more to do than to present himself, with his troops, before the fortress of Carthagena, to see its gates opened to receive him. But as he could by no means go against Carthagena instead of Santa Martha, he consulted with his new friend to find a plausible pretext to put his army in march. Then general Bolivar, who like the greatest part of his countrymen, the inhabitants of Caracas, is very dissembling, and very dexterous in finding out various secret means to intrigue, and to gain his aim by numerous windings and doublings—he openly professed to be a warm patriot, a disinterested soldier, who wished for the welfare of his country, but was always anxious to save his reputation and zealous to preserve his authority. In the preservation of this absolute power lies *exclusively*, all the

* This Delhagar was a *protégé* of general Bolivar, when dictator at Caracas, and commanded the siege before Porto Cabello, and was one of the first who fled when Boyes came after the battle of La Puerta to Porto Cabello in June, 1814. This same Delhagar was a young unbearded colonel of 19 years, who trembled extremely, when Castillo sent one of his officers with guarded men to arrest him that same night. This officer, captain Garcia, told me afterward, laughing, that he had never seen such cowardice in a colonel!

patriotism of general Bolivar. Here is the pretext of which he made use to cover his secret purpose of revenge on this occasion.

He sent an officer (the same Thomas Montilla whom he had sent to general Miranda in June 1812, after his desertion from Porto Cabello) to the government at Carthagena, in order to demand from it arms, ammunition &c. of which he was in great need, as he pretended, to enable him to carry on the siege of Santa Martha. This demand greatly surprised the government of Carthagena, as its members were well aware that general Bolivar was amply provided with all the necessary means to besiege Santa Martha; it appeared to them strange, too, that the general sent this letter after a stay of about a fortnight at Mompox, and that he had not applied in embarking at Honda. More strange did it appear to them, how he should not have known as positively as they did in Carthagena, the miserable state of Santa Martha, and the readiness of its inhabitants to open the gates to him as soon as he should present himself with an imposing number of troops. All these considerations together gave rise to many suspicions, and the men best informed, considering the character of general Bolivar, suspected "that his real intention was to render himself master of Carthagena, to displace Castillo, and to punish him, in revenge for the affront received in January 1813; to change afterwards the existing government in recalling the banished brothers, Pineres, and finally to march with the troops of Carthagena united with his own, and the means which this well furnished fortress could afford him, a second time against Caracas to free his native land, and then re-establish his lost dictatorship.

As soon as this letter was received, the general Manuel Castillo and the lieutenant colonel Marino Montilla (brother of Thomas) at that time a bitter enemy to Bolivar, suggested to the governor, what might be the real intentions of the general. It was, therefore, concluded to send an officer who could be relied on to general Bolivar at Mompox. The bearer of these letters was one of the aid-de-camps of general Castillo, captain Manuel Davilla.—The general wrote in his letter to Bolivar: that he would supply him, with pleasure, with all that he wanted; he would find in the magazine at Savanilla, a small fort and sea port at twenty leagues distant from Mompox, between that city and Santa Martha, all that he demanded, and that he, Castillo, had already delivered the necessary orders to that effect; he could nevertheless assure him positively by all the secret intelligences received from Santa Martha, that its inhabitants were waiting for him, and his army, and ready to open the gates as soon as he would present himself. He added: "he could easily convince himself of the

truth, if he would solely advance with his troops, as far as the banks of the Cienega river," &c.

The governor Juan de Dios Amador confirmed, in a separate letter, all that general Castillo had stated, and urged Bolivar in a very pathetic and strong, but obliging manner to lose not a single moment in advancing against Santa Martha, the inhabitants of which would receive him as their liberator.

Captain Davilla met with a very harsh reception in delivering his letters to general Bolivar, who was still at Mompox. When Davilla came back to Carthagena he repeated to various of his friends some expressions which were not very polite, nor worthy to be used in the ordinary way of conversation. He added that various of Bolivar's officers insulted him, and proposed to the general to arrest and treat him as a spy, sent expressly from Carthagena to examine what was passing in their head quarters! This party spirit, this hatred, this unworthy treatment of an officer in mission, deserving at least a civil, though it should be a cool reception, was communicated from the commander-in-chief to the subalterns, and showed clearly the vindictive character of Bolivar against Castillo and all who came from him. Davilla was dismissed without any answer!

The festivals, balls, dinners, &c. at Mompox, of which Bolivar is a passionate friend, lasted during the whole time of his stay; and the attack upon Santa Martha was delayed. It appears that in leaving Mompox, he had already determined to act hostilely against Carthagena; and in descending the river from Mompox to Magdalena, he gave orders to seize all the armed gun-boats which general Castillo had established on the river, to keep the communication open between Carthagena, Honda and Bogota. He declared the officers to be his prisoners, and gave the command to others chosen out of his army. This manifestly hostile act against Carthagena showed clearly his real intentions.

He debarked his troops at the little fort called Carabano, and instead of marching directly against Santa Martha, where all were in the greatest consternation, he left it behind and directed his march through Baraquilla, Soledad, St. Stanislaus against Carthagena. His head-quarters were established at Purbello, four leagues from the latter city. Here new festivals and balls, were his occupation for a fortnight.

The inhabitants of Carthagena, anxious to hear from general Bolivar, followed his operations and lived in hopes he might act in accordance with their wishes, and take Santa Martha. But as soon as the news arrived of his hostility against the patriot gun-boats belonging to the republic, as soon as his arrival at Tur-

bacco was known, the general indignation raised to such a degree, that they forgot the arbitrary acts of general Castillo, and organized themselves in regular corps to repulse by force of arms, the unheard of attempt of general Bolivar against his brethren, against the cause of freedom and independence. More than six hundred strangers established at Carthagena rallied round the government and joined the armed inhabitants, in organizing the camp and mounting guards. General Castillo had never been so powerful as during the siege of Carthagena. Martial law was proclaimed, which gave him unlimited power, and each one was anxious to prove his devotion to the cause. Many thousands, and amongst them the most distinguished ladies in Carthagena, worked day and night at the fortifications, erected and enlarged in order to put the place in a better state of defence.

Soon after Bolivar's departure from Carthagena to Tunja, Ducoudray Holstein was appointed commander of the four beautiful forts of Boca Chica, which are the key of New Grenada. These forts are at the entry of the sea-port of Carthagena, and lay at the mouth of a very deep and wide canal, four leagues long, by which the vessels pass into the port of the latter place. These forts were considered the key of the main, and were a post of honor and confidence, in the command of that officer in a time of civil war, in which he served against general Bolivar, and whilst Morilla and Morales besieged Carthagena and Boca Chica. He was fortunate enough to save the foreigners at Carthagena, who came to save their lives under the protection of the batteries of these forts. He was, therefore, perfectly able to be well informed of all secret transactions passing at that time.

General Bolivar being soon acquainted with what passed in Carthagena, and learning the general indignation felt against him, began to fear and feel that he had acted too rashly. But being no more than four leagues from Carthagena (at Turbacco) and unable to return and attack Santa Martha, and his hostile intentions against Carthagena being too much divulged, he resolved to throw off, as much as possible, his responsibility. He assembled a great council of war, and there he spoke a long time, and with great warmth, against the government of Carthagena; and at the end of his speech he asked the advice of his officers, and sounded their dispositions to know how he should act in this dilemma. Not one of these officers opposed the intentions of their commander, and had vigour of mind enough to represent the disgraceful consequences of acting as enemies against a province which had always shown patriotism and zeal for the sacred cause of liberty, and never given any motive of disunion or disobedience to

the congress of New Grenada ! Knowing the secret intentions of their commander, these officers were all in favor of attacking by force of arms, the city of Carthagena, and of treating its inhabitants as enemies ! They contributed thus to the destruction of liberty in New Grenada, under the most noisy acclamations of "long live our Liberator Bolivar, and death to Castillo and his partizans !"

They marched now directly against Carthagena, but the inhabitants of this strong fortress had shut the gates, and full of resentment against the undeserved hostilities already commenced by Bolivar, in making prisoners the officers belonging to Carthagena, in the gun boats upon the river Magdalena, had spontaneously taken arms, resolved to repulse this undeserved aggression. As soon as Bolivar's troops appeared, they were received with grape shot, and compelled to retreat, and to encamp upon a large hill, about a gun shot distance from Carthagena, where a convent of friars, called the monks of *Nuestra Senora de La Popa de La Candelaria*, received him and his troops. After some days, various diseases began to spread amongst them, caused in a great measure by the want of fresh water. Here I must mention a trait of the greatest barbarity, which will give a convincing proof of the exasperation of the spirit of party, which reigned at that time amongst both *patriotic* contesting armies ! One of the leaders in Carthagena proposed, in a council of war, after it was well ascertained that Bolivar would attack the place, to occupy the Popa, that hill on which Bolivar had established his troops, but the other objected, on account of the danger of dividing the garrison, already small in proportion, to the extent of the fortifications, and the difficulty of supplying these troops with the necessary provisions, this officer yielded to the majority, but being well aware that Bolivar had no other chance than to occupy the Popa, he proposed to poison the only well on it. This was executed by putting a large quantity of corrupted skins of animals, and other materials of a similar kind, into this well, which was very deep, with the express intention of poisoning its water, and killing those obliged to drink it, knowing perfectly well that Bolivar and his troops would occupy this only post on the Popa. When they arrived, being exhausted by the march, the dust, the burning sun, and by thirst, they drank copiously of this corrupted water, which soon caused great sickness amongst them, and of which a great many died in the most excruciating pains. They were soon deprived of every kind of fresh provisions, which the troops and the inhabitants of the province of Carthagena, all very much exasperated against Bolivar, intercepted entirely, whilst those of the fortress received them daily.

General Bolivar had with him a single small cannon, which he ordered to be established as a battery, against a place, provided with about 80 guns, of which the smallest were twelve pounders! His commander of the artillery, Mr. Collot, *from whom I have this fact*, an able and experienced French artillery officer, (who declined to assist, at the council of war, held at Turbacco, disapproving highly of this hostility against Carthagena,) endeavored to make him change by remonstrating against such a measure, as highly ridiculous and useless; but Bolivar would hear nothing and insisted. Lieutenant colonel Collot was obliged to obey, with the greatest reluctance. When the order was given to fire upon the place, the inhabitants of Carthagena said gestingly and in mockery: "that Bolivar surely must be in need of provisions, and that he therefore was obliged to kill some ortalans (which were very abundantly found in that part of the environs of Carthagena) to give him some provisions!" In one word, this *battery*, so called, not only excited the greatest ridicule amongst all classes of the inhabitants, but gave a very contemptible idea of the military dispositions and skill of a captain general and commander-in-chief. He ordered the colors of the province of Carthagena, to be hoisted at his head quarters, as if he was already the master of this fortress.

As soon as the troops of Bolivar were apprised that the water in the well of La Popa was corrupted, it was necessary to provide from abroad. But, as the spring water in Carthagena is very scarce, and at a great distance, this water was to be carried on horses, mules and asses, escorted by a large number of armed men to protect the convoy against the sallies of the garrison, or the attacks of the numerous and armed inhabitants of the neighborhood. Bolivar attempted in vain to induce them, by paying largely, to fetch him every day a fixed quantity of water for his troops. Some few consented, but the majority refused his gold and their water, and so his troops were obliged to provide for themselves, which tired and fatigued them very much. He acted now as if he was in the enemy's land, arrested a large quantity of merchandise going up and down from Carthagena to Bogota, upon the Magdalena river, and sold it for the maintenance of his troops. But, then I must render justice to general Bolivar, in saying that he has never been an avaricious or money making man; that he is generous and cares little or nothing about money. I have seen him often emptying his purse and giving his last doubloon to an officer, who asked him for some money on account of his salary, and when he was gone, he would turn to me and say, laughingly, "this poor devil (*le pauvre diable*) is more in need than I, and this golden stuff is worthless to me. I gave him all that I possessed."

The true friends of Bolivar endeavored now to represent to him the dreadful consequences of such a siege, and used every exertion to make him desist from it; but he was deaf, and persisted in besieging the strongest fortress in the present republic of Colombia. The government of Carthagena called general Ducoudray Holstein for some important military transaction from Boca Chica to Carthagena; he departed the 16th April, and visited the fortifications at the forts of San Felipe and the Cerro by request of the government. He saw with pleasure that all was in good order, ammunitions and provisions plenty, and joy reigning every where; all expressed to him the highest indignation against the ridiculous attempt of general Bolivar, who treated his countrymen, his fellow citizens, fighting for the same cause, like enemies. So did the inhabitants of Carthagena, where Ducoudray remained a couple of hours, and then returned to his post. No one, of all the inhabitants in Carthagena, or in Boca Chica, was afraid of Bolivar, knowing perfectly well that he was unable to take either place; but commerce was totally annihilated by cutting off all intercourse between Bogota, the interior provinces of New Grenada and Carthagena. The merchants of Carthagena, Mompox and Bogota, applied in vain to general Bolivar for the restitution of their confiscated property, he replied that he could not do any thing for them, and spent the money resulting from these confiscations, more than two millions of dollars in value, for his troops. This siege lasted until the 20th March, but was reduced to a pure blockade, during which, the diseases and the mortality, natural consequences of the miseries felt by the besieging troops, in their camp upon La Popa, increased every day.

The cruel and sanguinary Spanish general, Montalvo, being nominated commander-in-chief of the army, and informed of their civil troubles, desired to take advantage of them, and sent two letters to the governor of Carthagena, Don Juan de Dios Amador, to propose to him to unite his provinces with Spain. The official answer of the latter, deserves to be cited here as an account of the noble sentiments of its author, and as an unanswerable proof of the hostile intentions of general Bolivar against the republic of Carthagena.

These were his words: "We wanted by no means the protection which your excellency offers us, in your despatches of the 25th March, and the 15th of the present month, in which you propose to end the troubles which exist between us and general Bolivar; and supposing we did want them, we could not at all accept them. We prefer rather to perish a thousand times in this struggle, than to obtain, by such means, a triumph, which would un-

doubtedly cover us with shame, and would end in the destruction of our liberty and independence.

"Your excellency has addressed yourself to our ambition, and you expect to gain by our internal troubles, but you are entirely in error; there has been no division or misunderstanding in regard to the cause of liberty; no personal consideration, no opinion, no private partiality, can ever disunite us. Moreover, when our ambition is invoked, and we are exhorted to defend our rights, and repulse by force of arms, all that your excellency would undertake to resist, our tyrants,—how could you have thought, we should act in so cowardly a manner as to be ever able or disposed to unite ourselves with them? Your excellency might have made us more flattering propositions, which might perhaps have influenced us; but having made these, they can be no other than very revolting in form, and in substance. And who would not be shocked, and with reason in hearing that a man like you, who trembles at the mere name of Bolivar, dare propose as your excellency does, to exhort us to serve as an instrument to save you, and who, at the same time recommend to us to enter again into slavery? What impudence, what gross ignorance in attempting to interfere, and to offer himself to take an active part in the differences between freemen; and what is more, with the intention of breaking their chains to reduce them again to slavery?

"Experience should have apprised you, that these haughty expressions, which offend us much more by their ridiculous promises of pardon, than by their style, do not at all impose upon us; nor will they intimidate us. You have, therefore, taken a gratuitous trouble, by affecting so much concern, so much interest, and so much sorrow for our domestic dissensions. We know, perfectly, that no country has ever rendered itself independent, without experiencing troubles, and convulsions. We endure them, always keeping in mind their commencement and their end; and we feel that it is necessary to make some sacrifices. They will end at last; and, if they should not terminate spontaneously, it will be our duty to bring them to an end. But what is this to you? What have you to do with the free and independent counties of New Grenada? Is it to have the empty name of governor of this people, or to be so in reality?

"In regard to the remainder of your excellency's despatches, I will submit them to the congress," &c.

General Bolivar continued to besiege Carthagena, even after having received the official news, which the governor transmitted him through a messenger, of the arrival of the great expedition from Cadiz, at the island of Margarita, under the orders of gen-

eral Morillo (March 25.) The commissioner of the congress of New Grenada, the reverend father Marimon, the governor of Carthagena, Juan de Dios Amador, and various others, visited general Bolivar at his head quarters of La Popa, and made him the most urgent representations upon the dreadful consequences of a civil war in such circumstances, and urged him to join his remaining forces with those of Carthagena, and march united against their common enemy. They offered him the command-in-chief, ammunition, provisions, and all necessary supplies, to enable him to keep the field. But all was in vain; he replied, he would consent under one condition, which was that Carthagena should open to him the gates, and receive him with his troops into the fortress. As his secret intentions were too well known, they feared, not without some reason, that once master of the place, he would think of nothing else but to avenge himself, and to satisfy his passion.

All negotiations were again broken off, and hostilities renewed, notwithstanding the Spanish general Morillo, who arrived at Santa Martha, and had debarked a strong body of troops, was already in his rear.

The garrison of Carthagena had made various sorties, but they were constantly repelled by the troops of Bolivar. At the beginning of May, Bolivar at last began to open his eyes, and to conceive that he could do absolutely nothing against Carthagena.—He found himself reduced to the humiliating necessity of sending to his enemy, general Castillo, a flag of truce, through which he requested an interview with him. This interview was managed by the father Marimon, commissioner of the congress, at that time assembled at Bogota, who was sent expressly, as soon as this assembly received the dreadful news of Bolivar's march against Carthagena, instead of Santa Martha. This clergyman, although of a weak and timid character, was, nevertheless, a very respectable man—honest, upright, and an ardent patriot. He consulted with the governor and the doctor Pedro Gual, and after some visits paid by Marimon and doctor Pedro Gual at the quarters of general Bolivar, after many conferences on the part of the two former with Castillo, who gave his consent very reluctantly, the meeting was at last fixed on the 8th of May.

At the appointed day, father Marimon conducted general Castillo out of the gates of Carthagena, at the foot of La Popa, where general Bolivar waited for him in a small private house, chosen expressly for this purpose. Their mutual reception was, in the beginning, rather cool and stiff, but Marimon prevailed upon them to put themselves, at least politically, in good accordance.—

A treaty of peace and friendship was then drawn up, by which these two commanders solemnly promised mutually to forget what had passed, and to live in good harmony and friendship. General Bolivar consented to give the command of his army to general Florencio Palacio, his cousin, and embarked the 10th of May on board of an English armed brig, with about a dozen of his officers, and departed for the island of Jamaica, without having entered the city of Carthagena.

Before he embarked, he published the following remarkable proclamation :—"Soldiers! The general government of New Grenada has put me at your head, to break the fetters of our brethren of the provinces of Santa Martha, Maracaybo, Coro, and Caracas, who groan under their chains.

"Venezuelans!—You would have returned to your country, and you, Grenadans, would have remained in yours, crowned with laurels. But this felicity, this happiness, has turned totally into mischief and unhappiness. Your arms have destroyed no tyrant, but have been stained with the blood of your brethren in two battles, very different in their aim, and very painful to our feelings. We fought in Cundinamarca (Bogota) in order to obtain a re-union; here (at Carthagena) to obtain mutual co-operation; on both occasions we have been covered with glory. We have been generous in both actions; we have granted pardon to the vanquished, and given them equal rights, and admitted them on the same footing with ourselves. We have united with those who have been against us, to march thus united, and free them from slavery, and save their fortunes and their families. The issue of the campaign is yet undecided. You will go into the territory of the enemy and terminate it, in disputing with me our triumph over tyranny. You, who will devote the remainder of your days to give freedom to your country, are fortunate; but I, who cannot accompany you, and who am forced to die far from Venezuela, in distant and foreign lands, in order to establish peace between you and your countrymen, I am the most unfortunate of men.

"Grenadans and Venezuelans!—I am torn away from you, who have been my companions in so many disasters and battles, to go and live in inactivity, and not to die for my country! Judge of my sorrows and of the greatness of the sacrifice, which I make of my heart, my fortune, and my glory, in renouncing the honor of leading you to victory. The welfare of the army requires it imperiously. I have not hesitated; your existence here and mine are incompatible with each other. I have preferred yours; your and my welfare, that of our brethren, of my friends, in fine, that

of all, depends on the welfare of the republic. Farewell, farewell ! This 9th May 1815.

(Signed)

BOLIVAR.

Here is again one of those captivating proclamations which deserves some explanation. General Bolivar commences this address with a very singular phrase in saying, "Venezuelans !—you have returned to your country crowned with laurels ; but this felicity, this happiness, has been turned totally into unhappiness and mischief. Your arms have been stained with the blood of your brethren," &c. How (may I ask) could they return to their country, crowned with laurels ? Was it because they had forced a defenceless city, as was Bogota, or because they suffered it to be pillaged during forty eight hours ? And who has hindered this felicity,—who has stained his arms with the blood of his brethren ? What will be said and thought of such language, after reading the particulars, unfortunately too true, of the proceedings of general Bolivar against Carthagena ? The dexterity, to say no more of it, with which he tried to make the public, who were ignorant of these circumstances, believe that he had sacrificed his existence to the welfare of his countrymen, may be called, with great reason, an *oriental* phrase ! After having contributed very actively to lose the cause in Venezuela, and then in New Grenada ; after having shed the blood of his innocent countrymen, as *patriotic as himself* ; after having desolated the province of Carthagena, betrayed the confidence of the congress, and put the Spaniards in Santa Martha, at their ease, and procured the means for Morillo to find this fortified sea-port, into which he entered with his troops soon afterwards ; after having facilitated the entry of the Spaniards into the interior of New Grenada, general Bolivar foresaw perfectly well that all would be lost very soon, and that he might have been arraigned and tried for not having followed the instructions of Congress ! It was for these reasons that he thought proper to save himself and put his person in security, in preference to remaining at the head of his army, to accept the proposals of the government of Carthagena, and to march against the enemy to make reparation for the faults he had committed, and to die a glorious death, if necessary, in the defence of his country. But far from this, Bolivar embarked for Jamaica, where he was very safe, and distant from danger ! Nobody had *forced* him to give up the command of his army ; on the contrary, the command of the two armies, as I have mentioned, was at his disposal ; but the government refused the admission of his army into the fortress, as very unpolitic and inexpedient, fearing with reason, an unhappy conflict between the two parties, in the state of animosity of the

troops of Carthagena, against those under command of general Bolivar.

Bolivar wished to make it believed by this *ad captandum* proclamation, that he was totally innocent, and the victim of some secret enemy, or a faction. But there existed no such thing; it was himself only who caused the death of more than a thousand of his soldiers, the dreadful consequence of a siege which ended with the evacuation of Carthagena, and the destruction of the province of New Grenada, and of the liberty of that province !

CHAPTER X.

Consequences of Bolivar's besieging Carthagena—Situation of New Grenada and Venezuela—Marquis de San Leon and Captain General Cagigal—Death of Boves—Execution of Ribas—Cruelties of Morales—Conspiracy of the Blacks. 1815.

General Bolivar's departure gave great power to his rival general, Manuel Castillo, and notwithstanding the formal promise to forget the past, to live in good harmony and friendship, the bitterness of party spirit and the innate hatred which exists between the Caraguin and Grenadan, still continued in its force. The chiefs of Bolivar's troops, now under the command of general Florencio Palacios, were greatly excited against all who belonged to the army of Carthagena, and particularly against its commander, general Castillo.

Bolivar before his departure had appointed his cousin Florencio Palacios as his successor, in the command of the remaining troops, which from 2400 men, were reduced by desertion and malady, to about 700 ! Castillo, by the treaty made with Bolivar, had bound himself to supply these troops with provisions and ammunition, of which they were in need, but with the express condition that general Palacios, with his troops, should be put under his (Castillo's) command, to which Bolivar was obliged to consent on account of the total destitution of his camp. The knowledge of this article of the treaty, spread a general dissatisfaction among the troops still encamped upon La Popa. Some of the officers indulged in biting remarks against Castillo, which were reported

to him, perhaps a little exaggerated. He was very vain, proud and sensitive, and he had flattered himself that on the absence of general Bolivar, all would be forgotten, and order and good harmony re-established. He was furious at hearing what had been said of him. But I must render the justice to the memory of general Manuel Castillo, to say, that all that has been alleged of his being secretly attached to the Spaniards, is a pure calumny, and totally without foundation. His intentions were always pure and upright, in whatsoever concerned the welfare and freedom of his country. But his ambition, his passions, lost him every thing. All could have been again settled, to the satisfaction of both parties, if he would have listened to the advice of friends, who entreated him to send for general Palacios and to have a frank and friendly interview with him. But he refused any advice of such a kind, and treated it as being a weakness, and too great a condescension. I have known both generals very intimately ; the one was my commander-in-chief, and the other my prisoner.

Castillo, after having heard all that had been said of him and his army on the day of Bolivar's embarkation for the Island of Jamaica, ordered that the troops of general Palacios should be removed from La Popa, and be encamped out of the gates of Carthagena, in a very humid and muddy ground, where nothing was to be found except sand and stones. But general Palacios and his officers, were shocked much more when they found that this camp was close under the batteries of an out-work, called the fort San Felipe, so that Castillo could, at the least rebellion, destroy them in a few minutes, with grape shot! Every representation against such a revolting and extraordinary measure, from every man of just sentiments, had no effect upon the exasperated feelings of Castillo. He refused, peremptorily, to change the ground of their encampment. True, the camp was provided with rations, but in an insufficient quantity ; permission was however granted to some few of the officers to enter Carthagena, to get what they wanted ; but it was refused to every non-commissioned officer and private to enter the city, and the guards at all the gates and batteries, were reinforced, as if there was some fear of a sudden enterprise against the fortress.

These measures indicated plainly to Palacios and his officers, the true sentiments of general Castillo respecting them. Seeing that there would be no change, they, in the evening, secretly called a council of war, in which it was determined to remove the camp, and to retreat to Turbacco, at four leagues from Carthagena, which was effected the same night.

When Castillo heard, the following morning, that Palacios and his troops had decamped, and when he received a very energetic letter

from Palacios, who acquainted him with this resolution, and with the motives which had forced him to act as he did, Castillo was much more furious. Palacios mentioned in his letter that he was always ready to act in union with Castillo, whenever he would grant him the promised provisions and ammunition, and also some auxiliary troops to march against their common enemy. This last circumstance softened his resentment a little, and he felt that he had gone too far. He was placed, indeed, in a very embarrassing situation, and did not know how to act. Some friends advised him to take conciliatory steps, and to begin by sending to these troops provisions and ammunition, which he did. He sent the lieutenant colonel, Mariano Montilla, with the commandant Stuart, who commanded a battalion of about 400 men, with more provisions, and arms, &c. to Turbacco, in order to conciliate general Palacios. These officers and men were received well enough on their arrival, and the warlike stores were immediately distributed among the troops of Palacios; but after this was done, the latter, by a secret order, surrounded the battalion of Stuart and summoned them to surrender or to be shot. They were thus forced to obey, if not to perish. The non-commissioned officers and privates were deprived of their uniforms, and all was taken from them; and so, half naked, they were obliged to return to Carthagena. Palacios retained prisoners the two lieutenant colonels, and some other officers, and treated them ill, and like prisoners of war.

When Castillo received the news of such an uncommon treachery, his indignation was instantly excited; he immediately gave orders to arrest all the Caraguin officers which belonged to that corps and of whom a great many had returned into Carthagena. They were put in prison, and strong patrols were sent out in search of the remainder; those who attempted to resist, were very roughly treated. Castillo gave orders to take from them every valuable article, such as watches, money, &c. and to search them in the Spanish manner, viz: to strip them all naked, and to examine scrupulously every part of their clothes, and even *their bodies*!

And who can the reader believe was charged with, and accepted, such a vile and infamous commission? It was a lieutenant colonel of the garrison, a near relation to Castillo, whom I could expose publicly in naming him, if I had not some regard for his respectable family, who treated me with great kindness and friendship. They were treated like the vilest criminals, and shut up day and night, with scanty rations, and in want of necessary food and even of water.

When Palacios heard this, he put Montilla and Stuart at liberty, and as soon as these arrived, the Caraguin officers, were

released but conducted with a guard to some vessels which were about to sail, and banished to foreign countries, without any regard to their future welfare or comfort. The masters of those merchant vessels ready to depart, were bound to take a certain number of them on board, and all representations against it, were in vain. They were compelled to receive, and provide for them, during their whole passage. Thus ended the quarrel between Bolivar and Castillo, and these facts of which I was an eyewitness, will give a convincing proof how strong the enmity was between the two parties, to which Bolivar was the first to give the impulse, and which had the most deplorable consequences upon the welfare and independence of New Grenada.

General Palacios, it is true, marched from Turbacco against the Spaniards, under Morillo, and drove them from the different posts which they occupied, on the river Magdalena; but his forces were too weak, and too much in want of the necessary supplies, to be enabled to undertake any enterprise of consequence.

We will see now what was going on in Venezuela, after the departure of Bolivar. I have already given a detailed account of the manner in which he left Caracas, and retreated towards Barcelona and Cumana, and with what precipitation he embarked and decamped from the latter port.

The astonishingly precipitate flight of the two dictators, Bolivar and Marino, would have lost entirely the cause of independence and liberty in Venezuela, if the Spanish leaders had acted with more moderation, good faith and justice; but their system did not change at all. The persecutions and cruelties practised upon the unfortunate and much disappointed inhabitants of Venezuela, left them no other choice but to endure them, or to fly, or to take arms, and defend their liberty and lives, and repulse tyranny with their bayonets.

Since the 7th July 1814, the day of the entry of the Spanish troops into Caracas, the Marquis de San Leon was entrusted provisionally with the civil government (which the Spaniards express to be the *Gefe politico*) of Caracas, and the captain general Don Manuel Cagigal, with the military department, (*Gefe militar*.) Both were moderate, humane and wise, and desired the welfare of the country *in their sense*, that is to say, they pretended a blind submission to the Spanish government, and tried to do as much good, or little mischief, as possible.

The Marquis had only a temporary authority, and Cagigal was not firm and courageous enough to suppress, by a vigorous act of severity, the cruelties committed in the provinces and at a dis-

tance from his head quarters, by his subalterns. The former was one of the richest inhabitants, and had great influence among all classes of people in Venezuela. To him, Caracas was at this time indebted for not being destroyed. This is shown by the following circumstance.

When the column of colonel Gonzales entered Caracas, on the 7th July, the provisional government, the archbishop at its head, came to receive them, and requested the colonel to maintain order and discipline, assuring him that nothing should be wanting for his troops. This column behaved very well. Some days afterwards, a second one arrived, commanded by a man of color, named Machado, and composed of colored and black people, free-men and slaves, enlisted by Boves in his division. The commander had been the major domo, or house intendant of the count of La Grange, before the revolution. As soon as their approach was announced to the Junta, its members were afraid that the too well known wild and sanguinary character of Machado, might occasion the greatest mischief in entering the capital. Three of the most respectable inhabitants of Caracas, offered to meet them at some distance, to compliment them on their arrival, and to assure them of being supplied with the necessary provisions, &c. so that they should not have the least pretext to commit any disorders. The former master of Machado, Count de La Grange, was one of the three deputies who met him at a little distance from the town. Machado, on perceiving them, ordered a halt, and reproached them in very strong and hard words, "for having received and tolerated so long, the insurgents and their leaders, and that he came now to punish the inhabitants of Caracas for their treachery, &c. &c."

The Count de La Grange, believing himself still to have some authority upon the mind of his former servant, tried to justify himself and the inhabitants; but he had not spoke two words, when he, and one of his companions, were murdered on the spot. The third deputy escaped by the speed of his horse, to announce this dreadful news to the assembled Junta.

Machado came soon afterwards at the head of his troops, which he put in order of battle, into the public square. He came alone, with drawn sword, before the assembled Junta, in which the archbishop presided, assisted by the Marquis of San Leon and others. He reproached them, in the same violent language, with their treachery, and asked, "where is that traitor Gonzales? He is a d——d scoundrel," &c. The Marquis asked him in a firm and stern tone, "what he wanted of the colonel?" "I come to cut his throat," answered Machado, brandishing his drawn sword in a very

menacing manner, so that the archbishop, and the whole assembly, were trembling. The former told him that colonel Gonzales was, at that moment, not present, but if he would wait, he would send for him. The Marquis de Casa Leon, indignant at the behaviour of such a wretch, rose from his seat and advanced close to Machado, and asked him in a calm, but firm tone of voice, "for what purpose he spoke to the members of government, to the representatives of his king, in such a tone which could not be suffered from any of his subjects?" He ordered him to return immediately to his troops, and assure them that their wants should be supplied immediately; but made him responsible for the least mischief which they should commit in the city. If he complied not with this order, he would arrest him, and try him as a disturber of public tranquility, &c. Machado intimidated in his turn, stammered some words of excuse, promised to obey, and kept faithfully his word. Thus were the inhabitants of Caracas saved from destruction, by the firmness of one man.

But when general Cagigal was named commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, in Venezuela, his authority was very limited, the natural consequence of his weakness and his fears. Boves and Morales, who had been witnesses of his cowardice, and his flight from Maturin to Angostura,* who, moreover had had the greatest success, when Cagigal was absent, in the credit of which, he could not therefore participate, and finding themselves at the head of a strong division of determined plunderers and vagabonds, who were entirely devoted to them, they cared little or nothing about the orders of their captain-general, and acted entirely at their pleasure. Others imitated this example, so that each little subaltern, commanding a small body of armed men, committed the greatest vexations, and went unpunished! Caracas and its environs alone felt the benefit of the good intentions of general Cagigal and the Marquis de Casa Leon.

After the departure of the two dictators from Cumana, Ribas, Villapol, Bermudes, and others, found the means to unite the remainder of the scattered patriots, and form a corps of about 2000 men, who fortified themselves at Maturin. They sent some hundred men to Urcia, not far distant from the latter place. Boves marched against it, and, on the 5th December, took possession of the place, after some resistance. Boves received a blow with a lance, and expired immediately. His enraged soldiers murdered every one, men, women and children!

* See particulars, Chapter VI.

Don Francisco Thomas Morales now took command-in-chief of this division, and marched directly upon Maturin, where a great many patriots, with their families, and the dispersed troops from Urica, had retired. He attacked it, on the 11th December, and took it, by assault, after an obstinate defence. All were put to the sword. Ribas and Bermudes, with some officers, escaped, closely pursued by the cavalry of the enemy.

General Ribas was overtaken, and made prisoner, with six of his officers, on the 20th December, in the valley of Pagua. They were disarmed, bound and delivered up to the Spanish commander, Manuel Gomez, who sent them to Morales. On the way, they suffered very barbarous treatment, which was common among the Spaniards at that time. They were put in irons and treated like the greatest criminals. Soon after their arrival at Barcelona, where Morales had fixed his head quarters, he ordered them to be shot, and not being satisfied with this, the head of Ribas was cut off, and sent to Caracas, where, horrible to relate, the Spanish troops and the militia were assembled, on the 14th March, to assist at, and witness the hanging, of this same head of general Ribas, in the public square, *by the hands of the hangman!* This barbarity is, I believe, one of the most atrocious traits of ferocity of the Spanish leaders on the Main.

Thus perished this young and brave man, of an ardent and elevated mind, who deserved a better fate, and who was left in the manner I have related before, by his cousin, Simon Bolivar, who saved himself with Marino. Joseph Felix Ribas, was one of the first promoters of the revolution at Caracas, and from that time he took the most active part in the field of battle, under the orders of the commander-in-chief, the Marquis del Toro, whilst Bolivar remained very peaceably at San Mateo, or in the valley of Tui. He and Bolivar were, from their youth, very intimate friends and companions, and the latter was indebted entirely to Ribas and colonel Briceno, as I have related, for the success of his campaign, in 1813, against Monteverde. Ribas had the greatest ascendancy over the fearful mind of Bolivar; it was he who persuaded Bolivar to march forward, after Castillo had left him, in January 1813, with his Carthagenan auxiliary troops; it was by his skill and bravery that Bolivar gained many battles, being favored by uncommonly fortunate circumstances, which united to give him his brilliant success. It was Ribas who was against evacuating Caracas, and who refused positively to assist at Bolivar's conferences with the archbishop of Caracas; it was he, who at last represented to the dictator, in warm and strong terms, the dreadful conse-

quences of his flight from Cumana in 1814, and who refused positively to accompany him in his flight,

Morales acted like a barbarian; after the death of Boves and his success at Urica and Maturin, the most dreadful cruelties were committed upon the prisoners, and the inhabitants were murdered, the city plundered and burnt. He was proclaimed commander-in-chief of all the provinces lying eastward of the capital, Caracas included; so that Barcelona, Cumana, &c. were subjected to him, whilst Maracaybo, Coro, Barinas, and all the other provinces westward from Caracas, recognised the authority of the captain-general Cagigal, who dared not oppose an innovation so dangerous for the Spanish cause.

As the division of Boves, now commanded by Morales, was composed of about 3000 colored and black people, which were collected from among freemen and slaves, who were spread over the whole country, their actions and words had the greatest influence over this class of people, and various dangerous conspiracies against the whites, were discovered and punished.

It is useless to give a detailed account of all that happened after Bolivar and Marino's embarkation at Cumana; it will be sufficient to say that Venezuela was about in the same state of anarchy, and the theatre of the same cruel and sanguinary acts, as under Monteverde in 1812, and under the dictatorships of Bolivar and Marino.

An impartial and well informed reader will easily perceive that Bolivar's appearance in Venezuela in 1813, and his embarkation and flight from Cumana in 1814, had a very strong resemblance to his arrival at Tunja, and his campaign against Carthagená. In the former he succeeded at first in being victorious, but had neither military skill nor talents enough to drive the enemy entirely out of the country, which could have been easily done under any leader of ordinary experience and talents. Bolivar's ambition suffered no advice, no congress, and entirely guided by his own will and caprice, he ruined his country. After having plunged it into the greatest misery, he left it, embarked, and put himself in safety. In New Grenada, congress gave him the best occasion to atone for his faults committed in Venezuela; and I may here allege, that Urdaneta, or any other chief, might have done much better than Bolivar did. His task was easy and glorious; it was to subdue an open and defenceless city like that of Bogota, with no, or a very small garrison; another would not have suffered the plundering, during 48 hours, of a part of this fine capital. Bolivar did authorise it! Another would have complied with the strict orders of congress, marched against St. Martha without delay, and

have been received with open arms by its inhabitants. The well known cowardice and tyranny of Montalvo, with his 200 men, could by no means resist such a number of soldiers as Bolivar had with him. By the occupation of Santa Martha, Carthagena, Savanilla, Rio Hacha, and all the seaports of New Grenada, would have been shut against the squadron of Morillo; Carthagena would not have fallen a victim to the Spaniards, and congress powerfully seconded by the excellent spirit of the people, would have governed quietly and wisely, as it did, the new founded republic.

Bolivar, blind and deaf, listened to the perfidious advices of Celeonio Pineros, and forgot his engagements, his glory, and the welfare of a million of countrymen. And, strange to relate, but too true: "when the government of Carthagena gave him a good opportunity to redress the faults committed, in offering to entrust him with the command of the troops in that province, with the remainder of his besieging army, and to destroy the (in the beginning) small number of Spaniards who landed under Morillo, he preferred to secure his own personal safety, and embarked; pretending that he was the victim of a faction," &c. The reader may judge of the real character of that leader, who, wherever he goes, spreads confusion, anarchy and blood, when it appears by his curious proclamations, as if he was the only sufferer, and the true friend of order and liberty!

CHAPTER XI.

Events at Carthagena—Siege of that place, by Morillo—Castillo, Bermudes, Duoudray Holstein, Brion—Evacuation of Carthagena and Boca Chica—Causes of Bolivar's return. 1815.

After having shown the consequences of Bolivar's departure from Venezuela in 1814, and his embarkation at Carthagena in May 1815, we must give some account of what passed in the latter province, in the absence of general Bolivar, and how it came to pass that he returned, after staying more than eight months at Kingston, in Jamaica. But for the understanding of the following events, it will be necessary to give a short account of the situation of both provinces, of Venezuela and New Grenada, at the time of

general Bolivar's leaving the first, in August 1814, and the latter, in May 1815.

The situation of the Patriots in Venezuela, was not at all so desperate as the dictator, Bolivar, had represented it, when he embarked at Cumana, in the night of the 25th August. There was not so good reason as he stated in his memoir, to leave the field of battle and to take shelter in New Grenada, and to desert the cause of his native land. To convince the reader fully that this was a hasty desertion by the two dictators, I will enter here into some details.

It is true, that the greatest part of the eight provinces of Venezuela were in the hands of the Spaniards, after the battle gained by Boves at La Puerta, (June 1814,) but they were not at all subjugated, or their inhabitants in favor of the Spanish government. They saw, truly enough, that they had been seduced by the brilliant promises of their countryman, Bolivar; that he had not fulfilled their expectations, and that he had acted in an arbitrary and tyrannical manner; but they were on the other hand fully convinced that a congress, a wise and republican government, could offer them a happier existence, than the cruelties of a Monteverde and his subalterns, or of a Boves, Morales, Puy, Rosetta, and others of a similar description. The *name* alone of freedom and liberty, was a powerful magnet, which had too great attraction, to be left and abandoned hastily; the cruelties and vexations of the Spaniards, on the other hand, offered them no security, no other chance than to take arms again, and to drive their oppressors out of the country, or to die. If therefore Bolivar would have followed the sound advice of his cousin Ribas, to remain in Venezuela, and to suffer the desertion of his colleague, Marino, every one would have rallied to the standard of the only remaining dictator; every one would have had a central point, a single leader, who could have given to each of the dispersed columns, a unity of action, a combined force and success.

General Bolivar, who is so fond of a central government, who professed loudly, in his last proclamations, that the military power alone can support a civil and free government, forgot, surely, in the night of the 24th of August 1814, and in May 1815, and still more, in July 1816, &c. his favorite principle; if not, he would have remained in Venezuela, united his scattered forces, and fought, or died, like a hero, in the field of battle. But general Bolivar *did not* show us, at all, these brilliant qualities.

Instead of Bolivar and Marino, we see Ribas, Piar, Paez, Urdaneta, Villapol, Yarasa, Sedeno, Monagas, Roxas, and many hundred brave chiefs, remaining in their country, and fighting for liber-

ty and independence. These chieftains continued to harrass the Spaniards so successfully, and gained daily, more ground and forces, that it is a known fact, that the Spaniards would have been at last driven out of Venezuela, without general Bolivar, if Morillo had not arrived in time to support the cause of tyranny and oppression, in its agony.

Many of these chieftains, of which I know a great number personally, have assured me, that if the dictator Bolivar would have remained, all would have gone better; all felt the want of union, and an authority which they were already used to recognise.

Besides the eight provinces of Venezuela, the island of Margarita, had preserved and supported its liberty and independence, from the beginning of the revolution, and destroyed about 2000 of Morales' best troops, who attempted to subdue, in the beginning of 1815, this small island, inhabited by a set of brave, industrious and determined people, who destroyed, afterwards, about 3000 of the best troops under Morillo. This alone may give a proof that the cause in Venezuela was not so desperate as Bolivar asserts.

The inhabitants of Margarita were emulated by the so well known Llaneros, (inhabitants of the plains, in the provinces of Caracas, Cumana, Barcelona and Barinas.) They were in continual war with the Spaniards, and fought under Paez, Yarasa, Sedeno, Roxas and Monagas, their favorite leaders, with a bravery and zeal which did them the greatest honor.

Morillo, with his 10,000 men, arrived, and did great mischief, ruined the country, took the pompous title of *Pacificator*, and caused the destruction of thousands, &c. When all was about lost for his cause, he embarked and left a weak chieftain, known for a great coward, as his successor, who by his apathy, his cowardice, and jealousy of the military skill of Morales, lost the Spanish cause, and strange to say, imitated the good example of his master and benefactor, Morillo, of whom he was a great favorite, because he was docile, and submitted to the caprices of his master, and knew how to flatter and pay court to him, at the proper time. Dr. Miguel de La Torre embarked, after he had destroyed the cause of tyranny on the Main, and took the more sure and quiet command of the island of Porto Rico, where he found a second Angostura in its capital, St. John. No grape shot or balls would trouble him there, and he could repose and sleep, as he did in Porto Cabello.

Morillo divided his forces into three strong divisions, of which one was destined to act against Bogota, and the interior of New Grenada, another to besiege Carthagena, and the last to reinforce the Spanish troops in Venezuela.

At the latter end of August 1815, arrived the Spanish squadron in sight of Carthagena and Boca Chica. General Castillo, after Bolivar's embarkation for Jamaica, and Palacios' departure from Turbacco, acted with very great haughtiness and despotism in Carthagena, and took not the least vigorous step to put the place in a good state of defence. From the 15th January 1815, the day of his entry into Carthagena, at the head of a part of his army, to destroy the faction of Pineros, he remained quiet in his large and beautiful residence, near the walls of Carthagena, and appeared no more at the head of his troops. He occupied himself with festivals and parties, married a young and beautiful lady, with whom, and her sister, he remained regularly at home, was very seldom to be seen, received his subalterns in a harsh and haughty manner, arrested various commanders unjustly, namely the commodore Aury, and the general Florencio Palacios, and made himself many great enemies. Among them was general Ducoudray Holstein, of whom I am compelled to speak more than I would have done, if what I relate was not a characteristic picture of the chieftains on the Main.

From the time that general Ducoudray had taken the temporary command of the strangers, during the sessions of the legislature, general Castillo became entirely changed in his manners to the former. He became embarrassed, cold and stiff, when he before was very intimate and friendly. When we took a ride out, which happened almost every afternoon, he was silent and appeared sorrowful, and when I asked him the reason of it, he said to me, "that he had no motive at all to be so." I perceived this change, and declined to ride out any more with him. I heard afterwards that he felt jealous of me, and the ascendancy which I appeared to have over the strangers, and that he wished to have me out of his way, declining to follow a great many of my suggestions, tending to introduce more order and discipline among the army, so called, of Carthagena, counting less than 2000 men in all.

I was therefore appointed commander-in-chief of the four forts of Boca Chica, which I found in a deplorable situation. I arrived in the night, very unexpectedly, and when I rose at day-break, as usual, I met with a handsome young man, well dressed, who approached me in a respectful manner, and welcomed my arrival, saying that the report from the commander in the forts was, that nothing had passed worthy of notice. I lived in a large and beautiful house, called the Commandancia, at some distance from the forts, at the entrance of the borough, called Boca Chica. This young man was nothing else than the first servant of the Commandancia, who told me that the former commanders of these forts,

were in the habit of receiving from him, Lucas, every morning, the report from the forts. Astonished at such a disgraceful mode of service, I ordered the four commanders of these forts, the major and the staff officers, before me, and established order and discipline, which had been very much neglected. I understood that the officers on duty and guard, left their guards under the care of a sergeant, and came, in short jackets, into the village, where they passed the whole night.

When Bolivar approached Carthagena, the question was suggested, whether I could be trusted to remain, as the commander of such an important station as that of these forts, which lay as a bulwark at the entry of the port of Carthagena, 12 miles from the fortress. Some said I might be in favor of Bolivar, and give up to him these forts, but the majority were in my favor, and expressed great confidence that I would be faithful to my duty, and was an officer of honor and trust. Martial law was now proclaimed in Carthagena, where Castillo commanded, and in Boca Chica, where I had united the three powers. As the garrison of the four forts was very weak, and unable to do field duty, I assembled the inhabitants of the surrounding islands of Boca Chica, Baru, Passao-Caballos, &c.; represented to them, in a short and earnest speech, the situation in which general Bolivar's hostile attack placed us, and showed them the necessity of taking shelter, with their families, in the forts, and doing military duty, as militia, promising at the same time, that not one of them should be pressed, (as was the common use,) for the marine service, and that they should be armed and fed at the expense of government. They assented unanimously, and I had about 1500 young and brave soldiers more, which I organised the same day in different corps and companies. I created a company of 150 boys, from 10 to 15 years old, which rendered me great service. Drills with the musket, rifles and guns, were regularly established in the forts, and the distribution of good rations provided for, a hospital organised, military tribunals erected, the marine, including 15 armed vessels systematized, the fortifications repaired, the arsenal, workmen, forges, sailmakers, fishers, &c. established, and all was activity, zeal and order, so that many thousand strangers, who were witnesses of what passed in Boca Chica, were surprised to see such activity and zeal, when at Carthagena, all was in great apathy.

One Sunday, being at mass, I observed a great bustle amongst the congregation, and all the men and boys running, in the midst of divine service, out of the church. Much surprised, I sent an officer to know the reason of it, and received the report that the commandant of the Matricula (or press gang) had arrived from

Carthagena, in order to press sailors in Boca Chica ; and that, as soon as they heard that the colonel Marques was coming, they fled into the mountains and surrounding forest, fearing they should be pressed. I determined immediately to show them that I was a man used to keep my word, having pledged myself to protect them against any service of that kind. I sent for colonel Marques, and at the same time ordered the inhabitants to return and assemble, without arms, before my house ; here, in their presence, I asked the colonel what kind of mission he had, and by what order he came here. He showed me an order from brigadier general Eslava, and general Castillo, to press 80 sailors, of which the marine in Carthagena was in great want. I told him I was sorry that I could not consent to assist him in the execution of such an order, having pledged my word that none of these inhabitants should be pressed during their services in the forts, and I wrote immediately to general Castillo and Juan de Dios Amador, the governor of the province, the motives of my refusal, and the urgency of being faithful in my promises, to inspire that confidence in me so highly necessary in civil war, &c. I dismissed colonel Marques, who wished to make me some representations, which I would and could not hear. But he persisting, I was obliged to tell him in a tone of authority, that if he did not embark in five minutes, I would arrest, and send him into one of the forts. I took my watch, and gave the necessary orders to put in execution my threat. This had the desired effect, and he returned without one man.

When the inhabitants saw how I protected them, they had the greatest confidence in me, and served with redoubled zeal. The following is an instance of this confidence.

The governor wrote to me a private very obliging note, approving my zeal, my good services, &c. and ended, by requesting me, if I could, to procure him 220 good sailors, for an extraordinary expedition against some Spanish vessels ready to sail in a few weeks from Havana, with one and a half millions of dollars, which he was desirous to intercept. I answered him, that he could have 300, and more, without any difficulty. The squadron of five armed vessels came some days after, under the command of commodore Tono, from Carthagena, to Boca Chica, and the latter handed me a polite letter from the governor, in reply to my answer, full of thanks and confidence. The procuring of the necessary provisions, water, &c. took the whole day, and I had a large dinner and ball party, to which the officers of the squadron and the forts were invited. Tono's first question was, whether the sailors were ready, and whether they were chosen by me ? I replied *no* ! With this, he was perplexed and thunderstruck, and

he was the whole evening very uneasy, and came in the middle of the ball, at about one o'clock in the morning, with a very sorrowful face, to ask me if I had not yet given the necessary orders for the sailors, &c. I replied to him again, *I had not!* and that he should not be detained a single minute by me. At day-break, Tono and myself left the ball room, embarked for the principal fort, and ordered the alarm gun to be fired. Soon after, every one was at his post. I ordered all the sailors from the three other forts to come down to San Fernando, where I made them acquainted that the government was in need of good sailors, to embark for about one month, and that I had pledged my word they would embark voluntarily for such a short time. They received my speech with acclamations of *viva la patria*, and said they were ready to embark. Tono and all the navy officers were astonished, and could hardly believe what they heard and saw. I told him to choose the best sailors, and every one of them embarked cheerfully.

When general Castillo heard all that was doing in Boca Chica, he appeared jealous and uneasy. He came one day to visit me, and after having dined with me, appearing to be much pleased with his hospitable reception, he asked how many rations of fish were dealt out daily. I answered so many. He said in a haughty manner to me, "that will not do, sir, you *must* catch more!" I showed him the ridicule of such a pretension, in stating in a sarcastic tone, that I was the commander-in-chief of these forts, but not of the fishes in the sea! and that I could not command these to be so good as to fill our nets! All the bystanders laughed heartily at my reply, but not so Castillo; he stood up in a fury, took his sword, and said to me, I should soon hear more of him. He stepped out and ordered the officer of my own guard to arrest me, and that I should be tried before a court martial, for having disobeyed his orders. I heard these words, took my uniform and sword, and, in his presence, commanded the guard to present arms. I then asked them, who commanded here, Castillo or I? As the general made much noise, a great many officers and privates had surrounded my house, and all cried with the guard, "*viva nuestro comandante*, our father, our commander-in-chief," and "*muere Castillo*," (perish Castillo.) The general turned pale, and said to me, in a faltering voice, that he hoped I would not suffer him to be murdered. I immediately commanded silence, and said to the enraged soldiers, that general Castillo having come on a visit, I, and they, would surely not suffer a breach of hospitality to him; and that he, Castillo, should embark immediately for Carthagena, from whence he came. So ended this ridiculous behaviour, and

he thanked me very heartily when I handed him into his long-boat, safe and uninsulted. But my officers, and those of Carthagena, had a long time been tired of his tyranny and haughty manners, and one night came three of the officers of the highest rank from Carthagena to Boca Chica, and asked my assistance to arrest Castillo and put myself at the head of the troops. I refused positively to accept the command of Carthagena, being fully satisfied with my station, but consented to displacing Castillo, as having become unworthy, by his apathy and bad measures, to command us any longer.

After the refusal of three others, the command was conferred upon colonel Bermudes, who belonged to Bolivar's army. He arrested Castillo, and began by shooting captain Cespedes, who commanded the guard before the palace of general Castillo, and who tried to resist. This cruelty against a young officer, who did his duty, was unnecessary, as Bermudes had a stronger guard with him, which was sufficient to make prisoners of Castillo's captain and soldiers, being only 20 men, without killing a young officer, 20 years old, the only consolation of his afflicted father.

The friends of Bermudes advised him to get himself elected dictator, during the whole time of the siege. A great council of war was convoked for the 16th September, to which I received an invitation; but I sent in my place colonel Sata y Busy, the ex-chief of the staff of Miranda's army, in 1812, who served under my orders. I had the following report from him: "The council was solemn and numerously attended, and after various orators had urged the necessity of uniting the forces, and naming general Bermudes as a temporary dictator, the latter having already risen from his seat, to express his thanks and acknowledgments, was interrupted by a Caraguin, named Garcia de Sena, who was the provisional secretary of the war department. He spoke with so great vehemency against such a step, that Bermudes, being confused, dared not to speak a single word more. This weakness in a commander, on such an occasion, where the public welfare stood in danger, made a very unfavorable impression upon the minds of the other chiefs, who had conceived a higher opinion of Bermudes. From that time, and when Morillo besieged the place, the commander of Carthagena took very insignificant measures to provide the place, showed no energy, no activity, no talents, and occupied himself with his pleasures; and so it happened that the city was filled with sick and perishing people, who died for want of food. Some told him, in vain, that the secret friends of the Spaniards, of whom Carthagena had at the time a large number, had secreted flour, rice, and other provisions; but all was in vain; he took no

step to search the indicated places, but sunk into great apathy. This was so true, that two hours after the entry of Morillo's troops into Carthagena, white bread, baked from this same flour, was found in abundance, for sale in the streets of the fortress.

In a time of civil war, where the greatest precaution should have been taken to fill the public offices with virtuous and devoted subjects, it is a too notorious fact, that a great many of the most important offices were filled with Spaniards, or secret enemies of the cause.

In September 1815, or during the siege of Carthagena, by Morillo, were to be found in Carthagena, 1st, a *Mareschal de Campo*, a European Spaniard, to whom the republic paid his half pay from the beginning of the revolution, who remained quietly during the whole siege of Morillo in Carthagena. His name was *Don Francisco Esquiagua*, born in the province of Cataluna, who, notwithstanding his being 75 years of age, was yet very vigorous and active; mixed in all societies, and was well acquainted with all that passed in the city; he gave, every week, a detailed account of the situation of the fortress, to the Spaniards, to whom he was entirely devoted.

Such a dangerous man was tolerated, whilst the widow of a Spanish colonel, an American, was expelled from Carthagena, with her two daughters, because she spoke some insignificant words against the patriot leaders in Carthagena!

The second Spaniard was brigadier general Antonio Angiano, commander of the engineers; 3d, the brigadier Eslava, commander of the navy; 4th, the chief of the staff of the same department, captain of a man of war, J. M. Tono; the three other captains of the same rank, were also Spaniards born, and were yet in the service of the republic; 5th, the chief of the land troops, colonel Manuel Cortes, the same who proposed poisoning the well of La Popa, during the siege of Carthagena by Bolivar; 6th, the commander-in-chief of the artillery, lieutenant colonel Joseph Bossa, and the major Joseph Lear, with a dozen other subaltern officers; 8th, the treasurer general Francisco Ferrer, and his deputy Juan de Dios Sotomayor; so that the finances of the republic were entirely in the hands of Spaniards, and at their disposal; 9th, the intendant of the army, Antonio Cespedes; 10th, the director of the custom house; 11th, the grand vicar, known under the denomination of *Father Provisor*, Dr. Bantista Sotomayor, the same who excommunicated the free masons and others in 1814.

Besides this list of Spaniards in office, in the small province of Carthagena, the richest commercial houses, also a great many private families and individuals, the friars, priests, monks and nuns,

were secretly devoted to the Spanish cause, and great enemies of the republican system. And never did Bermudes take any step to watch, or to change these Spanish officers, of which a great many were known to be in favor of Spain. He never gave the least order to send away in time, all the useless consumers, in a place destitute, as he very well knew, of all means of subsistence. The fact is, that Bermudes was an ignorant, ambitious, and indolent man, totally unfit to command, in such critical circumstances, a place of such importance, as was Carthagena. When, at last, he sent away some miserable wretches, whom he sent to me, with a recommendation to provide for their subsistence, he did it much too late, and when, already, 340 persons died every day at Carthagena.

While Bermudes acted, in the latter place, with great apathy and weakness, Ducoudray organised armed gun boats, to take from the magazines of the enemy, in the islands of Boca Chica and Bara, large quantities of provisions; created companies of fishermen, who took daily, under the protection of these boats, a large quantity of fish; supplied Carthagena with provisions; sent armed privateers in search of all that was wanted, and showed every where, the first example to his troops, in every kind of danger and fatigue. Thousands of foreigners, at that time in Carthagena, will confirm these well known facts; when Bermudes, and those chiefs concerned in this statement, will try to deny it publicly, and will, in order to destroy the impression of truth, make the utmost exertions to calumniate my actions and services, as this same Bermudes, Charles Soublotte, and others, have done already. I despise such attempts, and am sure that the statement of facts, dates, names, in my history, and still more the deplorable state of affairs in Colombia, will show how miserably public affairs have been managed in this beautiful country, where nature has done every thing to give happiness and plenty to its inhabitants.

I said that I was always ready to show the example of order and submission to discipline, and of exposure to danger. One day, for instance, I ordered a sortie of 200 men, from the fort of San Fernando, to repulse some incendiaries, from the village of Boca Chica, but could not find more than 20 volunteers who would follow a certain lieutenant colonel, under my orders, in whom no one had the slightest confidence. When I heard this, I put myself at the head of the party, and was immediately followed by more than 300 men, ordering, peremptorily, the surplus back, to remain in the fort. I soon drove the enemy back, who took to flight and returned no more.

Another day, having given orders to demolish a battery of no use, more than 3000 cannon balls remained piled up in the redoubt. The commander of the artillery, colonel Toborda, represented to me that his artillerists were too much engaged in other works, and unable to take these balls into the arsenal. I thereupon issued an order, that every individual coming to the fort of San Fernando, should bring one of these balls, whenever he passed the draw bridge to come in, without distinction of rank or person. I understood that this order met with general approbation, and that three staff officers alone, said they never would submit to an order so degrading to officers of their high standing. These having been named to me, I determined to subject them immediately to the order, as a measure highly necessary, in the present extraordinary circumstances. I sent for them, after having instructed the captain of the guard at the draw bridge not to suffer even myself to pass, without carrying a cannon ball, and so nobody *else*, in coming into the arsenal of San Fernando, where I had, since the siege by Morillo, established my head quarters. I told these three officers that I wanted their advice on some outworks, on which the Spanish prisoners were employed. Having passed the bridge with them, I pretended to have forgotten some plans, and sent two back to my cabinet, requesting them to ask my secretary for those papers. They were in full uniform, as well as myself; and bearing themselves loftily, they passed the bridge and the first centry, who presented arms. The second stopped them short, and asked them, respectfully, "if they were not acquainted with the general's order?" They answered, "yes, but such an order had nothing to do with them." The centry told them "that they were subject to it like any body else;" they were about to force a passage, but he presented his bayonet and called for the guard. This naturally made a noise, and many hundreds assembled in a few minutes to know the cause. I came, of course, immediately, and asked the reason of the centry's call. The officer of the guard told me, "that the resistance of the two colonels against the orders given, was the cause of the alarm." "Well, gentlemen," said I, very coolly, "I will go fetch my papers myself, but as the commander of the forts has given the order that nobody should be permitted to enter San Fernando without taking one of these balls into the arsenal, the useful orders of the commander must be respected, and I obey him with pleasure, since they have been given for the welfare and safety of us all." So saying, and without giving them the least reprimand or looking at the two officers, I took one of these rusty bullets, and passed the gates before the whole guard under arms, and amid huzzas

of all the bystanders, who took, each one his bullet, and followed me. The officers astonished and ashamed, followed my example, and from that time nobody attempted to resist any order given.

I could relate a great many other instances, but I am afraid of speaking too much of what I did. It will suffice to state here, that I was the last officer who left the forts, after having protected the whole emigration, which came under my batteries, from Carthagena to Boca Chica, in the afternoon of the 7th December.

In the meantime, captain Louis Brion, afterwards admiral Brion, came from London, with a fine corvette of 24 guns, 14,000 stand of arms, and a great quantity of warlike stores, to Boca Chica. He fell sick, and I took him into my house, where our acquaintance was soon changed in intimacy. He spoke to me continually of general Bolivar, and regretted much to see him absent. One day an intimate friend of Bolivar arrived from Jamaica, a Dr. Rodriguez, a man whose plain, unassuming manners pleased me much. He had frequent conversation with Brion. They both lived in my large government house. One evening, being in my cabinet, captain Brion came in, and asked me if I had any pressing business, or was at leisure to hear what he had to communicate. He told me that Dr. Rodriguez had just arrived from Carthagena, where Bermudes, in consequence of his apathy, and half way measures, was generally despised; that they accused him of occupying himself more with his pleasures than with his duty, and that he was unworthy to command; that Carthagena was in a deplorable situation, through his fault, &c. Brion said to me, after a pause: "I know no other man, among all these chieftains, but Bolivar, able to save the place; at least, he has an acknowledged authority over them all, and you and I could assist him much; then I hope that the misfortunes he has experienced, will correct his haughty and despotical character. Dr. Rodriguez assures me that he is quite another man in Jamaica, and that he is anxious to return. The Dr. came here on his order, and desires much to have a private conversation with you on the subject, as you alone are able to support, and send for him."

After five or six conferences between Brion, Rodriguez, and myself, the following measures were adopted, to favour general Bolivar's return. As Ducoudray possessed the entire confidence of all those under his command; as he had, moreover, many friends amongst the most powerful natives, and strangers in the city of Carthagena, he spoke to Dr. Rodriguez, upon the facility of introducing Bolivar, and putting him at the head of the government of Carthagena, instead of the weak and indolent Bermudes. I requested the Dr. to go again to Carthagena, and sound, adroitly,

some persons whom I named to him, and any body else upon whom I could rely. He returned and found my observations correct. He said further, that all those persons whom he visited during his three days stay, assured him that Bermudes had entirely lost his confidence and activity, and that they saw him, with sorrow, associating too much with women known to be secretly attached to the Spanish cause. This the Dr. repeated to me twice, and said he had heard it from good authority. Brion offered to go with his five corvettes, to Aux Cayes (Hayti) to get one thousand barrels of flour, rice, and other provisions, which might enable Cartagena and Boca Chica to support a longer seige, and to come immediately back to Boca Chica, whilst I engaged the fast sailing well armed privateer *La Popa*, which was one of the armed vessels under my order, to go for general Bolivar, to Kingston, in Jamaica, and to send Dr. Rodriguez in the vessel with a letter directed to Bolivar. All was ready in a couple of days, and they sailed early in the morning on the 11th of November in company with three other privateers, commanded by me, to search on the coast for provisions.

Dr. Rodriguez received verbal instructions, from me and Brion; nobody else in Cartagena or Boca-Chica, had the least idea of what was going on. Besides, I handed a letter to the Dr. addressed to general Bolivar in French, of which the following is a translation: "Dear General, an old soldier of acknowledged republican sentiments, with whom you are personally well acquainted, and are informed that he has served against you, invites you now to come and place yourself at the head of the government of Cartagena, where Bermudes acts with great weakness and apathy. I engage, by the influence which I have here in Boca-Chica and in Cartagena, to put in execution this change of government without the least bloodshed, and pledge my life for all the consequences. In taking this extraordinary step, I can assure you, candidly, that I have no other intention than to save the cause, which is in danger of being lost in Bermudes' weak hands. Brion is your friend, and Brion alone, has engaged me by showing your character to me in a very different light from that in which I had received it from others. Dr. Rodriguez, who will hand you this letter, will explain to you every other particular concerning this plan, but lose not a minute, and come in the same vessel immediately. Captain Pierrill, who commands the *Popa*, has orders to take you and your friends to Boca Chica.

Respectfully Yours,

(Signed)

DUCOUDRAY HOLSTEIN.

Dated, Boca Chica, November 11th, 1815."

General Bolivar was much surprised at the sudden arrival of Dr. Rodriguez, and much more at my letter, and at all the particulars communicated to him by the Dr. Bolivar was so highly pleased, that he remained not a day longer in Kingston, but embarked with the Dr. and two aid-de-camps, the same evening, to join me in Boca Chica. But being under sail, he met with another Carthagenan privateer, the Republican, captain Joanny, who informed him that all was lost, that Carthagena and Boca Chica were evacuated by the patriots, and that Ducoudray and the principal patriot families were on their way, in ten armed vessels, under the command of commodore Louis Aury, directing their course toward *Aux Cayes* (Hayti.)

General Bolivar then changed his course and arrived ten days before our squadron at Aux Cayes, and departed from thence to the capital of Hayti, Port au Prince, where he was cordially received by the president, Alexander Petion.

It will undoubtedly surprise the reader, that I, who was so decidedly against general Bolivar in September, 1814, had changed so suddenly in his favor, in November 1815. But this is not so surprising, when we consider the circumstances of my personal and delicate situation, in a land where I was a stranger, and full of enthusiasm for the liberty and freedom of this beautiful country. Recently arrived at Carthagena, I remained more than two months, a quiet observer of all that was going on, before I engaged in the service of this republic, which was offered me some days after my arrival. But having at last consented to serve as *Gefe de Brigada* (colonel) in Castillo's staff, until my nomination as *mareschal de campo* could be confirmed by the congress of New Grenada which was sent to Tunja by the president Manuel Rodriguez and general Castillo, I was in honour bound to support the existing government in Carthagena, and obliged to act against the united combination of the two Pineros with Bolivar as I did, and as I have stated in another chapter.* General Bolivar departed from Carthagena to Tunja, and besieged Carthagena; I being commander of the forts of Boca Chica, was naturally obliged to remain faithful to the established government of Carthagena, and in killing general Bolivar in an action (*as I said afterwards to himself*,) I should have done my duty. But Brion's arrival from London, my intimacy with him, the warmth with which he represented to me the necessity of saving Carthagena in pursuance of his plan, and

* See Chapter VII.

my being fully convinced that this plan was the only one to save the province, which I alone could effect, considering my position at that time, determined me, and I would have fulfilled my new engagement with Bolivar at the peril of my life, if the evacuation of Carthagena had not taken place sooner than I and Brion expected. Then I was like many others, fully convinced of the total incapacity and apathy of Bermudes as commander of Carthagena. I was so fully persuaded that I had formed a wrong opinion of Bolivar's character and abilities, and moreover that I saw in this recal of Bolivar the only way to save the republic from destruction, that I acted in conformity to my conviction, and will never deny these steps taken in favour of a man, whom I found afterwards, not at all to correspond to the ideas I had formed of him.

I will say shortly, in closing this chapter, that the distress was so great in Carthagena, for want of provisions, that it was resolved to evacuate it secretly in the night, without capitulating with a cruel and faithless enemy like Morillo. This was done, and Louis Aury the commodore of the squadron, received these unfortunate people on board, forced the passage of the canal, which forms the entry of the port of Carthagena, from Boca Chica, and all came to shelter themselves under batteries of the forts which I commanded. I was, therefore, the last chieftain who remained, and after all the families from Boca Chica were embarked, I came at two o'clock in the morning of the 8th December, 1815, on board the commodore Aury, where I joined my family; and so we left this unhappy country, and sailed for the port of Aux Cayes.

CHAPTER XII.

Particulars of the stay of General Bolivar in Aux Cayes—Characteristical Anecdotes.

The emigrants from Carthagena, and my family, arrived the 6th of January 1816, at Aux Cayes, after having suffered cruelly for want of water and food. Some weeks after, general Bolivar arrived from Port au Prince, and came to visit my family. He embraced and thanked me in the most obliging manner for my letter, and for all that I had intended to do for him, and urged me to come and breakfast with him.

It was in his room, and in presence of Brion, that I spoke to him as follows : “ I hope, my dear general, that you will forget past events ; that now, being private individuals, in a strange land, we shall not act hostilely against each other. I served against you, and would have certainly wounded and killed you, or you me, if we had met together on the field of battle ; but that was my duty, and so I was in honour bound to maintain the existing government of Carthagera against you, or any body else,” &c. General Bolivar got up, embraced me again, and said to me the most obliging things. He told me then, that the president of Hayti had offered him large supplies of every thing for a new expedition against the Spaniards in Venezuela.

Some days after, he offered me the office of chief of his staff, and promised me my grade of mareschal de campo, as soon as we should enter upon the territory of Venezuela, saying very obligingly, that I deserved it for my past services. He authorised me to choose my staff-officers, but expressed the wish to admit the lieutenant colonel Charles Soublotte, and captain Perez. The former is at present the secretary general of the dictator in Colombia, the latter having occupied the same office during Bolivar’s campaigns in Peru.

I was charged with the organization of the staff, with forming regulations for its officers, and for the administration of the army, and proposing candidates to fill the necessary appointments.

From that time, I had always eight or ten young officers of the staff employed daily under my orders, in the house which I occupied during our stay in Aux Cayes. All that I proposed in my frequent conversations with Bolivar, was approved and put in execution ; all these measures were intended for the furtherance of our intended expedition, and for forming a good and well instructed body of officers, of which, as I told the general frankly, we were much in need, &c.

The president, Petion, received Bolivar with great distinction when at Port au Prince, and not only granted him large supplies in arms, ammunition, &c. but gave orders to the governor of Aux Cayes, general Marion, to assist him in his enterprise.

Some friends of general Bolivar advised him to assemble all the principal patriots, who had emigrated, and were then at Aux Cayes, and submit to them his new enterprise, principally for the purpose of being recognised as the commander of the expedition. At this assembly were present all the civil and military chiefs, and the principal emigrant patriots ; among them, Brion, Piar, Marino, Mc Gregor, Bermudes, myself, the brethren Pineres, the intendant Zea, the commodore Aury, &c. It was decided—1, to as-

sist the patriots in Venezuela;—2, that general Bolivar should command this expedition;—3, that he should unite in himself the civil and military authorities until the convocation of a congress;—4, that the expedition should first sail to the island of Margarita, and from thence to the Main, &c.

Aury alone was opposed to giving general Bolivar unlimited power, and proposed to nominate a commission of three or five persons, which should, with general Bolivar, be invested with that authority. The latter spoke with great warmth against the proposal, and ended in declaring he should never consent to a division of those powers. Not a dissenting voice having been heard, the articles were agreed to and passed.

I must mention here that these articles were prepared beforehand, and already drawn up; and that general Bolivar was seated upon an elevated large armed chair, and the military chieftains lower, and on common chairs, on the right and left of the general; opposite to him sat the secretary of the assembly, and on his left, right, and behind him, all the other members, who had been invited to the assembly by written hand bills, signed by general Bolivar. I must confess that this armed chair elevated about two feet gave offence to me, and to many others; besides, it had the air of a throne, and a monarchical distinction. This arrangement was prepared by Bolivar, in concurrence with colonel Louis Durand, a native of Bogota, who came over from London with Louis Brion, and who was the principal owner of the fourteen thousand stand of arms bought for the government of New Grenada, and which were fortunately not landed at Boca Chica, but remained on board of Brion's corvette, in which came, as I have mentioned, from Boca Chica to Aux Cayes.

General Bolivar opened the session with a long prepared speech, in which he attempted to show the necessity of having a central government, or a united power in one single person, and he therefore requested the assembly to name such a one before the expedition departed.

Brion then urged in a few words the necessity of this appointment, and said that general Bolivar was a suitable man for such a command, and if the majority were in his favor, as he was sure it would be, he would join with his vessels, and employ his means and his credit to fit out the necessary number of other armed vessels and transports, with provisions, &c. to assist general Bolivar, but *no body else!*

Brion immediately put the question to each of us, and said: "Do you consent, general Marino, that general Bolivar, as cap-

tain-general of the armies of Venezuela and New Grenada, shall be our only commander—yes or no ;” and turned round, naming each of us by name ; and so Bolivar was named our commander-in-chief, *uniting all the powers*, of which nothing was before mentioned in a positive and explicit manner, either by Bolivar or Brion. When the secretary had read the articles, Bolivar requested that no one should go out before they were reduced to form, and signed by each of us. Article 3d was put, as I have mentioned, to which Aury objected, and refused positively to sign that paper. This refusal was the cause of the first disunion among the chiefs of the expedition ; and from that time Bolivar was very angry with Aury ; and that resentment lasted until the death of the latter.

Among many traits of the vindictive character of Bolivar against Aury, I select the following : Before, and during the siege of Carthagena, by Morillo, Aury had made the greatest exertions to supply the place with provisions ; he had exposed his person, and his own vessels to great danger, and had received on board many hundred families at the time of their evacuation of Carthagena, and had, in short, rendered the greatest services to the republic, which owed him a great deal of money for advances made for provisions, &c. At his arrival at Aux Cayes, he claimed, as payment, the property of an armed privateer, the Constellation, and in his written demand, directed to Father Marimon, as the commissary general of the congress of New Grenada—the only competent authority which came with us to Aux Cayes, the governor of Carthagena having remained in Jamaica—said that if they would grant him this schooner, he would come with the three other armed vessels belonging to him, and would engage four or five other owners of privateers to join the intended expedition of general Bolivar.

As soon as Bolivar was apprised that Marimon had named a commission to examine the justness of Aury's demand, and to settle it at once, knowing that the commissary of congress was greatly in favor of Aury, he sent the next day after his election as commander-in-chief, for Father Marimon, and the intendant Zea, one of the arbitrators, and reprimanded them very severely in my, and commodore Brion's presence, for having meddled in this affair, annulled the just award made in favor of Aury, and tore it in pieces, it having been already written, signed, and approved. Not satisfied with this, he requested general Marion, the Haytien governor of Aux Cayes, to put a guard of Haytien troops on board

of the Constellation, in order to drive Aury's men from the vessel, and take it for himself.

Aury, greatly surprised, in vain made the most just representations, and said afterwards, that having well known the tyrannical principles of Bolivar, he had opposed being under his sole order ; that he could not endure that such a man should be the ruler of so many thousands of his brethren.

The reception of Aury, by Bolivar, at Savanilla, is too well known to be repeated here.

The consequence of this arbitrary act was, that our expedition lost, with commodore Aury, more than four hundred good sailors, and about fifty foreign officers, with eight armed vessels, which separated from the expedition, whilst the squadron under Brion departed without them ; full one half of our forces were thus lost to us.

Bermudes, a secret enemy of Bolivar, remained with Aury ; so did colonel Ducayla, Coland, Bolivar's ex-commander of artillery, Garcia, and others.

Aury, as is known, took the Mexican colours, and sailed, separately, from Aux Cayes to the island of Amelia. All that might be said of Aury's subsequent privateering operations, has nothing to do with Bolivar's resentment at Aux Cayes ; it is a convincing proof, like that of the besieging of Carthagena, how vindictive and irascible is the character of the man who rules over about two millions of Colombians at the present day, with more power and *absoluteness*, than does the autocrat of Russia, or the Sultan at Constantinople over his subjects.

The inhabitants of Aux Cayes were greatly scandalized at the indecent quarrels which took place between the patriot chieftains. There was a challenge for a duel from the lieutenant colonel Mariano Montilla to general Bolivar ; another of general Marino against commodore Brion ; both were prevented. In the first, I was the second of general Bolivar, who chose me, as Brion did in that of Marino. The particulars of the first will be related afterwards ; the second did not take place because I told an officer to go secretly to general Marion and advise him, that he should interpose his authority in detaining Marino in his house, as such duels were not tolerated by the laws of Hayti ; which he did. Brion and myself, accompanied by Bolivar, were going to the place appointed for rendezvous, when I urged Bolivar to retire, as his presence was entirely useless and indecorous ; he felt the strength of my arguments, and the more when I assured him I would never suffer Brion to be insulted or hurt. He returned to the city. Soon

after came colonel Valdes, the second of general Marino, to the place of rendezvous, telling me, greatly perplexed, that the latter was arrested by order of the Haytien governor, Marion; and that the whole affair was known to him. I pretended great disappointment; but was in fact very glad that general Marion had taken the hint; and so another day and place were appointed for a second meeting.

Colonel Valdes, satisfied with my consent to a second meeting, left me at a full gallop. When Brion heard from me this delay, he was disappointed, and expressed to me his sentiments, in very strong terms, against Marino. Before our horses were put in readiness, an officer, with about 20 men of the Haytien guard, came suddenly upon us, and saying he had orders to arrest us, bade us give him our pistols and swords. The grenadiers fixed their bayonets, and all resistance would have been in vain. Luckily it happened that I was acquainted with this officer; I requested him to order away the grenadiers, and promised that I, and my friend, would follow him alone, upon parole, which he granted very politely. We mounted our horses, and appeared before the Haytien governor, who after a short, but polite admonition for having acted against the laws of the country, dismissed us. The affair between Marino and Brion was settled in the same evening, in the closet of general Bolivar, by the latter, in my and colonel Valdes' presence.

A third challenge happened between lieutenant colonel Raphael Hugo and general Piar; a fourth, between myself and lieutenant colonel Charles Soublette, the same who is now general of division and secretary general of the president Liberator, notwithstanding the known cowardice of the said Charles Soublette. The following are the particulars of this curious and characteristic affair.

During the evacuation of Carthagena, by the patriots, (December, 1815,) and their retreat under the batteries of the forts of Boca Chica, I remained the last and only commander, who, in virtue of the martial law proclaimed since the beginning of Morillo's siege, had been invested with dictatorial powers. Soublette came from Carthagena to Boca Chica, where he wished to meddle with business in which he was not at all concerned: Some of my officers reported it to me immediately. I came, and reprimanding him for his intrusion, ordered him to leave the fort of San Fernando and embark. He replied not a word, and embarked on board the Constitution, where I, and my family, came afterwards, it being commodore Aury's vessel. When in sight of the Island of Jamaica, the latter desired to go on shore, to procure fresh provisions and

water, and requested me to take the command of the squadron in his absence. Mr. Soubllette, already much incensed against me, attempted to criticise some of my orders, while I was in the cabin. My friends told me of the murmurs of said Soubllette; I came on deck and reprimanded him again very severely, in presence of more than an hundred persons, assembled to whom I explained the propriety of my orders, and Mr. Soubllette again received this second reprimand without replying a single word.

Soubllette being, like all cowards, of a very vindictive and haughty character, could not bear this double public, and well deserved reprimand, and said to some of his friends, that I should pay for it very dearly. As soon as general Bolivar arrived from Port au Prince at Aux Cayes, and I had been entrusted with the organization of the staff, and the military administration, Soubllette, who had never commanded four men, was raised, by the favor of general Bolivar, to the grade of lieutenant in the staff, and was a great favorite of the latter, for some reasons well known to those acquainted with the family connexions of the two handsome sisters of said Soubllette, of which can be found satisfactory proofs in colonel Hyppisley's account of his journey to the Orinoco, ed. London, 1819. Said Soubllette, sure now of the protection of general Bolivar, began to say to some of his companions, in my absence, "that I had tyrannized much over all the Caraguins on board of the Constitution, which was, on the part of a stranger, much more intolerable, and should be resented by every native of the country," &c. He repeated these falsehoods to a great many of his countrymen, in order to inspire hatred against me in the minds of the Caraguin officers, and particularly of general Bolivar, who is a Caraguin himself.

I had heard nothing of these rumors, thus maliciously spread against me by Mr. Soubllette. One day, being alone with general Bolivar, in his bed chamber, he said to me, in the course of the conversation, "Apropos, my dear friend, (we always spoke French together, and in these conversations, Bolivar used the term, in speaking with me, of "*Mon cher Ami*," which the Spaniards use much in their intimate conversation in the Spanish language, saying "*Mi Amigo*!") do you know that Soubllette has made great complaints against you and Aury, that you both have not well treated the Caraguin officers on board the Constitution." I remembered, immediately, that Soubllette had since been very careful to avoid my presence, and what had passed between him and me in Boca Chica, and on board of the Constitution. I recounted all this, minutely, to Bolivar, who laughed much at the warmth with

which I related it; but I said, at the end of my account to Bolivar, "as it is high time to finish all these calumnies of such a young fellow, I will give him advice of my intentions, and that in your presence." I asked for pen, ink and paper, and immediately wrote to Soublette, in Bolivar's own bed chamber, the following note in French, which Soublette understands passably well: "I have just now heard from general Bolivar, that you speak and spread falsehoods against me, like a coward, in my absence. I give you notice, that if you continue to do so, I will treat you as you deserve, and mark your face with my whip wherever I can meet you; such a fellow as you deserves nothing else!" After having signed the note, and addressed it to "Mr. Charles Soublette, present," I handed it to general Bolivar, saying: "Here, sir, is my reply to such a shameful calumny, read it, if you please." Bolivar read the note over, and said I should do well to take care of Soublette's vengeance, which might bring discredit on a man of my age, and the head of a family." I laughed, and replied, "there is not the least danger for me, I know this man much better than you do. I am ready, if called upon, to give him, when, and wherever he pleases, hereafter, any satisfaction he may choose to take!" I called one of the officers on duty, who happened to be the lieutenant colonel Pedro Chypia, and ordered him, in presence of general Bolivar, handing him my folded, but unsealed note, to give it *himself, in person*, to Charles Soublette; to seek him at his lodgings, or wherever he could find him out, and return to the residence of general Bolivar, where I would remain and wait for his return. It was about eleven o'clock in the morning, and an hour afterwards colonel Chypia returned, and said to me, in Bolivar's presence, (where I remained alone with him in his bed chamber,) that he found Soublette in the street, and that he read my note over twice, turning pale and red, and saying not a single word more than "it is good, it is well!" And so it was; then, I can declare, under the most solemn oath, that said Soublette, after having received my note, avoided, very carefully, to meet me in the streets, or in any house where he could suspect I frequented. This was carried so far, that when Soublette was cautioned at one end of a street which I entered, he turned quickly round and passed into another, so that my aid-de-camps, who were perfectly acquainted with the whole transaction, said to me, (who am near sighted,) "there comes Soublette." I quickened our pace, in order to meet him, but they shortly afterwards exclaimed, "he is gone into another street; oh, see how fast he goes!"

As I am speaking of Charles Soubllette, I must give some other particulars of him, taken from the books of colonel Hippiisley, which has the following title: "A narrative of the expedition to the rivers Orinoco and Apure, in South America, London, John Murray, 1819." In a note, page 322, he says, "The council had received an addition by the presence of the adjutant general of the army, just arrived from head quarters, general of division, Charles Soubllette. Of this man, colonel English and the British officers, who had been at the last actions, at Villa del Cura and Ortiz, spoke most degradingly; the former officer, colonel E——, had seen him seeking shelter behind a tree, during the action at Ortiz, and has reproached him with his cowardice. This Soubllette is, however, an exception to the general conduct of the patriot officers, who certainly are not destitute of courage, and is, I believe, the only instance of such weakness in the land service. General Soubllette is a very handsome figure of a man; about twenty-five years of age; tall, thin, and well proportioned; remarkably neat in his dress and appearance; half cast by birth and complexion; he is about five feet ten inches in height; rather a handsome and European style of countenance; black hair and large mustachios; a smile more than prepossessing; a general lover, amongst the female part of the province, by whom he is well received, and has no disappointments in affairs of gallantry to complain of; he has, however, been a martyr to his pleasures, and makes an infamous boast of retaliation in this respect."

At page 334, colonel Hippiisley expresses himself as follows: "Soubllette's quarters (at the city of Angostura, in the province of Guayana,) are extensive and in most excellent repair. They belong, as an appendage of his own sister, to his brother-in-law, who is a merchant, and keeps a large store on the ground floor underneath. The general-in-chief, Bolivar, is, in common with the rest of his countrymen, much attached to women; and *one, two, or three, generally accompany him on his various marches. Among his favorites was Soubllette's sister*; and when his short season of love was expired, the lady, being not only young, but tolerably pretty, with a head of flaxen hair, upon which she could tread with her feet, became an object of chaste love to the enamored swain, who considered it an honor to be married to the mistress of the 'supreme chief of the republic of Venezuela and New Grenada,' and the sister of the adjutant general Soubllette. And doubly was he rewarded; for, on the second visit Bolivar made to Angostura, he presented his *quondam chere amie*, with this house as her marriage portion; the original owners not being in a situation ever to

claim it again, as their bones still remain unburied among the heaps, lying in the interior of the new, yet unfinished, cathedral," &c. &c.

At page 468, the same author says: "General Soublette, the adjutant general, I had previously to notice. He is too well known, even by the British, for his timidity and cowardice, on all occasions. He is a native of Caracas; and Bolivar, when he made him a general, did him, as I before mentioned, the additional favor, of making his sister his favorite mistress; an honor of which, two of the parties felt proud," &c. &c.

And such a man has been promoted to the rank of chief of the staff, general of division, vice-president of the republic of Colombia, intendant of the department of Caracas, minister of the war and navy departments, and, lately, secretary-general of the president Liberator. He is, besides what colonel Hippiusley and many others say of him, a vile and cunning flatterer of his master, and all his well known cowardice and blunders, were excused and covered by other good and *honorable* qualities!

We will return to Aux Cayes, where I left Charles Soublette, avoiding me like a spectre. This anecdote is not alone known by all the officers of the staff at that time, but by a great many of the principal inhabitants of Aux Cayes, and general Bolivar himself cannot deny this fact—which took place in his chamber, in the house of an English merchant, established in Aux Cayes, Mr. Joseph Downie—without stating an untruth.

Here follow now the promised particulars of lieutenant colonel Mariano Montilla's, challenging Bolivar to a duel at Aux Cayes. The lieutenant colonel Montilla, Caraguina, arrived from Jamaica at Aux Cayes, in March 1816, to offer his services to general Bolivar, in his projected expedition. Some hours after his arrival, he presented himself, unexpectedly, with commodore Brion, before general Bolivar, who had often spoken to me and others of said Montilla, as a very dangerous, intriguing man, capable of doing *great mischief—capable de tout bouleverser*, as he expressed himself in French, in speaking to me of that officer. He spoke in very animated terms, and I saw clearly some old hatred was remaining against him. I heard afterwards of the following circumstances, which had provoked this hatred.

Mariano Montilla was one of the first promoters of the revolution at Caracas, as I have related elsewhere. He spoke in strong terms of Bolivar's refusal to join his cousin Ribas, and was from that time not at all on good terms with the former. He came to Caracas during the time when Bolivar was dictator of Venezuela, but preferred to serve in the army of Marino, the rival of Bolivar,

and the dictator of the eastern part of Venezuela. Much dissatisfied with Bolivar, and his constant refusal to establish a congress, he joined with some others, and tried to turn him out, and make a second revolution in favor of a congress and a republican government. This was prevented, and Montilla escaped and came to Carthagena, where he joined Castillo, the rival and enemy of Bolivar, when the latter besieged this fortress. Here, he was the counsellor and friend of general Castillo, and he afterwards turned against the latter, and greatly assisted Aury and others to displace Castillo and elect Bermudes. Montilla evacuated Carthagena with the other patriots, but separated himself, remaining at a little port of Jamaica, Savana La Mar, where we stopped two days. From thence he proceeded to Kingston, and arrived some days after the departure of Bolivar for Boca Chica and Aux Cayes. As soon as he heard of a new expedition against the Main, and that his friend and protector, Luis Brion, would have the command of it, he came to Aux Cayes, and offered, as I have said, his services to general Bolivar, who much surprised at his unexpected visit, had, nevertheless, self command enough to receive him with that politeness which characterises him. Bolivar had some officers with him, so that Montilla could only speak on indifferent topics; he remained a quarter of an hour, and in taking leave, he told Bolivar, lowering his voice, that he wished much to have a private conversation with him, and requested he would appoint him an hour to have the pleasure to wait on him and to meet him alone. Bolivar astonished, fixed him, nevertheless, the hour of seven o'clock in the evening, and so they separated. This passed in the morning at eleven o'clock.

I was the whole of that day absent from town, and when I came, at about six o'clock in the afternoon, as usual, to visit the general, I found him at dinner. I declined to dine, but drank a glass of wine with Mr. Downie and general Bolivar. I found the latter uneasy and thoughtful, and asked him if he was not well, "Oh yes, yes, my dear friend, I am very well, very well;" which words were spoken in French, and with a distracted air and tone. After a while, he asked me how late it was; I answered, in looking at my watch, (he having left his in his bed chamber,) it wanted ten minutes to seven. He jumped up, and bidding me follow him, took his hat and ran down the steps from the dining room into the yard, with such haste that I could not follow him in the darkness. As soon as I had descended, I said to him, jesting, that he was surely very anxious to meet some fine handsome girl. He took me by the arm, and only saying "*don't talk,*" he quickened

his pace, passed the yard door, walked with me very rapidly to the large square, during which he turned round three or four times, like a man who is afraid that somebody might follow him. Two of his aid-de-camps, Paez and Chamberlaine, followed a good distance after us. I was, I must confess, very much surprised, at such unusual walking and behaviour, but was silent and quickened step with him, who kept my arm fast. When we were about in the middle of the square, he at last appeared to respire more easily, and stopped, asking his aid-de-camps who joined us, if they had not seen Montilla pass; they answered in the negative! what, exclaimed I astonished, Montilla, Montilla; "Oh don't speak so loud," replied Bolivar, "I must tell you that Montilla has arrived from Jamaca; he came this morning and requested me to fix an hour to see me *in presence of four eyes* (*entre quatre yeux.*) I was a little perplexed and appointed him the hour of seven this evening. But I shall not, I will not, see that man again; you must know that he is a very dangerous intriguing man, able to do great mischief. In order not to meet him I quickened my steps; then you know he lives with Brion.* But let us go to our Signorita's; (this was the house of the lieutenant colonel Juan Valdes, whom Bolivar appointed, during his dictatorship, governor of Lagaira in recompense of certain connexions with his handsome wife, (who must not be confounded with colonel Manuel Valdes, devoted entirely to Marino, and who was no relation of the former.)

Here we met with the regular coterie, to wit, the intendant Zea, some aid de camps of Bolivar and the family Valdes. Valdes seldom received any company and Bolivar liked not a great assembly when he was there. He introduced me as a friend, and I came two or three times a week when he was there every day. As soon as he had arrived, he took captain Chamberlain, his aid-de-camp, aside, and spoke a few words to him; the latter took his hat and went out. Bolivar was sitting in a hammock and had a very distracted air, looking constantly towards the door. Zea took me aside and asked what was the matter with Bolivar? he remarked that he was not as usual, and so in fact it was. Chamberlain came with a captain, of large mustachios, named Jose Ma-

* The house of commodore Brion was situated in the public square close by the new coffee house, so that Montilla was obliged to pass a part of the same way, which we came, and Bolivar was afraid that Montilla would see and follow us. Therefore he ran down the steps, so fast and quickened his pace, imposing silence upon me. He was afraid Montilla, determined and courageous, would challenge, or ill-treat him in this private interview.

ria Hernandez, who saluted us, and was crossing the room with Chamberlain, going immediately together into the adjoining piazza. Bolivar jumped from his hammock and joined them. I stood with Zea and some of the ladies of the family in the other corner of the pretty large piazza, and heard Bolivar, speaking to Hernandez in a low quick voice, and gesticulating much, which is his custom when he is talking of some very interesting matter; the captain appeared to reply, but, at last, he left the general, and went out with Chamberlain without wishing any of us a good night. Chamberlain came alone, after a full half hour's absence, to join us at the house of Valdes, but without the captain; he spoke a few words in the ear of Bolivar in a very low tone, who appeared much pleased, and was afterwards more at his ease. We retired, general Bolivar, intendant Zea, myself, and the two aid-de-camps, together. The general took us, Zea and myself, each by the arm, and said in a jesting manner, that he was now well escorted in case Montilla should attempt anything against him. We left him at the gate of Mr. Joseph Downie's house, and retired.

At seven o'clock the next morning captain Demarguet, another aid-de-camp of Bolivar, came to my house in a great hurry, and requested me, in the name of his general, to come immediately, as he had something of importance to communicate to me. I hastened to meet him, and found him sitting in his bed, and dressing himself. He sprang from it and said to me greatly agitated, but smiling: my dear friend I am in need of your advice; be so good as to read this letter, and tell me the meaning of it, as I do not understand French well enough to know what the writer says. It was a note addressed to general Bolivar, present, and signed by Charles La Veaux, a French gentleman with whom I was very well acquainted, as he had been a long time established in Cartagena, where he was the representative of the French nation, as Mr. Baxter of the German and Swiss, and Mr. Hyslop of the English. Its contents were as follows:

Mr. General—Having been chosen by lieutenant colonel Mariano Montilla, my friend, to enclose you the following printed injurious pasquinade against said colonel, signed Jose Maria Hernandez, which having been posted up at the corner of the public square, was brought to him early this morning; I am directed by him to tell you, with reluctance, that he, colonel Montilla, considers this injurious paper *as coming from you*, and not from a man of whose existence he had never heard before. Certain past transactions between you and my friend, made him more than suspect that nobody else except yourself could be the author of this handbill,

and, therefore, I am authorised to demand for the colonel, the usual satisfaction between gentlemen and officers; please to acquaint me with the day, the hour, and the place where your meeting can be settled; but as the stay of colonel Montilla admits of no delay, I request you to fix it in the course of to day, or at least to-morrow, I have the honour to be &c." Signed Charles La Veaux, Aux Cayes, March 8th 1816.

The paper enclosed, was printed in the Spanish language, as follows: "To the Venezuelan officers at present residing in the city of Aux Cayes: Citizens and countrymen—You are advised that commandant Mariano Montilla has arrived in this town, and applied to have the honour to be admitted among us. All those who know well the intriguing and dangerous character of this man, will, I hope, join me to oppose his admission into the army, &c. Signed T. M. Hernandez, captain of the body guard of his excellency the captain-general of the armies of Venezuela and New Grenada, and commander-in-chief of the expeditionary army," &c. &c.

While I sat down to read these papers, Bolivar was pacing his bed chamber up and down, like a man profoundly occupied, and stopping before me three or four times, he asked me, at last, what I thought of Mr. La Veaux's letter. "I think it is a formal challenge from Montilla." "What," said he, greatly agitated, "do you think so, my dear friend?" "Yes, to be sure!" I replied. "But how came you to receive such a curious challenge; what can be the reason of Montilla's attributing to you such an infamous paper. Montilla should have directed the challenge to Hernandez! Well, general, be quiet and easy; I will arrange the whole singular business, and will see La Veaux, and never will I suffer that you shall be molested by any of your subalterns, on such a ridiculous accusation!" He embraced me, highly pleased with the warmth of my actions, and called me his best friend.

I went to La Veaux, and found him not; I went to Montilla, and found these two gentlemen, with the lieutenant colonel of cavalry, Rafael Tugo, in a conversation, which appeared to me to be very animated.

Mr. La Veaux acknowledged that he was the author of the letter written to general Bolivar, which the latter left with me, and that it was upon the particular request of colonel Montilla, that he wrote it. I turned to Montilla and asked him the reason of such a procedure against a man who was my commander-in-chief, and unable to act in such a base manner against him. "Oh, said he, you know not this man, as I have done for many years; he is pos-

itively the author of this paper, and nobody else." These were the words of Montilla.

After a long conversation, I told the two gentlemen, Mr. La Veaux and Montilla, that I would never acknowledge Mr. La Veaux's letter to be a challenge; and if they would absolutely challenge general Bolivar, I declared to them they should fight with me and kill me first, before I would suffer general Bolivar's life to be hazarded, upon which the safety of so many thousands of us depended entirely, &c. But being, at the time, fully convinced of the innocence of general Bolivar, I offered Montilla a written declaration, by which the general would be ready to give him an honourable testimony, enabling him to show it to whoever he pleased. Montilla desired that it should be stated in that letter expressly, that Bolivar disavowed any participation in the said pasquinade. This I positively refused, as degrading to the character of the general, but engaged to urge him to furnish it from Hernandez, as a just satisfaction to him, Montilla. Mr. La Veaux interfered and said to Montilla that my proposals were honourable and sufficient, and added, it would answer to bring Hernandez before him, La Vaux, at his lodgings, to acknowledge that he was sorry for having made such a pasquinade against Montilla. To this the latter consented; and I pledged my word to see both measures punctually fulfilled; and the hour of four o'clock in the afternoon was fixed, when I engaged to bring captain Hernandez with me to Mr. La Vaux's.

I returned to Bolivar's house, where I found him in his bed chamber alone, walking to and fro, and looking very dejected and pale. I related to him minutely my whole conversation, which gave him great satisfaction; but when I came to the last point, the intended apology of Hernandez, he jumped from his chair and asked me abruptly—"what! have you consented that I shall punish Hernandez, and send him to La Vaux's at four o'clock?" "To be sure I have; it is absolutely necessary to save your own honour, which is deeply compromised by the formal accusation of Montilla, who appears sincerely to think that you, and not Hernandez, are the author of this pasquinade; and therefore it is necessary that not the least shadow of suspicion against you should remain in his mind." "You are correct, my dear friend, it is true; it must done."

He requested me to make out a letter in French to Mr. La Veaux, in reply to his note, in which I gave an honourable testimony to colonel Montilla, but without mentioning either the challenge or captain Hernandez's pasquinade.

Bolivar said to me in making this request, that he did not write French well, and that his mind was vexed with such a disagreeable business. I did it in his bed chamber, immediately, as Mr. La Veaux and Montilla were waiting my return. After having perused my draft, Bolivar appeared highly pleased with it, and sat down to copy, sign and seal it.

Montilla and La Veaux were both satisfied, and so was I. When I came back to the general, he said to me in a jesting tone, that my engagement to fetch Hernandez to Mr. La Veaux, was a *pretty hard task* ! but nevertheless, you are in the right ; it will, it must, it shall be done. These last words were spoken in a rash and passionate manner, in walking up and down his bed chamber. Well colonel (no more *mon cher ami*) you will be here at four o'clock ; I must go and prepare Hernandez before ; he shall be here and go with you.

I arrived a little before four o'clock ; my hand was on the knocker of the general's door, which led from the saloon through a large piazza to his bed chamber, being accustomed to go freely out and in, without being announced, when colonel Paez, the aid de camp on duty, told me not to enter, requesting me in a low voice not to go in, as the general desired me to wait some minutes, having to speak with captain Hernandez. This private conversation in a matter in which I had undoubtedly some claims to be present, struck my mind, and some suspicions arose in regard to the truth of colonel Montilla's accusation ; but I had then too great and exalted an idea of general Bolivar's character to suffer the least impression to remain, and entering the saloon, conversed with some officers present. After a while, the general called me out into the piazza, his face being highly colored, and showed me Hernandez coming out of the bed chamber with a very harsh look, and his eyes fixed to the ground, as a man who contemplated something profoundly engraved on his mind. Bolivar whispered me in the ear, in French, in going through the piazza into his bed chamber : "*Ne faites aucun reproche à Hernandez, je l'ai déjà fait,*" (make no reproaches to Hernandez, I have done so already.) Hernandez was in full uniform, but without his sword, with his hat in his hand. Bolivar and myself were in civil dress. The general said to me, that Hernandez was ready to follow me, when the latter stepped hastily forward, put his hat deep over his face, and said, *Vamos, Vamos!* (let us go.) I followed, a little surprised at his behaviour, but being in the street with him, he walked extremely fast. "Captain, (said I,) go not so fast, I cannot follow you, it is too warm." "Oh yes, yes, it is true ; I beg you pardon, (answer-

ed he, slackening his pace,) but you would excuse me if you should know all that has happened. No, no, you are a good man, too good a man; but it must be done." He grasped my hand, and some tears fell from his cheeks. "But captain Hernandez, what is the matter with you, are you sick? what can have happened to you?" Until then, I had treated him with great severity, firmly convinced of his being the author of the paper, but now I felt again new doubts, and in this uncertainty, I spoke to him with a milder tone, and entreated him to open to me his mind, and to fear nothing in doing so. "Oh no, oh no! I cannot, I cannot! I know you are the father of your aid-de-camps, (they said so to their companions in arms.) You are good, but—no, no, I cannot speak, I dare not speak;" and so we arrived at Mr. La Veaux's room. I told the latter, in French, to be satisfied with any apology he should make; then I pitied Hernandez, who proffered some broken and unintelligible words, with which Mr. La Veaux professed himself satisfied, and Hernandez was dismissed. I now told Mr. La Veaux, who had always been my good friend, and had served with distinction in the French army, of the strange behaviour of Hernandez. "Oh, (said he to me,) Montilla is in the right; you know not all; but as you are engaged, and can run a brilliant career with your new friend, I will not say any thing else to you. You acted in a frank and honorable way, and if Bolivar is not an ungrateful man, he must undoubtedly be your friend," &c.

The lieutenant colonel Montilla embarked two days afterwards, with Mr. Papagea, a French merchant, established, at the time, at Kingston, Jamaica, under the firm of Hardy, Moose & Company. He is acquainted with Mr. La Veaux, who is now in Martinique. They will undoubtedly confirm this statement, which, of course, will be denied by Bolivar and Montilla, who are, at present, very good friends.

Now I must give the key of Montilla's ground of suspicion of Bolivar's, Hernandez's and La Veaux's actions and words, which the following circumstances will put in a proper light. After the action of Ocumare, where Bolivar fled, and, a second time, took shelter at Jacquemel and Port au Prince, came captain Chamberlain, one of his aid-de-camps to Aux Cayes, where I then resided, to see me. After dinner, when he had drunk pretty freely, and we were talking together of past times, I asked him if he could not give me some account of the challenge sent by Montilla, and of the strange suspicions of the latter, of general Bolivar's being the author of the pasquinade and not Hernandez. "To be sure," said he "I can," and so he told me the following facts:

“After Montilla’s first visit in the morning, to general Bolivar, he called Chamberlain, and said to him, he wished to get rid of Montilla, who was a very dangerous intriguer, and the thought had occurred to him, to find some of the officers who would sign a paper against Montilla, and have it immediately printed. Chamberlain proposed Hernandez as the most fit for this purpose; and the general sending for him, was very much disappointed to hear he was out, and would not return that evening. So Bolivar and Chamberlain spoke secretly in the piazza of colonel Valdes’ house, and then went to Mr. Baillot the printer, (engaged by Bolivar to follow us,) and to sign the pasquinade already prepared, which was printed during the night, and fixed on the different corners of the streets of the city. When Montilla complained to general Marino, the Haytian governor, with one of the printed bills in his hand, the general immediately ordered the only printer in the city, Mr. Baillot, to be arrested, who declared that he had received the written pasquinade, by an aid-de-camp of general Bolivar, with the order to print it secretly, and not make known to any one, that it came from him. This aid-de-camp was Chamberlain, in whom Bolivar had always had the greatest confidence; he was a native of the island of Jamaica, and had served in the British army. So it came that colonel Montilla and Mr. La Veaux, highly offended of Bolivar’s conduct, agreed to challenge him, and to accuse him of what was the truth, namely, of his being the author of the pasquinade.

I have entered into all these minute circumstances, in order to show the true character of Bolivar and his great duplicity. I vouch for the truth of this anecdote, having been myself one of his dupes, and actors in the whole transaction.

Captain Hernandez was eight days after promoted to the rank of major, and in Margarita, two months later, I received the order to deliver him a brevet as lieutenant colonel, and so the mouth of this officer was closed.

CHAPTER XIII.

Sailing of the expeditionary army, under command of General Bolivar, from Aux Cayes to Margarita—Naval action on the 2d May, and how General Bolivar behaved in it—Events in the Island of Margarita—Arrival of the expedition at Carupano—Characteristic Anecdotes of General Bolivar—The author takes final leave of the service—what happened between General Bolivar and him at Aux Cayes and at Port au Prince. Year 1816.

The Haytian government made great advances to general Bolivar, in ammunition, provisions and money. President Petion and his friend general Boyer, were very favorable to his expedition, whilst the corrupt and cunning Inginac, secretary of state, was, as I was assured, secretly an enemy to all whites, who had not money enough to gain him over. This despicable man, who is a white, as has been said, had done more harm to the whites than all the colored and black people of Hayti. He is too well known to many thousands and unworthy to be mentioned more.

Louis Brion, promoted to the rank of post captain, did more than any of us to fit out the squadron in a proper way. He was named commander of the navy, and employed his great credit and the remainder of his large fortune, to enable us to depart from Aux Cayes on the 10th April, 1816.

But scarcely had we arrived at the island of San Beata, when the whole squadron was detained by—a woman; it was no other than Miss *Pepa M—*, (the Spanish name of Josephine,) the dear mistress of general Bolivar. She alone, by her secret virtues, had the power to detain the whole squadron and about a thousand men, during more than 48 hours, at anchor!

The following particulars will explain this curious and notorious fact. General Bolivar is, like all his countrymen the Caraguins, greatly attached to the fair sex, and has usually with him, one, two, and more mistresses in his retinue, besides those whom he takes a fancy to in passing from one place to another. These amours last ordinarily 24 hours or a week; but Miss *Pepa* made a rare exception to the general's customary habits.

He had known her since 1813, during his dictatorship, at which time she had much influence over him, as I have already mentioned. When Bolivar arrived from Aux Cayes at Port au Prince, he found, unexpectedly, the two sisters, Helen and Isabella Soublette, sisters of the famous general Charles Soublette, which our readers know already; and in Aux Cayes he met mistress Valdes and her two daughters, where Bolivar regularly passed the greatest part of his time.

As soon as he was named commander-in-chief, by the assembly held at Aux Cayes, he wrote to Miss Pepa, who resided with her mother and sister at St. Thomas', to come and join him without delay. He expected them daily with great anxiety, and detained the departure of our expedition, from one day to another, during more than six days. At last commodore Brion, growing impatient, declared to him frankly, that it was high time to embark, and that he would not and could not wait any longer. Bolivar, therefore, was obliged to sail without his mistress, and we departed. Before we arrived at the island of La Beata, some leagues from Aux Cayes, a fast sailing pilot boat brought the lucky tidings to general Bolivar, that his dear Miss Pepa, mother and sister, had arrived from St. Thomas' at Aux Cayes. This letter caused a bustle on board the whole squadron. Bolivar immediately took commodore Brion, (on board of whom, he, general Florencio Palacios his cousin, intendant Zea and myself, with the officers of the staff, had embarked,) down into the cabin, where they remained a long time talking together. Brion was strongly opposed to waiting the arrival of Miss Pepa, with whom he had been already well acquainted at Caracas, but the entreaties of general Bolivar prevailed at last, and he consented to wait. The complaisant Paez,* Anzoatiqui, and Soublette, made a formal toilette, put themselves in uniform, and sailed in the fast sailing armed schooner, the Constitution, back to Aux Cayes, in search of the dear Miss Pepa. They were rewarded for their readiness to comply with the desires of their master; Anzoatiqui was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel, commander of the body guard of general Bolivar, and Soublette, adjutant general colonel, attached to the staff.

When I and others of the foreigners heard this curious news, we were greatly mortified at such a proceeding, and declared loud-

*This Paez, who was an aid-de-camp of general Bolivar, must not be confounded with general Paez, of the Llaneros. They are not at all related or connected.

ly that we would leave a commander who compromised the welfare of so many thousands for such a motive. When Brion heard this determination, he urged me in very strong terms to remain, and said to me that if I were to leave the expedition, all the other strangers would, undoubtedly, follow my example, and he should be greatly disappointed at it. His entreaties were so urgent that I, at last, yielded, and promised him to stay; I persuaded the others to do the same, and not a single foreign officer debarked. But general Palacios, the cousin of Bolivar, with some other Caraguins, would not remain any longer, notwithstanding the entreaties of Bolivar himself, and were put on shore not far distant from the Haytian port of Jacquemel.

The majority of the officers composing this *expeditionary army* very much dissatisfied with being under the control of such circumstances, when activity and bravery alone, and not a woman, could save the country. From that time Bolivar sunk very much in my opinion, and that of others.

The composition of that *expeditionary army* which took afterwards the title of *liberating army*, was as follows: There were six generals, nine colonels, forty-seven lieutenant colonels, a chief of the staff, three adjutant generals colonels, and eighteen officers of the staff; one commandant of the artillery, one intendant general, one secretary general of the intendency, and a good number of the administration of the army; one commandant general of the cavalry, without taking into the account that each general had his aid-de-camps, a secretary, servants, and many their mistresses or wives; that each adjutant general and each colonel had his adjutant; that the number of majors, captains, and lieutenants amounted to about 500, and that we had for these epaulets not fifty soldiers. Each lady had either her mother, sisters or some other friend male or female, servants, and a good deal of baggage, which embarrassed greatly the manœuvring of the vessels. There were besides a number of families emigrants from Venezuela, who embarked at Aux Cayes in spite of the entreaties of commodore Brion, who was against the admittance of any female on board the squadron. When Miss Pepa arrived, she was never suffered to come on board of the commodore's vessel where general Bolivar, Zea, and myself, with the staff officers, except Charles Soublette, remained. This man, before we departed from Aux Cayes, had asked, as a favor from general Bolivar, that he should not embark in the same vessel where I was; he was ordered on board the Constitution, and remained with Miss Pepa; he never came on board of our vessel during our whole passage, in which

we had the visits of a number of other officers from the squadron. Miss Pepa arrived at last, on the third day, from Aux Cayes, where the *Constitution* was obliged to remain a whole day; this belle being not prepared to embark. Bolivar made his toilette in a superb style, and left our vessel to pay his visit on board the *Constitution*, where he remained the whole day and night, and came the next morning on board the commodore, who was, as well as myself, and the other officers, highly displeased at having lost about four days at anchor.

When we passed the city of St. Domingo, at that time belonging to the Spaniards, the whole city was in alarm, believing we should attack them; we saw, from our deck, their bustle, and laughed heartily at their fears.

On the morning of the 2d of May, the squadron being not far distant from the three elevated rocks, known by the name of the Three Monks (*Los Tres Frailes*) not far from the island of Margarita, two Spanish men of war, a large brig, and a schooner were signaled. As our squadron had no colors at all, Brion ordered the Spanish flag to be hoisted on board of each of our vessels, so that the enemy believing it was his long expected squadron, took in sail and waited for us. But as soon as they perceived their mistake, the captain of the schooner, which was a fine and fast sailing vessel, pressed sail and left his commander, whose brig sailed not so well. Both tried to escape, but too late. Brion changed his colours and fired upon them. The brig was soon overtaken by our brig a fine and large vessel, armed with eight carronades and a brass 24 pound swivel. Three fast sailing schooners were detached from the squadron in chase of the Spanish schooner, which was taken some hours afterwards. It was the Spanish royal schooner *Rita*, with two carronades, 24 pounders, six 8 pounders, and one 18 pound swivel; commanded by the captain *Don Mateo Ocampo*, who was mortally wounded in the combat. The royal brig was the *Intrepido*, with 14 pieces of eight, and 150 men, sailors and troops, commanded by the brigadier *Don Rafael Iglesias*, who was wounded and then killed by our men, who took the vessel by boarding. They entered the cabin with drawn swords while the surgeon was dressing his wound, and killed him; the surgeon attempted to appease them and was murdered too. Such was the horrid character of this barbarous war.

Commodore Brion, who fought bravely, received a wound which was, fortunately, of no dangerous consequence, and was promoted, after the action, to the rank of admiral of the republic of Venezuela.

But how did general Bolivar behave in this pretty hot and close action, which lasted more than four hours? As soon as he heard that Brion had ordered the necessary preparations for attack, he took me aside and spoke as follows: "But, my friend, do you not think that the Spaniards will resist and fight to the last." "To be sure they will," replied I laughing. "Well, but do you think that our schooner is strong enough to fight alone against these two strong vessels, (at the same time looking at them through a spy glass,) we are too distant, and too far in advance, which renders it impossible for the remainder of our squadron to support us in the action." "That is true, (said I,) but we will take them by boarding; this is the customary way to force Spanish vessels." "What? by boarding, do you think of such folly?" (*y pensez vous mon cher Ami? c'est une folie!*) These were the very expressions of general Bolivar to me! "But what is it best for me to do? do you not think that if I were wounded, or killed, our expedition would be totally lost, and Brion, the poor Brion, would have expended in vain, all his fortune! I looked up astonished; it first occurred to me that he might be jesting; but when I saw that these strange questions were put to me in earnest, I understood him, called Brion and said: general Bolivar has made me a just observation concerning you, he said that he being wounded or killed in the action, you Brion, would lose all your advances, as then the expedition would, of course, be disbanded. "Oh the d—d coward," said Brion to me in Dutch; (he was a native Dutchman,) "Well general, (turning to Bolivar,) you will be safely placed with the intendant Zea, to whom I have assigned a place in our cabin, (in which Bolivar, Brion, Zea, and myself slept,) at the entry of the powder magazine, to hand the necessary cartridges. As Brion said these words in an angry manner, Bolivar asked him: But my dear Brion, do you not think that Ducoudray's observation is just, do you not think so? Oh yes, yes, said Brion, and turned round. I was giving the necessary orders to our officers to arm with muskets and cartridges, when Bolivar came hastily and took me by the arm, saying: "Now I have found an excellent place, better than to be down in the cabin with old Zea," (who looked, in fact, much older than he was, and he was the same man who died as minister of Colombia in England.) He showed me the longboat which, in armed vessels, is generally fixed over the cabin windows. He jumped in, called Garcia, (his intendant,) ordered his pistols, and sword, and told him to load two balls in each pistol, which Garcia did in my presence, and looking at me and laughing. This position which Bolivar chose for himself, was surely the safest place

in the vessel, then in setting as he did in the longboat, his head and whole body was safely protected by the thickness and strength of the beam which supports the rudder of the vessel. He sat down in the boat, and requested me to take command of the officers, which I provided with arms and ammunition, and Brion entrusted me with the command of the volunteers, so that I had to survey the whole infantry of about 160 armed men. A strange contrast between the old and honest Mr. Ballot, a respectable French gentleman of 64 years of age, taking a musket with his young son of 16 years, putting themselves voluntarily under my orders, in spite Brion's and my representations that they should go down into the cabin, and assist Mr. Zea. But both, full of ardour and courage, refused positively, and said that this was a post of honor, and that they would not have any other assigned to them. In comparing the behaviour of Ballot, father and son, who exposed, voluntarily, their lives, for the welfare of a country in which they were not born, and to which they did not come in order to fight, with that of a military chieftain, already famous, by his rank, and now placed at the head of an expedition, withdrawing himself in such a curious manner, when he should have taken the command of us all; we clearly see this characteristic trait of Bolivar, and an illustration of what I must repeat in the course of these memoirs of him. Both the Ballot's fought with great courage and coolness.

We suffered much during the very warm action, from the musket fire of about a hundred men of the Spanish regiment La Corona, who fired from the rigging into our vessel, and wounded and killed about fifty of our officers and men. We stood more than an hour at half pistol shot distance from the brig, before we could fix the grapples for boarding. When the crew saw about a dozen of us on their deck, the battle began to be renewed with more fury; but when our number increased, and their brave commander felt himself to be mortally wounded, they lost all hopes; and about thirty of them stripped off their clothes and jumped overboard, in hopes to save their lives by swimming to the Three Rocks which lay a gun shot distance from us.

At this moment, general Bolivar, having all this time been sitting very safe behind his beam in the long boat, perceived these naked unfortunate men swimming at a very short distance from him; he took his pistol and killed one of them, took the second, fired at, but missed another!

When all was over, and the brig was taken, he jumped out of his boat, came with a radiant face to me and said, "my dear friend, you fought bravely, but I too, have not been inactive ; I killed my man ; but unfortunately missed the second !" I, who passed several times from one side of the vessel to the other, always seeing my commander leaning his head close to the beam, was surprised, and asked him how he could kill a man in his boat ? " Ah, said he, laughing, with my pistol, in the water !"

Such was Bolivar, in the action of the 2d May, 1816. I was there ; I saw him, he spoke to me, and I commanded, in his place, our corps of officers and volunteers, who will testify to the truth of my plain statement, if they are any longer living out of Colombia, and not interested, and out of his reach.

On the third of May, the squadron entered the port of Juan Griego, in the island of Margarita, with her two prizes. General Bolivar fearing, not without some reason, that general Arismendy might not receive him or recognise his authority, after what had passed between Arismendy and the two dictators, Bolivar and Marino, in August, 1814,* requested the new admiral, Louis Brion, who being wounded, was put immediately on shore, and the chief of the staff of the navy, a Frenchman, named M. Villarette, to speak with general Arismendy. Villarette, who was formerly acquainted with Arismendy, after a couple of hours' absence, returned on board, and said to Bolivar that the governor of Margarita, highly pleased with the success of our combat at sea, expecting soon to see the cause of liberty re-established on the Main, and filled with joy and hope, was reconciled with general Bolivar, and assured him of his respect and friendship.

One hour afterwards, Arismendy arrived on board to compliment the commander-in-chief on account of his safe arrival on the shores of liberty and independence, and of his naval victory, in which Bolivar took a very curious part, as we have related. Bolivar embraced Arismendy with that kind of frankness and cordiality, which appeared so natural in him, took him by the arm, after having presented me, and the intendant, and invited him down into the cabin, where they remained alone more than an hour. They appeared, in mounting on deck, very well satisfied with each other, and Arismendy invited us,

* See chapter VII.

Bolivar, Zea, Marino, Piar and myself, to come on shore in the afternoon, where horses would be in readiness to convey us to the villa del Norte, the head quarters of Arismendy, at a distance of three leagues from the sea-port of Juan Griego. The governor himself received us at the latter port, with a numerous retinue, and in arriving on the public square at his head quarters, the troops received us under arms, and with military music. After a good and splendid dinner, the ball began, which lasted the whole night. But not a single word passed, which had any connexion with business; Bolivar was so totally engaged in dancing, of which he was passionately fond, that he thought of nothing else but the dance. I was in a very melancholy humor, recapitulating, in my mind, all that had happened from our sailing from Aux Cayes, and declined to dance, and formed a firm resolution to quit a man, whom I could by no means love or respect. I walked up and down in the public square, and was soon joined by general Arismendy, who was full of attention and kindness to me. I was astonished to find in him a frank and good man, who spoke of military matters and politics, with much more knowledge and sense than I ever heard general Bolivar. The latter, during about a month of our being in the same vessel, and very intimate, never asked me a single question on military tactics, or any thing concerning our art. His great employment was to play backgammon with me, or with Brion, or Zea, to walk up and down on deck and talk on very common topics with one or another of his officers, or to sleep. I saw him in about a month's time, three times reading in a book; and when he did, it was the first one he found in our cabin; and this not half an hour at a time. His favorite topics were, with me and Brion, to speak of his stay in Paris, to give us detailed particulars of his good fortune in this capital, and sometimes he asked me many questions about Napoleon, the dresses of the ladies and gentlemen at court, and what kind of ceremonies were necessary to be presented, &c. &c.; another time, about his mustachios, and those of the officers, the modes of dress and uniforms in the French and English armies, but never could I speak a single word about military tactics, drills, &c. He stopped me immediately, saying, 'oh yes, yes, *mon cher ami*, I know that, I know that book is very well written, but tell me'—and then he asked me a very insignificant question on absolutely indifferent trifles, which gave another turn to our conversation.

One day I saw him walking, with a quick step, to and fro on deck, absorbed in thought, and melancholy. I came up and observed that he continued so a good while, without seeing or hearing any thing that passed around us. It was some days previous to our naval engagement. I at last accosted him and said with my usual frankness and familiarity to him : " what is the matter with you, my dear general, are you unwell, or has something happened?" " Oh no," replied he, " but we are approaching the island of Margarita, where Arismendy commands, and I fear this man and his character ; he is obstinate and cruel." At that time I was totally unacquainted with what had happened between these two chieftains in August, 1814, and therefore I made some inquiries about Arismendy, his manner of acting, and character. " Oh *mon cher ami*, Arismendy is a very dangerous, ambitious man, who governs the island of Margarita with great despotism ; he is an absolute brute, without any education or knowledge, and of low extraction." (I must mention here, that Bolivar thinks much of birth and good families, and treated all those which were not of high birth, with the common phrase of,—"*he is of low extraction.*")

I was, therefore, much prejudiced against general Arismendy ; but when I found in him a plain man, and one much better instructed in military matters than Bolivar himself, I was quite surprised. I had afterwards long conversations with him, which pleased me ; and when some days later, general Bolivar made the inspection of what Arismendy had done against the Spaniards, I was highly pleased, and observed that when Bolivar asked me, in an ironical style, what I thought of this or that fortification, or battery, or redoubt, and I approved of them, and expressed the reasons of the construction of these works, our commander-in-chief was not at all satisfied with my observations. Arismendy, who did not understand French, but asked me afterwards to explain to him in Spanish my observations, was satisfied, and took me more and more into his favor.

But as general Bolivar had deserted Venezuela in August, 1814, and New Grenada, in May, 1815, it was necessary that his authority should be re-established in his native land, by a formal and solemn acknowledgment of what the general assembly in Aux Cayes had stipulated in his favor. Arismendy was easily gained over by various secret conversations which Bolivar had with him on the matter, in which the former received the formal promise, that Bolivar would establish a National Congress at Venezuela, as soon as he should be master of the

country. This formal promise was given to him, as he had given it to us before his departure from Aux Cayes, and so Arismendy hesitated not a moment to call a general assembly, or Junta in the cathedral of La Villa del Norte, to which all the officers of our squadron were invited by an order emanating from Arismendy and Bolivar. The principal inhabitants of the island were assembled, and the clergy, in their sacerdotal dresses, were kneeling before the altar, reciting prayers in a low voice, for the welfare of the republic. When all were assembled in church, the mass began, and afterwards the numerous clergy remained kneeling before the altar in silence and in prayers. These religious ceremonies, mixed with politics, were generally used by the Spanish leaders; and their Juntas and great assemblies were always held in churches. The patriots have continued this custom.

When the mass was over, general Arismendy delivered a long speech, in which he recommended our union, and the necessity of having one single chieftain, and related what had happened in Aux Cayes, and the election made of general Bolivar, whom he now recommended to his army to recognise and obey, as he, Arismendy, did. He then approached general Bolivar, and delivered him the wand of commander-in-chief, (a small reed with a golden head,) and proclaimed him solemnly, commander-in-chief of the republic of Venezuela and New Grenada, which were to be re-established. Bolivar then delivered a speech, in which he declared his acceptance of the wand of commander, which Arismendy had given him up. He concluded by promoting a great many of the natives to be officers in the land troops, but not a single foreigner belonging to this army was promoted, notwithstanding that a good many had distinguished themselves, particularly in the action of the second of May.

By particular and urgent request of the newly promoted and wounded admiral Brion, some few promotions were made among the foreigners belonging to the navy. I was highly displeased not to be promoted, when I could say with truth, that I had distinguished myself in the combat of the second of May, had taken Bolivar's place and the command of our officers, while Bolivar sat very safely in his long boat, and out of all danger. Many of my friends, among them Brion and Zea, were astonished to see me not at the head of these promotions, having seen me at the head of the officers and volunteers, and mounting, one of the first, to enter the enemy's vessel. Chypia, Martinez and

Anzoatigui, who were in the action under my orders, one of whom withdrew himself for fear of the balls, were promoted. Charles Soubllette, being a mile distant from the battle, on board the *Constitution* with Miss Pepa, was, notwithstanding, promoted to the rank adjutant-general-colonel in the staff. But these four were natives, and the most servile flatterers of general Bolivar.

After these promotions, a solemn *te deum* was sung in honor of the battle of the second of May, and on the present occasion under artillery salutes, &c.

This behaviour of general Arismendy was very honorable to him, as it was easy to take general Bolivar's place, at a time, where he alone was four times as strong as Bolivar, and when, as is generally known, he had much more energy and patriotism, much more knowledge and personal bravery, than ever Bolivar had possessed. Arismendy was well informed that Bolivar had treated him in his manifesto, published in Carthagena, in September 1814,* as an intriguer and an ambitious man, who contrived to take his place; he knew perfectly well the character of Bolivar, his ambition, jealousy, and his despotism as dictator, having been a long time governor of the city of Caracas. But Bolivar, since his first interview with Arismendy on board the *Commodore*, had captivated the simple and plain mind of the governor of Margarita, who saw his ancient master surrounded with vessels and power, and heard his brilliant and formal promises to assemble a congress as soon as matters were a little settled on the Main, and yielded to his promises, as Brion, and many others of us had done before.

I was, I must confess, highly displeased with all these events, and sleeping in the same room with general Bolivar from the beginning of our arrival at La Villa del Norte, in the house of a Mr. Galindo, I reproached him with good reason for not having kept his promises, so solemnly given to me in Aux Cayes, to give me my rank of general, as soon as we should arrive in a country of his own, which was free and independent. He jumped out of his hammock, and coming near my field bed said, taking my hand, that it was not his fault, but that he dared not promote any of us strangers, for fear Arismendy and other chieftains might be jealous of our promotion, that his authority was not yet sufficiently established to dare to take such

* See Chapter VIII.

a step ; that, nevertheless, he would do so, as soon as we should arrive on the Main ; and that then, no consideration should prevent him from rendering me justice, &c. &c.

I reproached him with Soublette's promotion, known by every one as a coward and a vile man, and very much disliked by his own countrymen, declaring that after what had passed in Aux Cayes with him, I could never admit him to be employed in my offices of the staff, which were, as usual, established in a room opposite to our bed chamber on the same floor ; and added that Soublette, in the action of the 2d May, was a mile from the battle, on board the *Constitution*, and had not smelt the powder of our own guns, and still less that of the enemy's. He gave me a singular reply, in the mouth of a commander-in-chief : " I could not pass Soublette in the general promotion published this afternoon in the church, he belongs to one of the best families in Caracas, and as I promoted Chypia and Martinez to the rank of adjutant-generals-colonels in the staff, who were younger lieutenant-colonels than Soublette, I was obliged, of course, to promote Soublette."

I saw clearly by this conversation, the weakness of such a commander, appeared satisfied, and having once embarked with him, I took patience and remained.

On the day of his being received as commander-in-chief of the armies of Venezuela and Caracas, in the island of Margarita, he published a proclamation, in which he said, " he had not arrived to conquer, but to protect the country, and that he invited the inhabitants of Venezuela to unite and join him, if they would be considered by their *Liberators* as pure and good patriots. I have not arrived," continues he, " to dictate laws to you, but I advise you to hear my voice, I recommend to you union in the government, and *absolute liberty* for all classes, in order that you may not commit any more *absurdities* and *crimes* ! But you cannot be *freemen and slaves at the same time*, if you form no more than *one single mass* of the whole population ; if you choose a *central government*—(Simon Bolivar !) if you join us, you may rely upon a sure victory." This proclamation is signed by Bolivar, and dated, " Villa del Norte, Island of Margarita, May 3d, 1816."

Here is a new instance of the pompous style of Bolivar's proclamations, who repeated his illusory promises as he did in 1813, and as he has not ceased to do from that time to the present day. "*Liberators, liberating army, central government, advices*," &c. &c. resounded from one end to the other,

in all his proclamations. We shall soon see whether the inhabitants of Venezuela could rely upon a sure victory, and whether he acted as he promised.

When the Spaniards were apprised of our arrival in the Villa del Norte, they evacuated, on the same night, the capital, Villa del Assumption, and the famous Spanish coward, Mr. Miguel de La Torre, retired precipitately into the forts of Pompatar.

At our landing at the port of Juan Griego, Arismendy, Bolivar and I were talking, when I heard suddenly the discharge of musketry. I turned round to see what caused this firing. Bolivar told me smiling, "it is nothing, my dear friend, (speaking with me always in French,) general Arismendy has ordered some Spanish prisoners, landed from our squadron, to be shot." These unfortunate men were, in landing, tied together, while others made a large hole, before which they kneeled down and were shot in the back, so that they fell into their grave, which was immediately filled with earth. It happened that many of them, not receiving deadly wounds, were buried alive in this manner.

When admiral Brion, detained in bed by his wound, heard of this, he gave the formal order to suffer no more of the Spanish prisoners to be landed, and saved the lives of about fifty Spaniards, who were humanely treated and put to useful employments. So should general Bolivar have acted, instead of Brion. It would have cost the former no more than a representation to Arismendy to save them; he only smiled at the horrors which I expressed for a barbarous act committed in cold blood.

The next day after his installation as commander-in-chief, Bolivar, in his proclamations, and in his official transactions, took the following titles: "Simon Bolivar, general-in-chief, captain-general of the *liberating* armies of Venezuela and New Grenada, *supreme chief* of the republic of Venezuela, commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces," &c. &c. &c. without having conferred upon him the right to name himself supreme chief, which made a very bad impression on all the foreigners who came with us from Aux Cayes. As I had promised to Brion to remain, I made my best exertions to quell and appease these officers, and succeeded. We were absolutely destitute of every thing; the small and rocky island of Margarita was unable to furnish us the necessary provisions; the vessels were in want of rations for the crew, so that each offi-

cer and private, had a scanty ration, consisting of a little cake of indian meal, not weighing two ounces, called *arepa*, and two small salted fishes, and nothing else ! We, general and staff officers, dined with general Arismendy, but our table was surrounded by at least 50 hungry officers not belonging to the staff, who took from our table what they could reach, so that many of the company rose without being able to satisfy their own hunger. There was no money, no clothes, nor any thing but great confusion and misery !

The 25th May the squadron departed from Margarita, Brion having recovered from his wound, and arrived the 31st before the large borough of Carupano, the port of which was protected by a fort, called Sta. Rosa, upon which the Spanish colors were displayed. I have related in Chapter first, how it was taken. The patriots found a fine merchant brig and schooner, belonging to the Spaniards, with a rich cargo in each. The greatest part of the inhabitants having fled, left their stores filled with provisions and dry goods, which were plundered and disappeared in 24 hours. The confusion and disorder were very great, and no precaution was taken to distribute any of the provisions in a regular way, but each one took what he pleased, and destroyed or left the remainder. I offered to make magazines, and station guards and sentries, in order to save them, and to distribute regular rations ; but Bolivar told me, laughing, "that these guards would give the first example of taking what they chose, and that all would be useless." I was highly disgusted, and had already, in Margarita, asked my absolute discharge from such a service, but remained against my will, Bolivar declaring to me in a friendly but positive manner, that it was impossible for him to grant me my request. After some day's stay at Carupano, I did the same, but was again refused.

The consequences of this disorder were, that after some days we had no provisions, and that some maladies reigned in the barracks, where the ordinary filthiness of this people, joined to the want of sufficient and wholesome food, introduced a great many diseases of which a great number died. It would have been an easy task for Bolivar to have delivered his country, in a short time, if he would have followed my advice ; at that time the Spaniards, struck with panic terror at our sudden arrival, retired in great haste towards Valencia and evacuated the whole of the extensive territory from Carupano to Cariaco and Guiria, so that the communication with Maturin by land, and through the gulf of Trieste, was entirely left free. I will

relate here some particulars which passed between general Bolivar and me, which will give still further illustrations of his talents and character.

At my first interview with Bolivar at Aux Cayes, he promised to give me my rank as general, which was due to me, having sent my commission through the regular channel of the president and general-in-chief of the republic of Carthagená to the congress of New Grenada, as I have already stated. We arrived at Margarita where other officers were promoted, and I was passed over, as I have mentioned. We arrived at Carupano, a place laying on the Main, declared free and independent by our presence and that of Bolivar. After having reminded him of his promise already given, and after having said that I cared not much about a piece of paper, (meaning my commission,) which gave me not a cent of pay, nor any solid advantages; I added, that it was just I should not be degraded by the title of a colonel, when I had deserved my ancient rank, by my services at Carthagená, Boea Chiea, at Aux Cayes, in the action of the 2d May, and since, at Margarita, and here on the Main; and, moreover, when I saw that Soublette, whom he himself knew to be a coward, ranked with me, who was an old veteran, not only covered with wounds, but deserving, for having some claims on account of the services I had rendered, my former rank, &c. &c. I spoke very warmly and strongly, and Bolivar, taking me by the hand, gave me again his formal promise, that after the next action, when he could promote others, I should be the first named. He added so many obliging and friendly promises, that I was again foolish enough to rely upon his word and remained.

In my frequent and long conversations with general Bolivar, I spoke to him often of the necessity of instructing the officers, who were in general very ignorant in the elementary principles of the military art, and proposed to him to establish schools for instruction in the theory and practice of forming depots and to drill recruits, a commission to examine the foreign officers who wished to enter the service; to be authorised to judge of the merits and the talents of the officers in general, of their behaviour in action, in order to recommend them for promotion, &c. I told him frankly that nothing was more degrading for an officer of honor, than to depend upon favor, flattery and protection, or the caprice of one single man, by which talents and modesty were often put aside, while intriguers and flatterers, cowards and ignoramuses, were advanced and put at the head

of men, who knew a thousand times better how to command. "And now see," pursued I, growing warm, "that general Mar—what can he know, how will he command fifty men, is he able to do it?" "Oh; *mon cher ami*," interrupted general Bolivar, laughing, "you are perfectly correct, he cannot even command *four men*." After various conversations upon these and other military matters, with general Bolivar, he named a kind of special council of war, being at Aux Cayes, in which the military and administrative operations were freely debated. It was composed of Brion, Marino, McGregor and myself, Bolivar presiding. A commission was also established, to examine the pretensions of the foreign officers, in which I presided, composed of generals Piar and McGregor. At the first session held in my house, some foreign officers made objections to showing their commissions, but I stopped them, saying that we were assembled here by special command of general Bolivar, and that I would begin by obeying his orders. I immediately took from a drawer before me, my commission from the government of Carthagena, and ordered it to be passed round. So did Piar and McGregor, and nobody afterwards made the least difficulty. But as soon as we had arrived at the island of Margarita, every thing was forgotten, and Bolivar alone acted as he pleased.

When at Carupano, where we stayed much longer than I expected, I again urged general Bolivar to establish a school for the instruction of the officers in theory and practice, which he at last consented to. I proposed for instructor, a lieutenant colonel Schmidt, who had served under my orders at Barcelona, when I was the commander of the head quarters of the marshall McDonald, duke of Tarentem, governor of the citadel, &c. He was an able officer and highly pleased with my proposition. General Bolivar authorised me to put on the order of the day, "that every officer of infantry should assemble at such a place, hour and day fixed in my orders, to receive the necessary instructions from colonel Schmidt: That those who should not comply with the present order, without a well grounded reason, would expose themselves to be arrested and sent for 24 hours to the fort of Sta. Rosa. During several days this school was well attended by the officers, of whom a great many distinguished themselves by their zeal to learn. I must state here once for all, that the majority of these young officers were good, docile, and willing to obey, as soon as they were well treated and commanded, and that I never had to complain

of, or to punish any of them. It would not have been the case here, if some invidious, vile individuals, had not tried to make all my actions, my words and my orders, ridiculous and suspected, not in my presence, but always in my absence. One day colonel Schmidt came to complain that the officers began to be very neglectful of their duties, and that a great many came not at all. I mentioned this to general Bolivar, who authorised me to renew and sharpen the order; but by and by the same neglect was complained of by Schmidt. I said now to Bolivar, that it was high time to punish, if we would not lose all authority, discipline, &c. He approved, and authorised me to act in accordance to the existing order. I entered the next day into the large room where the officers were drilled, accompanied by some of my officers, and saw a small number of them assembled in comparison of other days, when I came to assist at their drills. I asked for the roll, on calling over which I found that among about 100, 36 were absent, of whom 15 had no excuse at all. I ordered immediately the adjutants to arrest and put them for 24 hours in the fort, and sent a written order to colonel Landeta, who commanded at Sta. Rosa, to give them leave to walk in the fort wherever they pleased, but to allow none to go out until the hour of the arrest was expired. Enclosed were the names of these officers. I reported all to general Bolivar, who approved it highly, notwithstanding his own nephew, captain Manuel Palacios, son of his sister, was among the arrested officers. Bolivar was very well satisfied and laughed, sitting in his hammock, when I told him that it was necessary to commence with his nephew's punishment, as giving to others a proof of his impartiality and justice. He finished, by approving highly my remarks and orders, and I left him well satisfied. This was about 11 o'clock in the morning. The same day, at 6 in the afternoon, arrived general Bolivar, with six or eight officers, at my house, and after having saluted me as usual, he took me by the arm, in my upper piazza, where we were alone, and spoke the following words to me: "You will never find out, *mon cher ami*, from whence I came just now. I have received a doleful note from my nephew Palacios, (which he handed to me for my perusal) who is in the fort, who urged me for his, and his companion's sake, to come and see him; I did, and come from Sta. Rosa, and can tell you that these poor devils (*les pauvres diables*) have requested me, in a very urgent manner, to pardon them, and to set them at liberty, and promised that they will never

more fail in their duty, &c. I told them that *I had not sent them to the fort*, but *you*! and that I would promise to go and make interest with you for them, and ask you to relieve them from their arrest." "What, general," said I, extremely surprised and shocked to hear him speaking these words, "it appears as if *I* was the only cause of their arrest, and as if *I* was the author of their punishment! How could you say that it is not *you* who have sent them to the fort, but *I*? Have you then not approved highly the daily orders for the army, published by me in *your name*? It is then *I*, who alone have punished them, and should you not have said that their punishment was the natural consequence of their disobeying *your* orders. Well, then, I see that I have nothing more to do here, I am of no use, when you cannot or will not support the authority given to me, without my request or my intriguing for it; I can remain no longer in a service where I cannot be of use," &c. &c. I was warm, and spoke fully determined to quit forever such a disgusting service. But Bolivar again entreated me so urgently to remain with him, told me that I should be always his good friend, that I was very useful to him, &c. &c. so that I embraced him and remained. The prisoners were released by a written order, sent by one of my aid-de-camps to colonel Landata, and Bolivar departed after a full hour's stay at my house, very well satisfied. I must confess, I was not much satisfied, and took the firm resolution to punish nobody, to complain of nobody, and act, for a little while, in a very passive way, to see if at last, there would be any alteration in our curiously organised, or rather our totally unorganised *liberating* army, which counted not 800 men!

One day at Carupano I found Bolivar laying in his hammock alone, looking melancholy and dejected. His face was unusually pale and his eyes sunken. I asked him if he was sick; "Oh no, no, *mon cher ami*, (which was always his favorite term) not at all, but Marino teases me to go with Piar and twenty officers, to Guiria to recruit some more men; he wants me to give him 2000 stand of arms, ammunition and some flecheras, (large armed barges) to convoy him along the coast. But you know what we have to fear from these two generals; I am convinced they will try again to render themselves independent from me, which would renew the scenes of 1813 and 1814.*

* The reader will remember that Marino, at that time, was dictator of the east and Bolivar of the west of Venezuela, and that the first acted entirely independently of the latter. We have seen the dreadful consequences of this rivalry. See chapter VI. and VII

I know not indeed, how to act or what to do." If I were in your place, I would refuse their request under various pretences, of which you have so many, and never would I consent to let them be absent from you; then after what has passed in Aux Cayes,* you have certainly to fear that Marino, once detached from you, would try another time to shake the yoke from his shoulders. Brion who came in, heard my last arguments and confirmed not only what I had said, but spoke in much stronger and contemptuous expressions against Marino and Piar. Bolivar fully convinced and satisfied, promised to follow our advice.

Admiral Brion had never esteemed Marino, and said many times, that he and Piar were dangerous enemies to Bolivar. Marino indeed, never had been, nor could he be dangerous to the latter, for want of talents and character, as I shall fully show at the trial of Piar; but united with Piar, who was a colored man, a native of the island of Curacao, with Brion, he has done great mischief to Bolivar. Piar was an able partizan officer, brave, active, a secret enemy of Bolivar, who, like Brion, hated, in general, the colored men. Piar was the soul of Marino, and both were inseparable friends, so the much more dangerous to Bolivar, as Piar, the avowed friend of the constitution of the first Congress in Venezuela, in 1811, by which the colored people enjoyed the same rights as the whites, had often and loudly declared, that he wished not to see Bolivar uniting in himself alone, the three powers, but to have a Congress and good laws. Piar, who had fought various brilliant actions against the Spaniards, had a great many partisans, and was friendly and sociable with those who belonged to his family, and principally with officers of foreign countries, and colored people, who all liked to serve with him in preference to Bolivar, who was haughty and imperious. The insinuating and polite manners of general Marino, rendered him very popular, and he gained a great many partisans among the simple and uncultivated people, particularly in the provinces of Cumana and Barcelona. Both

* San Jago Marino charged a colored captain, named Sobie, to find him 300 colored men, which should form the germ of his body guard, and who should be attached entirely to his service. Sobie, who had served under my orders at Boca Chica, and who was a brave and able officer, very much attached to me, came immediately to acquaint me with this strange commission; when I communicated to Bolivar the secret orders of Marino given to Sobie, he was alarmed, and requested me to counteract this plan. I told Sobie to ask from Marino 300 doubloons, which was the ordinary engagement for 300 men; Marino had no money, and so all was finished.

knew perfectly well, that Bolivar hated them, but that he dissimulated this hatred ; it was, therefore, very impolitic, even dangerous, to suffer the union of the two commanders, and their absence, in the position in which Bolivar was placed.

Recently arrived at Carupano, Bolivar was too confident that the inhabitants of Venezuela would again rise in his favor, as they did in 1813. But instead of it, they left their property and houses, and after a fortnight's stay, he could not count fifty recruits who came voluntarily to serve under his orders. His behavior as dictator, his flight, his abandoning them in the way he did in embarking at Cumana, had lost him their confidence, and many resolved and good patriots chose to keep at a distance from him, or to emigrate. Bolivar, knowing all these circumstances, and more, the great influence of Piar with the weak and ignorant Marino, should have, at least, retained Piar by giving him some honorable occupation ; and he was well aware, as I told him, that Marino, without Piar, would have never been, by any means, dangerous.

Brion and myself were highly astonished to hear that these two chieftains had, at last, persuaded Bolivar to consent to their departure, to give them arms, amunition, barges, officers, &c. They took with them the colonel-adjutant-general Chypia, the best engineer officer, and about twenty officers more. When I asked Bolivar how he could have granted this permission, he said that Marino urged him very much, had promised him to send a numerous body of men, and particularly a very good battalion of colored people, from the island of Guadaloupe, (about 400 men strong) which had, three years before, fought in the eastern provinces of Venezuela with great success, known in that country under the name of *battalion of Guiria*, &c. &c. But as soon as Marino had arrived in Guiria, he proclaimed himself general-in-chief, organised *his* army, *his* staff, named chief of the staff, colonel Chypia, and sent not a single man to general Bolivar, who was daily urging him in vain to join him, or, at least, to send him this battalion of Guiria. Nothing came. Bolivar, in fine, was no more joined by Marino nor by Piar.

I have said that we had a great many officers, and a very small number of soldiers. Then the 300 men embarked from Margarita with us to Carupano, had their officers, all natives, from that island. I one day proposed to Bolivar to give employment to these officers, and form a separate corps, which should be organised in companies, drilled, armed, &c. and employed as a guard of our head-quarters. He proposed to form

of them, at first, no more than one battalion of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry. Both proposals were highly approved of by general Bolivar. Three days afterwards, I was surprised to receive the reports of the commanders of the out posts established around our head quarters, that the commandant N. N. had passed with passports of the supreme chief, with such a number of officers, to go to such a place. The results of these different reports instructed me that five commandants or chiefs of a battalion, had absented themselves, with their respective officers, in search of recruits. I called immediately on the general with these written reports, and asked him if this was done by his order? He replied to me in a very cold and unusually dry manner, that having well reflected on the nature of my proposal, he found it *at present* inadmissible, and had thought proper to send these officers in search of recruits, and to have more forces. I objected to him that this measure might perhaps endanger the safety of these isolated officers, knowing well that the Spaniards had approached us, as far as San Jose, a small village at two leagues distance from our head quarters. He said there was no danger to be feared, and the officers went off! This change of mind in general Bolivar was caused, as I heard some days afterwards, by a conversation held at his evening assemblies in Miss Pepa's house, where Bolivar was ordinarily surrounded by his minions and flatterers, Soublette, Pedro Leon Torres, Anzoatigui, Ferdinand Galindo, and others of the same description, in which they criticised the actions, orders, and innovations which I would introduce into their army. Soublette, a secret enemy of mine (the reader is instructed already for what reasons) distinguished himself more than any one of the rest, and was truly supported by Bolivar's mistress, Miss Pepa, and her mother, who could not endure me at all, because I had never visited them in Margarita, nor in Carupano. Bolivar himself told me frequently, in his ordinary jesting and laughing manner, that he many times took my defence against these ladies! They represented to the general that I was of a despotical character, that this stranger would introduce ridiculous innovations, to which they would never submit, that he, Bolivar, was very good to submit any longer to such counsel, and the influence which it appeared I had gained over him, &c. The others joined in chorus, and so it happened that Bolivar, at eleven o'clock in the night, gave the order to these commandants to depart with their respective officers. They committed so many disorders, that they were obliged to come

back without any forces at all, and so the same disorder remained ; nothing was done.

While we were in the island of Margarita, Bolivar observed to me that it appeared the foreign officers, in our service, were not satisfied to be with him. I told him frankly, that they had no reason to be so, they had no pay, no food, no means of subsistence ; but, added I, the worst of all is to be commanded by young and inexperienced officers, who are generals, colonels and lieutenant colonels, and who, by their great inexperience, exposed them to lose, not only the battle, but their lives, without being allowed to make any dispositions, or to give salutary advice, &c. &c.

As I was by office, age, and services, the most elevated, and the most in general Bolivar's intimacy, these officers came frequently to see me, and to ask my advice on different occasions ; and so I was very well acquainted with their various claims and dissatisfactions. Among them were a great many officers, French, English, Germans, Poles, who had served with distinction in Europe, and some during 20 and 25 years, and who knew twenty times as much as these officers born in the country.

The just observations of the officers inspired me with the idea, to make their services useful *in their own way*, viz. to create a corps of foreign troops, commanded by foreign officers, under the name of *legion of Venezuela*. Shortly after our arrival at Carupano, I one day found Bolivar in good spirits and alone. We talked a great deal on indifferent topics, and after a while, I introduced my plan of the creation of a foreign legion with the necessary amendments and organization, adapted to our kind of war, the country, and the resources which we could reasonably expect. I said to him, frankly, that our army, so called, was nothing more than a collection of armed men, very ill organized, clothed, drilled, instructed, and not paid at all, &c. I entered, with my usual warmth and frankness, into all the great advantages of having such a corps of men, already acquainted with war, able to beat all the Spaniards, who recruited two-thirds of their soldiers among the natives, and finished by proposing to him to make an essay with 1500 men, of which 1000 should form two battalions, one of riflemen or chasseurs, and the other of grenadiers, 500 divided into two squadrons of light cavalry, and two companies of light artillery of 100 horse each. These 1500 men could, after a while, be increased by mixing natives among them, to a full third, half or more, by giving to each company so many more natives, but

all commanded by experienced commissioned and non-commissioned *foreign* officers. I am certain, added I, that were these troops well commanded and treated, we should have in one year, 3000 of them, as each of them could write to his unfortunate countrymen, how well they were among us, and so would we be able to finish the war in a very short time, but with the express condition that nobody else than you, general Bolivar, should have the right to interfere with them.

General Bolivar heard my long demonstration with unfeigned pleasure, jumped from his hammock, shook hands with me, and said that my plan was so excellent, that we would continue to talk together over a good bottle of Bourdeaux wine, a present from one of the merchant vessels arrived from St. Thomas'. He called Garcia, his intendant, and ordered him to bring the wine into his bed chamber, and to say to his aid-de-camps that he would not be interrupted by any one. After having drunk my health, he sat down next to our small table, and said, smiling : " but, *mon cher ami*, your plan is good, but one trifle is wanting." What? said I. " The money, we have not a cent, and are as poor as Job." I said to him that the battalion of Guiria having arrived, (which deserted Marino, and took by force some flecheras to come over to us) the same battalion of more than 400 colored men, from Guadaloupe, which had been already used to our manner of carrying on the war in this country for more than two years, of which I have spoken before, we could have, by adding the officers of different nations present, about 500 men already assembled here, that I had had different conversations with colonels Bidot and Boe, of whom the former had assured me, that with eight or ten dollars for each man engaged, and his passage paid, he would find easily between Martinique, Guadaloupe, St. Thomas', St. Bartholeme's, &c., more than 500 men, and that the other 500 would be procured, by sending to the United States of America. In regard to expenses, Brion, with his credit, could be of great use ; he had also a good quantity of merchandise, found in the two captured Spanish vessels, and in the stores left by their owners ; the two merchant vessels might be sold ; all of which would afford more than sufficient means to raise, by exchange, the necessary money, without counting a good cargo of mules, asses, cocoa, tobacco and other produce of the country, which could be collected and shipped. There should be named honest agents, and able men, with the necessary knowledge of the country to which they were to be sent, in order to collect re-

sources and recruits. Bolivar said I was perfectly correct, and the more he heard me, the more he was convinced of the practicability of my plan. I proposed to send for admiral Brion, who came soon after. I had already talked much with Brion upon the usefulness of the plan, but he had always expressed his fears that general Bolivar would be opposed to it, knowing too well his suspicious character, and his general aversion to foreigners. He was, therefore, much surprised to hear Bolivar so full of praise, in regard to this plan, and offered immediately a number of his vessels, and his credit, for the execution of the plan. We drank another bottle and separated, after having taken each of us a part in the execution of the plan. Brion was charged with the vessels, and their cargoes; Bolivar with the appointment of the officers, and I with the organization of each corps, and the general instructions to the agents and recruiting officers; and so we separated, very well satisfied, at a late hour. But, in the warmth of my zeal for the prosperity of our enterprise, I committed a great blunder in saying to general Bolivar, "that if I was not the chief of his staff, I would have desired to be the commander of that legion. These words appeared to me to have made a bad impression on the suspicious mind of general Bolivar, who treated me afterwards much more coolly, even, many times, with great dryness.

I sat down the same night and drew up the outlines of my plan, which I presented the next morning to general Bolivar at the usual hour of my daily reports. As I entered his bed chamber familiarly, and without being announced, I found him lying in his hammock, as usual, occupied in reading. When he saw me, he hastily placed his book under his pillow, jumped out of the hammock to shake hands with me, but a little cooler than usual. Surprised to see Bolivar occupied in reading, which he never did before, and desirous to know with what book he occupied himself, I came nearer to the hammock and took the book out from under his pillow, asking him, "what he was reading?" He looked a little confused, and answered: "he read it to recreate his mind a little!" It was the *New Heloise*, by J. J. Rousseau.

We spoke now of the usual military concerns during the last twenty-four hours, and I handed him my plan of the legion. Bolivar, without even looking at it, folded it and put it under his pillow, saying: "well, well, leave it with me, I will look it over in the course of to-day or to-morrow, as soon as my time will permit." These words pronounced in a cool and dry man-

ner, gave me a new conviction of Bolivar's very limited talents, and of his not being at all the man able to command for the welfare of others. I immediately took leave of him without saying a single word more.

What in fact can be thought of a *supreme chief*, upon whose activity and skill depended the welfare of so many thousands, passing the greatest part of his time in his hammock reading the *Nouvelle Heloise*, or talking with his flatterers, on trifling topics, or passing his time in the house of Miss Pepa, who *had no time* to examine a plan on which depended so greatly the success of his enterprise, while Brion and myself were busily engaged to prepare every thing which had been fixed the evening before.

I saw the general in the evening, the next morning and afternoon, and heard not a word of the plan. Meanwhile came Brion and all the foreign officers to my house to inquire if there was any news; and being myself anxious to finish the business, I determined to speak with the general, definitively. I found him in his hammock alone and half asleep, and after some indifferent words, I asked him abruptly; "*apropos*, general, have you examined the plan for the creation of that legion?" He answered me in a furious manner, and jumping from his hammock like a madman: "Foudre Mr. Foreign legion! Foreign legion! How, *mon cher ami*, can you think of it? do you know the consequences of it? no, no, no, no legion. These foreigners would then impose laws on me and control me." Such was precisely the reply of general Bolivar, expressed in French. While making this reply, he walked the room to and fro, evidently in a great passion. I was highly shocked and displeased with such an unexpected scene, and approaching towards him, I took him by the arm, and exclaimed in a firm and animated voice, having an upright and clean conscience, "what means this Mr. general. You forget, undoubtedly, that you speak to a foreigner? And do you think that with my white hairs and at my age, I would suffer any man to betray you, or you suppose, perhaps, what I can hardly believe, that I myself should think of betraying you?" He interrupted me here, and said in a much more moderate and friendly tone, "*Ah mon cher ami*, you certainly are not a stranger among us, you are one of our good citizens, and a man of honor; you belong to the republic by your services, which are and have been distinguished, and by your marriage with a South American lady. I have never thought nor meant you, my dear friend. Yet," added he, in a more passionate tone, "there exist some other ambitious

foreigners who are desirous of taking my place, (supplanter) and who might do it."

This was alluding to general Piar, who had separated himself with Marino from Bolivar, and chagrined to see that all his orders were disregarded by these two chieftains, who neither returned nor sent any recruits, he imagined that Piar might take his place.

I represented to him in the strongest terms, that there was not the least danger to him, in consenting to the creation of such a legion ; that it would, on the contrary, be highly useful to him and the cause, &c. All was in vain, and Bolivar would never more hear of the forming of such a plan. Admiral Brion tried also to change his mind, but could not succeed ; the whole plan was given up.

One day while we were at Carupano, the enemy surprised an advanced guard of 40 men of the cavalry, of whom a number came wounded, at two o'clock in the morning, to our head quarters, giving the alarm of the approach of the enemy. Bolivar, immediately struck with a panic terror, dressed himself hastily, mounted his horse, and rode at full speed to the arsenal, which lay close by the port, and the fort of Santa Rosa, so that, at the first notice of the enemy's approach, he could have the chance to embark in a few minutes, or shut himself up in the fort. All his trunks and baggage were immediately carried from his house to the arsenal, where I saw them all collected. During this time I took the few disposable cavalry and some officers, and directed my course towards the place where this guard had been surprised, to reconnoitre the enemy, and ascertain the nature of the danger. I ordered the troops in the head quarters to take arms and be ready to march at the first signal to repel the enemy in case of an attack. I saw no one at all, and all my reconnoitering parties having joined me, I returned with the usual precautions to the head quarters. In approaching the house of general Bolivar, in order to make him my report, I was surprised to find it empty, and dark. I heard from a dragoon, detached by general Bolivar in search of me, that the commander-in-chief was at the arsenal, with all his retinue, his household, trunks, &c. I found him lying in his hammock, surrounded by his flatterers, who lay half asleep, half awake, on trunks, tables, benches and boards. As soon as I saw among them Charles Soublette stretched out on a bench, I could not refrain from giving him, in presence of Bolivar and more than twenty officers, a very harsh reprimand, because he, being nom-

inated by the general-in-chief commandant of the head quarters, was not at his post at the head of the troops, as he should have been, and not lying on a bench, when the enemy was attempting to surprise us. Soublette, as usual, said not a single word.

I now assured general Bolivar that there was nothing more to be feared, as I had doubled the guards at the out posts, and ordered all the troops to be ready at the first signal given. I escorted general Bolivar with my dragoons, to his old quarters, where trunks, baggage and papers were again ordered, and retired to my own house feeling more and more the strange and cowardly behavior of the supreme chief, in every case of danger.

This was an authentic proof of Bolivar's incapacity to save us in case of danger, or to put himself at the head of a body of troops to attack the enemy in person, in the last critical moment, which he never did, nor ever will do, as all those who have been in any action with him, in Venezuela, in New Grenada, in Peru, will readily attest : I would be understood to speak of those persons who are no longer in the service of Colombia, and who are not dependent upon him by their connexions with that, so called, republic, and who have nothing to hope or to fear from the President Liberator of Colombia. True enough, the bulletins and proclamations, drawn up all by himself, or under his immediate inspection, display him as a hero, at the head of his troops ; but none of these bulletins are correct, nor can they inspire in those who know the character of Bolivar, and the composition of his, so called, liberating army, any confidence.

I have already given the authentic facts, in respect to three or four of his bulletins and proclamations, and shown how deceptive they are to distant people. On examining them closely, the clouds which surrounded them, and must naturally exalt the imagination of persons not well acquainted with all the circumstances, will at last disappear, and show, in his *true* light, the President Liberator, his actions and his military skill.

General Bolivar is the same man at the present day, that he was in 1816, with the difference, that he is much more vain, ambitious and bold. But then he has the bayonets in his favor, which accounts for many things.

I was now perfectly convinced that my longer remaining with such a commander, would be of no avail. I saw clearly that all plans and advice tending to establish order, instruction, drills and organization, in a word, any thing like an army, was pow-

erfully counteracted by most of those who surrounded the general, and who were too much interested *to leave every thing in statu quo*, as being much more convenient to their wishes. My intimacy with Bolivar, with whom I was always frank, as a man of character and a free man should be, excited the greatest jealousy in all, or the greatest part of these natives. I was not only a foreigner, but I reprimanded, corrected and punished those who did wrong, and Bolivar himself, threw all the blame upon me, as I have already shown. Sarcasm and ridicule have always had a great influence upon Bolivar, as in general they have upon half cultivated and limited minds; and Soublette, powerfully supported by Miss Pepa, was much more at his ease in these evening assemblies, called *tertulias*, than he is on a field of battle, where he has been seen pale, trembling and *mute*! To these two were joined Miss Pepa, her mother and sister, who detested me cordially, for some words spoken publicly by me, against this family, and who always called me the *maldito Frances*. Pedro Leon Torres, whom I punished once, when I was lieutenant colonel and commander of the fort of San Jose, in Boca Chica, where I was chief; major Fernando Galindo, whom I treated once in Aux Cayes, as he deserved; lieutenant colonel Anzoatigui, whom I reprimanded one day at Carupano, and who commanded the body guard of the supreme chief, and some others, now made a combination, and tried by degrees to create suspicions against me, in the too jealous and weak mind of general Bolivar.

It appeared to me, that from the day I had mentioned the wish to command the foreign legion, general Bolivar was no more the same man; his manners were changed; he did not speak to me with the same confidence, with the same frankness, if he is at all capable of frankness, of which I have great doubts, as I said before. All these reasons, and moreover my impaired health, injured by privations and great exertions of mind, determined me at last to leave a service, in which (I declare it here frankly) no man, who has feelings of self respect and personal independence, can consent to remain. I chose, therefore, to write him an official letter, in which I formally requested him to grant me my final discharge from the army, and that I might join my family (wife and children) which I had left at Aux Cayes to restore my impaired health. I ordered one of my aid-de-camps to deliver it into general Bolivar's own hands, and when he came back with the assurance that he had obeyed this my last order, I felt at my ease and cheerful.

Four days passed before I received any answer, during which, the general sent me various persons, as the adjutant Brion, the intendant Zea, his aid-de-camp Chamberlain, who was always greatly attached to me, &c., to make me strong representations, and to persuade me to remain, and to revoke my first letter. Adjutant general, Jose Martinez, my officers of the staff, and my aid-de-camps, and a great many foreigners, tried in vain to persuade me ; I remained firm, and answered that my health too much required a change of air, and rest. When Bolivar saw that nothing could retain me, he sent, at last, my absolute discharge, in very honorable and flattering terms. He had written it with his own hand, and said, among other things, that he granted me my request with great regret, (*condolor*,) and saw me departing with reluctance, but that my health having declined, he could not urge me any longer to stay, &c. &c.

Charles Soubllette was named to be my successor, and as he dared not to avenge himself upon me, he had the baseness to do it upon my too adjutants, Manuel Flores and Joseph Martinez. These two young promising officers refused positively to serve any more in the staff under Soubllette's orders, and had requested the general-in-chief to be placed in their respective ranks, in one of the battalions of infantry. This request was represented by Soubllette to general Bolivar in a false and malicious way, and so he consented that these officers should be arrested, and put, for a couple of days, in the fort of Santa Rosa ; Soubllette knowing very well that I was attached to them. As soon as I heard what had happened, and being now no more in the army, I wrote to general Bolivar a very strong letter against the misrepresentations of Soubllette, and urged him to put these young officers at liberty, with which general Bolivar complied, and he himself returned me a very obliging answer.

I inquired in vain for an opportunity for St. Thomas' or Aux Cayes, and was obliged to remain in Carupano. Two days after, Bolivar seeing that his position was very critical, as I had told him beforehand, gave orders to evacuate Carupano and to embark the same night. I came in the evening to pay a visit to admiral Brion ; general Bolivar entered some time after me. I stood up from my seat and came to shake hands with him as usual. But Bolivar withdrew his hand like a madman, and said in a furious tone to me, "that he would not give his hand to a man who deserved to be shot instantly !" I never saw in

my life, among the houses of madmen, in Charenton and Bedlam, a figure like our *supreme chief*, at this moment! and was doubting if it was general Bolivar or some of these madmen, deserters from Bedlam, who were before me. As I have never feared any man, and as my conscience was very clear and quiet, I looked at him some moments, and asked in a firm and strong tone, for an explanation of these strange and unintelligible words, and declared to him positively, that he should explain himself, and that I feared nothing. He said not a single word more to me, abruptly left the room, jumped upon his horse, and rode away. Brion, in reply to my inquiries, said to me, I need not care about what he said, as I was no longer in his service, and added that Bolivar had been the whole day in a very bad temper, having been very much disappointed, by the desertion of Marino and Piar, who had left him in a very disagreeable position, and made it necessary for him now to evacuate this place, where the Spaniards threatened to attack him. And then, added Brion, he is very angry with you for having insisted on leaving him, &c.

I sought Bolivar every where, but could not find him, and Brion said to me, that it would be more prudent to avoid his presence, at a moment when his passion was excited, and so he brought me, who was of course enraged at such treatment, on board of one of his own vessels, the *Diana*, where the captain and officers treated me with the greatest kindness. Having not been able to see general Bolivar, I wrote a strong and laconic letter to him, in which, I asked an explanation of this strange behaviour to me, and that notwithstanding I was no more under his command, I would submit to be tried before a court martial, and hear what were the charges against me, and who was my vile accuser! That I would remain on board of the *Diana*, one of the vessels belonging to the expedition, and not go to St. Thomas, until the sharpest inquiry, from the beginning to the end of my distinguished service, should be made, and that I never could have expected to deserve such an indecorous and ridiculous treatment. I gave this letter, directed to general Bolivar, supreme chief, to Mr. Ballot the next morning, to deliver it into the hands of the former, telling him that I waited for an answer. Mr. Ballot gave him the letter, but he answered me not a single word.

Some months afterwards, I found myself at Port au Prince, where general Bolivar arrived as a fugitive, in September 1816, as I will relate in the next chapter. As soon as I heard of his

arrival, I said to my landlord, Mr. Wastenfield, a German and a rich and established merchant, and to Mr. Southerland, the English agent, that I was very glad of general Bolivar's arrival in a country where he did not command, and where I could address him on equal terms. I related what had happened at Carupano, to these two gentlemen, and they approved my resolution; but after a while, Mr. Southerland, who feared the consequences of such a meeting, took me aside and observed to me, that general Bolivar, being lodged at his house, he urged me, in very obliging terms, to desist from challenging general Bolivar; adding that the latter was very much dejected and melancholy, and that it would not be generous on my part, to pursue a man, who was already unfortunate enough, in such circumstances, &c. I yielded, at last, to his representations, but refused peremptorily to avoid Bolivar, as both gentlemen urged me to do; and insisted on having an explanation, before one of them, with general Bolivar, whom I feared not, and had never feared. It was then settled that Mr. Southerland should first see general Bolivar, and make him acquainted with my intended visit, and see what he said to it. But if he should refuse, I promised to both, that I would join general Bolivar, wherever I could meet him, except in the houses of these two gentlemen, Wastenfield, and Southerland.

The next morning, Mr. Southerland told me that general Bolivar would be *very happy* to see me, (his very expression.) I must confess that I was greatly astonished to hear such an unexpected answer from general Bolivar, and told them, laughing, that he would not have sent me such a polite message at the head of his troops and so I related to them his cowardice; in the naval action of the 2d of May, of the same year. Mr. Southerland told me then, that when general Bolivar heard from him of my being here, he changed color and was much surprised to hear this news, and told him hastily he would not see me by any means; but after Mr. Southerland had assured him, that in spite of my being much irritated against him, I had at last yielded to his (Southerland's) representations, to cause no scene in his house, and to consider the general's situation, &c. but that I had insisted, peremptorily, on having an explanation with him, in regard to the scene that took place at Carupano, but without intending to insult or to provoke him, &c., Bolivar, who was now fully re-assured, said to Mr. Southerland, that he would receive me with great pleasure. I went immediately and found him walking with his aid-de-camp,

Dr. Perez, (at that time lieutenant colonel, and now general, and his secretary general in Peru,) in the large piazza in Mr. Southerland's house. As soon as I came up the steps, he left Perez and came hastily towards me, embraced me with all the demonstrations of an unfeigned satisfaction, and the usual exclamation, "*Ah, vous voila, mon cher ami*, (ah, there you are my dear friend,) I am extremely happy to see you." He took my arm, and I sat with him on the sofa. Mr. Perez, after having saluted me, retired. I was, I must confess, more confused than general Bolivar, at such a singular reception, and could hardly know if it was the same man, Bolivar in Carupano, and Bolivar in Port au Prince, or in June and September 1816! My confusion was the result of a painful conviction of the duplicity of a man of such high standing, who forgot himself twice; in Carupano, by insulting me when *he was in power*, and without giving me any reasons, and in Port au Prince, in receiving me with this apparent satisfaction, *when he was unfortunate and isolated*, and well aware that I was a man who would have called him to account wherever I could find him. "I insisted on seeing you," said I to him very earnestly, "to have a definitive explanation with you for your strange behaviour to me at Carupano. What induced you to ask in such an indecorous manner?" &c. He saw clearly, that in speaking, I grew a little warm. Bolivar, who sat near to me, took my hand again and said, "that Brion had reported to him, that I had the intention to displace him, Bolivar, and to give the command to admiral Brion! I jumped up and said, in a contemptuous manner, that I could never believe that Brion, who had always been very friendly towards me, should have reported such a ridiculous calumny; that my friendship and the frank and plain manner with which I had constantly treated *him*, (Bolivar,) my letter written from Boca Chica, my sending for him at the risk of my life, my interfering in Aux Cayes when Montilla challenged him, and my zeal for his welfare, should have convinced him of the ridiculousness of an accusation, which could have never come from Brion, but perhaps *from somebody else*! But supposing it should have come from Brion, could you not confront me privately with the admiral, who was present, and in whose house we were together; and I believe that would have been the shortest way. And how could I have acted so foolishly as to take my absolute discharge first, to lose voluntarily my authority, if I had such a plan; and then act as a madman, to effect such a conspiracy against you at a time of my to-

tal isolation, and being sick ! I spoke much more, and with warmth ; so that he at last, fully convinced of the absurdity of such an accusation avowed to me, that it came not from Brion, but from somebody else ! But he would never mention his name. "It is very true," said he afterwards, "that you have always given me proofs of being a sincere friend ; that you spoke to me with frankness ; that you acted in your service like an ancient soldier, and a man of honor ; it is true, it is true, I should have considered all this before ; but, *mon cher ami*, (our whole conversation passed in French, as usual,) you must think no more of it, you know we are not perfect," and in saying these words he gave me his hand in sign of reconciliation. This explanation does honor to general Bolivar, (if, as I suppose, it came from his heart,) and was satisfactory to me, as I declared to him. He asked me now a great many questions concerning my private concerns, useless to repeat here, and so we departed good friends, I for Aux Cayes, and he, some months later, to the Main.

I have entered in these minute details of the principal facts that happened to me, in order to show the true character of a man, who has acquired such a colossal reputation, little corresponding to what he is, in regard to heroism, bravery, military skill, firmness of character, and talents. I will close this chapter with another trait, which will show how he always takes care to preserve his own baggage, and all that belongs to him. I have already proved how he fears being wounded or killed, or takes care to have his sacred person perfectly secured.

When at Margarita, where we slept in the same room, in which he had established his office, and mine was opposite to his, on the same floor, he came one day into my office, to tell me to give the order to all the officers belonging to our army, from the general down to the second lieutenant, to take with them no more than a few changes of dress, and to leave behind their trunks and luggage. I, myself, take no more than six changes of clothes, &c. In conformity to this order, every one of us left our trunks in a kind of block house, in the Villa del Norte. I had three, full of valuable articles, and as the glass of my gold repeater was broken, Bolivar told me to leave it in one of my trunks, where I could send for them when I should be definitively settled. I left also all my papers, certificates of services from Europe, correspondence, and other very valuable documents, &c. We embarked, and being one day at Carupano, on board the admiral, I was astonished to see on

deck, more than 20 trunks, pretty large and heavy. I asked to whom they belonged, and was surprised to hear from Garcia, the intendant of general Bolivar, that they were his master's baggage! I learned from him that the general had given him orders to hire mules, and to transport all his baggage from Villa del Norte, to the port of Juan Griego, where we should embark, and that he did it the night previous to our embarking.

When I expressed my surprise to general Bolivar some days afterwards, on seeing all these trunks in his house, he answered me dryly, "that Garcia had embarked them *by mistake!*"

I have related how general Bolivar carried his trunks into the arsenal, where he took shelter, when our cavalry guard had been surprised by the enemy at Carupano. This station was safe for himself and his baggage, then from the arsenal he could in five minutes embark, or take shelter in the fort of Santa Rosa.

These are facts of which I was an eye witness. And so it came to pass, that after the defeat of Soublette at Carupano, all our baggage was plundered, the trunks broken open, and all was irreparably lost, because general Arismendy, hearing that Bolivar had fled, judged we were all taken or slain, and our baggage was distributed among the troops of Margarita. I regretted the loss of my watch and my papers; wrote twice to general Arismendy, but received no answer. These were irreparable losses which I regret to the present time.

CHAPTER XIV.

Evacuation of Carupano—Skirmish at Ocumare—Fifth flight of General Bolivar, and his retreat to the Island of Hayti—McGregor's retreat towards Barcelona.

We have seen how general Bolivar acted in Carupano, how jealous he was of his authority, and what were my recompenses after so many fatigues and disgustful services. The fear of general Bolivar that the creation of a foreign legion would compromise his authority, shows sufficiently the little confidence he had in his own merit. Then how could 1500 and more, for-

eigners, give him the law, (as he said distinctly to me) being in his country, surrounded by his countrymen, and having already his authority established. If George Washington should have protested against the landing of so many thousand French troops and foreign officers, during the revolutionary war, would it not have been prejudicial to him and his country? How differently did he treat these auxiliary foreigners; but George Washington was a *man*, a soldier, a sage; and Simon Bolivar a *liliputian* in every respect in comparison with this great man! Should such a man be suffered to be compared with Bolivar? no, certainly not, as will be sufficiently shown in the course of this work.

General Bolivar is not the only one who is jealous of strangers; this jealousy is very common among the chieftains of Colombia, and is, I must say, characteristic of them. Their prejudices, their education, their talents, their ignorance, is the natural consequence of the Spanish system to suppress, in the Americans, every spark of light and industry. The superficial knowledge acquired by some among them is regarded as a phenomenon, as an extraordinary and remarkable instance, and such a man is a hero among them, when he would be a very common and ordinary man among civilized and enlightened nations, where education, intercourse with strangers, industry and liberal institutions, have a daily influence upon the population. The ceremonies of the catholic religion, the intolerance of the greatest part of the clergymen, the influence which monks, friars and priests have, down to the present day, upon the people, the miserable condition of public education, the natural apathy of the inhabitants, the total want of industry, agriculture, and commerce, united with military despotism, can never give to Colombia freedom and rational liberty, and are altogether unfavorable to the production of men of talents and liberal ideas. The few existing cannot raise their voices against those of thousands, and must necessarily remain silent. Arbitrary arrests, exiles, and punishments, are the natural consequences of a military government, where bayonets and those who command them, rule exclusively.

Limited talents make an illiberal government, and never can a man of character, experience, and knowledge, be suffered by such men, because they must naturally fear the consequences of his powerful influence over those who were under his immediate care; and the great difference between the two, will necessarily, sooner or later, be found out. In time of danger and

war, they will be consulted, suffered to take the command, to make dispositions and act ; then here they stand in danger, and expose their lives ; but once this danger passed, once in prosperity, they captiously cavil at those actions of yours which have saved them, and employ every means to weaken the favorable impression made upon their subalterns ; they try to ridicule you, whenever and wherever they can, and suffer your presence with reluctance and difficulty. Therefore it results that the thousands of strangers, who have served in Colombia, could never render effective services in a country where their authority had been so limited, that it was impossible to act freely and in accordance with their talents and experience. It is a fact, that the greater part of these chieftains have complained of strangers, have exiled, punished and ill-treated them, alleging that they had rendered very little or no service. This is the greatest injustice ever heard of, as in the course of this history I will prove, that Bolivar, the republic of Colombia, and its chieftains, are indebted to strangers, and their powerful support for their existence, if not as a free, at least as an independent people.

Labatut took Santa Martha, 1813, and was obliged to evacuate it, in consequence of the intrigues of his subalterns. He was arrested and exiled. Louis Aury saved the evacuation of the patriots from Carthagena. We have seen how Bolivar has recompensed him. Ducoudray Holstein was the last commander in Carthagena and protected in Boca Chica many hundred families. He was threatened to be shot ! Louis Brion sacrificed his large fortune for the republic, and was the constant support of Bolivar, who treated him very harshly at Savanilla. He died broken hearted, at Curacao, and so poor that he did not leave a cent to pay the expenses of his burial ! General Piar, who fought bravely in 1814 and 1815, when Bolivar fled from Venezuela, and who conquered, in union with Brion, the beautiful and rich province of Guayana, was arrested, tried, and shot. To whom are the Colombians indebted for their successes in 1819, in conquering New Grenada ? Was it not to foreign legions ? Who gained the battle of Carabobo ? was it not the Irish legion ? &c. &c. Thousands of these brave men perished by misery, and maladies brought on in consequence of hardships ; and now the Colombians boast that they have gained their independence alone, and without the aid of foreigners. They forget past services because they want them no more.

It is an astonishing fact, that among all these chieftains of Colombia, not a single man can be found who deserves the name of a great man, a hero, or an extraordinary man. There exists none. Can Simon Bolivar possibly pass for such an one? It has been proved, already, by *facts*, that he is not, and will be still more fully proved. In a time of revolution, when the ordinary distinctions of rank and titles are confounded and the lowest citizen can rival any other, if he is brave or has talents, we search in vain for distinguished characters on the Main. Among the military chieftains, we find Paez, Amismendy and Padilla, who have achieved some distinguished actions; all the rest are very ordinary characters, which have gained an undeserved name of heroes and skilful men.

I left general Bolivar ready to embark at Carupano for Ocumare. The defection of generals Marino and Piar, the want of order, regulation, and provisions, produced diseases and maladies, and a good many of those who came from Aux Cayes, and the island of Margarita, with general Bolivar, fell sick and died, or left him. The enemy profiting by the faults of Bolivar, his want of firmness, activity and talents, increased their forces in proportion to the declining state of the patriots. The history of the campaign of 1816, is substantially the same as that of 1813 and '14, in Caracas, and ended with the flight and embarkation of general Bolivar, like the year 1814.

When general Bolivar saw at last that there was no hope of making recruits, or of any support and junction from Marino and Piar, he followed the advice of admiral Brion and evacuated Carupano to seek another landing-place more convenient, and so it was determined to go to Ocumare, where he could find more resources and recruits. They landed accordingly in the bay, protected by a little fort of no consequence, and proceeded to the village of the same name, Ocumare, where he arrived the 3d July, 1816, with 13 vessels, of which seven only were armed. He published the following proclamation:

“Head-quarters, at Ocumare, July 6, 1816.—*Simon Bolivar, Supreme Chief, &c. &c. to the inhabitants of Venezuela:*

“An army provided with arms and munitions of war of every kind, is on the march, and under my orders, coming to liberate you.

“I will drive out, and exterminate our tyrants, and I will restore you to your rights, your country, and give you peace. On our part, the killing of the prisoners of war will cease from

this instant. We promise to grant a general pardon for those who submit, even to European Spaniards.

"All the troops of the enemy which will join us, will participate with us in the advantages and recompenses, which the country and its inhabitants can afford.

"No Spaniard shall be killed, except when he may resist with his arms in hand. No harm will be done to the natives, who are found in the army of the enemy.

"Our unfortunate brethren who are suffering as slaves, are from this moment declared free. Nature, rights, and government, reclaim their liberty. In the future will exist in Venezuela, no more than one class of inhabitants; all will be citizens.

"As soon as we have taken possession of the capital, we will convoke the people to name their deputies for Congress. During my march upon Caracas, general Marino will besiege Cumana; general Piar, supported by general Roxas and Monaga, will render himself master of the plains, and march against Barcelona, while general Arismendy, with his victorious army, will maintain himself in the island of Margarita.

BOLIVAR."

This proclamation is like those of the same author, viz. drawn up to deceive the ignorant, and people living at a distance. The army, of which he speaks as being under his order, consisted of 650 men, of whom not 300 had ever seen a battle, and whose officers were a greater part of them totally unfit to command.

"I shall *exterminate* our tyrants," says general Bolivar, the 6th of July; and the 10th of the same month he was beaten by 300 men, which Morales and Guero had assembled in haste, and fled in full gallop from the field of battle to the bay of Ocumare, where he embarked for the Dutch island of Buen Ayre, as I shall relate hereafter.

"As soon as we have taken possession of the capital, (Caracas) we will convoke the people to name their deputies to Congress," says general Bolivar. His sincerity on this occasion is doubted by those who know him and his intentions. In 1813, he spoke the same language, and did nothing to assemble the Congress, when it was in his power; in 1815 he disobeyed, formally, the orders of Congress in New Grenada in besieging Carthagená instead of St. Martha; in 1817, when recalled, the first condition of his admission was to convoke a Congress; it was not done; on the contrary, he broke up the Congress assembled at Cariaca, and persecuted its members in 1818, and the

following events in these memoirs will show clearly that he has been, and is decidedly against the formation of any Congress ; and when forced to suffer its existence, he limited its power by military display and authority, so that the senate and chamber of representatives were no more than *nominal*, and the submission servants of the President Liberator.

“While I march against Caracas, general Marino will besiege Cumana ; general Piar supported,” &c. &c. This is again deception ; when some days previous to his evacuation of Carupano, he said *to me* that he was very sorry to see Marino and Piar paying not the least regard to his orders ; and when it is known that in consequence of the defection of these two chieftains, Bolivar was obliged to evacuate Carupano, &c.

To any experienced military man, the following reflections will give a convincing proof of Bolivar’s weakness and small capacity, as a commander-in-chief. Instead of employing every means in his power to compel Marino and Piar to do their duty, he approved, in an official manner, their defection, which naturally encouraged them to act in an isolated and independent way. Then if Marino, instead of besieging Cumana, had joined Bolivar at Ocumare, the united forces of both would have been sufficient to take Valencia, which had not 200 armed men to defend it, and to march against Caracas, where there were at the time no more than 500 men. The forces of the Spaniards were much dispersed and would have fallen an easy prey to the patriots, who could have destroyed them, isolated as they were, one column after another. This success would have reanimated the sunken spirit of the inhabitants, not in regard to patriotism, but in regard to confidence in Bolivar’s bravery, military skill and ability to govern them. The actions of the dictator, and his flight, gave them disgust ; and therefore Bolivar himself was much discouraged to see, that after more than a month’s stay at Carupano, not 70 of the inhabitants came to volunteer under his orders. On the contrary, about the whole population fled on the approach of Bolivar, and we found deserted houses. The same thing happened at Ocumare, &c. &c.

General Bolivar collected, in virtue of his proclamation of the 6th of July, some hundred slaves, which were armed, and united to his troops. He collected about 800 men, armed in haste, but without instruction, uniforms, or discipline. With such a band of armed men, called the *liberating army*, he marched from Ocumare to Valencia, where, at the time, less than 200 men were able to resist him. The possession of Valencia was

precious to him, being situated between Caracas, the plains, and the fortress of Porto Cabello, by which he could have been supplied easily from the plains; where Paez, Zarasa, Roxas, Sedeno, &c. had always acted bravely and resisted the powerful forces of Morillo.

Morales arriving at Valencia, heard that general Bolivar had debarked at Ocumare. Having with him no more than a small escort of cavalry, he lost no time in waiting for more troops, collected about 200 armed men, and directed his march towards Ocumare. The major of the militia, Jose Guero, joined him with one hundred more, and with this small force he determined to attack general Bolivar. He met him on the 10th of July not far distant from the village of Ocumare, upon a hill which commanded a view of the lake of Valencia. When Morales discovered the advanced guard commanded by Soublette, he put some *tirailleurs* among the trees, unperceived by the patriots, in the bushy hills where they had to pass, and took an advantageous position with the remainder, to wait a favorable moment to attack. A small skirmish began, which lasted not a quarter of an hour, when a deserter from Morales was brought before the supreme chief, who acquainted him, that this much feared partisan was the person at the head of the Spanish troops. Soublette, as usual, and as has been stated by eye witnesses, fled immediately on hearing some musket shots; general Bolivar, seeing his advanced guard dispersed, lost all presence of mind, spoke not a word, turned his horse quickly round, and fled in full speed towards Ocumare. Colonel Boe, (brother in law of mareschal Lefebvre Dugue of Dantzic, who was in this action) related to me afterwards, that Bolivar was so blinded by fear, that his horse run against Boe's mule, loaded with baggage, and precipitated mule and baggage down the hill, without stopping a single moment. He passed the village at full gallop, and arrived at last at a place of safety, the bay of Ocumare, two leagues distant from the village of the same name, jumped from his horse, got into a boat, and embarked on board the Diana, the same armed vessel which I had left about 3 hours previous to his arrival, having found a French captain, (Mr. DuClerk) who sailed from Ocumare to St. Thomas', and who treated me with the greatest kindness, and offered me a passage, gratis, on board his vessel. I had lost (as related,) in Villa del Norte, all my baggage, and had only some few changes of clothes, and my uniform, without a single cent in my pocket, being at the same time sick with an intermitent fever. We were very much

surprised to see the whole squadron coming after us, under full sail, and we were soon joined by them, all steering towards Bonaire laying close by the bay of Ocumare. Here I heard the following particulars :

Bolívar was so seized by a panic terror, that he arrived with only a single aid-de-camp, out of six, who was the lieutenant colonel Perez, on board the *Diana*. Not far distant from the bay, opposite the little fort, was a kind of farm house, under the roof of which lay stretched on a mat, the wounded major Picard, who lost his arm in a surprise (related in the last chapter) of the advanced cavalry guard not far from Carupano, and who, unable to move, was carried on shore in order to be more comfortable. When he saw Bolívar and his aid-de-camp Perez passing close by him at full speed, he called the general, and requested him for God's sake to order him to be again carried on board ; but the supreme chief did not hear him, or would not hear him, and embarked. Captain Demarquet, another Frenchman, and aid-de-camp of Bolívar, arrived at the bay some minutes after Bolívar's being in the boat, and urged the boatswain to return and take him in ; but the general ordered him to proceed and put him on board the *Diana*. As soon as he was on deck, he directed captain Debouille,* the commander of this fast sailing armed vessel, and in the absence of admiral Brion, (on an excursion to the island of Curacao) the commander of the squadron, to make the signal to cut their cables and to depart, which was done accordingly. They directed their course towards the small Dutch island of Buen Ayre where they arrived in the afternoon of the 10th of July.

Thus general Bolívar left again his army, and his command, and put his person in safety, and this was the *fifth* time that he had done so since 1812.

1st. Lieutenant colonel Bolívar left in June, 1812, the strong place of Porto Cabello, of which he was governor, and embarked clandestinely in the night, with some officers, in consequence of the fear he had of the revolted Spanish prisoners of war, and retired to San Mateo, leaving his garrison without commander or orders ; in consequence of which, these retired, and the place fell into the hands of Monteverde.†

2d. The general-in-chief, dictator, liberator of the western provinces of Venezuela, S. Bolívar, embarked hastily in the night

* I have these particulars from captain Debouille himself

† See chapter V.

of the 25th of August, 1814, at Cumana, and fled with his colleague San Jago Marino, dictator of the eastern provinces of Venezuela towards Margarita, &c. He lost all presence of mind, and would not listen to any representation of his cousin Joseph Felix Ribas, and others, to remain with them on the Main; he sent for Marino, and as soon as the latter was on board, he ordered commodore Bianchi to cut the cables, and off he sailed. He left Ribas, Villapol, and thousands of his countrymen behind, who had placed their confidence in his skill and bravery, and sought safety *in flight*.*

3d. The captain-general of the armies of Venezuela and New Grenada, Simon Bolivar, not having succeeded to take Carthagena by force of arms, and after having lost, in a miserable position, his troops, and the province of New Grenada, embarked on board an English brig of war, and left his countrymen, and retired in safety to Kingston in the island of Jamaica.

4th. In the naval action, of 2d May 1816, the supreme chief of the Republic of Venezuela, retired into the long boat of commodore Brion's armed vessel, and gave the command to Ducoudray Holstein during the whole time of the action, which lasted about four hours.†

5th. And now, here at Ocumare, where the supreme chief fled and sheltered himself from all danger in the island of Buen Ayre.

When admiral Brion arrival at Buen Ayre, from Curacao, he was much astonished to find the squadron and general Bolivar there, and came immediately on board the Diana, where general Bolivar had remained the whole day in bed, and reproached him in very strong terms with his cowardice and desertion, and above all, for having given orders to the squadron to follow him alone, and to leave all his companions without means and assistance. This was a well deserved, but humiliating lesson, for a man of Bolivar's proud and vain character. But here, as every where, when the general was isolated, and in misfortune, he was very docile, and endured every thing. Brion, now a little cooler, admonished Bolivar to return to the Main, and rejoin the commanders on the coast of Cumana and Barcelona, and to unite again the patriotic troops. He spoke so convincingly to Bolivar, that at last he consented to depart in the same vessel for the coast of Cumana, while Brion, with

* See chapter VII.

† See chapter XIII.

the remainder of his squadron, was going to Margarita to refit some of his vessels.

As soon as general Bolivar arrived on the coast of Cumana, where he found Marino and Piar, these two received him very harshly, reproached him with his new desertion at Ocumare, and Piar threatened to try him before a court martial, and to have him shot as a deserter and a coward. This last scene enraged the vain and vindictive mind of Bolivar so much, that he afterwards was the most bitter enemy of Piar, which, as I have been assured, was the cause of his subsequent condemnation. Bolivar found it not prudent to remain, and embarked without delay. This essay, and the fear of being treated by other chieftains in the same manner, discouraged him so much that he ordered captain Devouille (who had received positive instructions from the admiral, to remain at the disposal of the supreme chief,) to make the port of Aux Cayes, in the island of Hayti, from whence he had departed some months before with the sanguine hopes of the most brilliant success! He remained a couple of days and re-embarked for Jaquemel, from whence he departed by land to Port au Prince, where I had, as related, my last interview with him.

I forgot to say, that during the conversation with me, he told me he had heard that I was going with the expedition of general Mina, who, in fact, had made me several very honorable propositions to join his expedition, which came at the time of my stay in Port au Prince. I answered general Bolivar—"I will never go more with general Bolivar or with general Mina, as long as there is neither organization or instruction, and only a shadow of an army." Bolivar said, "I believe, *mon cher ami*, you will never forget your *ancien métier*."

The president of Hayti, Alexander Petion, received him very coolly, having already been acquainted with a part of his actions.

Such was the end of an expedition which sailed in May 1816 from Aux Cayes some months before, which cost large sums, and promised so brilliant results. This pitiful end must entirely be attributed to the wrong measures taken by general Bolivar, of which I have related some striking particulars. We have seen that Bolivar had lost, by his fault—1st, the forces of commodore Aury, which were half of the whole strength in vessels and men, lying at that time at Aux Cayes: 2d, his cowardice in the action of the 2d of May, alienated from him the esteem and the confidence of so many hundreds of his subal-

terns : 3d, by his weakness in following the perfidious advice of his flatterers, he annulled all the good, which I could have done in endeavoring to establish order, instruction and discipline, in a band of armed men, who called themselves generals, colonels and officers, and who had not the least notion of the first elements of our art. He was opposed, by the same weakness and his jealous fears, to consenting to the organization and the formation of a foreign legion, which could have had the most useful consequences. This same weakness of character induced him to consent to the departure of Marino and Piar, against his own conviction of having done wrong, and against mine and admiral Brion's well grounded advice : 4th, finally, to crown all these faults, he lost, in an attack by 300 men, when he had more than 800, all his presence of mind, and fled with all the speed of his horse, at the first musket shots, and galloped 12 miles from the field of battle to the bay of Ocunare, as if the enemy was at his heels.

What I have related here of general Bolivar would appear impossible and exaggerated ; but it is, unfortunate enough, too true and authentic. Hundreds of eye witnesses like me, as the inhabitants of Been Ayre, Aux Cayes, Jaquemel, Port au Prince, &c., to whom these facts are perfectly known, will confirm and testify to the correctness of my impartial statements, if they are not blinded by self interest, or by fear of a persecution, in case of their being settled on the Main or in the service of Colombia. The Gazettes in the Havana, from July, August and September, 1816, give a correct account of what had happened in Ocunare, and in which general Bolivar is treated with the most contemptuous rigor. There will be found a detailed list of all that the Spaniards found in the bay of Ocunare, of debarked arms, ammunitions, the beautiful and new print, &c. All these objects were debarked in order to follow Bolivar's troops, and waiting for the transportations by mules, were left on shore. Bolivar would not suffer their being re-embarked.

I fear and hope nothing from Bolivar or the Colombians ; my name is on the title page, and I will, and shall state the naked truth, and nothing else, in order to show general Bolivar as he is, not by declamations, but by facts. I give him credit when he deserves it, and relate his actions and their consequences, and nothing else.

Gen. Bolivar, who had received powerful support from the Haytian government, has acted very ungratefully to the Hay-

tians. Before he came to Carupano, he had sent back the Haytian captain, named Courtois, who came with his vessel from Aux Cayes as a transport ship, and treated him harshly and in a haughty manner, on his making him some just representations. At Carupano, he sent two other Haytian vessels back without paying, or consenting to give them any written promises to pay their fleet, and forced them to embark and to quit Carupano, without the least compensation for their voyage. This impolitic treatment against the Haytian vessels, and the officers which served in the land troops, united with the condemnation of general Piar, who was a man of color, and shot some years later, at Angostura, made a very bad impression on the inhabitants of this hospitable island.

President Petion, who was fully acquainted with the treatment, by Bolivar, of the Haytians, nevertheless did not reproach him in the least, but of course, received him much cooler, and made no great exertions for a man who behaved himself so ungratefully. General Bolivar, in one respect, kept his promise to president Petion, on which express condition the latter assisted him so powerfully in his expedition which sailed from Aux Cayes, that he, Bolivar, would promise him the emancipation of the slaves. This general Bolivar, faithfully fulfilled, as I have shown by his proclamations, published in Margarita, Carupano and Ocumare. Bolivar did the same afterwards with his own slaves, in San Mateo, which did him honor.

In consequence of the flight of the supreme chief from the field of battle at Ocumare, and the sailing of all the vessels from the said bay, general McGregor united the scattered troops of Bolivar's corps, and effected a retreat along the sea shore, of which too much has been spoken that is not worthy to be repeated. The fact is, that McGregor had nothing else to do, but either to perish or to advance as well as he could, until he effected a junction of his miserable and harrassed troops with general Piar near Barcelona.

The European Gazettes have described this retreat, in which nothing was done that was worth mentioning, like one of the most heroic actions of McGregor, and some of them had the ridiculous idea of comparing it with the retreat of Xenophon and general Moreau. The public is now too well persuaded of the merit of general McGregor to render any further reflection necessary, in regard to a man who is too well known and justly appreciated.

CHAPTER XV.

Cause of General Bolivar's recal to the Main—His arrival at Barcelona—Siege and occupation of Barcelona, by the Spaniards—Behaviour of General Bolivar at Barcelona.—Years 1816–17.

General Bolivar, whilst in Port au Prince, was the inseparable friend of the brethren Pineros, whom I have mentioned before,* and particularly with Celadonio, the ex-corregidor at Mompox. He regularly spent his evenings with the two sisters of Soublette, whose mother died at Port au Prince. Mr. Southerland afterwards said to me, "that he wondered at finding in Bolivar nothing extraordinary, nothing to be admired, and nothing adequate to the idea he had entertained of him. I do not like," said he, "his great familiarity with every stranger who is introduced to him. He takes one by the arm and walks up and down my piazza with him, as if they had been acquainted for many years." I told him that Bolivar, in Port au Prince, and unfortunate, was altogether a different man from the Supreme Chief, on the Main; where his haughty manners formed a complete contrast to those he adopted here. Various other gentlemen made the same remarks, as Mr. Southerland.

General Bolivar, meanwhile, passed his time in a quiet and amusing way, at Port au Prince. Admiral Brion was busily engaged, endeavoring to persuade the chieftains who remained in Venezuela, to consent to his recal. Brion was the most sincere friend Bolivar ever had. He had expended his large fortune and employed all his credit, in fitting out the expedition from Aux Cayes, and he placed entire confidence in general Bolivar's skill and courage. He was grievously disappointed; but, as he often told me, "he knew no other chieftain among the natives who possessed a greater reputation, or more authori-

* See chapter VIII.

ty, (whether deserved or not,) than general Bolivar. He was the only military character who was able to exercise authority, sufficient to unite them all." When I spoke privately to Brion of the strange, even cowardly conduct of Bolivar, of his weakness, and his incapacity for command; he asked me, often, "to whom else would you confide the command?" We examined once the native chiefs, one by one, and, I confess, could find none, who, on the whole, we thought preferable to him.

Under this conviction, admiral Brion was active and ardent in favor of Bolivar, and after making great exertions for some months, he succeeded in uniting a majority of the chieftains, viz. Arismendy, Paez, Zarasa, Sedeno, Bermudes, Roxas, Monegas, and others, who consented to recal general Bolivar as their commander-in-chief, upon two express conditions. 1st. That he should assemble a congress. 2d. That he should direct the military operations only; and should not meddle with the administration of the Republic. He consented to comply exactly with their wishes, and prepared to sail in the *Diana*, captain Devouille, for Barcelona, the place appointed to receive him.

Before general Bolivar departed, he communicated to president Petion, the despatches and his recal, and received from him new supplies of warlike stores.

Bolivar sailed the 25th December 1816, from the Haytian port, Jaquemel, on board the privateer *Diana*, accompanied by three of his aid-de-camps, Perez, Chamberlain and Palacios, his nephew; two brothers Pineres, and some others private families, who wished to return to their country. He arrived the 31st of the same month at Barcelona, where the arms, munitions of war, and provisions given him by Petion, were immediately debarked; and of which the patriots were in great want.

General Bolivar published a proclamation, in which he again took the former titles: "Commander-in-chief, Captain-general of the armies of Venezuela and New Grenada, Supreme Chief of the republic," &c. &c. He confirmed his former proclamations respecting the emancipation of slaves, and offering it to those who would serve in the army. He called a new congress, and ordered the deputies to assemble at his head quarters Barcelona. He proclaimed a provisional government, of which he took the presidency, under the title of "Supreme Chief of the Republic of Venezuela," &c.

General Arismendy came, the 2d January 1817, with 300 men, to join general Bolivar. This is the same Arismendy, who, after the flight of the two dictators, Bolivar and Marino, from Cumana, in 1814, had treated them as I have related. He said, moreover, publicly, in Margarita, on hearing of general Bolivar's flight from Ocumare, "that general Bolivar's cowardice was shown too often, and that he ought to be tried for it by a court martial, and condemned to be shot." Brion not being on the best terms with the governor of Margarita, employed Villaret, the major-general of the navy, in whom Arismendy had great confidence, and who succeeded, at last, in gaining his assent to Bolivar's recal; who, though he knew Arismendy's character, and what he had said against himself, was so delighted at gaining him, that he executed all his great power of pleasing, and subjected Arismendy to his wishes, in-somuch that the supreme chief, on the 4th January, proclaimed martial law, and again united the three powers in himself.

Bolivar was not beloved in Barcelona. He, however, continued to prevail on the inhabitants to take arms, and joining to them, as many slaves as he could collect, marched on the 5th against the posts of observation of the Spaniards, which they had established in the neighborhood of Clarius. On the 9th, at the head of about 900 armed men, with a field piece, he attacked the Spaniards, under colonel Ximenes, about 500 men strong, half of whom were placed in ambush. General Arismendy, who is brave, active and skilful, commanded in the action, whilst general Bolivar was behind. He sustained the combat for four hours, but being attacked on his rear and flanks, he was compelled to retire with the loss of his field piece, baggage, arms, &c. As soon as general Bolivar discovered that his troops had fallen into an ambush, from which he was at a considerable distance, instead of rallying them and disengaging Arismendy, he turned his horse, and escaped with some of his officers to Barcelona, where he was in safety. A French captain, a clored man, Zenon Bouille, who fought bravely at the head of his company, was wounded and taken prisoner. After having surrendered, he was shot. The papers and plans of operations of the patriot chieftains, fell into the hands of the Spaniards.

When this victory over Bolivar's troops was known in Caracas, the Spanish inhabitants collected one thousand dollars in money, which they sent to be distributed among the non-commissioned officers and privates of colonel Ximenes' troops.

Government promoted each officer, one grade. The patriots have not, in any instance, employed such means for the encouragement of their troops.

The routed troops of the patriots retired to Texas, and were pursued by order of Col. Ximenes. A considerable part of the 300 soldiers from Margarita, and strangers were taken prisoners. The former were pardoned on condition of entering into the Spanish service. All the rest were shot. By this action Ximenes opened a communication with Morales.

The latter having collected more forces, attacked general Zarasa, and routed him and some smaller patriot corps; so that by the last of January, the whole province of Barcelona except the capital, came again into possession of the Spaniards.

San Yago Marino, who acted separately from Bolivar, in his native province Cumana, besieged this capital, where general Pardo, who commanded there, attacked him. He was repulsed, and forced to retire to his entrenched camp in the savannas of del Cantaro; whence he advanced against Cumana.

General Bolivar immediately gave orders to fortify at Barcelona, a large building which stands isolated, and formerly served as an hospital. It is called the *Charity*. Various privateers arrived there, bringing him officers, men, arms, ammunition and provisions, sent by the persevering activity of admiral Brion. Six heavy guns were transported from the vessel, and put in battery in this house, where he collected some of the routed troops and recruits; so that he was again at the head of a thousand men, among whom were about 450 strangers, taken from the crews of the privateers.

When general Pasqual Real, commander in chief of the Spanish army, called the Eastern army, heard that general Bolivar had taken shelter in the Charity, he united the forces of colonels Bausa, Ximenes and general Francisco Thomas Morales, in order to attack the city of Barcelona, which Bolivar endeavoured to defend. But he was compelled to retire into the Charity, and from that day (10th February) the city of Barcelona was closely besieged, and by the strange negligence of the Spanish commander, the road to Cumana remained unguarded.

Urged by Bolivar, Marino came at last, through this unguarded road, surprised Real, and forced him to retire. He entered the city of Barcelona the 11th February. The 14th, a part of the patriotic army directed its march towards San Bernardino, where they attacked a part of general Real's troops

entrenched in a convent. But they were repulsed, and, the next day retired to Barcelona.

The Spaniards attempted to force the entry of the port of Barcelona, by sea. They advanced with their squadron of 17 armed vessels, brigs, schooners, gunboats, &c. and attacked (the 18th February) the privateer schooners and the four gunboats posted to defend this entry. After a sharp action, the Spanish squadron was forced to retire. On the 19th they again returned, and were again repulsed, with great loss. The captains and crews of the three privateers were French and North Americans in the service of the Republic.

General Real united his scattered troops, and being reinforced, marched again towards Barcelona; and reached Tuacal about two miles from the city, where he entrenched himself.

On the 22d, the privateer *Diana*, captain T. Devouille, with 5 guns, sailed from the port of Barcelona, and attacked a Spanish royal schooner armed with seven guns, and posted near the port, to observe what was going on in the patriotic squadron. Devouille burnt the schooner in view of the whole Spanish squadron; not a vessel of which ventured to her support. The *Diana* lost nothing but half a sail, which was burnt; and she pursued her course, unmolested, to the island of Margarita.

On the night of the 28th the Spaniards left their entrenched camp without having made an attack upon Barcelona, and retired towards Caracas.

The 4th March, the republican gun boats, under the command of the post captain, Antonio Dias, with 300 infantry on board, attacked a Spanish battery placed upon a hill called the Moro, near Barcelona. The patriots were greatly annoyed by this battery; and the approach to it was dangerous, it being defended by 18 Spanish armed vessels. At day break, the fire of two of the gun boats commenced against the battery, whilst four others coming out of the river, attacked the Spaniards with such promptitude and vigor, that they thought of nothing but evacuating the battery, and the whole coast. The confusion of the enemy was without example. The sloop of war *Baylen*, and the armed brigs and schooners cut their cables and escaped. The attack of the Indian colonel, Aunario, upon the Spanish battery was conducted with great bravery. His troops rapidly mounted the hill, once a rough and broken road, close by the shore, and exposed on both flanks to the fire of more than a hundred guns. Aunario lost but few of his kinsmen.

The land troops under general Real, were dispersed or destroyed.

General Morillo, the Spanish commander in chief, had, in March, fixed his head quarters at Maracay: When he heard of these events, he raved like a madman, and ordered general Real to be arrested and confined in the fort Del Colorado, at Lagunaira. Brigadier general Morales, colonels Uniestieta and Guero, and captain Alexo, were also arrested and sent to Porto Cabello, as was supposed for cowardice in the attack on Barcelona; but such was the capricious and tyrannical character of Morillo, that he deigned not to inform these officers for what offence, nor for what length of time they were to be punished.

Bolivar and Marino, elated with these unexpected successes, lost their time in festivals, and indolence. They took no serious measures to unite their forces and march against Cumana, to clear the coast and the neighbouring valleys, and to drive the Spaniards from the provinces of Barcelona and Cumana. Bolivar, jealous of Marino's influence over the inhabitants, declined assisting him to besiege Cumana, and insisted on directing his operations against Caracas where the other had no influence. Marino was in favor of besieging Cumana. And so it happened that disunion now again broke out between them, as it had done in 1813. Marino regarding himself independent of Bolivar, at last gave orders to his troops to evacuate Barcelona. But hearing that the Spaniards were in march under colonel Aldama to attack the place, he encamped not far from this city opposite to general Bolivar's entrenched house.

Marino, a second time, left his commander in chief; who was weak enough to suffer it. Bolivar sent various officers to persuade him to return; representing to him the danger to which both were exposed by acting separately. He always answered equivocally. And Bolivar looked for their reunion in vain.

Bolivar was greatly discouraged, feeling himself unable, with about 1100 men, to resist the force that was advancing towards Barcelona. After the arrest of general Real, Morillo appointed colonel Juan de Aldama commander of the first division of the eastern army, destined to act against Barcelona. This column marched on the 2d of April from the environs of Picutu; and on the 5th, took possession of the town, whilst the patriots retired towards the entrenched Charity house. As soon as general Bolivar saw the enemy approaching, he clandestinely left his post in the night of the 5th and 6th of April, with a few of-

ficers and a good guide, all well mounted. He told colonel Pedro Maria Freites, that he was going in search of more troops, and would soon return with a strong body of armed men. He confided to this colonel the command of the post, during his absence. He departed as secretly as he could, and directed his course to the plains of Cumana, where he was again in safety.

On the 6th, the Spanish commander summoned colonel Freites to surrender; and offered him honorable conditions, which he refused, under the expectation of being soon relieved by general Bolivar. He sent the messenger back with a negative and spirited answer, to the Spanish camp. On the 7th, the Spaniards assaulted the Charity house; and the garrison, after a brave defence, were obliged to surrender. Colonel Freites, who was wounded in the action, and the intendant, Francisco Esteban Ribas, were put in irons; all the rest, among whom were many foreigners, were butchered. The two prisoners, after receiving the usual barbarous treatment from the Spaniards, were transported in irons to Caracas, where they were shot.

Bolivar, here in Barcelona, renewed the scenes of 1812 when he escaped from Porto Cabello. A commander of ordinary skill and talent would not have left 1100 men in a place unfit to shelter them against a serious attack: nor would he have left them with only four days provisions. Nor would a man of integrity, have left his people under the pretext of obtaining aid, which he knew to be out of his power. Yet were all these things done by the supreme chief in April, 1817, at Barcelona.

Marino had broken up his camp and retired, leaving Bolivar and his countrymen to their fate. Any other commander would have joined and marched, united with them, against the common enemy. Both Marino and Bolivar behaved here as they had done in Cumana. Each of them being jealous, and ambitious of command, they both sought their own security in flight and basely deserted the interests of their country.

General Bolivar, by his flight, abandoned one of his aid-de-camps, who was initiated in many secret negociations of his master. I mean lieutenant colonel Charles Chamberlain, a native of the island of Jamaica, who had been attached to him for several years. On this subject I will copy a page from colonel Hippisley's narrative, p. 466. "At the taking of Barcelona, captain Chamberlain was with him (Bolivar) in the rank of lieutenant colonel, with a regiment. When the general-in-chief fled from the place, he directed his friend to continue

in the command, with an assurance that if he held out for three days, he would order a strong reinforcement up to his relief. Chamberlain with difficulty retained it for the period. No reinforcement arrived; and knowing the cruelties which the royalists would inflict on him, he retired to his quarters, and the firing of a pistol was to be the signal for opening the barriers. The pistol was fired, and a second; the barrier was opened; the enemy rushed in, and running to his residence, found that the same shots, the sound of which gave the token for opening the gates, had also given the signal of death to the ill-fated Chamberlain and the girl of his heart, whom, to save from miseries of the worst extreme, from violation and public exposure, he had first shot, before he placed the second pistol to his own head. Deprived of the satisfaction of putting a period to the existence of the Englishman and his wife (for a priest had previously united them) the royalist commander glutted his disappointment and revenge, by severing the bodies into quarters, and publicly exposing them on the walls of the fort."

Without noticing the variance of my own relation from that of colonel Hippiusley, as to the taking of the Charity house, I will only observe, that they coincide respecting the clandestine flight of Bolivar from Barcelona, the promise of a reinforcement at his departure, and the destruction of more than one thousand men!

As soon as the inhabitants of New Grenada heard of the advantages gained by the patriots over the Spaniards, they began to revolt against their oppressors. In the provinces of Antiochia and Choco, various guerillas were formed, who did great damage to the Spaniards and gained advantages. The provinces of Quito and Papayan, openly revolted, took arms, and drove the Spaniards out of their territory. The patriot guerillas were so strong and so numerous, that they cut off the communication between Bogota, Carthagena, and Santa Martha. The commerce of these places was nearly destroyed.

CHAPTER XVI.

Conquest of the Provinces of Guayana by General Piar and Admiral Brion—Trial and execution of General Piar—Bolivar and Marino—Anecdotes. 1817.

When general Piar heard, in December 1816, that the province of Guayana was confided to colonel Miguel de La Torre ; he resolved to march against him, and take this beautiful province by force of arms. He had heard from several officers, and had himself witnessed so great a want of firmness and courage in Torre, that he was satisfied his attack would not long be resisted. This, together with a plan proposed to general Bolivar when at Aux Cayes, confirmed his opinion that the enterprise would be brilliant, and useful to the republic.

The following is the plan which was proposed at Aux Cayes. General Bolivar received a long letter from colonel Bidot who was in the service of the republic in the neighboring plains ; stating and explaining a plan for conquering Venezuela, by commencing with Guayana, because that province was rich, affording great resources, not having suffered by the war ; and containing numbers of inhabitants who were secretly opposed to the Spaniards ; and would declare for independence, as soon as general Bolivar should present himself with a thousand men. He added, that the security of Morillo the Spanish general-in-chief was so great, in regard to this country, that he had left a small number of troops to defend it, and that he was confident Bolivar would succeed, &c. This letter was immediately communicated to a number of us, and we were all in favor of colonel Bidot's proposal. Piar, with whom I spoke, was one of the warmest approvers of the plan. It must have produced the happiest effects upon our expedition. Bolivar, however, was decidedly in favor of first re-conquering his native country, Caracas ; and then, said he, "will we march against Guayana." This childish predilection for Caracas, was extremely injurious to the cause of independence in Venezuela ; Guayana was deprived of Spanish troops, and contained many who

were our friends, and were waiting to join us; it had also supplies for us, of every kind. A sudden attack upon it, could scarcely have failed of succeeding. I proposed to general Bolivar to establish in St. Thomas de La Angostura, its fortified capital, a depot for recruits, because the superior numbers of the horses, afforded a fine resource for the formation of a good cavalry; and its navigable rivers, an easy communication abroad; with the interior particularly. He preferred going to Carupapano, a village destitute of resources. If Bolivar could have got rid of his injudicious predilection for Caracas, an open and exhausted city, and have consented to conquer Cumana, as Marino had proposed, he would not have lost this general and his troops, which, in Barcelona, in 1817, amounted to 1500 men. Nor would he have lost this place, nor (by far the greatest loss) 1100 brave men. All these losses, certainly resulted from his predilection for Caracas. We shall see what fatal consequences resulted from it in 1818.

General Piar, remembering colonel Bidot's letter, conferred with general Sedeno, and proposed to him, to unite their forces, and march against Guayana. Sedeno, active, brave, and enterprising, approved highly of Piar's plan, and joined him with 1000 Llaneros, who all had perfect confidence in Piar's skill and bravery; having, for a long time, fought under his orders. He collected about 1000 infantry; and 1000 more cavalry under Sedeno, and having overcome the greatest labors and hardships, arrived with them, in this fine province the 10th of March, 1817. Many volunteers joined him, and supplied his wants.

When general Miguel de La Torre, the governor of the province, heard of this sudden irruption, he sallied from the fortified city of St. Thomas de La Angostura, at the head of 2000 cavalry and infantry, and advanced ninety miles to San Felix. Here he found Piar and Sedeno, in order of battle, ready to receive him. La Torre had left St. Thomas unprovided with any means of defence or supply, and, subaltern-like, had taken 2000 chosen men, 90 miles from their garrison, and exposed himself to be cut off. La Torre, who was in no respect to be compared with the mulatto general, as he had called Piar, owed his promotion entirely to his flattery and adulation of his master and benefactor, general Don Pablo Morillo. This will not be doubted when it is known that after La Torre had lost Guayana, as is said, by his cowardice and his wrong measures, he was promoted, by Morillo, to the rank of brigadier general;

whilst Real, Morales and others, were arrested and punished, for not having taken Barcelona. Such partiality surely proves the existence of some extraordinary and secret cause. So it was, that Morillo appointed this same de La Torre as his successor in the command of the army, and in consequence of it, lost the royal cause upon the Main.

The attack was commenced at San Felix, by lieutenant colonel Zeuetti, during which, as I have been assured by some who were present, colonel de La Torre, though at a good distance from the fire, trembled so much as to excite the laugh of some of his own officers, at his position on horseback. As the action proceeded, Zeuetti's example of activity and courage, became more and more conspicuous. But La Torre, seeing how bravely the battle was fought by the *miserable insurgents*, as he was pleased to call the patriots, instead of animating his soldiers by advancing to the charge, turned his horse in a contrary direction to that from whence the balls were flying, and galloped off with some officers, and about 40 men. They directed their course for the fortress of La Angostura; and were among the first who brought news of their defeat to the garrison. When La Torre's conduct became known to his officers they despised him; and attributed the loss of the battle to his cowardice. But knowing Morillo's partiality for him, they did not dare to speak out against him.

In spite of La Torre's decamping, Zeuetti and his troops fought bravely, during more than two hours; when at last, some soldiers learned the flight of their governor. This news was soon communicated to others. Growing discouraged, they defended themselves less bravely, and were nearly all killed.

Of the 2000 men, about 100 escaped. All the rest were taken or killed. Piar ordered all the prisoners to be shot; and among them the brave colonel Zeuetti. He was commandant of Angostura, and was an officer of the Spanish body guard; a man of talents and of a liberal mind. This is satisfactorily proved by his having been an aid-de-camp of Louis Lasey, captain-general in Catalonia, who was arrested by Ferdinand, and butchered, on coming ashore near Palma, the capital of the island of Majorca. Who knows not the fate of Lasey and Portia? Who can trust a sovereign capable of thus treating his bravest soldiers?

The battle of San Felix decided the fate of Angostura and the province of Guayana. The road was now open for Piar and Sedenó, who approached the capital, at half musket shot

from its walls. The patriots entrenched themselves, so as to be protected against the guns of the fortress, but, having no artillery, they could not bombard it. The ancient commander of the place, Mr. Fitzgerald, had been arrested, sent to Caracas, and tried for treason; but was honorably acquitted, and restored to the command of the fortress. He was a skilful officer, but severe and cruel. He condemned many of his soldiers to be shot, upon slight suspicion of treason, which alienated from him the greatest part of the garrison.

General Piar made various attempts to take the place by surprise, but was repulsed by the vigilance and bravery of Fitzgerald; so that he was driven to blockade it. The city of Angostura is small, the streets dirty, and the houses of a common size, neither handsome nor well constructed. The city lies close by the river Orinoco, partly upon the flat adjoining the river, and partly upon a hill, which affords a fine prospect over the beautiful river Orinoco and its rich plains. From the mouth of the Orinoco toward the interior, Angostura is the only port for 80 leagues. It was badly fortified; and contains about 500 houses. General Piar blockaded it so closely that nothing could pass either way. Colonel de La Torre having left the fortress unprovided, the garrison and inhabitants were compelled to live upon horses, mules, &c. The governor, Fitzgerald himself, paid three dollars for a cat. During the siege of Carthagená by Morillo, in 1815, a cat was sold for eight dollars, and a dog, from sixteen to twenty dollars! Very many inhabitants and soldiers died for want of food, and more than 1500 women and children embarked, to avoid certain death. But no man was allowed to absent himself. Notwithstanding this misery, Fitzgerald maintained his post, while the governor of the province, who should have been the last man to depart, deserted his post, and took shelter in the island of Grenada. I am assured, that on all occasions where danger awaited him, he betrayed his cowardice; insomuch, that when any one in danger appeared uncommonly disturbed, the Spanish officers would say, "He has a paroxysm of Miguel de La Torre's fever."

Admiral Brion arrived from Margarita at the mouth of the river Orinoco, with his squadron, and contributed powerfully to the conquest of Guayana, by forcing the passage of the river, which was defended by a numerous flotilla of Spanish armed vessels. Captain Devouille, the same who distinguished himself before Barcelona, with seven gun boats, forced the pas-

sage, and destroyed about 20 Spanish vessels of every description; and took many others.

As soon as governor Fitzgerald received the news of the total destruction of his squadron, he saw that all hope of defending the city any longer, must be given up. Considering the sanguinary character of Piar, he did not dare to trust to capitulation. He divided the small remains of his garrison among different boats and departed with them in the night. He arrived, without any loss, at the island of Grenada.

The 18th of July, 1817, general Piar entered the city of Angostura. He found many dead, and many sick, for want of food. Even his troops were struck with horror at the sight of such misery.

The city of *old Guayana* was evacuated the 30th of August, and the whole province united to Venezuela. In both cities, the Spaniards left large stores of merchandise and of war, and more than a thousand prisoners, among whom were the bishop, the clergy, many officers and other persons of rank and distinction, who were respected and well treated.

This brilliant and eventful conquest was effected without the knowledge or the order of general Bolivar. It was owing entirely to the courage and exertions of two foreigners, Brion and Piar. It resulted in vast advantages to the republic. And what was their recompense? The former died poor and broken-hearted in Curiaco; the latter was shot by order of the supreme chief.

This latter had lost much of his influence by his desertion from the battle field at Ocumare. And it had cost all the great exertions of admiral Brion to effect his recal to the Main. General Piar was strongly opposed to his recal, and spoke publicly against him, when Bolivar resumed his former title of supreme chief, and proclaimed martial law. After his flight from Barcelona, he was so retired in the plains, that nobody could know with certainty what had become of him. The greatest number of the patriot chieftains were averse to Bolivar's assuming the supreme power, and neglecting the calling of a Congress. His warmest friends, Francisco Antonio Zea, the former members of Congress, and Jose Brion among others, had constantly, but in vain, admonished him to keep his word. They thought his absence, therefore, a convenient time to convene a Congress, and that the measure would be best for the republic. Brion spoke to Zea, and he to Marino and Arismendi, and they thought the moment propitious. Marino, hav-

ing, at that time, (May 1817) established his head quarters at Curiaco, the 8th of May was fixed on, to assemble in the cathedral church, a junta, composed of the most respectable inhabitants of Venezuela, which followed the troops, among whom were many members of the first Congress of Caracas. This assembly was numerously attended. Admiral Louis Brion, the intendant Zea, Jose Cortes Madaniaga, better known under the name of the Canonieus of Chili, addressed the assembly, showing the necessity and urgency of establishing a Congress. The addresses made to the assembly, were received with unanimous approbation. Congress was re-established, and the citizens Francisco Xavier Maiz, Franc, Aleala, Diego Valenilla, Diego Alcala, Manuel G. Zaba, Franc de Paula Novas, D. B. Urbanija, and Man. Mancyco, were proclaimed members of this congress. This election was provisional, in order to give time to convoke all the members of the first congress. This body was to be legally constituted by the regular elections of the people.

The executive was entrusted to Simon Bolivar, Francisco del Toro and Franc. Xavier Maiz. The name of the first was kept for fear he might appear and disapprove the proceedings entirely. (Some doubted the existence of the supreme chief.) But the rapid changes of the war, and the impossibility of finding a safe place of meeting, prevented their assembling, and after some months fruitless endeavors to that effect, congress was obliged to dissolve and leave the three powers in the hands of general Bolivar.

The idea of convoking this congress, is generally attributed to Brion and Zea, who, though much attached to Bolivar, saw with great pain the powers united in a man so incapable of exercising power judiciously, and who so often abused it.

Hidden as he was in the plains of Cumana, Bolivar could know nothing of these proceedings toward having a congress. As soon, however, as he learned what was done, he fell into a violent passion, and not only annulled the proceedings, but persecuted the members appointed, especially the Canonieus of Chili, against whom his hatred seemed more particularly directed. Brion and Zea, who best knew his vindictive character, hastened to appease him, by a prompt submission, and by assuring him of their belief that he had been killed, and of the necessity of complying with the general wish of the inhabitants, and the old members of congress, to establish a government. Bolivar appeared satisfied, but from that time he treat-

ed them both with less confidence, and Brion, afterwards, at Savanilla, with harshness, as I will relate in the proper place. He could not endure Marino, who was implicated in the trial of general Piar, and would certainly have suffered, had he not saved himself by a timely flight.

General Paez, in two brilliant actions, with two thousand Llaneros, routed the Spaniards once at Guayabal, where general Calzada had united 3000 men, and the second time at Calabozo, where Morillo himself commanded, and having lost nearly all his forces, retreated precipitately towards Valencia, where he arrived with about 300 men, the remains of 2500. These two victories of general Paez, in which he destroyed, wounded, took and dispersed, about 6000 of Morillo's best troops, made him the terror of the Spaniards. They were discouraged, and treated for the evacuation of Caracas and Lagaira, that they might retire into the strong place of Porto Cabello. But Morillo, very unexpectedly, received news of the arrival of thirty transports, bringing him 3000 men, and a large quantity of arms, ammunition, &c. He came, himself, in the beginning of June, to Cumana, where they had arrived, and after some days rest, united them with the rest of his troops, and marched against Marino, who had not moved from Curiaco. He attacked and routed him, and taking possession of Cumana-coa and Carupano, left garrisons in all these places and returned to Cumana.

Instead of preparing to march against Paez, Morillo ordered the embarkation into the transports of about 4000 men, lately come from Spain, under the escort of various armed vessels of war, in which he, and a great many staff officers embarked. This new expedition was directed against the island of Margarita; and in passing the island of Coche, took in the troops assembled there under the orders of colonel Aldama.

Morillo could never forget the loss of 3000 men, on his first coming from Cadiz, in 1815, when he thought it would be an easy task to subject this small rocky island full of bushy hills, where Arismendy fought with bravery and skill. Morales also had been beaten before; so that both Spanish chieftains were extremely bitter against these islanders. Before embarking, Morillo was heard to declare, "that now he would exterminate them with fire and sword!"

The inhabitants of Margarita have done more for the independence of Venezuela, than those of any other province. They now destroyed an army of 4000, and after various inci-

dents, in about a month's continual fighting, succeeded in driving them out of the island.

The further particulars of these three expeditions, will be given, when I come to treat, in a separate article, of general Arismendy.

Morillo, having lost nearly the whole of his 4000 men, in this bloody campaign, of about two months, after having burnt and destroyed all the houses, farms, trees and cultivation, wherever he passed in his retreat, to Juan Griego, where he had left his vessels, and having murdered every one that came in his way, man, woman and child—his cruelty and rage was not satiated. He ordered all those Margaritans, who had fought steadily under his banners; not excepting those who, in his expedition, in 1815, had presented themselves under his general promise of Amnesty, to be put to death. They were all murdered by his express order. Such are the deeds of Don Pablo Morillo, the Pacificator of America, who will be long remembered by the brave inhabitants of Margarita.

At the end of August, Morillo arrived in the city of Caracas, in such ill humor that, for several days, he refused to see any one. The reflection that in two months time, and under such critical circumstances, he had lost so many men, reduced him to the condition of a madman. He could discover nothing to be done for the support of the royal cause upon the Main. During his absence, Paez had beaten the Spanish generals, Calzada and Correo, not far from the city of San Fernando de Apuré. The want of provisions and money, had produced sickness and desertion. The patriots invested the province of Barinas and took possession of its capital, and of the city of Guanare, (August 14th,) where they found large stores of English dry goods, and, to fill the cup of sorrow, came the news of the total loss of the rich province of Guayana, which had supplied him with quantities of money, goods, provisions, &c. It was scarcely any alleviation, that colonel Ximenes had attacked and beaten general San Jago Marino, the 27th of August, and taken the city of Guiria from him by assault, from which he fled headlong. The Spaniards murdered men, women and children, after having committed the most shocking cruelties.

In these critical circumstances, Morillo, on the 23d September 1817, published at Caracas, with great solemnities, a general amnesty for all who had taken an active part in the patriotic army. He was stupid enough to believe that this amnesty,

granted under the express condition of "returning under the Spanish domination," would make a deep impression upon the minds of the Americans. But he ought to have been discouraged by the consideration that the Venezuelans had been but too well acquainted with the character of the Spanish chieftains, and particularly with the duplicity, despotism and cruelty of Morillo himself. No one confided in his promises.

While he was occupied with his expedition against Margarita, the patriots were busy in exploring the province of Guayana, where they found large supplies of every thing; this province having never suffered by any invasion during this civil war. As soon as Bolivar heard of this conquest, effected by Piar and Brion, two foreigners, his jealousy arose to a high pitch, but he dissembled it, and hastened to Angostura. He received general Piar most graciously, who naturally of a cold and dry character, received his compliments with an air of pride and disdain, which made a very bad impression upon the vain and haughty mind of the supreme chief. Piar feeling his own superiority in point of military skill and courage, had for several years shown an aversion to general Bolivar. He was advanced to be major general, when Marino was the colleague and rival of Bolivar, during his dictatorship of the eastern provinces of Venezuela, in 1813-14.

Marino, who is of a lively and amiable character, but has neither firmness or talents, found in Piar the man he stood in need of, and soon advanced him to the rank of major general, and was his devoted friend and second. Piar left himself under no obligations to Bolivar, whom he knew to be his inferior, and at Angostura, putting himself on an equal footing, felt not much flattered by the compliments paid him. He was well aware too, that they were insincere.

Bolivar was busily employed at Angostura, upon his favorite plan of delivering the capital and province of Caracas. He therefore formed a plan of a campaign against the Spaniards in that province. He sent general Bermudes, with 400 men, who departed the 25th September, with an order to unite with the division of Zaraza, whom he found at Chaguaramas.

Admiral Brion, devoted to the supreme chief, and anxious that he should forget the proceedings relative to a congress, was busily employed in overseeing the construction of a number of gun boats, to protect the river Orinoco, and facilitate the transportation and free intercourse between the inhabitants

of Angostura and foreign places. These gun boats were well manned and sent in perfect order.

Bermudes, after having joined Zarasa, who, with 2000 horse, (Llaneros,) occupied Caburto and the advanced posts, and were extended as far as El Ractro, on one, and St. Sebastian, on the other side. Bermudes marched towards Calabozo and San Carlos, where he united with general Paez. General Monagas was ordered to take possession of Barcelona. The supreme chief collected a strong body of recruits in the province of Guayana, with which he intended to act in concert with all these forces, against Caracas, an open and defenceless city, instead of directing them against Cumana, which the Spaniards had fortified, and against Porto Cabello; both of these being seaports, and affording the enemy a strong central place, whence he might be supplied, and carry the war from east to west, throughout Venezuela. Whereas Caracas is neither a fortress or a sea port. But representations against his favorite plan, were made in vain. He persisted in his partiality for Caracas. He was so certain of soon being in possession of it, that he said publicly, "the colors of the republic shall be hoisted very soon upon the tower of the cathedral of this capital." In this conviction, he published the following proclamation, directed to the inhabitants of the valley of Tuy :

"Caraguins ! the precious moment decreed by divine providence, for the total expulsion of the Spanish government, from the territory of Venezuela, has at last arrived. The arms of the Republic have triumphed every where. We have been constantly victorious, from the plains of Casanare to the mouth of the river Orinoco. Twenty glorious actions have consolidated the fate of Venezuela. All the famous chieftains which Spain has sent to subject us, have been beaten by our troops, except Morillo, who avoids the battle which we seek him to offer. Five thousand men protect this rich province, (Guayana,) five thousand others, under Gen. Marino, are ready to march against Cumana, and to deliver it ! Thousands of brave inhabitants of Maturin, commanded by Gen. Roxas, are ready to receive the Spaniards, if they should attack that city. The intrepid Gen. Monagas harrasses them with his brigade near Barcelona. The brave brigade commanded by the worthy Gen. Zarasa, two thousand men strong, marched through the plains of Caracas, to deliver its inhabitants subdued by force. The army of Gen. Paez which reminds us of the defeats of Calzada, Morillo, Gonin, Lopez, Ramos, Reyes, Gongaha, and

a great many more, is four thousand men strong. He has spread the sparks of liberty over a great part of New Grenada. Caraguins! having delivered Guayana, I re-cross the river Orinoco, and will be soon in the midst of your capital with such a formidable army as has never existed in Venezuela. The forces of Morillo were reduced to nothing. The miserable reinforcement which Capine has brought him lately from Spain, (the three thousand armed from Cumana,) is not sufficient to take the fort of Pampatic, in the immortal Margarita.—Caraguins! despise the power of the Spaniards; as long as we are united we will remain invincible!

Head-quarters of Guayana, July 1st, 1826.

(Signed) SIMON BOLIVAR.

Here is a new instance of Bolivar's deceitful proclamations: 1st. He says that "twenty glorious actions have consolidated the fate of Venezuela." It is notorious that, from the day of his re-entering upon the territory of Venezuela, (31st December 1816,) there had been fought no other glorious action, but the two gained by general Paez over Aldama and Morillo, by general Piar over De La Torre, and by colonel Gomez, in Margarita, over Morillo; making in all, four. Perhaps the supreme chief includes those which passed at Barcelona under his command and after his flight, or those of Curiaco, Guiria, &c. under Morillo's command.

2d. He accuses Morillo of avoiding the battles which he says *we* seek, &c.

3d. These many thousands, to come near the truth, must be reduced, at least, one third; and the remainder forming his powerful army, were badly clothed recruits, collected in haste, and without organization or instruction. The reader will recollect what I have said in another place, (chapter xiii.) as to the instruction and formation of these *armies*.

4th. The army of general Paez, which reminds us of the defeats of Calzada, Morillo, Gonin, Lopez, Ramos, Reyes, Gongona, and many others. This high sounding collection of names, can deceive none, but those at a distance from the seat of war, and have no other means of information but these proclamations. The victories gained over Calzada and Morillo would be truly described, by saying that their antagonist, in a regular combat, gained the advantage. All the rest were skirmishes, with small bodies of armed men, known under the appellation of Guerillas, and among them, some Indian chiefs, as is Reyes, who came over to the patriots, after having three

or four times changed his colors, between the contending parties. He had some sixty or an hundred naked and half armed Indians, that committed great devastation wherever they came. The bands of Guerillas were a little better. Some might have 150 or 200 men, who fled ordinarily, at the first serious attack. Such was the character of the Spanish chieftains whose names are here so pompously enumerated.

5th. But the following cunning phrase affords the best example of his duplicity: "Caraguins! having delivered Guayana, *I* recrossed the river Orinoco." By this certainly he means to be understood, that he, general Bolivar, had delivered Guayana. When, in fact, he was about a thousand miles distant from the battle field at Guayana, carefully hid in the plains of Cumana, after his flight from Barcelona.

In his proclamation he names nearly all the chieftains in Venezuela, and gives them, or their corps, flattering epithets. He speaks of having delivered Guayana, and says not a word of admiral Brion or general Piar, the actual deliverers. These two were foreigners, and if he had mentioned their names he could not have avoided the mention of their glorious actions, and their conquest of Guayana. All the rest were natives. If he had not used this mode of expression too, he could not have used the grand phrase, "*recrossed the Orinoco.*"

This omission of mentioning the names of Brion and Piar, in a proclamation of which far the most important topic was the delivery of Guayana, shocked them both; and Piar expressed the bitterness of his feelings in a most sarcastic manner. His expressions were reported to the supreme chief, whose vanity was deeply piqued. But he dissembled as usual, and received Piar with the same exterior marks of kindness and regard as before.

General Bolivar was now advised to form a government, and to show that he sincerely wished for a republican form, and a division of the powers. But he had great objections to calling a congress, pretending that there would be great difficulty in convening the members during the war, and he named in its place a "*Supreme Council of the Nation.*"

Bolivar was charged exclusively with the executive, under the name of President Supreme Chief. This council was divided into two sections; in one, the *political section*, (*seccion politica*,) Antonio Francisco Zea presided; in the 2d, the *military section*, Louis Brion presided. Bolivar was well aware of the submission of both presidents to his wishes, so

that he again effectually united in himself all the powers of government. Nothing could be done without his sanction. In his absence, messengers were continually on the road between Angostura and his head quarters, with papers to sign, relative to one or other department, that of Zea or of Brion. This uncontrolled power and influence of Bolivar, was said to be the principal cause of Piar's condemnation.

I must here relate this too famous trial, which excited a great sensation at the time. The secret causes of which are not known, as they ought to be, for they are characteristic traits in the life of the Liberator of Colombia.

Manuel Piar was born in 1782, at the Dutch island of Curacao. He was a man of color, and his parents were poor, and labored for their subsistence. They nevertheless sent him to school, where he learned reading, writing and the elements of arithmetic ; and nothing more. He was averse to close application, and never would consent to be a mechanic, which was too degrading for his vain and proud temper. At the age of fifteen, he passed over to the Spanish Main and remained there a long time before the revolution of Caracas, being in one place and another, without any fixed or steady occupation. He came to Curacao, where he married a colored woman, who brought him a small fortune. But his restless and ambitious temper did not suffer him long to remain in Curacao, where his color and extraction, kept him from aspiring to rank and fortune. He travelled over part of the Antilles islands in search of business and fortune, until the time of the revolution in Caracas. He had left his wife and children at Curacao in the greatest misery, while he lived with a young and handsome girl, whom he seduced ; and whom he supported on the Main, with her parents, in a splendid manner. This family were white and of good extraction. It is a fact that, during our stay at Carupano, he established them in a large store taken from the families who had fled at the approach of Bolivar's expeditionary army in 1816. While he lived in great abundance, he sent not the least support to his wife and children.

At the beginning of the revolution (1810) at Caracas, Piar commenced his military career as a non-commissioned officer. Miranda had, as I have mentioned, a great predilection for foreigners who had served ; and preferred them, as officers, to his own countrymen, saying, that the latter should learn to obey, before they could be fit to command. He saw in Piar, an ambitious and courageous young man, and advanced him, by de-

grees, to the rank of colonel ; whilst Piar, day and night, studied military tactics. He distinguished himself on the field of battle, acquiring by practice, what was wanting in theory. His coolness in the hottest fire, his quickness in discerning the faults of his enemy, and his personal bravery, gained him the confidence of his subalterns, whom he inspired, by his example, with fire, and a confidence of certain success. He owed his rapid advancement to merit, and not to any intrigue, which he always despised. He advanced thus to the rank of major general, under the dictatorship of Marino, in 1813. Marino having in 1812, passed to the island of Trinidad, came soon afterwards, back to Cumana, where he formed a small corps of young men, and named himself dictator of the provinces of Cumana and Barcelona, as I have related. Piar joined him very soon ; and being acquainted with the active part Bolivar had taken in the arrest of general Miranda ; for whom Piar felt the greatest veneration ; he detested Bolivar for this act of cruelty and treachery against a defenceless old man. This was the first cause of Marino's defection from Bolivar ; Piar having gained a complete ascendancy over the weak mind of Marino, so that Marino could do nothing without Piar. It was Marino who persuaded Piar to join Bolivar at Aux Cayes, where they lived like brothers ; and were called by Bolivar, the inseparables. Bolivar at that time spoke to me of Piar as a very dangerous man, who hated all whites, and saw with great anxiety, Marino's intimacy with him. Brion hated Piar, and in speaking to me of him, used to say, "that mulatto of a general, Piar, is a great plunderer and vagabond."

Piar, however, was the ablest commander of them all ; and very far superior to Bolivar, not only in personal bravery, but in knowledge, of military tactics, and operations. He was so beloved by his subalterns, that foreigners particularly, preferred general Piar as a leader, to any of the other chieftains. He was cold in his manner, but plain ; and attentive to each one of them, treating them kindly, and taking the greatest care of their general welfare. But his discipline was rigorous ; and he never overlooked a fault committed under arms ; not even the slightest. His cold, reserved, and often sullen manner, inspired them with respect and fear ; his personal bravery and skill, with courage and confidence. He constantly supported the cause of independence in Venezuela, and many times successfully in 1813 and '14. When the two dictators fled, Piar remained and fought with good success against the Spaniards.

The chieftains, and particularly Boves, feared him and Paez, more than any other. He was successful in Barinas and Maturin, and lastly, we have seen that the conquest of Guayana was conceived and executed by him; and this conquest had, undoubtedly, the most favorable effect upon the welfare of Colombia.

Piar was proud of his personal merits, and a firm and warm friend of liberty and the republican form of government. He had rough and harsh manners, the natural consequences of a neglected education, and of a life led in camps. He was neither a flatterer nor a courtier. He was greatly attached to general Marino, who had distinguished and advanced him. Marino's soft and weak mind seemed always to need Piar, who at last turned and directed every thing of any importance that Marino transacted.

Piar, in speaking of Bolivar, often said, that he was a coward, and an ignoramus in military operations; that he deserved no command, because he absconded when his presence was most needed at the head of his army; that, indeed, he never had been at the head of his army; that he had never seen him at the head of a corps, charging the enemy, and deciding the victory; that, therefore, it happened that Paez had gained so many actions, when left to himself; that the actions of Bolivar were gained by others, and not by himself, for that he always took care to keep himself at a respectful distance from the shot; that in his proclamations he appears to be at the head of his troops; and lately would appear to have liberated Guayana, whilst he had absconded to the plains of Cumana; and that he most ridiculously and contemptibly imitated Napoleon.

When Bolivar arrived at Angostura, these words of Piar were officiously reported to him. But his feelings were more hurt, by his seeing that he was no longer the object of so much respect as he had formerly received wherever he went. He saw himself in a measure deserted, and even despised by those who were acquainted with his last flight from Barcelona, by which he caused the miserable fate of a thousand men. Piar, who was then governor of the province, commanded of course; and made himself many friends by his bravery; and also by his cordial attention to every one. His house was constantly filled with strangers, and his evening parties were much more brilliant than those of the supreme chief. This was very natural, for general Piar did the honors of his house perfectly well. He was attentive to every one, and at his house the guests were

much more at their ease, than in the evening parties of the supreme chief, where a certain etiquette was observed ; and where any man of sense and honor was sure to be disgusted by witnessing the vile flatteries of such persons as Charles Soublette, Anziotigui and others.

Some biting sarcasms which escaped Piar, in full company, were the signal for his destruction.

At that time many men of color were in the service of the patriots ; and particularly in the division commanded by Piar. Many foreigners, good military men, said loudly that general Piar was superior to Bolivar in every thing relating to military affairs, of which the latter was quite ignorant, and that they preferred to serve with Piar, rather than under the orders of the supreme chief. Admiral Brion hated Piar, and, I lament to say, contributed greatly to his destruction. He advised to his arrest and trial before a court martial. When Bolivar, fearing the consequences, hesitated long, to take any vigorous measure ; it was Brion undoubtedly, who decided him to arrest Piar. This fact has been affirmed to me by more than twenty persons of rank and credit. Among other words against Piar, they heard him say the following. The question arose who would be named president of the court martial ; and Brion being told that he probably would be named, said, " If I should be named the president of that court martial, I would accept it under one condition, viz. that the court martial condemn Piar to capital punishment ; he is a mulatto, a vagabond, a man of the lowest class, dangerous and mischievous to all whites," &c. These persons assured me that Brion, that evening, behaved like a madman ; and that he had expressed himself in the same manner before. With respect to morality, Piar's character was equivocal. He was known to be over fond of money ; and to raise it as he could. He raised by exactions, a great deal at Angostura ; and converted the whole into doubloons. He loved luxury of every sort, and was vain and ambitious.

When his friends informed him that Brion had advised general Bolivar to arrest and try him before a court martial, as a colored man who conspired against the whites, and sought to overturn the existing government ; but that the latter had not yet decided to follow the advice, fearing the consequences of such an arrest. Piar lost his presence of mind and his usual bravery. He was conscious of what he had said against Bolivar, and knew that Brion was his enemy. In fear of their united power, he took the worst course a man of his standing, and

in his circumstances, could take. Instead of consulting his friends and adherents, and submitting to them his critical situation, and forming a powerful party to support him in case of necessity, in the first place ; and then demanding an explanation of the supreme chief, and of Brion also, he took all his gold, and departed clandestinely in the night, following the bank of the Orinoco, in search of the means of embarking on board some vessel in which he could leave the country. Bolivar had surrounded him with spies, and was soon informed of his escape. He ordered general Sedeno to take a strong body of cavalry and pursue him, arrest him, and bring him back to the city. Some are confident that Sedeno received a secret order to kill him wherever he could find him ; but this is not certain, though Sedeno afterwards told some of his friends that he had received such an order. But it is certain that Sedeno, with his troops, overtook him about six miles from Angostura, and forced him to return. On arriving at the city, he was put in the public prison, where the guard was reinforced, many patrols were walking the streets with orders to disperse any groups that might assemble to release Piar from prison. But as he had communicated his plan to no one, all his friends were astonished at the news of his arrest, and utterly unprepared to defend him, otherwise it would have been easy for general Piar to assemble a respectable force against any attempt upon his liberty.

The supreme chief was highly pleased with Sedeno's report that he had put Piar into the prison. General Bolivar took no rest during the whole night, fearing some accident might happen to himself ; he doubled his guards, and ordered his strong body guard to be ready at the first call. Brion, deeply interested for the welfare of Bolivar, to whom he had entrusted his large fortune, advised him to strike a decisive blow and to condemn Piar, in order, as he said, to frighten Marino, Arismendy, and others, who were secretly opposed to the usurped power of the supreme chief, and in favor of convening a Congress, that by this example he might prevent all future attempts to resist his power. This decided Piar's fate, and that the more fully, when, after two days, Bolivar saw no hostile movement in favor of Piar. The fact is, that many thousands were secretly indignant at the arrest of Piar ; and much more so to see him treated like a common criminal ; but there was no leader, nothing prepared beforehand. They had no point of union, and feared the vengeance of the supreme chief, if they made an open declaration in favor of their general. Some of them

have assured me, that they had never thought of the probability of the condemnation of such a man as Piar, who had rendered such eminent services to the republic; and that after his condemnation, it was too late to attempt any thing, because the supreme chief, powerfully assisted by the admiral, had increased his forces by means of crews of vessels, and by calling different dispersed bodies of troops into the town. A council of war was immediately assembled over which admiral Brion presided, and Charles Soublotte was appointed by Bolivar to act against Piar. Soublotte, the vilest of the vile instruments of his master's wishes and orders, had been rapidly advanced, and was at this time chief of the staff and major general of the army. Soublotte, in his long catalogue of accusations against Piar, inserted so many and such horrid charges, that the latter was highly irritated, and interrupted him vehemently. Calling him publicly an impostor and a vile and infamous liar, but Soublotte continued his accusation with the greatest coolness. All that Piar said was in vain. His fate was decided beforehand. Various false witnesses, bribed by brilliant promises, testified under oath, that general Piar had proposed to them to murder the supreme chief, saying he was a tyrant, a usurper &c. and that Piar was afterwards, to proclaim a republican government. Others testified that general Piar had formed a conspiracy to murder all the whites, and to establish a republic, of colored and black people, of which he, Piar, was to be the president.

Among these witnesses was the brigadier general Sedeno, the same who assisted Piar in the conquest of Guayana, and who, by some altercation between them, was embittered against him and had arrested him, as has been mentioned. Another witness was lieutenant colonel Hernandez, Dr. M., a surgeon, and various others. The two latter were colored men. Piar was astonished at the testimony. He said in his defence, that if he had intended to murder the supreme chief, he should not have wanted the assistance of these witnesses, he whose intripidity was well enough known to prove the absurdity of such depositions. That so many persons were not wanted to kill one single man. He said that with regard to the infamous accusation of the most vile and servile impostor Soublotte, that he had proposed to murder all the whites, he appealed to all the foreign officers who had served under him, how kindly he had treated them; and how he had preferred them to any others, colored and black officers, and that he had then white

officers among his aids-de-camp.* That the whole accusation was a treacherous and horrible conspiracy against him who had served the country with so much distinction and honour. He spoke with such strong and convincing eloquence, that the whole audience was deeply moved in his favor, and entirely convinced of his innocence. But his speech, and the defence of his council named officially, and *pro forma*, were of no avail. He was convicted and condemned to be shot on the public square, as a conspirator against the security and safety of the republic ! A republic then, and now in September 1828, existing in the person of the supreme chief, and dictator, Simon Bolivar ! Here, as in every instance of any consequence general Bolivar has always had the art to identify his person with the, so called, republic of a free and independent people. But, where is the republic ; where is the freedom and independence of Colombians ?

In the afternoon previous to the day of general Piar's execution, Dr. F. called on him in prison on account of some hundred dollars the former owed him. He was quiet and at ease, flattering himself he should not be executed, but banished, notwithstanding all the Dr. could say against his opinion. He grounded his hopes upon the great services he had rendered, but particularly upon his innocence of the crimes imputed to him. He spoke with warmth, and in a firm tone, showing that he felt no fear or anxiety.

The 16th of October having been fixed for the execution of general Piar, the strongest precautions were taken to prevent any trouble. From four o'clock in the morning, the numerous troops of the garrison were under arms ; and formed a square in the public place. A strong detachment was sent for him to the prison. Soon after, he came into the midst of the guard, in a kind of great coat, his arms crossed upon his breast. He walked firmly to the middle of the square formed by the troops, where a chair was placed for his execution. Being come before the chair, he urgently requested the officer that he might see the supreme chief, for that he had something of great interest to reveal to him in person. This request was positively denied. The officer requested him to sit down. One of them approached with a handkerchief to blindfold him, but he would not permit it, saying, he could well dispense with such a cere-

*Colonel Martin, a Polish officer, was his aid-de-camp at this time.

mony ; that he feared not, and never had feared, to die. But when they insisted upon it, he said ; " Well, well, do as you please." More than twenty-five muskets, close by the chair, were directed against him ; and when the officer began to command, Piar exclaimed, " Viva la Patria," and fell pierced with balls. The troops and great crowd of people now cried, " Viva la Patria, Viva la Republica, Viva Justicia !!" soon after, his body was taken into an unfinished chapel and buried with great solemnity, but without any other ceremony.

Thus died Piar, against whom there was no evidence except his precipitate, and extremely ill judged flight from Angostura. His enemies, with some appearance of justice, seized upon this and took his life.

The night previous to Piar's execution the supreme chief could not sleep. He was constantly fearful of some revolution, in favor of Piar, notwithstanding the troops being under arms and ready to act every moment of the time.

General San Iago Marino was implicated in Piar's trial, in consequence of what had been done respecting a Congress in May 1817, at Cariaco, and at Campano in 1816. He was at this time, in the neighbourhood of Cumana. Brion hated and despised him, and in speaking of Piar, uttered some threats against Marino, which alarmed his friends who had before known the hostile feeling of both Brion and Bolivar relative to him. Those friends immediately despatched a trusty messenger to Marino, advising him of his danger ; upon which he departed for the island of Trinidad, where he was safe.

Some days after the execution of Piar, Bolivar published the following proclamation.

" Soldiers ! Yesterday was a day of mourning for my heart. General Piar was executed for his crimes of high treason, conspiracy and desertion. A just and legally formed court has pronounced sentence upon this unfortunate citizen, who, infatuated with an ardent desire to make his fortune, and to satisfy his ambition had formed the plan to bury this country in ruins.

General Piar had certainly rendered great service to this republic, notwithstanding his behaviour has been that of a factious man ; his services have been always reasonably rewarded by the government of Venezuela.

Nothing desirable was left to a chief who had attained one of the highest ranks in the army : the second magistracy would have been confided to him by the absence of general Marino, but

all this sufficed him not; he aspired to the supreme command; he was plotting the most atrocious plan which could be invented by a perverse soul. Soldiers! he meditated not alone to kindle a civil war amongst us, but to introduce anarchy, to the most inhuman sacrifice of his own brethren and of his companions in arms. Soldiers! you know that freedom and independence are our motto! Has not mankind recovered their rights by the establishment of our laws? Have our arms not broken the chains of slavery? Has not the order been given that national property should indiscriminately be respected among you all? Has your merit not then been amply recompensed? Or has it not been so at least with justice? What could general Piar desire more for you? Are you not free, independent, respected and honored? Could Piar promise you greater benefits than those? No, no, no; Piar wished to dig with his own hands, the grave in which he wished to bury the republic, in order to destroy the life, the property, and the honour, as well as the welfare, and the glory of the brave defenders of Venezuela, by destroying its children, its husbands and fathers.

Heaven has contemplated this cruel parricide with horror; heaven has given him up to the vengeance of the laws, and has not permitted that a man who so greivously offended both the divinity and mankind, should sully our terrestrial globe with horrid crimes a minute longer.

Soldiers, heaven protects you and the government, which is your parent, and is earnestly watching over your security. Your chief, who is your companion in arms, and who has always shared at your head, your misery and your dangers, as well as your triumphs, and has placed his confidence in you. Rely then upon him, and be persuaded that he loves you more than if he was your father or your son.

Head-quarters of Angostura, October 17th, 1817.

(Signed) SIMON BOLIVAR."

The hypocrisy and duplicity of general Bolivar's character is shown throughout this notorious proclamation in its true light. No other man could have had the assurance to say, in the face of the world, that the day of general Piar's execution was a day of mourning to his heart, when we are acquainted with the circumstances of this scandalous act of arbitrary power; when we know that the whole transaction depended on his will, and that a single word could have saved this man, whose only crimes were, that he was the true friend of constitutional liberty and a foreigner. If we inquire what Arismendy and Bermudes did

against Bolivar, we shall find that these two were much more explicit against him than Piar was. Arismendy treated the dictator as a coward, who deserved death, and declared that he would shoot him as such if he put his foot on shore, (Aug. 1814.) Bermudes did the same in 1814, at Ocumare; and much more in Maturin, in June, 1817. The following are the particulars of these strangers' transactions. The reader will recollect that Bolivar was recalled, in December 1816, from Port au Prince, to resume the command of the army, upon the express condition that he should assemble a Congress, and confine himself to the military operations alone.

By means of martial law being proclaimed, Bolivar again assumed the supreme power, and destroyed all that was done in Curiaco by the provisional Congress, installed in virtue of a general assembly, held at the Cathedral church on the 8th of May; the majority of its members being convinced that Bolivar was dead.

This absence of Bolivar was certainly caused by his own cowardice; by his escaping in the night from Barcelona, and secreting himself in the plains of Cumana. Hearing that the danger was over, he appeared again; and again indulged his haughty and despotic disposition, by annulling the transactions of Curiaco. Being made acquainted with Piar's conquest of Guayana, he passed from Barcelona into that province. In his journey he found general Bermudes established with his troops at Maturin; and with his usual meanness and impudence, thought to gain over Bermudes, whom he knew to be attached to a republican or constitutional government. He was received by the latter and his staff, with the most bitter reproaches for his desertion from Barcelona, his absconding to the plains of Cumana, and his measures against the members of the congress of Curiaco. Notwithstanding all this, Bolivar gained over Bermudes, who is weak, and in truth has no fixed character. As they sat dining together quietly, but under a good deal of constraint, Bermudes, who drinks hard, grew warm, and renewed his reproaches to Bolivar, treating him as a deserter, a coward, and, in short, the lowest of mankind.

Bolivar would never bear such treatment from his equal, much less from his subaltern. Bermudes' passion rose so high that he stood up and told Bolivar, he was tempted to cut him in pieces, and that his recollection of his glorious march from Carthagená to Caracas, with his cousin Ribas, alone restrained him.

The supreme chief, trembling like a child, sprung upon his horse and decamped as soon as possible, lest Bermudes should put his threats in execution, for he knew him to be a cruel, uneducated barbarian.

Bolivar's proclamation of the 17th of October, is the production of a mind triumphant in a bad cause. The impartial reader will justly appreciate the charges of Bolivar against his victim already slain. The reader will also give due weight to his declaration, that he has shared the dangers, as well as the triumphs, of his brethren in arms. A moment's recurrence to the facts of 1812, at Porto Cabello; in 1814, at Cumana; in 1816, in the naval action of the 2d of May; in Ocumare in July of the same year; in Barcelona in 1817, &c. &c. will afford a sufficient comment upon this part of his proclamation. I have undertaken to show the President Liberator in his true light; and to strip him of the mask with which he has ever covered his person and his transactions.

I must now relate the conduct of San Iago Marino, and make the reader better acquainted with the character of a man, who, for a long time, was the equal, and has even been the rival of Simon Bolivar; of the hero of South America; of the Napoleon; of the Liberator; and of the father of the republic of Colombia.

As soon as Marino arrived at Trinidad, he wrote Bolivar a letter in a very submissive and supplicating style, in which he most humbly entreated him to pardon all his offences, committed without his fault; he said the pernicious counsel and advice of Piar had robbed him of the favor and affection of the supreme chief; that he would hereafter follow his guidance alone, would never deviate a hair from his duty, and would act directly according to the orders of the supreme chief, &c. &c.

Bolivar, gratified and exulting, showed this letter to his flatterers, and was himself the first to laugh at and ridicule it. He nevertheless pardoned, and most *graciously* recalled Marino to his former rank and command, rightly judging that Marino without Piar would never impede him or his views, whatever they might be. Marino, on his return, issued the following proclamation:

"San Iago Marino, general-in-chief of the armies of the republic, and of that entrusted with the operations against Cumana, &c. &c. to the officers and soldiers composing his division. Officers and privates! my soul is, even now, filled with the most appalling sentiments, when I think, that but yesterday,

neither you or myself were reckoned a part of the great family, who, under the direction of the supreme chief of the republic, fight for liberty and independence ! How delightful are the sentiments which this day again fill my heart—when I see that the government like a good father, relying upon my promises, and forgetting all that has passed, receives us again under its protection, and directs me to put myself again at your head, and to command the whole province. (Cumana.)

Officers and privates ! if by a mischief ever to be regretted, we have until now been considered as dissatisfied, and have under this character attracted public attention ; it is now, and from this moment, our most sacred duty to become a model of submission and obedience to the supreme chief ! My sincere wish is, that the whole universe may be convinced of the sincerity of our intentions, and find in us the most faithful supporters of our government. I swear by the ashes of so many of our famous companions in arms, I swear upon my honor, and upon all that is sacred on earth, that this is now the only felicity to which I aspire. From you who have always given me so many proofs of your love and your devotion, I expect a much stronger proof, namely, that you will co-operate to execute the orders of the supreme chief. Separated nearly a year from government, from the father of the people, and the armies, and but just now reincorporated into the large and free family of Venezuela, our hearts beat with the most delightful sensations for such unexpected good fortune. Long live the Republic ! Long live the Supreme Chief ! Long live General Bolivar !

Head-quarters of San Francisco, January 26th, 1818.

(Signed) SAN IAGO MARINO."

Such language requires no comment. It displays the character of the man ; and such are most of the Colombian chieftains. This being the fact, the reader will readily discover how much, or rather how little, real character was requisite to enable general Bolivar to usurp and hold the supreme power during so many years. He will also, I think, be satisfied as to what must be the disposition of a leader, who can not only suffer, but encourage, language so disgusting to men of delicacy, good sense and honor.

CHAPTER XVII.

Campaign of 1818—Foreign Legions—Conspiracy against Bolivar's power.

In the beginning of 1818, the situation of the two belligerent parties had entirely changed, in favor of the patriots, owing chiefly to the conquest of Guayana. This rich province alone afforded more resources to the patriots, than the seven other provinces of Venezuela taken together. The friends of independence now conceived the most sanguine hopes of seeing, at last, their oppressors driven from the territory, they had sullied by their cruelty and barbarity during these last years of war and distress.

I will give here a short sketch of the situation of the royal party, that the reader may be enabled to judge whether these hopes were well founded, and might have been realised, under any other leader of common talents and experience in the act of war. Unfortunately for the cause of freedom and independence, the districts of Venezuela were in the hands of Bolivar. I say unfortunately, because her freedom and independence were, by that means, completely lost. The history of this campaign is nearly a repetition of that of Bolivar's dictatorship in 1813-14, when, as now, every thing depended on his exertions, and all circumstances concurred most favorably to produce a happy result. Bolivar, by his own fault alone, irreparably lost, a second time, the most promising occasion of driving the enemy out of Venezuela, and of giving its miserable and worn out people, liberty and repose. These reflections will be justified by the facts related in this chapter.

By the disgraceful expedition of Morillo against the island of Margarita, he lost about 4000 of his best troops. The folly and cowardice of Miguel de La Torre, lost the rich province of Guayana, the heart of the royal family. The extensive plains, and two thirds of the provinces of Venezuela, were in the hands of the patriots, who marched with numerous and superior forces against the Spaniards. Industry, commerce and

agriculture, were ruined by taxes, contributions and a continual change of masters. Scarcity of hands, and an utter want of security, left the royalists destitute of the means of repairing their immense losses they had lately suffered. The public stores and treasury were empty. The general-in-chief no longer enjoyed the confidence once reposed in him. His own discouragement deeply affected his troops. This, together with the general want of every thing, produced daily desertions. Many times, from thirty to fifty sailors passed over to the patriots in one day.

Notwithstanding all their losses, and the gloomy prospects of the royal cause in Venezuela, such is the obstinacy of the Spanish character, that they still determined to persist in their cause, and to make every exertion in support of Morillo. European Spaniards of the Main had become averse to the emancipation of their country; not because they did not like freedom, but because they saw no leaders in whom they could confide, to give them a fixed and good government, in place of the one under which they then existed. We have seen that many native Spaniards took an active part in the struggle for independence, and supported their chieftains. But their hatred of Bolivar had now become great. It began with his desertion from Porto Cabello in 1812; was increased by his cruel decree of February 1814, by which he ordered to be put to death, not only those of their countrymen who were prisoners of war, but peaceable inhabitants, many of whom had never taken any part in the existing struggle. From that time hatred took the place of that admiration which had been excited by his rapid and early success in 1813. Rich and poor, therefore, all the Spanish families on the Main, rivalled each other, in making the utmost sacrifices to put Morillo in a condition to take the field, and to commence with renewed vigor the offensive operations of this campaign. It is to be lamented that these almost superhuman exertions were made in favor of such a man as Ferdinand VII, whose name includes all that can be united in the persecution of all men of feeling and character, and of whom Morillo was a faithful representative.

In consequence of this resolution to resist the numerous patriot armies to the last extremity, a general assembly of the civil and military authorities of the city of Caracas was called together. They met on the 16th of January in the capital, and canvassed the miserable situation of the royal cause. They unanimously resolved upon prompt and vigorous measures.

They determined to improve the condition of their soldiers, by giving them better rations, better pay, and if not the whole arrears at once, enough to quell their dissatisfaction. In case of desertion, to pay the inhabitants of the place where the deserter had been enlisted, the value of his uniform and accoutrements, and compel them to furnish another in his place until he should be found. Any young man who should arrest a deserter, was declared to be free from service. The cavalry was reorganised. All possible means were employed to re-establish confidence, and revive the public spirit. Their exertions were, in general, successful. Large voluntary contributions were made. Many ladies gave up their jewelry, gold chains, &c. Many rich possessors of land, besides money, gave their harvest, slaves, horses, mules, cattle, &c. Horses kept for pleasure or show, were given to the cavalry. The merchants offered money, provisions, &c. &c. Many persons who were present, have assured me that, during several days and nights, Caracas and Laguaira were complete pictures of besieged cities, where were seen vast warlike stores carried upon mules and horses.

New Grenada afforded no better prospects for the royal cause. The viceroy Semano, residing at Bogota, and lately appointed to this office, wrote to general Montalvo Torres, governor of Carthagena, that "it would be impossible to maintain himself any longer in this capital or in the kingdom, one of his divisions having been defeated in the plains of Casanare, of which the commander and seventeen others only returned to the capital. That a second division sent by him to the same plains had met with the same fate." General Urdaneta gained these two victories in October and December 1817.

The tyranny and cruelties committed by the Spaniards upon the inhabitants of New Grenada; the miserable fate of many among the most respectable householders in Bogota, who, during the stay of general Morillo, were arrested in their houses, and shot by his order, without even a plausible pretext, had excited such detestation of the Spanish name, that the fair sex were active to do them all the harm in their power. One of them procured a detailed list of the Spanish forces in the capital, and had the courage to carry it to the patriots at Casanare. She was unfortunately detected. The list was found between her stocking and shoe; and she was publicly executed. She was deeply lamented by her countrywomen, whose hatred of

the Spaniards was greatly increased by this instance of their cruelty.

The garrison of Mompox, 400 men strong, was surprised in the night, and all put to death by the patriotic inhabitants, among whom were many women, who fought bravely, and contributed much to the success of the enterprise.

The city of Carthagena, then in the power of the Spaniards, was in a kind of uproar. As soon as its inhabitants were apprised of general Urdaneta's victory, gained on the 6th of October 1817, over the Spaniards, and that in consequence of it, the patriots were in possession of the province of Pamplona, the garrison and its cruel and cowardly governor, Montalvo Torres, were terribly alarmed, and forced the inhabitants to great contributions, for obtaining provisions of every kind, in case of being besieged. The inhabitants were, moreover, embittered against the tyranny of Montalvo, and that of the president of the criminal court, Cano. Placards had been found on the church doors, and in the walls of Carthagena, which, in bold and seditious language, proposed killing the two tyrants of the people. In spite of the several requisitions and great rewards offered, the authors could never be detected. They were supposed to have been posted up by some noncommissioned officers or privates, who were dissatisfied with their wretched condition. Numerous patriots were sent day and night through the streets of Carthagena, to preserve order and quiet.

Many patriot bands of guerillas were formed in the provinces of New Grenada, which greatly annoyed and distressed the Spaniards. In Venezuela, they were still more numerous and formidable.

Such was the situation, in both countries, of the royal cause, at the end of 1817, and the beginning of 1818, when Bolivar commenced his operations against Venezuela.

After having given to his various divisions the necessary orders to march towards the points intended, general Bolivar departed with his staff and a numerous body guard, at the end of December 1817, from Angostura, and directed his march towards the rich plains of Apure. He left about 1800 men to protect the province of Guayana, and united his forces (about 3000 men) to those of generals Paez, Monagas and Sedeno. He arrived the 12th of February before the city of Calabozo, where Morillo had fixed his head quarters.

When at Sombrero, he published, on the 17th of February, the following proclamation :

“To the inhabitants of the plains—Your territory is free of the enemy. The armies of the republic have gloriously triumphed over the Spaniards, from the middle of New Grenada to Maturin, and the mouth of the river Orinoco. The armies of Boves and Morillo, which before were very numerous, are now buried in the fields, consecrated to liberty. The cities of Calabozo and San Fernando, have been taken under the protection of the republic, and the remainder of the armies of Morillo, routed the 12th and 16th January, (by general Paez,) flee before us, to seek a shelter in Porto Cabello ; but in vain ! soon will they be thrown from them into the sea ! It is impossible to resist an army of freemen, brave and victorious. Fame will guide our steps, and the cruel oppressors of Venezuela be forced to surrender or die !

Inhabitants of the plains—you are invincible ; your horses, lances, and your deserts, protect you against your enemies. You must absolutely be independent in spite of the haughtiness of Spain. The republican government guaranties your rights, your prosperity, and your lives. Unite yourselves under the banners of Venezuela, which is your victorious country. This campaign will end with the surrender of the capital. You will again enjoy peace, industry, and the blessing to be free and honest men ; your enemies have deprived you of these advantages. Be grateful to providence which has given you a wise government, much more adapted to the welfare of mankind.

Head-quarters at Sombrero, 7th of February, 1818.

(Signed) BOLIVAR.”

The style of this proclamation, is an intended imitation of that of Napoleon. The truth is that the remainder of the armies of Morillo, which were *flying before his victorious troops*, consisted of small foraging parties, which Morillo detached from his head quarters, to procure pay for his cavalry. So far was Morillo from flying, that, as is notorious, he remained quietly in his head quarters at Venezuela. That the cities of Calabozo and San Fernando were taken under the protection of the republic, is one of the mistakes of the supreme chief. On the 7th of February, the first was in quiet possession of Morillo, who had established his head quarters there. General Bolivar must have known this fact, for he marched against Calabozo, and arrived before this little city, no earlier than the

12th, *from whence Morillo had not moved !* San Fernando was evacuated by order of Morillo, to concentrate his forces. Thus, and no otherwise, was the place under the *protection of the republic.*

“The remainder of the armies of Boves and Morillo fly before us to seek shelter in the walls of Porto-Cabello. But in vain ; soon will they be thrown into the sea.” This is an imitation, though a poor one, of Napoleon’s style. In the most important point it fails entirely ; for Napoleon generally kept his word. Whoever places any reliance upon these proclamations will certainly be deceived. The style of them would be a matter of little consequence, if they contained the truth only ; yet surely this kind of language is beneath the dignity of a true republican.

The first Bulletin published by the liberating army, dated opposite the city of Calabozo, and signed Charles Soublette, says “that the liberating army commanded by the supreme chief, departed the 31st of Dec. from the city of Angostura, towards the plains of Apure and was joined by the division of Gen. Monagas, Sedeno, and Paez, and arrived the 12th of February in sight of Calabozo, which at that time, was the head quarters of the royal army under the command of general Morillo. There took place an engagement in which the Spanish army, composed of the regiments of hussars, Ferdinandos, half of the infantry, and all their light troops were engaged ; the regiment of Castillo, who fought on the left wing, escaped from the general havoc of the enemies’ army, being close by the city of Calabozo, which it entered. The general Morillo, surprised in the midst of immense plains, by an army which had marched 300 leagues, was completely beaten, the first time he drew his sword in South America, without ever attempting a general battle, or waiting for a single discharge from our infantry. The general Morillo escaped almost alone from the field of battle, after having been saved twice, by two hussars, who parried the strokes directed against him by two of our lancers. General Morillo, the proud Pacificator of South America, was besieged in the centre of Venezuela, in consequence of his own cowardice, and our extraordinary promptness. Such is the interesting picture of the action of Calabozo, presented to the military world. We have lost no more than twenty men.”

I shall not consume the readers time in pointing out the follies and absurdities, apparent to every military man at least,

upon the face of this bulletin. The facts are these. When the cavalry of the patriots approached near Calabozo, on the 12th of February, they met with a foraging party of seventy or eighty men, who had sallied from Calabozo, and made a halt before a watering place to water their horses. They had dismounted, and the horses were without saddle or bridle. The men had on their short jackets, and no swords or other arms, so that it was impossible to defend themselves. They were all killed except two, who jumped upon their horses, and escaped into Calabozo, and reported the news to their general, Morillo, at his head quarters. During this time general Bolivar detached 400 men to surprise the grand advanced guard of the enemy, which were defeated. This gave time to the troops of Morillo in Calabozo, to form, and not only to resist the patriots, but to force them to retire. The Spaniards were not 1800 men strong, whilst the united force under general Bolivar, amounted to upwards of 8000 men.

Morillo, fearing that he should become destitute of provisions and forage, if he remained any longer in Calabozo, where the enemy could easily intercept his convoys, resolved to evacuate it. He took his sick, baggage, stores, and a good many of the inhabitants, who chose to follow him; and placing them in the centre of his 1800 men, on the 14th of February, marched out of the city, directing his course towards Sombrero, in presence of the patriots, who had about 3000 cavalry. He was obliged to march through sandy and arid plains, under a burning sun, 25 leagues, until he arrived at Sombrero, at the foot of a strong chain of mountains. The patriots followed. But notwithstanding, this great superiority, did not attempt to attack him. This cavalry, far more numerous than his, could have acted on these plains with vast advantage. At Sombrero they attacked him; and were repelled with the loss of several hundred men. They pursued no farther; but retired towards Calabozo, where general Bolivar arrived the 22d February; whilst Morillo directed his course upon Barbacoa, Camatagua, and arrived in March at Ortiz near Villa de Cura, where he effected his junction with Morales, and colonel Lopez, and found himself at the head of 4000 men nearly all infantry. Here he had full time to recruit and form his cavalry. General Calzada had been posted at Guardazenaga with 1000 men, to observe the movements of the patriots.

General Bolivar, who united with general Paez, Monagas and Sedeno, had above 8000 men in Calabozo, took posses-

sion of San Fernando and Apure, and gave orders to occupy the province of Barinas. He gave the command of these operations to general, Paez; while he himself, remained inactive at Calabozo.

Bolivar left his head quarters, and directed his march towards Guadatinasus, San Jose and San Francise de Pimados, and joined, the 5th of March; with the cavalry of general Zarasa composed in a great part of Llaneros. On the 7th the patriots began their operations against the capital, Caracas, and on the 22d the valleys of Aragua were occupied by the different columns of the patriots, whilst their advanced posts were besieged in Cabrera and in Consejo.

General Morillo, finding that the city of Ortiz could no longer furnish him with supplies, departed with most of his troops towards Valencia. He detached de La Tora, who had been advanced to the rank of brigadier general, to occupy Villa del Cura, Vittoria, and Las Cocuisas, where he found no resistance, with orders to maintain himself there, until further advice. Calzada with his troops, 1000 men, occupied San Carlos, and colonel Lopez, the city Del Pao.

General Bolivar, on the evening of commencing his decisive operations against Caracas, received the unexpected news that general Monagas whom he had detached to supply the fortifications of La Cabrera, had been forced to leave this post, not far from Caracas, and to retire towards Cagua. This greatly deranged his plans.

Meanwhile general Morillo had redoubled his activity, and, supported by the zeal of the Spaniards had provided himself with many useful warlike stores, had recruited, remounted his cavalry and united as many forces as he could in so short a time. He now thought proper to begin his offensive operations. The 12th of March, he detached general Morales from Valencia, with 3000 men; following him, on the 13th with 300 cavalry and 1000 infantry. Morales on the 14th between Guarara and San Joaquin, had a little skirmish with a small detachment of the many who fled towards the post of La Cabrera, where they sallied with the forces under general Monagas 1500 strong, and took a strong position at Tapatapa. Morales attacked and routed them. They lost 300 men, baggage, &c. He pursued and attacked them again at Villa del Cura, and forced them to retreat as far as Boca Chica, two leagues.

When general Bolivar heard of Monagas' defeat, he immediately united all the forces, near him, and arrived on the 15th

with about 3000 men in the camp of Monagas, and marched with his troops from Boca Chica towards Semen, where they encamped. The Spaniards attacked them at two o'clock in the morning, but were repelled. A second attack with the bayonet, divided the combat. Bolivar was completely routed, and lost more than 1000 men, his artillery, baggage &c. In attacking at the head of his cavalry, Morillo received a slight wound, and gave over the command to the new brigadier de La Torre, instead of Morales, who was mareschal de campo. La Torre, pursued the remainder of Bolivar's army, attacked him the 29th March at Ortiz, and routed him with the loss of 500 men. Here general Morales distinguished himself in directing the charge, whilst La Torre, as I have been well informed remained at a respectful distance behind. On the 6th of April Bolivar was again beaten at La Puerta, by Calzada and Lopez, whom de La Torre had detached in pursuit of him. He lost here 600 men killed and wounded; twelve hundred, including the wounded were taken prisoners. The remainder of his artillery (two field pieces,) and of his baggage &c. were taken; and Bolivar escaped, by the speed of his horse, with a few officers. Morillo cured of his wound, soon afterwards joined the army and resumed the command.

After these defeats, Bolivar retired to El Rincon de Los Toros, and there united 600 cavalry and 300 infantry, the remainder of his forces. Colonel R. Lopez was detached against him, surprised his out posts, and, penetrated into the midst of his camp, at two o'clock in the morning, killed 400 men, taking nearly all the rest. Bolivar had just time to get out of his hammock, mount his horse, and escape in the darkness of the night. Colonel Raphael Lopez, the Spanish commander, was killed; so was the patriot colonel Palacios who fought bravely at the head of his battalion; which gave Bolivar time to escape. To complete these defeats of the patriots, colonel Francisco Ximens, attacked Marino, at Campano on the 12th March, and routed him completely.

The general La Torre marched May the 2d from San Carlos upon the city of Coxede, where he expected to find the enemy, but met with the advanced posts of general Paez near Camaruco, who, on his part had determined to attack the Spaniards at San Carlos. La Torre after having defeated the outposts of Paez, marched against him and routed him, not far from Coxede. Morales, on the other side, having marched

against Bolivar, who had reinforced himself at Calabozo, attacked and routed him, and retook possession of the city.

General Bolivar retired towards San Fernando and Apure, and recruited from the plains as many Llaneros as he could; and being unmolested during the whole month of May, he had time to unite again a sufficient number of chieftains separated at different posts, to do the same. Two strong detachments of English troops under colonel Wilson came to join Bolivar at the end of May.

A short account of the different corps that came over from Great Britain to the Main, may perhaps be interesting. They contributed much to the success of Bolivar's campaigns; and were rewarded with ill treatment, misery, sickness, and death.

The supreme chief, seeing the behaviour of the battalion of Guiria, composed of colored men from Guadaloupe, of which I have already spoken, remembered what Brion and I had said to him, in 1816 in Carupano, on the usefulness of foreign legions; and thought, at last that it would be well to have some foreign troops with him. He directed his agent in London to have an understanding with the English houses to which admiral Brion and others had written, for the purpose of forwarding such a plan. He directed his agent to send as many such troops as could be procured. The character of Bolivar, like that of all Caraguins, is, that the moment a project is adopted, they are impatient and restless until it is accomplished; and will hazard every thing for that purpose. So it was here with Bolivar. But, having no money, no personal credit, no produce or merchandise, nothing to give in exchange, he could accomplish nothing but by the great exertions, of admiral Brion, and by means of promises, and holding out prospects of great rewards to such as would come to the Main, and serve a cause, which indeed had in itself great attractions. Propositions were therefore made to lieutenant colonel Hippisley, an Englishman devoted to the American cause, to come over and bring with him a number of his countrymen. No money, but great promises were given to him, and such as he should bring with him. Colonel Hippisley, being rich and in good credit, with great pains, procured 300 men who were armed, clothed, and equipped in England, arrived at Angostura a little after the departure of general Bolivar for the army at the end of 1817. But when the men came to see these wretched state of the service, and that the promises made them in England could never be realised; they found the condition far worse than in their

native land ; and made loud and just reproaches to colonel Hippisley, for having seduced them into this service. He had no intention to deceive his men ; he was himself deceived probably with the same hopes that induced his men. After some months' service, he took his leave, greatly disgusted with the military services in Venezuela. His second in command lieutenant colonel English, remained in England to procure more men ; and sent, in detachments of from 100 to 200 each, 1000 men, to the island of Margarita, and after them, arrived there himself. But before his arrival these troops were divided into three companies commanded by captains Johnston, McIntosh, and Woodstock. To these were joined about 50 or 100 men of different European nations, who made this campaign with general Bolivar ; who committed the great fault of distributing them among his division, and those of Paez and Monagas. This distribution was made as I have been informed, for fear that they might, if left together, be dangerous to Bolivar himself. The foreigners were greatly displeased and discouraged. Thus separated, they would be of but little use ; whereas 100 such men or even, a less number, acting together against the troops of the royalists, might have been of very great service to the republic. Many of them left the service disgusted with this and other ill treatment. The remainder perished miserably for want of food, or fell victims to the climate.

When colonel Hippisley retired, colonel English was appointed commander of a second legion, which increased to about 2500 men ; among whom were officers of distinguished merit. Lieutenant colonel English was advanced, successively, to the rank of colonel and brigadier general. He arrived in the begining of the year 1819, at Margarita, where admiral Brion received him very handsomely in the port, of Pampatar.

Colonel Wilson brought some few hundred men, who served in 1818. He was arrested and took his leave.

The third legion was called the Irish legion, because it was composed chiefly of Irishmen, and commanded by general Devereaux a native of Ireland, and son of general Devereaux to whom he had been aid-de-camp. His father died and left him a handsome fortune. Young and enthusiastic, he departed for Buenos Ayres, where he offered his service in this new republic. Not finding what he expected, he did not remain long, but came in 1818, and offered his services to general Bolivar, with a certain quantity of arms, amunitions and war-

like stores, upon advantageous conditions, and long terms of payment, as he was authorised to do by his friends in Ireland and England. The supreme chief accepted his offers, and this encouraged Devereaux to go farther and propose the formation of a legion in his native country to be brought here; and to serve under his orders. He had the good fortune to please the supreme chief, who authorised him to raise such a legion, consisting of 5000 men.

Bolivar told him frankly that he had no money at his disposal. Devereaux replied, "that he wanted only an ample commission from him to act with full powers, and according to circumstances for the benefit of Venezuela, with Bolivar's promise to approve his transactions in Great Britain, where he could obtain what he desired."

Devereaux arrived in Ireland with the necessary papers. Such was the state of the people, that, by the hope of greatly improving their condition, and by means of his splendid representations and promises, numbers of his countrymen readily consented to take service in Venezuela. There had been various statements in the public papers relative to the manner in which he succeeded. He sent, at different times, about 5000 men to Angostura and Margarita, the greater part of whom had served before. He went to London and succeeded there also. Among his officers were many, who, being apprised by their friends, in St. Thomas and Jamaica, of the miserable condition of the service on the Main, refused to embark. Their number increased daily, and it has been reported that many endeavored to give up their commissions and get back the money they had paid for them; but that Devereaux, apprised of their intentions, kept out of their way, and hastened the departure of the remainder.

He embarked at Liverpool in the English brig *Ariel*, with two aid-de-camps, one colonel, one major, one surgeon, one chaplain, and twenty two privates. The general had chartered this brig, under a feigned name, to transport him and his companions to their native country, he being a merchant who had been shipwrecked.

After sailing about a fortnight, having taken his measures well, beforehand, he informed the captain and crew, that he was the patriotic general Devereaux, and ordered the master to take him to Margarita. On arriving there, he found neither his people or the necessary provisions. Being told that Brion and Montilla were gone, with part of his men, to Rio Hacha,

he determined to join them. On arriving before this port, he saw the Spanish colors hoisted, and his signals were not answered. He therefore cruised for some days, and not learning where admiral Brion was, he sailed to Jamaica to obtain information. As soon as the brig anchored in Port Royal, a guard of marine troops came, by order of the governor, to remain on board the brig, until the duke of Manchester should determine what should be done with her. General Devereaux asked leave from commodore Huskinson to go on shore with one of his aids, but could obtain permission only for himself. During the passage, the ship's crew had revolted three times, and generally had behaved very ill.

General Devereaux left Port Royal in July. He was well received at Savanilla, by admiral Brion, but very coldly by colonel Montilla. The Caraguins are generally of a jealous temper, particularly with regard to strangers. Montilla's aversion to them is notorious. The people of Carthagená (where he is now, by Bolívar's appointment, intendant and commander-in-chief of three departments,) generally complain of his harsh manners, which, I confess, surprised me, when I first met with him, but upon further acquaintance, I found him attentive, polite and kind. He commanded part of general Devereaux's division, which had embarked with him from Margarita. He feared, that by the superior rank of the general, he should fall under his command, and particularly refused to submit to his orders. Some provocation passed between them, but no duel was fought.

General Devereaux being urgently advised by his friends to take no step against Montilla, but to absent himself for a while, from the province of Carthagená; which he did, and they never met afterwards. After this difference with Montilla, general Devereaux departed for congress, which then set at Cúcuta, and of which general Antonio Nerino was vice-president. Though Bolívar conferred upon Devereaux the rank of brigadier general, before his departure for Great Britain, he had never served, otherwise than as aid-de-camp to his father, and was not a military man. But being a handsome and fine looking man, of great address, wit, intrigue and discernment, he easily perceived the character of the supreme chief, and flattered him so adroitly as to gain his full confidence, and to obtain from him full power, with the rank of brigadier general. I have been assured that he never actually commanded his legion, or joined it; and that he never has had any command

since he has been in the service of Colombia. He remained at Cucuta as a brigadier general.

After the death of general English, his young and handsome widow went to Cucuta, to receive from congress the arrears of pay due to her husband, and a pension for herself. Some evil minded persons spread a report that she was not the lawful wife of the general; and the vice-president, Narino, called on her, with witnesses and an interpreter, in order to ascertain the fact. Mrs. English did not understand Spanish, nor Marino a word of English. When the interpreter had explained to her the motives of Narino's visit, she was shocked, and spoke to him in such a manner that he felt deeply ashamed of his commission, which he certainly ought never to have accepted. This singular visit came to the knowledge of Devereaux, who, being at Cucuta, immediately wrote a letter to Narino, in strong terms, certifying that the lady had been married to general English. Still they made objections, and raised difficulties. General Devereaux, informed of their unjust proceedings, undertook her defence, and sent a formal cartel to Narino. The latter, indignant that a stranger should dare to question *him*, a magistrate of high rank, immediately sent the general to a dark wet dungeon, where he was confined as a criminal. He found means to apply to congress, and complained bitterly of this treatment, demanding a commission of inquiry to examine his conduct. This was granted him, and after he had remained six weeks in the dungeon, without air or light, or any allowed communication from abroad, he was sent, under a strong guard, from place to place, until he reached Caracas. There he was tried before a court martial and honorably acquitted in November 1821.

The base treatment received by general Devcreaux, excited in the members of congress so much resentment against the vice-president Narino, that they turned him out of his office, and put in his place Dr. German Roscio, who had taken great interest in general Devereaux. As soon as president Bolivar was acquainted with the injustice done to Devereaux, he appointed him general of division, or major general, and ordered the widow of general English to be paid.

We return to general Bolivar, whom we left at San Fernando de Apure, ready to recommence his offensive operations against Caracas. He took possession of the city of Calabozo in June, and gave orders to the different patriot columns, to march again upon Caracas. Their advanced party reached

effectively to Curayto, five leagues from the capital, where the inhabitants were in great consternation. But Morillo, who had closely observed all the movements of the patriots, and was much better served by his spies, than Bolivar, gave orders suddenly to attack these separated divisions one after another. Bolivar had actually neglected to combine his movements with those of his other divisions. The patriot divisions were separated, routed, deprived of their brilliant successes, and lost all the advantages they had gained. They were beaten in nine different actions, at Sombrero, Macaca, La Puerta, El Caymans, Ortiz, El Rincon de Los Toros, in the Savannas of Coxede, upon the mountains of Los Patos and Nictiros. They lost in seventy days more than 5000 men in killed and prisoners. Many thousand stand of arms, twelve standards, 7 field pieces, more than 3000 horses and mules, a quantity of cattle that followed the troops, their ammunition, baggage &c. They were compelled again to leave in the power of the Spaniards, all the cities, places on the plains, and the provinces which lay on that side of the river Orinoco. The supreme chief, leaving the remaining scattered troops to the command of general Paez, retired in haste to the fortress of Angostura.

I will give an extract of a letter written and published by colonel M. F. P. a native of Caracas, who was in the service of Venezuela, but had leave of absence, for the purpose of restoring his health, in the island of St. Thomas, addressed to Mr. F. a merchant in Caracas, dated St. Thomas' July 12th. This colonel, a man of talent, knowledge, and military skill, was so disgusted with the conduct of Bolivar, that he realized a great part of his fortune left the service, and went to live in London.

"I have waited patiently the result of the last campaign, which began at Calabozo. It has been most dreadful, and yet, such as might have been expected from the dispositions of Bolivar. After having approached the capital, at about six leagues distance, he constantly kept himself in such a position, as to expose his forces to be beaten in detail; committing, at every step, faults, which would have been unpardonable in a corporal. In consequence of these dispositions, he had been forced to remain on the right side of the Apure, after having sacrificed the strong and brave army which the several generals had placed under his command. The last news received from the Orinoco says, that the people begin to open their eyes upon this hero. May Heaven grant, that it may, at last, be in our power justly to appreciate his merit, his talents and his worth.

It is astonishing that we should not have been able to expel a handful of Spaniards from our country, with a force of more than nine thousand men, well armed, equipped, and amply furnished with all the necessaries of war! But this is one of the consequences of the confusion and the disorder which direct our operations."

Whilst general Bolivar was securing his person at Angostura, generals Paez, Bermudes and Marino retired to their respective plains. Paez again took possession of the city of Auracia, and made himself master of this part of the plains, whence he recruited himself, with great activity and success. Marino and Bermudes blockaded Cumana, which the Spaniards had fortified, and reduced it to great distress. The patriots again took possession of Guiria, of Carupano, and of all the coasts of the gulph of Paria.

As soon as the inhabitants of Guiria were acquainted with the results of this campaign, many of them murmured loudly against the supreme chief. Five of the most influential men, as I have been well informed, held a secret consultation on the subject of turning him out and putting general Paez in his place. All were strongly enough opposed to Bolivar; but one of the five was quite as much opposed to Paez, whom he justly represented as illiterate, and utterly ignorant of civil affairs. He said too, that, though Bolivar was by no means fit for the place, it might be pernicious to displace him at that time, and that he might now, after so much loss, probably listen to good advice and change his conduct. After warm debates which lasted two or three hours, the others yielded to his reasons; and Bolivar remained at the head of the government. This he owed to a foreigner, who has never mentioned these particulars. I have them from two others of the five, one of whom is dead, the other is still living. I am acquainted with the name of this foreigner, and know, that at that time, he held a high rank in Angostura. My informants said the change might easily have been effected at that time, in spite of Bolivar's strong body guard; for that the aversion to the supreme chief was universal, arising partly from the condemnation of Piar, (who left many secret, but warm friends,) but chiefly from his conduct in the last campaign. But the dissatisfied had no leader, and they knew that the supreme chief had numerous spies, so that they dared not to communicate their sentiments one to another.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Bolivar and Sanander—Council of Government at Angostura—Roscio and Torres—Situation of both contending parties—General Urdaneta and English—Bolivar's expedition against New Grenada—His return to Venezuela—Events at Angostura—Fundamental law of the Republic of Colombia. Years 1818-19.

The supreme chief, however mortified, appeared with his usual retinue, and acted as if nothing adverse had happened. Through his emissaries he received the welcome news, that the inhabitants of New Grenada, oppressed and vexed by their Spanish tyrants, waited only for an imposing force, to declare their independence, take arms, and join the patriots. General Anander, or, as he now signs, *Sanander*, the vice-president of Colombia, and known to be the greatest opponent of Bolivar, was, at that time, in Angostura. He is a native of New Grenada, where he had many friends, who urged him to come with whatever forces, arms, ammunition, &c. he could bring with him. He informed the supreme chief, that the Spaniards were daily harrassed, not only by the victorious divisions of general Urdaneta, Valdes and others, but also by the numerous and strong parties of Guerillas, which augmented on all sides in Grenada. Sanander urged Bolivar to send him with 1000 men, 3 or 4000 muskets, ammunition and other warlike stores, to New Grenada, and to give him the command of the expedition. But, as the supreme chief had conceived the idea of going himself, sooner or later, into this province, and as he was always jealous of any who possessed more talent and character than himself, so in this instance, as is said, he feared that Sanander might supplant him, or at least, do much better than he could, and that he took his measures accordingly. The opinion that he did so, is supported by the following facts :

At the end of July 1818, there arrived at Angostura a three masted vessel, from London, and a brig from New York, with large cargoes of muskets, pistols, gunpowder, swords, saddles,

and every description of warlike stores, sufficient for an army. The whole was offered, on good terms, to general Bolivar, who purchased them. When Sanander heard of this, he pressed the supreme chief to grant him 20,000 stands of arms, which were needed in New Grenada, together with the necessary ammunition, &c. which he offered to have transported safely to that province. But Bolivar, on various pretents, (with which he is always ready,) refused his request, and gave him only 2000 stands; he had in the stores, at Angostura, about 50,000; of which, afterwards, at the the time of his marching himself into that province, he took a quantity with him, as well as of other warlike stores. By this conduct, as was then with good reason believed, he intended to convince the Grenadans, that he alone was able to afford the powerful assistance they were in so great need of. Whatever may have been his motive, by refusing to furnish Sanander with sufficient means, he certainly delayed the emancipation of this extensive and beautiful country for one whole year at least. When he lost the cause of liberty and independence in 1815, he was evidently actuated by a spirit of vanity, ambition and revenge.* And it was neither unnatural or unjust to suppose that he was now actuated by the same kind of spirit.

General Sanander was now sent to New Grenada with a very inadequate supply of arms and warlike stores, far less than the Grenadans demanded, and than might have been, with perfect convenience, shared from the vast store of every thing at Angostura. Sanander left Angostura for New Grenada, with his 2000 muskets, &c. accompanied by the son of general Urdaneta, some other officers, and a small escort of soldiers. The object of his commission was to unite the numerous bodies of Guerillas in favor of the patriots, to assemble them on the fine and vast plains of Casanare, to arm, organise and fit them for action, and then to march them, united with general Urdaneta's strong division, against the capital, Bogota, and to drive the Spaniards out of Grenada, and intercept the communication between the royalists in this province and those in Venezuela. But how was Sanander to do all this without the necessary means? These were withheld from him by Bolivar. He, however, effected more with his limited means, than Bolivar

* See chapter VIII.

himself had done in his campaign of 1818, with powerful forces. He is brave, ambitious, active and laborious, and speaks and writes with facility. He possesses a perfect knowledge of the whole face of his native country, which affords great advantages in choosing military positions. His countrymen placed great confidence in him. They knew that he had been accustomed to hardships, and that by his own personal merit and exertions, he had raised himself from the lower class in which he was born, to the rank of a general. His countrymen, therefore, preferred him to any other general, particularly to Bolivar, who was not liked in Grenada. He was so highly thought of, that his name alone terrified and discouraged his enemies. He gained various battles, and fought bravely; but stained his glory by his cruelty. After gaining the battle of Bogota, he ordered 28 generals and other officers, who had surrendered themselves prisoners, to be shot. And thus he did, after this practice was abolished by agreement. By those who were well acquainted with the campaigns of 1818-19, the emancipation of New Grenada, was attributed principally to him. Bolivar only finished what Sanander began, and would have accomplished a year sooner, had not the means been withheld from him by Bolivar.

After the departure of Sanander from Angostura, the true friends of liberty saw nothing in the established patriot government, upon which they could form a reasonable expectation of stability and welfare. Under the administration of the supreme chief, the state was like a ship in a stormy sea, without a firm and skilful pilot. They looked in vain for energy, activity and talent. They saw that his operations were the result of momentary impulse. There was a mutability in his actions, which showed them that he acted without firmness, skill or system.

Before his departure from Angostura in 1817, general Bolivar established a *council of government*, of which he appointed Francisco Antonio Zea, president. Mr. Zea (who afterwards died, while minister at London,) was undoubtedly an honest and upright man; but he was suffering with ill health. His malady affected his mind, and prevented his acting at all, or with the requisite energy. Blindly submissive to the will of the supreme chief, he dared to do nothing without his express consent. And so it happened, that the most trifling decisions of this council of government, at Angostura, were sent to the supreme chief, "wherever he could be found," for his sanction, before any step could actually be taken. General Bolivar, in his continual movements, from place to place, often left large

packets unopened, some were decided upon after a hasty glance, and sent back to Angostura. It is impossible for any human being to do every thing; but Bolivar appeared not to have the capacity to know this, although he appeared to be actually incapable of working in his closet more than three hours at a time. Another hindrance to business was, that Mr. Zea having lived in Spain above twenty years, followed strictly the old Spanish principles, habits and manners. It was impossible that two such men should govern an extensive country agitated by passion, civil war, and troubles of every kind. The unexpected result of the last campaign, was not of a nature to inspire confidence in the general. Disappointment enhanced the general misery. Every branch of the administration was in complete disorder, and the finances exhausted.

The government affording no security for a loan from abroad, Bolivar had no way left to raise money, but by extraordinary and forced contributions. These were imposed, and in a very arbitrary manner too, upon the inhabitants of Venezuela. But it was hard to procure money in a country where industry and commerce were ruined. The few who had money in their power, were either Spaniards and secretly averse to the government, or those who placed no reliance upon the supreme chief; so that these forced measures increased the general dissatisfaction. Under these circumstances, the inhabitants of Angostura saw, with a kind of abhorrence, the increasing splendor of the household of their supreme chief, his luxury, his manner of rewarding his old and new mistresses, his body guard, and the numerous officers who surrounded him. These were his flatterers and spies, and they lived in high style, drawing hard upon the few and scanty resources left for public use.

The greatest part of these officers were useless to the army. Being ignorant themselves, they were most of them incapable of drilling or affording any instruction to the soldiers. Generally speaking, they gained their epaulettes and rank, like Soubrette, by flattery and devotion to the supreme chief, who was the only source of recompense and honor. As he had no instruction in military matters himself, he was jealous of every foreigner who had the reputation of being well instructed in them. Thus it happened, that, at the court of Bolivar, sycophants held the places of the brave, and flatterers, of men of skill and talent. The luxury of these officers of the household, excited great dissatisfaction among the other officers of the army, and the more so, because the cowardice of several of

them had been displayed, as was Soubllette's at Ortiz, and on other occasions. The Irish colonel T. who was present, assured me, that he had never, in his life, seen so much cowardice in epaulettes, as Charles Soubllette showed at the battle of Ortiz. He was so often insulted, and had become so contemptible at Angostura, that the supreme chief was obliged to interpose his own authority for the protection of this worthy friend. The republic of Venezuela was, in fact, a despotic military anarchy, like that of 1813-14, so that the supreme chief, had he possessed talent, would have been puzzled to know where his attention was most requisite. He daily received news of defections, and reports that the dissatisfaction of the people was increasing, and was kept from breaking out, only by their fear of the bayonet. At this embarrassing and critical time, unexpectedly arrived a man of sense, talents and character, who saved this miserable government and his country from total ruin. This man was Dr. German Roscio.

In order to be understood, I must give here some interesting particulars, but very little known.

The Dr. was a native of Venezuela and had been a distinguished member of the first congress of Venezuela, assembled at Caracas in 1811. He was like many others, arrested in July 1812 at Lagunaira, and sent to Cadiz with general Miranda. He was put into a dungeon at La Caraca, not far from Cadiz. He had friends there by whose assistance, he effected his escape to Gibraltar. From there he went to London; and thence to the United States of America; where he met Mr. Manuel Jones, another Caraguin who lived at Philadelphia, as an emigrant from the Main, in a private and retired manner. They soon became intimate friends. Mr. Jones died a few miles from Philadelphia in 1822 in miserable circumstances; being however at the time, the accredited charge des affaires of Colombia. He was sick in his bed during the last three or four months of his life, and would have perished with his family, if the necessaries of life had not been furnished to them by a number of respectable citizens to whom he was known, and who will attest the facts here related. His small salary was not paid to him by his government.

Both Dr. Roscio and Mr. Jones were firm patriots, men of superior talents, and of sound knowledge in every branch of civil administration, particularly in the department of finance. They were competent to form a constitution of government adapted to the condition, character, and genius of their country-

men. Both were honest, and their dearest interest was the welfare of their country. They saw with deep regret the inauspicious turn which the revolution of Caracas had taken. They lamented the fate of Miranda, and justly venerated his character and memory. They loudly censured the memory of general Bolivar, who had usurped the dictatorial power; and seemed determined to retain it, though he possessed neither talent, firmness of character, nor dignity, sufficient to qualify him for such an office. Notwithstanding their private opinion of general Bolivar, they determined to use their utmost exertions to save their country. They were resolved to convince him, if possible, of his errors, and bring him into measures conducive to the welfare of their countrymen.

Mr. Jones being of a feeble constitution, chose to remain in Philadelphia, where he could be free and independent; and, being out of the power of the supreme chief, could speak to him in plainer, and stronger language, than he would be permitted to use, whilst under his immediate control. He, therefore, determined to commence a correspondence with general Bolivar.

Dr. Roscio departed alone, and arrived at Angostura in the beginning of 1818, soon after Bolivar marched against Caracas. He was the bearer of many letters and papers very interesting and important to Venezuela, but particularly of a very long letter from his friend Jones to the supreme chief; flattering the vanity of Bolivar, and paying him many compliments upon his good intentions, his perseverance, &c. &c. But he frankly told the supreme chief that the government, which he had established in Venezuela, was not at all suited to the character of its inhabitants, nor to the complicated interests of so extensive a republic; that, moreover, a military government would lead to anarchy, which would bring along with it the ruin of the country, and the certain destruction of the man, whoever he might be, that should attempt to support such a government.

I have already said that Bolivar abhorred the despotic Spanish government, and that he could listen to the advice of enlightened men, and approve of their plans, but that unfortunately for himself and the country, he was surrounded by vile and ignorant flatterers, to whom he listened, and for whom his affection was so great, that he often acted in compliance with their wishes against his own conviction.* If Bolivar had acted ac-

* See chapter XIII.

cording to his own judgment, even the interest of his country would probably in many instances have been promoted.

In the absence of general Bolivar, Dr. Roscio was received by the president of the council of government, Zea, in the manner he deserved. During his stay he made many friends; he appears to be one of the editors of, or writers for, the *Courier of Angostura*, a Gazette which was protected by Zea, and for which he sometimes furnished articles himself. This concurrence excited a kind of rivalry between these distinguished men. As the Dr. announced his principles strongly and clearly, and wrote in a superior style, Zea began to grow jealous of him, and to receive him coolly, and to be reserved in their conversations. Every one was anxious to be introduced to Dr. Roscio, while the house of Mr. Zea became less frequented. Bolivar, on his arrival, received him as an old acquaintance, having known him at Caracas in 1811-12. The Dr. presented Mr. Jones's letter, which made the desired impression upon the supreme chief. Possessed of an agreeable and persuasive eloquence; and supported by an unsullied reputation, Roscio, in various private conversations with Bolivar, spoke with the warmth of a feeling heart, in favor of the principles advanced in the letter of his friend Jones. He was strongly seconded by the doctor, Romon Cadix, and Palacio Faxar, men of talents, and respected by the supreme chief. The result of these exertions was, that general Bolivar consented to convene a Congress. He appeared to be satisfied of the necessity of changing his measures. But when he came to act, he allowed the congress very limited powers only; still reserving to himself the supreme authority. Whether he did this in compliance with the wishes of his flatterers, or was directed by his own ambition is uncertain. These probably coincided. His new plan, however, evinced a total ignorance of the principles of modern republican free governments, and of the excellent treatises extant upon the subject. It was of course unsatisfactory to the enlightened patriots. He had drawn out with his own hand, a pretty extensive project of a constitution, which he proposed to introduce into Venezuela. In this project he proposed to institute a house of Lords, and a house of Representatives. The members of the Senate or house of Lords, were to have the title of Baron, Count, Marquis, or Duke &c. These offices to be held for life, and titles to be hereditary. From this plan, obviously in imitation of the

British constitution ; it is plain that he wished to establish a permanent aristocracy.

Bolivar was so enchanted with his plan, that he privately communicated the project to the council of government, and I regret to say, the president Zea highly approved of it. But Dr. Roscio, being informed of the project, consulted with his friends Cadix and Faxar, and they united in such representations to the supreme chief, as brought him, at first to hesitate, and then to suspend the execution of his plan. The Dr. immediately wrote to Jones, stating the plan to him, and he, by an eloquent and persuasive letter directed to the supreme chief, prevailed with him to reject the aristocratical part of his project.

It was resolved to convene a congress, and Bolivar, a second time, had the merit of subjecting his own ardent desire to the superior wisdom of his friends. These two instances, heretofore known to but few persons, render it probable, that if Bolivar had chosen for his friends, men of information and integrity, instead of surrounding himself with vile flatterers and ignorant and selfish advisers, he would have been a very different character.

Dr. Roscio and others of his ablest and best friends, are dead. He appears now to be left to flatterers and ignorant and selfish advisers ; and, if he continues to be so, much longer, will destroy himself, or his country.

Upon the assembling of the deputies of congress the installation of this assembly took place, the 15th February, under the most solemn and imposing ceremonies, which it would be useless to detail here. Franc. Ant. Zea was elected president, and general Bolivar entrusted with the executive power.

The appointment of this congress changed the form, but did not affect the substance of Bolivar's government. Zea, an honest and virtuous man, was nevertheless weak and entirely devoted, even yet, to the general, who by private intrigue procured him to be named president of the new congress. Bolivar knew that Zea was altogether unable to command the army, and that he had not friends and adherents enough to pretend to govern the republic. The election was made by calling on the members by name and not by secret balloting ; the supreme chief was present. Some 10 or 12 deputies proposed Mr. Zea, others dared not to oppose the nomination ; and so Mr. Zea was unanimously elected against the secret wishes of many, probably a majority of them.

On this occasion general Bolivar gave a new proof of his love of power and distinction. In his proclamation, dated Angostura, February 20th, he said ; “The general congress of Venezuela has taken the supreme power, which, until this day, you had confided to me ; I have returned it to the people, by rendering it into the hands of their legitimate representatives. The national sovereignty has honored me by putting into my hands the executive power, with the title of Provisional President of Venezuela. Venezuelans ! I feel myself unable to govern you : I have often said so to your representatives, who in spite of my well grounded refusal, have forced me to command you.

Soldiers of the liberating army ! my only ambition has always been to partake with you the dangers which you incur in defence of the republic.”

The name of Congress made a favorable impression upon public opinion ; and the new organised government was powerfully supported by the inhabitants of Venezuela : so that general Bolivar succeeded in collecting an army of from 13 to 14000 men, which enabled him to act on the offensive.

He received from England, besides the legion of which I have spoken, large cargoes of arms, ammunition, warlike stores &c. Numbers of French, German, Polish, and other officers came to Angostura and Margarita, to offer their services, with sanguine hopes of advancement and fortune and of enjoying the honor of being admitted into the ranks of those who fought for the sacred cause of liberty and independence ! General Bolivar received them well. His polite and easy manners, when in good humor, have fascinated thousands, who were unacquainted with his profound dissimulation, and his concealed jealousy of strangers. But when these foreigners found that they received neither pay nor good rations, and were looked upon by the native troops, among whom they served, with a jealous eye, while they were obliged to traverse marshy or arid plains ; their zeal changed to disappointment and dejection. Many retired in a pitiable condition, as the inhabitants of Jamaica, St. Thomas', Curacao &c. can testify, from 1819 to the present time.

The great exertions of the patriot commanders, and the reviving spirit of the people, excited sanguine hopes that the campaign of this year would be the last, and that the Spaniards could now be driven from the country ; and an end be put to this distressing war.

General Bolivar, anxious to efface the unfortunate campaign of 1818, conceived for this year an excellent plan, which in good hands must have succeeded. He made a display of an intention to attack Caracas, and free Venezuela from the Spanish yoke. By this he induced Morillo to weaken New Grenada and concentrate his forces upon this point; whilst Bolivar turning suddenly, united his forces with the numerous Guerillas, and marched, in different columns, against Bogota.

He had sent general Sanander forward to prepare every thing, as I have mentioned; he had revived the public spirit by gaining advantages over the enemy; so that he might easily have raised the inhabitants of these 22 provinces against their oppressors, whom they hated.

Bolivar, sure of retaining his supreme power, named Zea as vice president of the government during his absence, sent general Urdaneta and Valdes with about 20 officers, to the island of Margarita, to organise the troops which were there, and departed February the 27th, for the army. He had with him a numerous and brilliant staff, and 2000 men! He directed his march towards the left shores of the river Araura, to join general Paez, who had about 3000 Llaneros, all mounted.

General Bolivar named San Iago Marino commander-in-chief of the corps under Bermudes, Monagas, Zarasa, Roxas, and Montes, about 6000 men strong, and ordered him to march against Barcelona and Cumana; and, if they should refuse to surrender to take them by assault. These corps marched in February.

Besides these forces, the patriots had in the seaports of Pompatar and Juan Griego, in the island of Margarita, 12 armed vessels, and among them 1 corvette, 4 brigs, and 3 hermaphrodite brigs; the rest were schooners manned with Englishmen and Americans. On the Orinceo, eight vessels were constructed, consisting chiefly of gun boats, well manned and armed.

Against these forces which threatened his total destruction, the Spanish general Morillo, had neglected nothing to put himself in a good state of defence. In January, he departed from Valencia at the head of 5000 men, and ordered San Fernando de Apure, where La Torre commanded, and where Morillo established his head quarters, to be fortified. Soon afterwards, general Paez having evacuated the city, retired towards the river Araura, to effect his junction with general Bolivar.

Morillo moved forward, and established his camp before the borough of Caujaca.

General Morillo hearing that many English troops had already joined the patriots, became apprehensive that their numbers would become so great, that it would be impossible for him to resist them. He, therefore, issued a proclamation directed "to the chiefs, officers, and privates of his Britanic Majesty actually serving with the insurgents," to induce them to desert to the Spanish army. Among other things he said, "the government of his Catholic Majesty, and I, particularly, have been informed of the manner in which many subjects of his Britanic Majesty, have been seduced in England by Mendes and other traitors, to unite their fortune with those who styled themselves Independents of South America. The revolutionary agents have represented to them that there existed a republican government, well established laws, armies, and inhabitants who have voluntarily submitted to such a republic. By such illusions many have been seduced to leave their country with the intention of establishing themselves there and, obtaining as a recompense for their services, property, fortune and honor! But how cruelly have they been deceived.

Englishmen! It is to you that I address myself; to you who already know this famous personage (Simon Bolivar) whom you compare in England with a Washington; but now that you have seen this hero of this miserable republic, his troops, his generals, and the crazy fools which compose its government, you know you have been grossly deceived. You serve under the orders of a man who is in every respect very insignificant and you have united yourselves with a horde of banditti, who are known by their cruel deeds. I know there are many Englishmen and othes Foreigners who have been deceived, who cannot separate themselves from this unjust cause, for want of means: I offer and promise, therefore, to those who voluntarily present themselves to the army under my command, perfect security for their persons, whether they may choose to be admitted into the service of his Catholic Majesty or to retire to any other country. In either case they shall be in safety.

General Head-quarters at Achaguas, March 26th, 1818.

(Signed) PABLO MORILLO."

A decree of Ferdinand VII, dated Madrid, January 14th, 1819, and addressed to the minister of foreign relations, differs pretty widely from this proclamation of his representative on the

Main. His catholic majesty, the protector of liberal opinions, and the benefactor of humanity, says, in his decree, "That all strangers taken with arms in their hands, and serving in the cause of the insurgents, within his possessions, and all who have furnished arms for them, shall be condemned to death, and their property, being within the jurisdiction of his Catholic majesty, shall be confiscated."

On the 20th of March, general Bolivar united his forces with those of general Paez, who he made acquainted with his new plan of operations against new Grenada, requesting the support of his cavalry of Llaneros. Paez told him, that he was ready to follow him, but that he doubted whether his Llaneros could be prevailed upon to do so. It is notorious that these Indians dislike to fight at a distance from their plains; and in spite of the urgent entreaties, both of Bolivar and Paez, they refused, and declared that if force were used to compel them, they would desert, and return to their native plains where they were used to fight.

The two generals were obliged to yield to their refusal, and appeased them not without difficulty. This act of insubordination, and the consequent total want of cavalry, greatly dispirited the troops of general Bolivar.

Before his departure, he and Paez were attacked by a Spanish column, under colonel Paeira, to whose support the forces under Morillo came soon after; and on the 27th of March, an action took place, a little way from Trapiche de La Gamaua, where the patriots were beaten. In their retreat they were greatly harrassed, the Spaniards following them along the right bank of the river Araura, during the 29th and 31st of March, and the 1st and 2d of April. General Morillo, in his official report, ridiculed the disposition of general Bolivar. He said "the want of boats, which were unluckily destroyed in the river Apure, hindered me from crossing the Araura, in order to finish the destruction of the forces under Bolivar and Paez, who were advancing, as they said, to take the capital in two days, a rumor spread by Bolivar, when he departed from Guayana with his famous reinforcement of Englishmen, &c."

But Morillo's triumph lasted not long. Bolivar and Paez obtained more troops, and marched against Morillo, whose head quarters were at Achaguas. They attacked him on the 15th of April, and after a warm combat, Morillo was totally routed, with the loss of about 1200 men, and was compelled to retreat, with the remainder of his troops, to Calabozo. The

colonel Donato Paez, brother of the general, destroyed 36 Spanish gun boats, and took 18 pieces of cannon of large calibre.

The troops under the Spanish general La Torre, were also routed, and compelled to make their retreat along the plains of Aragua, and joined their general-in-chief in Calabozo. The consequence of these two victories was the occupation of Barinas by the patriots, which opened to them the way into New Grenada.

Morillo again united a force, of 6000 men, and attempted to invade the plains of Apure, and to avail himself of the absence of Bolivar, who had been in the province of Barinas to recruit, and to unite with the English troops, which had directed their march towards this point. General Paez cautiously endeavored to avoid a battle, and to draw the enemy into the interior of the plains, that he might afterwards cut off their retreat. In this short campaign, Paez manœuvred with such skill and success, that he harrassed and even beat various detachments of the enemy, took and killed more than 1500 of them, and cut off the convoys, provisions, and other aids intended for the army of Morillo, who was at last compelled to retreat to the island of Achaguas.

General Bolivar arrived in May, with his troops of foreigners, at Nutrias, where he allowed them some rest. Paez, with about 2000 cavalry and 800 English infantry, observed, and besieged Morillo in Achaguas. He even sent strong parties towards Calabozo and San Carlos, to observe what was transacting in this part of the country.

If Bolivar had possessed ordinary knowledge of the military art—if he had united his and Paez's troops with those of Marino, he could have destroyed Morillo's forces at a blow. He could have cut him off from all means of supply, and forced him to hazard an attack, or to perish by famine, or capitulate. Instead of this, he only observed the Spaniards in Achagua, without making any attempt against them. When Morillo saw this, he united his forces, placed himself at their head, and opening his way through the camp of the enemy, arrived without any considerable loss, in June, at Caracas, whence he immediately detached two battalions, to reinforce the places of Cumana and Barcelona.

Meanwhile, general Marino reinforced himself daily at the Pao of Barcelona, preparing to attack the Spanish colonel Aldama. Bermudes closely besieged Cumana, and Urdaneta

was destined to act in unison with general English, and the English troops arrived with him at Margarita, upon one of the points on the eastern coast of Venezuela.

This expedition, called the expedition of the foreigners, departed the 13th of July, from Margarita, in 25 armed and transport vessels. On board the squadron were 1400 English and Hanoverian troops, and about 1000 sailors commanded, in chief, by general Urdaneta. They debarked on the coast near Barcelona, and after effecting their debarkation the squadron was directed towards Cumana, in order more closely to blockade the place. Marino after having routed colonel Aldama, on the 12th June, near Mechispeco, joined the forces of Sedenó, Zarasa, Monagas, Roxas, Bermudes and Thomas Montilla, uniting his own forces with theirs in one encampment near San Diego of Caburtica, where the English troops, under Urdaneta, were daily expected. From that time, every one was satisfied that such an imposing force, of more than 13,000 men strong, would be more than sufficient to conquer Cumana, Barcelona, Caracas, and the whole country of Venezuela. The patriot chieftains were so certain of success that they detached 2000 men towards Cucuta, in New Grenada, to reinforce general Sanander, (who, at various times, had obtained some troops, and more arms,) in order to strengthen and encourage the patriots, who, since his arrival, had not ceased to join him, and he had already penetrated as far as Sagamosa, not far from the capital of Bogota.

The English troops, under Urdaneta, instead of uniting with the forces of San Iago Marino, near Cumana, debarked, as I have stated, not far from Barcelona. It has been said, that this evil course was ordered by general Rafael Urdaneta, to avoid acting under general Marino, whom he despised, and from acting under whose orders, he had ever been solicitous to keep himself. Urdaneta, too, was jealous of general English, on account of his great authority and influence over the English troops, who, very naturally, came more ready to obey him than Urdaneta. He, therefore, did every thing to counteract him. As soon as their debarkation was effected, a strong Spanish column opposed their advance into the interior of the province, and having no provisions, they embarked again on board the Spanish squadron, the 3d of August. They sailed towards Cumana, and debarked near it, at Bordoncos, which the Spaniards had fortified. General Urdaneta, without waiting for the forces under Marino, ordered an attack upon Cumana, where he

was repulsed by the garrison. On the 8th of August the English troops attacked with the bayonet, and in four different charges, which they made with the utmost bravery, were again repulsed with great loss. The greatest part of these heroic troops perished afterwards, before a small battery called Agua Santa. Part of them fell on the field of battle, and some at Maturin, where they retired after their defeat. As this city was entirely ruined, they found but scanty means of subsistence, and perished miserably for want of food, the effects of fatigue and the climate. General English retired to the island of Margarita disgusted with such a service, and particularly with the behaviour of Urdaneta towards him and his troops. The squadron directed its course towards the same island.

Thus ended this expedition, from which the patriots justly expected great success, and in which the English troops were uselessly sacrificed, as there is good reason to believe, by the ignorance and jealousy of general Urdaneta.

Among the foreigners who came with general English, was a major, named Guillemore, an engineer, and an officer of distinguished merit. He directed the fortifications of Santa Rosa, a fort which protected the small port of Juan Griego, on the island of Margarita, which Morilla could never take, and which caused his entire defeat in this island, as I have already related. Major Guillemore was entirely opposed to an attack upon Cumana, and spoke with warmth and eloquence, to show that the attack must prove unsuccessful. Urdaneta treated him harshly, and, though he was supported by the most reasonable representations of general English himself, Urdaneta obstinately persisted in ordering the attack. The consequences were as I have related. When the result was known, Urdaneta, Bermudes, Marino, and some other native chieftains, had the baseness to exclaim loudly against *these foreigners*, and to call them cowards. They most impudently imputed to general English the mischievous consequences of the ignorance and obstinacy of general Urdaneta.

General English was an enthusiast in the cause of civil liberty, and was a brave officer. He died of a broken heart, in consequence of the treatment he received from Urdaneta, and of the loss of so many of his brave companions, by the jealousy and meanness of the Spaniards. He died at Margarita, destitute of almost every thing, and lamenting his engagement in such a service. Major Guillemore retired, with the same opinion of the service.

The patriots succeeded at last in getting possession of Barcelona, on the 5th August. General Urdaneta found no more than forty men acting in the fortified charity house. Urdaneta and Bermudes, with their united forces of more than 2000 men, were engaged about two months, in getting possession of an ill fortified Spanish garrison, posted at a single house rather than a fortification, and consisting of less than an hundred men, and these became destitute of food and munitions of war. This fact may afford a pretty just notion of the military skill of Urdaneta and Paez.

Urdaneta ordered the forty Spaniards, found acting in the charity house, to be shot, by way of retaliation, for the following Spanish cruelty. When the patriots approached Barcelona, lieutenant-colonel Gorin, who commanded the Spaniards in the city, sent a detachment of thirty cavalry, to reconnoitre the enemy, who marched towards the suburbs of the city, without encountering any opposition. In the night, this detachment surprised an advanced guard of six men, commanded by a sergeant, and put them to the sword before they could give the alarm. They advanced rapidly towards the house where general Urdaneta was sleeping. They surprised his guard, commanded by an English officer, a lieutenant, and killed them, but spared the officer, whom they disarmed and threatened to cut in pieces, if he were not still. They then stuffed a handkerchief into his mouth, and two Spaniards fastened him to the tails of their horses. Urdaneta was awakened by the noise, escaped through a back door of the house, and gave the alarm to his troops. The Spaniards were obliged to retire, and departed at full gallop, so that their prisoner was literally torn to pieces alive!

In June, general Bolivar left general Paez for the purpose of penetrating into the heart of New Grenada with a very strong column. He rejoined the latter, and endeavored to make himself master of the province of Barinas, in order to cover himself on this side. Bolivar found the enemy in the valley of Samagoso, in the province of Tunja. He had 2000 infantry, of which the greater part were European troops, and 500 cavalry. The Spanish general Barasino had about the same number. The battle, fought the 1st of July, was warm and obstinate. The English, at last, decided the combat, by a vigorous charge, which forced the enemy to retire in great disorder. Barasino soon reinforced himself, and, on the 23d of the same month, attacked general Bolivar at Patuno de Berg, near the

capital of the province of Tunja. He was defeated a second time, with the loss of his artillery, baggage, and many of his troops, among whom were his staff officers. A considerable number of deserters, principally cavalry, came over to the patriots.

General Bolivar proclaimed martial law, in virtue of which all the inhabitants of New Grenada capable of serving were compelled to bear arms and join his troops, under the penalty of capital punishment. His army soon increased to 3000 infantry and 1000 cavalry. With these he marched towards the capital, Bogota. He found general Baesino at a large farm called the Venta Guernada, sixty miles from the capital. As the ground was hilly, and covered with bushes, some of the English officers advised general Bolivar to use stratagem, which he did successfully. He placed most of his infantry in ambush, and ordered his cavalry to gain, unseen, the rear of the enemy, so that his battle line presented a front of small extent. The enemy made the attack with great bravery; but at this moment the infantry in ambush, and the cavalry, rushed forward and attacked his flank and rear. The Spaniards were routed with a loss of more than 1000 men, and were not rallied until they reached Mompox. This battle, of the 7th August, decreed the fate of New Grenada, and was attributed to the European troops.

The viceroy, Samana, received intelligence of this battle in the night of the 8th; and Bogota being an open and defenceless city, he gave orders to evacuate it immediately. In the morning of the 9th, he, with some hundred persons, left the capital.

His retreat was so rapid, that he arrived at Honda in thirty hours; a journey which usually occupies three days. He left at Bogota half a million of dollars, in silver money. Bolivar made his triumphal entry the 12th of August, and ordered the city of Ocana to be taken possession of on the 17th.

On the 28th, the viceroy arrived at Tamburg, and sent expresss to Morillo to inform him what had happened. He also sent general La Torre (the same who behaved so ill at the battle of San Felipe, and lost Guayana) with various Spanish troops to New Grenada, to take command of the royal forces in that province. The Spaniards arriving at Mompox, worked day and night to entrench themselves.

In Venezuela the scene of war was too frequently changed to afford any thing interesting to the reader. Bloody struggles

resulted in nothing. The Spaniards driven from one place, occupied another. They were routed, and recruited again. The case was the same with the patriots. War raged in every corner of Venezuela, without producing any effect, important to either party.

I will now proceed to events which took place in the congress at Angostura, during the absence of general Bolivar. There was in congress a strong party of true patriots and republicans. These men were disquieted by the devotion of their president to the will of Bolivar. This, together with the decline of his health, led him to refer every measure to headquarters. Much business was left wholly undone. More was delayed. The general dissatisfaction had risen already to a high pitch. Some members told him frankly, that if he did not change his course they must consider it their duty to procure his removal and to put another into his place. Some reproached him with vile submission to Bolivar. He was just then engaged in framing a code of laws for the republic, and was unusually regardless of the executive business. He was compelled to resign, and general Arismendy was elected in his place, as vice president of congress, and president of the republic, in the absence of general Bolivar. This happened in the month of October.

As soon as Arismendy was in power, he procured a decree, that admiral Brion no longer deserved the confidence of the republic: that he was, therefore, dismissed, and that, in his stead his brother in law, commodore Toly was appointed Admiral. Arismendy ordered Brion before congress to give an account of his conduct: and sent to Toly, the ribbon of the order of the Libertadores.

Meanwhile Bolivar succeeded in freeing New Grenada. And all the provinces having risen in favor of independence, the Spaniards were obliged to retreat and shut themselves up in Mompox, which, as well as Santa Martha, and Carthagena, they had fortified.

Bolivar, who never lost sight of Caracas, in his usual hasty manner, which he mistakes for despatch, settled all business in Bogota. He ordained a kind of congress of which he was the regulator. He left general Sanander, commander-in-chief, and general Anzoatigui, one of his most devoted flatterers, as second in command, and directed his march towards Pamplona, where he arrived the 20th of September, and remained about two months, occupied in festivals and balls.

He departed at last with about two thousand men, for Guadalupe. About 800 of these deserted. They had been taken by force from their families, and were, besides, greatly disgusted with the imperious manner of this *Caraguin General*, as they called Bolivar.

The general arrived the 3d November at Montecal in Venezuela, where he had directed the patriot chieftains of that province to assemble with their troops. He had with him about three millions of dollars, which had been collected from the inhabitants of New Grenada, in taxes, and by forced contributions. He is said to have extorted a formal promise from the different authorities in the province, to send him regularly every month, a million of dollars.

The troops, however, were never regularly paid, and the foreigners became the more dissatisfied when they found, that instead of being paid to them and others, who had dearly earned it, it disappeared, by going into the hands of flatterers, and the officers who more immediately surrounded the general. These fared sumptuously, whilst the army was straightened for want of pay, food, and clothing. Many hundred of these foreigners were worn down in this march by heat, fatigue, and want of food. These were neither carried on, nor left provided for, and, of course, perished miserably.

As soon as Morillo heard of this numerous collection of troops, he gave orders to evacuate San Fernando de Apure, united his different detachments, and concentrated his forces at San Carlos. The Spaniards again lost the province of Venezuela, and various families left the country, and embarked at Laguaira and Porto Cabello for the West Indies and the United States.

The patriots had again, in Venezuela, a force of about 9000 men. Among them were 3000 English, Irish, and Hanoverian troops, of which many had lately arrived at Angostura and Margarita. They now marched towards the plains of Calabozo, so that the head quarters of both were about two days march asunder. Every one was now again certain that the Spaniards, who had not above 4500 men, and of those, two thirds natives, would at last be driven forever out of the territory of Venezuela.

The patriots had nothing more to do than to advance and act, and they were sure of success. They knew that the Spaniards had lost much of their confidence, that the native troops were kept from passing to the other side, only by their Spanish officers. But all these advantages, the benefit of the

country, and the course which general Bolivar pretended to defend, were overlooked in the sad tidings of the change that had taken place at the seat of government. On receiving these despatches Bolivar was thunderstruck. His own personal welfare, and the gratification of his personal feelings, had always and every where been preeminent with him. The cause of freedom was but his tool. Instead of attacking the enemy with his 3000 well disciplined European troops, which were dreaded by the Spaniards on the Main, he suffered himself to be overcome with the news of Arismendy's advancement; and in consequence of it, at last, took a resolution, the result of which was that the war was protracted for five years, and the lives of thousands sacrificed to his love of power.

With these 3000 troops, among whom were his body guard, he marched towards Angostura, or rather, against Arismendy. He knew that Arismendy, after all that had passed between them, would not be his friend; and there was no prospect of his being able to bring Arismendy to be, as Zea had been, his devoted minister. He knew too, that Arismendy was a decided republican, and would probably use all his power to establish the authority of congress, and to limit the power of the supreme chief. He knew also, that Arismendy was a far more able military man than himself, and that this was manifested to the country, by his wonderful defence of the island of Margarita. He knew that Arismendy was a brave, enterprising and ambitious chieftain; and it was perfectly natural for Bolivar to suspect him of a design to obtain the first office in the republic. Arismendy's conduct and services had made him many adherents, while Bolivar's cowardice and misconduct left him, as support, only his immediate dependents and flatterers. In this condition, he felt more anxiety than he had ever appeared to feel, at any time before. Various persons have assured me, that for 24 hours he appeared like a madman; speaking to none; looking dejected; lying in his hammock; then jumping out of it, and pacing his room.

At last, he decided to leave the command of his remaining forces to general Paez, and to march himself, with his best troops, towards Angostura.

General Bolivar, with his 3000 chosen men, fully devoted to him, arrived, the 14th of November, unexpectedly, at the seat of government, at Angostura, in the province of Guayana. Arismendy, having only about 600 men, and these poorly clad, armed and disciplined was obliged, of course, to submit to the

imposing force of Bolivar. He was exiled from Guayana and ordered to retire to his native island, Margarita. Previous to his formal dismissal from the service, he was condemned to lead a private life, and to come no more upon the Main.

It was not that Arismendy was less dangerous, in the view of Bolivar, than Piar had been, that his life was spared. But he knew that Arismendy had many friends in congress and in the army, and that the brave spirited inhabitants of Margarita, would rise in his defence; and that the greater part of the Llaneros were his friends, as they were the friends of republican government. Bolivar, therefore, listened to the advice of Dr. Roscio, and ventured not to take the life of Arismendy.

Mr. Zea was reinstalled President of Congress, and Vice-President of the Republic.

Dr. Roscio, and various other true friends of a free republican government, now united, in representing to general Bolivar, the instability of the government he had established; and, after long, earnest and eloquent discussions, at last prevailed upon him to consent to the establishment of a congress, upon a new and more extensive plan.

The conquest of New Grenada, except Santa Martha, Carthagena and Mompox, required a national representation. Those provinces of Venezuela, which were in the power of the patriots, were in the same situation. The inhabitants of both were anxious to have a congress, and a republican government. It was therefore urged to Bolivar to unite these two great provinces under one congress, and to call the new government, "The Republic of Colombia." This memorable act is generally attributed to the enlightened mind of the deceased Dr. German Roscio, of whom I have already spoken. It is entitled, "Fundamental Law of the Republic of Colombia."

CHAPTER XIX.

Events from the Proclamation of the Fundamental Law of the Republic of Colombia, December 1819, until the Armistice between General Bolivar and Morillo, November 1820.

After having reinstalled Mr. Zea, general Bolivar, on the 25th December, 1819, left Angostura, with a numerous corps of troops, and directed his march toward the plains of Apure. He arrived, the 20th of January, at San Fernando de Apure, its capital, where he learned that the cause of independence was declining in New Grenada. I have stated, that before his departure from Santa de La Bogota, general Bolivar settled the pending business in his hasty manner. *His manner* has, from 1813 to the present day, consisted in pretending to do every thing by himself; to be soldier, legislator, and administrator. He seems to be unable to understand how his supremacy can be retained in any other way. With his very limited talents, and constitutional aversion to serious business, his way has kept every thing in confusion, in every department, particularly that of the finances. Agriculture, commerce and every branch of industry, have been kept down and destroyed by heavy taxes, charges at the custom house, forced contributions, and the like. No officer, civil or military, of whatever grade, could count upon receiving his regular salary, or pay. These men, of course, let slip no opportunity of defrauding the public, or of taking bribes. Governors of provinces, and all the military men, who had it in their power, extorted from the people, besides their taxes, a proportional sum for the support of their persons, their troops and retinue. What the people were unwilling to give, was, very often, taken from them by force. The capricious decisions of an individual, united with the vexations inflicted by civil and military officers upon the Grenadans, who had done so much for Bolivar, and who were entitled to better treatment, fell so heavily upon them, that they compared their present distressed condition, with what it had been under the Spanish government. Many of them preferred the latter, and deserted, and joined the Spaniards, under La Torre and

Calzada. Calzada seeing his forces suddenly increased by these desertions, again took the offensive, and was preparing to march against the capital of Bogota. La Torre, hearing that the patriots had retired in haste, from Los Publicos, advanced towards the plains of Guarta, to support the movements of Calzada, and to cut off the retreat of the enemy who were in these plains. The rapid progress of the Spaniards in Grenada, caused great alarm among the members of the provisional government established by Bolivar, and preparations were made for retreating.

General Bolivar heard these tidings while he was in San Fernando de Apure. He determined to march again, at the head of 4000 men, against the enemy in that province. He left his head quarters the 26th of January, and directed his march towards Cucuta. General Morillo, fearing to be attacked at San Carlos, had retired towards Valencia, intending to get into the strong hold of Porto Cabello, in case of any loss, or sudden attack. The departure of Bolivar, with his 4000 troops, gave him a second opportunity to reinforce himself.

Meanwhile, general Bolivar was marching towards Cucuta, in Grenada. General Paez, entrusted with the chief command of the army in Venezuela, established his head quarters at Maturin, where he collected an army of 12,000 men, in which were 3000 Europeans, chiefly of the Irish legion of Devereaux. Contrary to all expectation, general Pacz remained at Maturin, without attempting to attack Morillo, or even moving against him. Morillo, therefore, returned again to San Carlos, where he recruited considerable, as he had done before at Valencia. The spirit of the Spaniards was raised, by tidings of a formidable expedition, fitted out by order of the king, at Cadiz, under the command of general Henry O'Donnell, (count of Abisbal.) This expedition had been ordered, in consequence of the urgent representations of general Morillo, who had sent pressing letters to the king, in which he strongly and truly stated the precarious situation of the royal cause in Spanish America. General Morillo had received great assistance from the commerce of Barcelona, Cadiz, Malaga, Alicante, &c., which suffered exceedingly from the war in the colonies. The richest merchants of these places, offered the king large sums of money, and support of every kind, if he would send a force sufficient to put an end to the war at once. This was accepted; and, since March 1819, the greatest preparations were making in Spain to that effect. A force of 25,000 men was collected,

to be divided into two army corps, under the command of O'Donnell, one of which was destined to act against Peru; the other against the Main.

The royalists in Venezuela, who had seen how Morillo, in 1818, with far less forces, destroyed those of Bolivar, on hearing this news, doubted not the success of their cause. The patriots were indebted to colonel Guiraja's revolution in Spain, which happened a little after this time, for the destruction of an expedition which was destined to forge new chains for the inhabitants of the Spanish colonies.

General Bolivar, pressed on all sides for money, was advised to send an agent to London, for the purpose of negotiating a loan sufficient to enable him to prosecute the war with more vigor. He chose the ex-vice-president Zea, (whose place was supplied by Dr. Roscio,) and gave him full and ample forces. He departed in March 1820, for St. Thomas's, whence he embarked for London.

Until the latter end of March 1820, the positions of the two armies in Venezuela, afforded nothing important. The operations of the patriots, however, afford satisfactory proof of the narrow capacities of their leaders. At Achaguas, general Pacz had about 4000 men. After Morillo's evacuation of San Carlos, Urdaneta had, at this place, 3500 men. Bermudes had, at Maturin, 1600 men. Zarasa and Sedenio had 800 men at Guebrada Stonda. Monagas and Diego had 1000 men in the province of Barcelona, without mentioning the numerous guerrillas and smaller parties of armed patriots, which had no fixed camps. In the island of Margarita, there were 1200 Irish troops, and with Bolivar 4000 chosen men. With all these mighty means, they were not able to expel Morillo and his far inferior force, from the country at once; even though he was so hated, and the Spanish name so generally detested. It is a fact well known, that Morillo had not at that time, 2000 European Spaniards at his disposal, that were able to take the field. All the rest of his troops were natives, and he could place but little reliance upon them. He knew they would desert him upon the first defeat. From this diminutive force a deduction must still be made of as many as were necessary to the several places held by the Spaniards. In addition to these disadvantages, the Spanish colonial finances were deranged, the army were in want of every thing, and discouraged by the failure of O'Donnell's expedition. All these circumstances united, would have ensured the success of the patriots under

leaders of ordinary skill and talent. Instead of attacking the Spaniards vigorously and at once, they wearied and discouraged their own troops by marches and countermarches, until desertions into the interior became frequent and their troops greatly diminished.

In this campaign general Bolivar committed his usual fault ; that of scattering his forces. While he marched with four thousand men towards Cucuta, and ordered general Paez to attack Morillo, and get possession of the capital, Caracas, he directed a third expedition against Santa Martha, and accomplished nothing. Some circumstances of this third expedition are worthy of remark.

Ever since the year 1813, colonel Marino Montilla had been one of the greatest enemies of general Bolivar. He served against Bolivar in Carthagená, and challenged him to a duel in 1816, at Aux Cayes, as I have related. He had engaged to go with general Mina, in his expedition against the Spaniards in Mexico, and was prevented only by sickness. He came to Baltimore, and hearing there of the success of the cause, and that Bolivar was at the head of the government, he desired several of his friends, who were going to the Main, to exert themselves to effect a reconciliation between him and the supreme chief. He wrote for the same purpose to his intimate friend, admiral Brion, who was much attached to him. Montilla, at length succeeded, and came over to Angostura, where he had a long, and, to him, very satisfactory interview with the supreme chief, who advanced him to the rank of colonel. He was sent, soon after, to the island of Margarita with 80,000 dollars, to accelerate the sailing of the squadron, and pay arrears. He was directed to have an understanding with admiral Brion at Pompatar ; and with general Urdaneta, who was destined to command, in chief, the expedition against Santa Martha. From that time, Marino Montilla was entirely devoted to general Bolivar.

General Urdaneta marched, at the head of 4000 men, from San Carlos towards the province of Maracaybo, to act in unison with the troops expected from Margarita. The squadron departed from Pompatar, a seaport of the latter island, in the beginning of March, having on board about 1200 men, chiefly European troops. They arrived at Rio Hacha the 12th of March, and took possession of the place without resistance. It is a small and poor place, affording no resources whatever. It has a small fort, and is an open seaport, not far from Santa

Martha. Montilla, who commanded these troops, expected to be joined by some Indians from the interior, who had promised to go with him against Santa Martha.

Colonel Montilla departed from Rio Hacha, in April, and directed his march towards the valley Dupari, where he arrived on the 4th, with 1000 English, and 500 Creole troops, which had joined him. The latter were furnished with arms, brought from Margarita. After some success, colonel Montilla was stopped in his further operations, by a sudden mutiny of his English troops. Among the correspondence found in the baggage taken from the enemy, was a letter from the governor of Santa Martha to the Spanish general Lima, whom Montilla had beaten in three successive actions. It was stated in the letter, that general Urdaneta was advancing with 3000 men, from Ocana, upon Santa Martha, and urged him to join him as soon as possible. Montilla, therefore, determined to march and join general Urdaneta, but was prevented by the refusal of his English troops to march any further, until all arrears were paid them. Montilla used every effort, promising them more than their due; but in vain. The insubordination was complete, and Montilla was forced to abandon his march, and embark on board the squadron, under the command of admiral Brion, who remained at anchor before Rio Hacha, with 13 vessels; having on board six months' provisions, 5000 muskets, and a large quantity of ammunition, and other warlike stores.

The governors of Carthagena and Santa Martha, threatened with an attack, took the strongest measures of defence, and the latter sent his wife and children to Havana.

At this time the Main was surprised by news of the revolution at Cadiz, effected by colonel Antonio Guiraja, in January of the same year, 1820, in consequence of which, the Spanish constitution, of 1812, was again introduced, in which the inquisition and arbitrary power were abolished. This saved the cause of independence in the Spanish colonies; and the formidable expedition under O'Donnel was disbanded.

General Morillo, who had placed his hopes in these forces, refused, for several days, to speak to any one. At length he yielded to necessity, and the constitution was proclaimed with great solemnity, in May and June, at Caracas, Lagaira, and other places in the power of the Spaniards, on the Main. He was now confident that the introduction of the constitution into the country, would make a favorable impression on the patriots. He, therefore, published two proclamations; one of the

king, to the inhabitants of the continent in America ; wherein he said : "What can you ask more ? Hear the voice of your king and your father." The second was from general Morillo, to the army, dated Caracas, June 8th, 1820.

Morillo sent a circular letter to the different governors of the West India Islands, and to the Spanish minister at Washington, requesting them to order the insertion in the public papers, of another proclamation from himself, to the emigrants from the Main, dated Caracas, June 12th, by which he invites them to return to their own country ; and promises oblivion of past, and protection, tranquility and prosperity for the future. "Your security is sacred and inviolable ; it is founded upon the will of the king. It is in unison with my honor, my word, and my desire !"

All these proclamations, and the earnest endeavors of the king and general, were in vain. They were convinced of the duplicity and cruelty of their Spanish leaders, and Morillo was again reduced to depend upon his own means and exertions.

We have seen how colonel Montilla was obliged to embark in consequence of the dissatisfaction of the foreign troops, arising from want of pay and subsistence, and from the general ill treatment they received. Montilla's hatred against foreigners, seems to have been greatest against Irishmen. More than 500 left the service, and went to Kingston in Jamaica, where the worthy inhabitants rivalled each other in relieving the sufferers, who came among them in a most destitute condition. More than a third part of them died in the hospital, in consequence of fatigues and deprivations, which they suffered in the service of the patriots.

This expedition, directed against Santa Martha and Carthagena, to open a free communication with Bogota, and to get command of the river Magdalena, greatly weakened the force directed against Caracas and the Spaniards, who had again united many troops in the centre of New Grenada. It ended with the burning of Rio Hacha, and cost 700 men and a great deal of money.

On the 10th of June, the Colombian squadron, under admiral Brion, with the remainder of the troops, was near Santa Martha. After firing upon the batteries of this fortress, it sailed towards Savanilla, a small seaport in the neighborhood of Santa Martha, consisting of about a dozen huts. The redoubt of three pieces of artillery, was immediately taken possession of, the Spanish garrison having fled without attempting any resistance. The Colombians landed their few remaining troops,

expecting a large reinforcement, which had been announced to be coming from the river Magdalena. Colonel Montilla directed his march towards Baranquilla, Soledad and St. Stanislaus, where the Colombians were received with acclamations. Many of the inhabitants came to join the troops, and lent their aid to put Montilla in condition to besiege Santa Martha, as soon as the Margarita troops should arrive. But he had neither besieging artillery, nor other materials fit for besieging the two strongest places in New Grenada.

Admiral Brion published a proclamation, directed to the inhabitants of Carthagena, in which he exhorted them to rise against their oppressors, and join the Colombians. This had the desired effect. It roused the spirit of the inhabitants, and many hundreds came, and placed themselves under the patriotic banners.

The conquest of Carthagena was feasible and easy; inasmuch as the inhabitants, harrassed by great and constant vexations, had become disgusted with their Spanish leaders. The Spanish authorities disagreed among themselves; some desired an absolute king; others, the majority, were in favor of the constitution. The viceroy, Semano, who had taken shelter within the walls of Carthagena, and the brigadier general Cano, were both arrested, by order of the other Spanish authorities, for having opposed the proclamation of the Spanish constitution. They were dismissed from their places, and others, afterwards, elected in their stead.

The situation of Santa Martha was like that of Carthagena. In these fortresses, as in all the places in the power of the Spaniards, there existed three distinct parties among the inhabitants and the Spanish administration; the friends of independency, those of the Spanish constitution of 1812, and the friends of the ancient absolute power of the king. The Spanish brigadier, Vicente Sanchez de Lima, who, with 2700 men, was thrice beaten by Montilla and his 800; having retired to Santa Martha, put himself at the head of the friends of the Spanish constitution, and introduced it, in spite of the opposition of governor Pouas. The anarchical state of the provinces of Carthagena and Santa Martha, greatly favored the enterprise of Brion and Montilla.

But, such was the peculiar character of this war, that in the whole extent of Colombia, notwithstanding their increased moral and physieal strength, no decisive operation, nothing of

important consequence, took place. The incapacity of the supreme chief become, if possible, more apparent.

Morillo's situation was also precarious and critical. The revolution in Spain rendered any efficient reinforcement from the mother country, impossible. He was aware that the new assembly of the Cortes like those in 1811, would never consent to recognise the republic of Colombia; and would persist in the obstinacy peculiar to the Spanish character. Such recognizance was demanded by reason, policy and justice. It would have put an end to bloodshed and misery. It would have given vast advantages to Spain. The miseries of a destructive and protracted war, could have been obliterated by a treaty of defence and alliance between Colombia and Spain; and by opening a free and profitable commercial intercourse between two countries so long and so closely connected. In the government of the colonies, by the King and Cortes of Spain, neither liberality nor generous principles existed.

The total want of money and provisions in the Spanish army on the Main; long and continual marches, and the discouragement of the soldiers, who as well as their officers, could judge of their precarious situation, greatly weakened the Spanish forces. To these were added sickness and frequent desertions.

Still the Spanish chiefs flattered themselves that the people of Colombia would eventually receive the Spanish constitution, and return to their former obedience to the Spanish authorities; whilst the patriots were engaged at the congress, in active and zealous efforts, for the discussion and adoption of their own constitution by that assembly. On this subject, the following letter is worth attention. It was written by a Spanish chieftain to one of his friends at St. Thomas':

"Letters from Caracas, Lagaira, Cumana, confirm the news that two commissaries of the congress at Guayana, Messrs. Roscio and Alzura, have presented themselves before the commander of one of the royal divisions, Arana, asking leave to pass to the head quarters (of Morillo) to present a despatch to the general-in-chief, which is presumed to contain a proposal of this congress to submit to the Spanish government in case of the taking of the oath to the Spanish constitution at Caracas. This was not done until the 8th June. Commandant Arana had refused to let them pass on, but sent the dispatch to general Morillo.

The patriots are probably anxious to submit and to swear to our constitution, by following the example of Spain; to make a

virtue of necessity, which perhaps, later, it might not be in their power to do." This is a specimen of Spanish vanity and presumption. The following facts which ought to be better known, explain the expressions of the writer.

General Morillo, sensible of his critical situation had secretly sent an agent to general Bolivar to acquaint him with the change of government in Spain, and, adroitly, to sound his views and designs with regard to it. In consequence of this private communication Dr. Roscio and Alzura were sent with a letter to Morillo, with proper instructions to negotiate a treaty of peace. But the letter contained not a word relative to submission, nor to the acknowledgement of the Spanish constitution. General Bolivar, in this letter to general Morillo, grounded his proposition contained in it, upon his desire to avoid the further useless effusion of blood, hoping that, with the change of government, the minds of the Spanish leaders might change also. This blundering step of Bolivar, produced consequences most mischievous to Colombia. It was the means of gaining time by her enemies, to carry on the war four years longer; and to the destruction of at least 20,000 lives. If Bolivar had presumptuously refused to negotiate with his faithless and obstinate enemy, and had attacked him with his powerful forces, in the position Morillo then occupied, there can be no doubt but that the territory might have been forever cleared of its Spanish tyrants.

The first false step of Bolivar was duly appreciated by Morillo, and his private council. Upon the reception of Bolivar's letter, he sent two commissioners, brigadier general Thomas de Cires, and the adjutant general Jose Domingues Duarte, to Angostura. In June they left Caracas for Lagaira, whence they embarked for the Orinoco, for the purpose of proposing to the congress at Angostura their acceptance of the Spanish constitution. And, they offered to general Bolivar the station and rank of a captain-general, and to the other chieftains their respective offices and rank. But, soon after the departure of these commissioners, Morillo learned that general Bolivar was not at Angostura, but in his head quarters at Montecal, nor far from him. He, therefore, sent two other commissioners, Don Francisco Linaus, and Don Carlos Marhaddo, with a copy of his letter and proposals.

General Morillo's long letter was directed to the congress, not of Colombia, but of Guayana. He gives himself the title of Pacificator, and speaks of liberal principals, in virtue of

which he is authorised by the king, to diffuse the blessings of peace and reconciliation among a people born Spaniards, &c. &c.

At the end of this letter, which is dated June 17th 1820, he says, "the deputies would submit to the congress the basis of this reconciliation.

The two deputies of Morillo then proposed an Armistice of one month; for general Bolivar the rank of a Spanish captain-general, and the conservation of their offices and rank to all the rest. The Armistice was granted, notwithstanding that the letter of Morillo proposed only, that the congress of Colombia should acknowledge the Spanish constitution and submit to the Spanish government!

The congress answered, "Sir, the sovereign Congress extraordinarily convened to discuss the despatch of your excellency under date of June 17th at your head quarters at Caracas, stating that brigadier Don Thomas de Cires and Don Domingo Durate have been named to come to this capital in order to solicit the union of these countries with the constitutional monarchy of Spain, and that these gentlemen will explain the principles of the reconciliation proposed by the nation, resolved, the 11th of this month, in public session, that the following decree should be transmitted by me to your excellency in answer. "The sovereign congress of Colombia desirous to re-establish peace, will readily hear all propositions made by the Spanish government, under the condition that the basis of this peace be the recognition of the sovereignty and the independence of Colombia. No other shall ever be admitted, which would in any way deviate from this basis so many times proclaimed by the government and the people of the republic. The president has the honor to be &c.

FERNANDO PENALVEE,
President of the Congress.

FELIPE DELAPAINE, *Secretary.*

At the palace of congress at New Guayana, }
July 13th 1820, year 10th. }

Besides these letters written to the congress and to general Bolivar, Morillo ordered that the different generals, governors, and other Spanish commanders throughout the territories of New Grenada and Venezuela, should direct letters of the same kind to the different chieftains of Colombia.

In this manner a general correspondence was established on the whole line, but as the subject of it was the recognition of

the Spanish constitution of these Cortes, and their king, without a word of the republic of Colombia, all discerning men, saw that the object of it was to amuse the Colombians, and continue the Armistice, whilst Morillo could reinforce himself and prepare for a new campaign. The Colombians lost, by it, that opportunity of expelling their enemies.

It is proper to state here, that Morillo acted by the express order of the king; and that he was encouraged, by the advice of various Spaniards, living on the Main, who flattered themselves with the hope that the congress, and the chieftains of Colombia, tempted by the offer of retaining their rank and titles, would gladly accede to their offers. Morillo and his advisers were, therefore, surprised and mortified by the answer of congress; his advisers particularly; for his principal object was to gain time, and prepare for a new exertion. None of the Spaniards, from the king down to the lowest subject, ever, for a moment, contemplated acknowledging the republic.

On the expiration of a month, the Armistice ceased, and the war raged with new fury on the part of the Spaniards, who had employed the time in gaining strength, and who were exasperated by the failure of their attempts to procure the acknowledgement of the Spanish constitution. The Spaniards on the Main, supported Morillo with redoubled exertions and zeal. The constitutional government excited a national spirit, and produced union. The king alone had formerly been the object of every exertion; by the constitution, every exertion was directed, or at least intended to be so, to the benefit of the whole Spanish nation.

Before the negotiations, general Urdaneta having routed general Miguel La Torre, marched against the fortified place of Maracaybo, and besieged it. The Colombian colonel Cordova, came from the province of Antiochia, with 600 men, descended the river Magdalena, and, on the 24th of June, took the city of Mompox without resistance. He then directed his march towards Teneriffa, where he encountered 400 men and 11 armed gun boats, all which he attacked and beat. The gun boats remained in his power. He joined admiral Brion and colonel Montilla, at Savanilla, in the beginning of July. Brion detached two of the armed vessels, to go before Carthagena, and two others against Santa Martha. The patriot colonel Lara was in the environs of that fortress with about 2000 men, whom he had recruited in the province. His communication was open with Montilla.

In June general Bolivar with 3000 men, was at Cucuta. He advanced to Cuenca, and opened a communication with Montilla.

The 6th June Valdes routed the Spanish colonel Lopez, in the province of Popayan, and its inhabitants again declared in favor of Colombia.

By the conquest of Mompox, and the destruction of the Spanish gun boats, by colonel Cordova, the river Magdalena was entirely in possession of the patriots, and the communication between Baranca, Savanilla and Baranquilla, as far as Bogota, were again open to the Colombians; which greatly facilitated these operations against Santa Martha and Carthagena.

Colonel Montilla established his head quarters at Baranquilla, three miles from Savanilla, where Brion remained with his squadron to assist his further operations. At the former place 600 volunteers presented themselves, armed and organized. This reinforcement put him in condition to direct his march against Carthagena, which is about 30 leagues from Baranquilla. In his march, he was every where received with enthusiasm, and assisted with every thing. The tyranny and cruelty of the Spaniards was so great, that besides many other recruits, Montilla was joined by some hundred young men on horseback, who had mounted and equipped themselves at their own expense. The ladies joined in the general enthusiasm, and I have been well informed that hundreds of them followed the troops, in different parts of these marches, on foot, carrying a musket for one, handing food to another, to a third water, taking the greatest care of the sick; and animating the soldiers by their spirited behaviour, cheerfulness and vivacity.

As soon as the Spanish governor at Carthagena was informed of Montilla's march, he sent to reconnoitre the patriots, a detachment of three hundred and thirty men, which was attacked at Pueblo Nuevo and completely routed. Twenty officers and some privates were taken; the remainder gained Carthagena, which was destitute of provisions, and, as I have said before, divided into factions. Some persons were arrested every day, and public feeling was strongly in favor of Colombia.

A false rumor which the secret friends of independence in Carthagena had spread throughout the city, that general Bolivar was coming with 12,000 men, so terrified the Spaniards, that the ex-viceroy, who continued to reside there, asked as a favor, that he might be permitted to embark; which was grant-

ed him; and he left the place together with some monks and priests, foreseeing that Carthagena would fall into the power of the Colombians.

During the stay of colonel Montilla at Baranquilla, he received various despatches from the Spanish chieftains; who, by the express order of their general-in-chief Morillo, made him proposals, similar to those they had made to general Bolivar, and to the congress of Colombia. Among them was a letter of brigadier Don Vicente Manches de Lima^a who had been three times routed by Montilla and was despised, by his own party, for his cowardice.

Having taken shelter within the walls of Santa Martha, he published a proclamation full of abuse and insult, against the Colombians. He said in it, that Brion and Montilla were robbers and plunderers, that they had set fire to the village of Rio Hacha, &c. This man, notwithstanding the cowardly assertions he had thrown upon the characters of these two distinguished chieftains, had now the impudence to write (21st July) to colonel Montilla, proposing to him to unite with the Spaniards and fight with him, against the enemies of the king and of the Spanish nation. To this Montilla answered, "I have already answered to their Ex. Don Pablo Morillo and Don Pedro Rien de Porras, who made me the same proposals as you have done, in their official letter of the 21st of this month. I stated to them that, without considering what the supreme government might determine, I would not, for my own part, consent to suspend hostilities; nor enter into any kind of treaty which should not in clear and positive terms recognize the independence of South America; and that all other treaties should be founded upon this basis. I repeat the same to you, adding that to the education and delicacy of a gentleman, the proposal to desert my colors, and become a traitor to my oath and my country, is most revolting. I send you enclosed, a copy of your proclamation, with such notes and remarks as I thought proper to make upon it. Permit me to add, that he who continues an unjust war, who deceives the people, to conceal his own weakness, his indolence, his cowardice and his numerous defeats, can be no other than a bad soldier, and a worse gentleman.

God and Liberty! Head quarters at Baranquilla 28th July 1820."

I request the reader to compare this answer with that made by the President Liberator to general La Torre, dated Chris-

toval 7th July 1820, and to judge between them. Mariano Montilla is far superior to Simon Bolivar, in patriotism, firmness of character, personal bravery, and military skill ; and, this is acknowledged by all who know them.

General Bolivar wrote to Miguel La Torre the following letter. " I accept with the greatest satisfaction, for the army here, the armistice for the space of one month dating from yesterday, proposed by your excellency as commander in chief of the Spanish army. I am sorry that the commissaries of the Spanish government have been obliged to make such a long and circuitous route, &c. &c.

(Signed) S. BOLIVAR."

The ingratitude of general Bolivar, as well as his gross ignorance of civil administration, are apparent from his treatment of his constant friend and benefactor, admiral Brion.

When Brion arrived at the seaport of Savanilla, he by a proclamation to the foreign powers friendly to Colombia, and particularly to those who were friendly to her commercial citizens, reduced the duties of the custom house from 33 to 25 per cent. This he did for the purpose of inducing such foreigners to enter there, and establish a commercial intercourse with the Colombians. The measure was politic and wise ; and met the hearty approbation of every enlightened friend of the cause.

As soon as general Bolivar arrived at Savanilla, and heard of the proclamation, he was highly displeased, and fell into a violent passion. When admiral Brion attempted to explain his motives, and show the great advantage resulting from the change, Bolivar refused to hear him, and immediately ordered a military publication, called a *bando*, proclaiming by the sound of drums, that from that day, the duties should be established upon the ancient footing of 33 per cent. The consequences of this act were, that he wounded the feelings, and compromised the authority of admiral Brion, (who very sensibly felt this public affront,) and caused the suffering and death of hundreds of his own people ; for these high duties kept out vessels, and cut off necessary supplies from the squadron, and from the land troops. Misery and want, united with the sultry climate, produced fevers, and other maladies, to which many hundreds fell victims.

General Bolivar went further. He imposed such heavy taxes upon the inhabitants of Baranquilla, Soledad, St. Stanislaus, Baranca, &c., who received Montilla with enthusiasm, that

he excited among them general dissatisfaction, by depriving them of all hope of reimbursement. All this was done after Montilla had gone from Baranquilla to Turbacco, whither Bolivar came and staid two days. It is his habit to wander from one place to another, giving laws, and publishing proclamations and decrees, altering the existing state of things, generally for the worse, as at Savanilla. A hasty glance, a report of one of his surrounding flatterers, even a sarcastic reflection, have sufficed to change every thing, during his stay of twenty four, and sometimes not over twelve hours. He acted thus at Baranquilla, Soledad, and St. Stanislaus, the inhabitants of all which places had made every exertion in favor of Montilla's troops as they passed. Montilla had the good sense to treat them politely, to exact nothing beyond their means, and to depend on their voluntary kindness. The President Liberator, under the pretext of loans, forced them to their utmost efforts. They of course bore him no good will.

Montilla, relying upon the factious state of the interior of the Carthagenan fortresses, and those of Santa Martha, sent colonel Lara, with 800 of his corps, against the latter place, while he himself marched with the rest to Turbacco, where he waited for reinforcements. This place is four leagues from Carthagena.

Here Montilla received from general Bolivar various despatches for the governor of Carthagena, brigadier general Gabriel de Torres, again treating of a new arrangement and of peace. The officers hearing the proposals were well received, but the offers of Bolivar were rejected. Letters were several times exchanged between Torres and Montilla, to no purpose. Bolivar went to Turbacco in August 1820, and renewed the negotiations, but having no success, he departed after a stay of two days.

On the 1st of September, the Spanish governor of Carthagena sent 600 men against colonel Montilla, at Turbacco. His troops were surprised in the night of the 2d and 3d, and routed. Cannon, baggage, ammunition, &c. fell into the hands of the Spaniards. But among the routed troops of Montilla, were some fifty Irishmen, who rallied, formed themselves, and rushed with such vigor upon the 600 Spaniards, that they killed a considerable number, and forced the remainder to retire, leaving their new acquisitions in the hands of these heroic Irishmen.

Carthagena was supplied with fresh provisions, and, among other things, with 600 barrels of flour, by the Spanish corvette. Ceres; and was thus enabled to hold out for some time longer.

Colonel Lara had 800 men, chiefly natives, commanded by European officers. He directed his march towards the Ciénega, whither admiral Brion had sent colonel Padilla with forty gunboats, in support of the movements of Lara, who expected reinforcements from the interior of New Grenada.

Montilla, finding that he could effect nothing against Carthagena by remaining at Turbacco, left there a small corps of observation, and came in October, with the rest of his troops, to join Lara, who was encamped on the borders of the river Ciénega. He had reinforced himself considerably on his march, and admiral Brion had sent him all the troops he could spare, so that when Montilla again took the command, he was at the head of about 2500 men.

Admiral Brion sailed from Savanilla the 19th of October with eleven armed vessels, to blockade Santa Martha, whilst Montilla and Lara approached it by land.

Montilla passed the Ciénega, attacked Sanchez de Lima, and easily routed him, on the 5th of November, at a place called Fundación. The action was decided in half an hour. Governor Lima was one of the first who fled. He escaped by the road to Upar, leaving in the hands of his enemy, his artillery, baggage, and 500 of his men. When the governor, general Porras, heard of this defeat, he thought no longer of defending Santa Martha with his remaining 1500 men, but embarked in great haste, in the night of the 8th of November, on board of the French schooner *Frelon*, with all his baggage, and came to shelter himself in the stronger fortress of Carthagena.

After this engagement, colonel Montilla met with little resistance, and, being vigorously supported by the squadron of admiral Brion, he entered Santa Martha on the 11th of November, having lost only a few men. They found large magazines and warlike stores in the place.

The occupation of this important fortress was attributed principally to the exertions and activity of admiral Brion, and the bravery of colonel Padilla, who commanded the gunboats. The latter is the colored man of that name who afterwards took the four forts of Boca Chica, (the strong hold of Carthagena,) Maracaybo, and, in 1814, Porto Cabello. He is now (1828) arrested, and in prison at Carthagena.

The taking of Santa Martha, which protected the mouth of the large river Magdalena, made the Colombians masters of this river, up as far as Honda, and of the road thence by land, as far as Bogota, and of all the provinces of the interior of New

Grenada. After this, the fall of Carthagena could not much longer be prevented.

While this was passing at Santa Martha, general Bolivar started from Turbacco, up the river Magdalena, to the province Popayan, and joined generals Sanander and Valdes, who had collected a force of from 6 to 7000 men. As long as these two generals acted without Bolivar, they were almost constantly victorious. This is attributed partly to their knowing the ground better than their general-in-chief, but principally to their being at liberty to act freely and promptly, as circumstances required. They had several thousand more men than were necessary to drive general Calzada out of that province and from the territory of New Grenada. General Bolivar's arrival disturbed all. He would follow his own notions in every thing, and spurned at all advice. He took command of these superior forces, and was beaten in different actions, and was forced to retreat with only 2000 of these troops. He had indeed a numerous retinue of emigrants, amounting to above 4000 persons of both sexes, who fled with him towards the plains of Apure in Venezuela. On his arrival there, he complained much of the apathy of the Grenadans. His complaints had no other foundation but his hatred, as a Caraguin, against the good people of Grenada, whose hatred he had drawn upon himself by his forced taxes, levied without regard to order or justice. The product of these, too, was notoriously squandered upon his flatterers and favorites, so that little or nothing remained for the pay or support of the army. So discouraged were the troops, that Calzada routed them in four several actions; the consequence of which was the evacuation, by Bolivar's troops, of New Grenada.

The royalists not only gained more provinces, but the public opinion turned in their favor, insomuch that guerillas were formed, under the command of colonel Santipana, to intercept a great quantity of arms, ammunition, provisions, &c., destined for the independent army; many of whom too, were taken prisoners. These successes of Morillo were consequences of Bolivar's entering into negotiations with his enemies, without having first laid a foundation for these negotiations.

Meanwhile general Morillo was not inactive. He came from Valencia to Caracas, and raised a new levy of 3000 men, and received 100,000 dollars in cash, besides what was delivered him, in provisions, uniforms and equipments, to enable him to

continue the war efficiently. The captain-general of the island of Cuba, Cagigal, promised him a similar sum every month.

General Bolivar, after having made his tour from Savanilla to Baranquilla, Soledad, St. Stanislaus and Turbacco, came back to San Fernando de Apure ; whence he passed to the province of Popayan. General Morillo perceiving that the Colombians made no movements, ordered general de La Torre, who commanded the Spanish forces in New Grenada, to march from Tunja upon Truxillo, uniting all his disposable forces, to join him, for the purpose of attacking general Bolivar. Morillo being too weak to attack the Colombians alone, waited the arrival of de La Torre ; and, meanwhile, on two separate occasions, gained some trifling advantages over the patriots. In spite of the great superiority of the Colombians, in point of numbers, and in regard to public opinion, which was generally in favor of independence, and which every where powerfully supported them, they dared not to attempt any thing decisive ; all remained in this state of suspense.

Suddenly every one was astonished with news that two officers had arrived at the head quarters of general Morillo, sent by general Bolivar, to treat again of peace and friendship. This occasioned the more surprise, as the latter had published the following proclamation, dated General Head-quarters, at Carache, October 14th, 1820.

“ Simon Bolivar, President Liberator, &c. &c. Two provinces more have entered into the bosom of the republic. The forces of the Liberator have advanced, amidst the blessings of the people restored to liberty. Caracas will soon be witness to a great act of justice. Our enemies will return to their country, and ours will be rendered up to its children. Peace or victory will give us the remainder of the provinces of Colombia. They have offered us peace and a constitution. We will reply peace and independence, because this independence alone can assure us the friendship of the Spaniards, and to the people their free will and their sacred rights. Can we accept a code from our enemies, and disgrace the laws of our country ? Can we violate the rights of nature, by crossing the ocean, in order to unite two countries so distant from each other ? Could we confound our interests with those of a nation which had always been the instrument of our torments ? No, Colombians ! No one has to fear the liberating army, which approaches with the sole intention to break your chains. She has upon her standards the colors of Iris, and desires not to sully the glory

of her arms by the effusion of human blood. By order of the President Liberator.

(Signed) ANTONIO DE SUCRE,
Provisional Secretary of War."

Moreover the province of Cuenca had, sometime before, declared her independence, and had elected a patriotic Junta. In consequence of the expedition sent by the Junta of Guayaquil against Quito, four departments of that province, had also voluntarily submitted to the republican army. The province of Rio Hacha had done the same, so that, at that time, 15 provinces of New Grenada, out of 22, had already joined the government of Colombia; and the Spaniards had no more than the fortress of Carthagena, and the isthmus of Panama.

In Venezuela six provinces out of eight obeyed the laws of Colombia.

Such was the situation of this republic, leaving out of consideration, the numerous armies, the public spirit, the supplies from every quarter of Europe, the foreign troops full of zeal to distinguish themselves, when Bolivar suddenly renewed negotiations with the Spanish commander-in-chief. In his letter to Morillo, he made overtures to him, to terminate the South American troubles in an amicable way, and invited him to send, the 23d of the same month, deputies to his head quarters, with whom he might have a full understanding, and who might labor with him at this great work.

General Morillo, surprised at receiving such a proposal in a moment so critical to him, was anxious to accept it, and wrote immediately to Bolivar to that effect. He could not think that the proposal had been without some occult motive; and therefore gave strict orders to his subalterns commanding the troops, to redouble their activity and vigilance. He soon afterwards moved his head quarters from Valencia to Calabozo, that he might be nearer to the President Liberator.

As general Bolivar had offered and required hostages for the security of reciprocal good faith; Morillo designated Don Carrea the civil governor of Caracas, Don Juan Toro alcalde, of the same place, and Don Francisco Linares. They left the city of Caracas, for Punto Pedregal, where they were to remain as hostages during the conferences between Morillo and Bolivar.

Meanwhile the Colombians moved towards Caracas, and took possession of the cities of Truxillo and Merida, and of Carora, a small village, three days march from Coro.

November 5th, two officers arrived at the advanced posts of the royalists, encamped at Humaraco, not far from the advanced posts of general Bolivar. These deputies were the colonels Sune and Ambrosco Plazo, who were the bearers of proposals of peace and friendship, from the President Liberator. They were immediately conducted to the head quarters of general Morillo, at Carache, who received them very civilly, and invited them to spend the day with him. Bolivar had, among other things, demanded of general Morillo, to send commissaries to him, at his head quarters. The Spanish commander complied with this demand by sending the two Colombian colonels, with the greatest politeness, back to their general. But Bolivar, impatient that no commissaries came to him from Morillo, sent to the Spanish general new deputies, who arrived November 16th, and who anxiously demanded the departure of the Spanish commissaries, already named by Morillo. These were Don Ramon Couca, Juan Rodriguez del Toro and Francisco Gonzales de Linares, who received orders to hasten their departure from Barquisimeto, where they were on the 17th.

When they arrived at Truxillo, the head quarters of general Bolivar, they were received as if they had been conquerers. Two treaties were here made with great despatch. One of them was an armistice between the two contending parties, which bore the title of "*Armistice between the Spanish and patriot armies.*" It began with the following introduction: "The governments of Spain and Colombia, anxious to finish the discords existing between the two parties, and considering that the first and most important step to attain this end is a suspension of hostilities, in order to explain and understand each other, have agreed mutually to name commissaries to stipulate, and to determine upon an armistice. To this end his excellency," &c. (here follow the names of the commissaries,) after having exchanged their respective powers, dated 22d of the present month, (November,) and after having exhibited their proposals and the explanations, offered by both parties, have agreed, and do agree upon a treaty of armistice, under the specified clauses in the following articles:

Article 1. Between the two armies, Spanish and Colombian, hostilities of every description shall cease from the moment that the ratification of the present treaty shall be published. War shall cease; no hostile act shall be committed between them during the whole time of the duration of this armistice.

Art. 2. The time of this suspension shall last during six months,

dating from the day of its ratification ; but as the principal and fundamental basis of this treaty are the good faith and the sincere wishes with which both parties are animated to end the war, a prorogation of the term now fixed, may take place for so much more time as may be necessary, if this term shall have expired before the conclusion of the negotiations, which shall be commenced ; in case, moreover, of there being a hope of bringing them to a conclusion.

The treaty consists of 14 articles, in none of which is any mention made of recognizing the republic of Colombia, or of its independence. It was ratified by Bolivar at Truxillo the 25th, and by Morillo at Carache the 26th of November, 1820.

The second treaty made and signed by the same persons at Truxillo, November 26th, stipulated to regulate this war upon a more humane footing, and in conformity with the rules of war among the civilized nations of Europe, that prisoners should not be put to death, but exchanged, and receive more humane treatment, the dead should be buried, &c. &c. These treaties do honor to the humane feelings of both parties.

After all was done, the two generals, Bolivar and Morillo, met together, and spent some time in rejoicings and festivals. The details of their meetings have been published in many newspapers, and are not worth repeating here.

This measure of Bolivar excited the astonishment of all the more enlightened Colombians. They openly declared, that he had no right to solicit an armistice with an enemy greatly inferior in force and in resources ; and especially, as he had, a few months before, formally declared against any treaty, which should not expressly admit the independence of the republic. They asked among themselves, "what reason could he have for not explaining himself upon a matter so interesting to himself, and to the republic whose representative he was ? How could he transgress the resolution of congress, who, in their letter to Morillo, had declared that no treaty should be made with Spain, before the Spanish government acknowledged the independence of the Colombian Republic ?" Some said that general Bolivar had acted here, as he had done every where else, rashly and precipitately, without consulting congress, or advising with any man. Others finally said, he should have better known the obstinacy of the Spanish character, and the duplicity of king Ferdinand, than to flatter himself with a foolish hope, that such a man would have been able to acknowledge the independence of Colombia, as long as there existed the least hope to subject

them by the force of arms. The present Spanish squadron united under admiral Laborde, in the harbor of Havana, ready to attack either Mexico or Colombia, is the best proof of my assertion.

The fact is, that general Bolivar, by acting with this rashness, brought upon his countrymen new scenes of bloodshed and war, as will appear from the following chapter.

CHAPTER XX.

Renewal of hostilities—Manifest of General de La Torre—Battle of Carabobo—Conduct of La Torre and Morales—Bolivar at Caracas—Surrender of Carthagena, Maracaybo, and Porto Cabello—Entire evacuation of the Main by the Spanish forces. 1821–1824.

As soon as the amistice was signed, ratified and proclaimed, general Morillo hastened to leave his army, and to return to Spain, where a rich bride awaited him. He was glad to leave a country where he had lost much reputation by his ill administration generally, and particularly by his tyranny, cruelty, and capricious duplicity, during his command on the Main. This (I know not what to call him,) after assuming the title of Pacificator of South America at Bogota in 1816, ordered some hundreds of the most wealthy and respectable inhabitants to be shot: In the island of Margarita, he destroyed and put to death, hanged and shot, not only men standing upon their defence, but women and children also; at Papao, Cabellos, and Boca-Chica, where he suffered the cruel Morales to burn an hospital of lazorinos. His cruelties were notorious every where.

General Morillo signed the armistice, the 26th November, and on the 17th of December, he embarked at Porto Cabello, for the Havana. He finished his course as he commenced it; in violation of the right of brigadier-general Morales, he named for his successor, brigadier-general Miguel de La Torre, who was both unskilful and cowardly; who had lost many battles; and the whole province of Guayana; and was despised by his

own officers ; whereas Morales, had advanced from a private, to become a vigilant, active, and brave commander. Though detestably cruel to his enemies, he has been more than once seen, while encamped in the midst of his soldiers, giving them his own shoes, blanket, even his coat to cover the sick, while he lay almost naked upon the ground. The appointment of La Torre created jealousy and schism between these two chieftains, and finished what Morillo left undone towards the destruction of the remaining Spanish army in Colombia.

The same day that Morillo left Porto Cabello, for the Havana, a squadron of 2 frigates, 1 corvette &c. with 4 transports, arrived at Lagaira from Cadiz ; bringing 6000 muskets, 7000 uniforms &c ; but no troops ; in their stead came 4 commissaries whom the king had sent to the Main, to *pacify* it. They had received an express order to conclude a peace upon no other basis, than that the seceders should previously recognize and obey the constitution of the Spanish Cortes of 1818.

When these commissaries were informed of the armistice of 26th of November, they were surprised, and openly expressed their dissatisfaction. They immediately spread a rumor that 10,000 Spaniards were ready to embark from Spain, and that in case the commissaries should not be able to effect a pacification upon the terms above mentioned, these troops would immediately sail for the Main, and join the loyalist troops remaining there. This rumor made no impression upon the patriots, because they knew it to be a fiction.

General Bolivar perceived at last, that in proposing the armistice of the 26th of November, he had acted injudiciously. But instead of retrieving his faults as far as he could, by declaring that hostilities should re-commence in eight days, if the commissaries and La Torre should not send him a formal recognition of the republic of Colombia, he adopted a crooked course, unworthy the chief of such a country as Colombia. He subjected himself to the just censure even of La Torre, as will appear by the Spanish manifesto, made out in the manner of La Torre, who exposed Bolivar's conduct by publishing his official letters. The two following documents show what was Bolivar's manner of acting :

The first is a proclamation of general Bolivar to his army ; the second to the inhabitants of Colombia.

“Soldiers ! Peace should have been the recompense of the armistice which is about to expire. But Spain has seen with indifference, the painful sufferings which we have experienced

on her account. The remainder of the Spanish government in Colombia, cannot measure their power with that of 25 provinces which you have delivered from slavery. Colombia expects from you its entire emancipation she expects more ; she commands you imperiously, in the midst of your victory, to fulfil with vigor the duties of your sacred struggle. I have always relied upon your courage, your perseverance ; but from your discipline alone I expect to have the satisfaction of acquiring new glory which you are on the eve of obtaining. Soldiers ! I hope you will have humanity and compassion even for your most bitter enemies. Be the mediators between the vanquished and your victorious arms ; and show yourselves as great in generosity as you are in bravery.

Liberating head-quarters at Barinas April 17th 1821.

(Signed)

BOLIVAR."

The second was as follows, and of the same date and signature :

"Colombians ! the anxieties of our armies, our unheard of privations ; the tears of the people almost expiring, force us again to take arms in order to obtain peace by expelling our invaders. This war, nevertheless, shall not be a war of death, not even of rigor ; it shall be a sanctified crusade. We shall fight to disarm, and not to exterminate our enemy. We shall struggle to obtain the crown of brilliant glory," &c. &c.

If it was true that "the remainder of the Spanish government in America, could not measure its power with 25 free provinces," and that "Spain saw with indifference the sufferings endured by him and his army," why not put an end to these sufferings, and those of the country, while he had the means of doing it in his own hands ? That Colombia had "heard with joy the propositions for peace, made by Spain," was absolutely false ; she desired peace indeed, but she preferred war to dependence, to every thing but liberty and independence ; and this had been unequivocally expressed by the voice of the whole country. It is certain that Bolivar himself was the first who proposed an armistice ; and it is certain that he did this at a time when, with his far superior forces, he might easily have destroyed those of the Spaniards.

Morillo and his king had simply proposed that Colombia should acknowledge the Spanish constitution, and to submit to her government. Their proposition was plain and unequivocal. How even Bolivar could propose, first an armistice of

one month, and then six months, without claiming, or even mentioning the acknowledgment of the republic, is an enigma. Such is the man who directs the destinies of two millions of his countrymen, whom he rules with absolute power, and whom he makes daily more slavish and miserable.

During the armistice, the congress was removed from Angostura to the city Del Rosario de Cucuta, in the department of Bogota, and province of Pamplona, as being a more central position between Venezuela and New Grenada, there to remain until the new city of Bolivar could be built.

I will give here some extracts from the manifesto published at the expiration, in April, of the armistice, and dated, Headquarters at Caracas, 1821, by brigadier general Miguel de La Torre, as general-in-chief of the Spanish troops in Colombia, respecting the continuation of the war.

For his introduction, he says: "From the armistice concluded at Truxillo, and ratified by their excellencies, the court of Carthagena, and Don Simon Bolivar, human prudence might have hoped that peace would have reigned again over the whole territory of the Main; that the unjust passions would have given way to reason, justice, truth, and to the other virtues," &c.

"The principal motives which had served until now, as a pretext, to justify in the eyes of the world the troubles in these countries, had, fortunately, disappeared. It was no more the despot Ferdinand who occupied the throne of Spain, it was no more an arbitrary power that disposed of the welfare of the Spaniards; no—it was Ferdinand the Constitutionalist, who had voluntarily resigned this odious power, and who had restored to the law all its majesty and force. The Spanish monarchy, already spread over the whole world, was no more an union of slaves; the Spaniards were already free."

"The hopes which my predecessor had conceived, so justly, to re-establish peace and tranquility, for so long a time lost, having vanished, he had nothing left him to do, but to prepare again for war, when he received an official despatch from his excellency, the president, dated Cucuta 21st September, by which he invited him to new pacific proposals. During this, he, the president, accelerated his march under frivolous pretences, and absolutely contradictory to the proposed object."

"My predecessor was nevertheless obliged to obey the orders of his majesty, to neglect no means to restore to this country its lost prosperity. In such a manner were the con-

ferences began at Truxillo, *not to treat there of peace*, but to suspend hostilities, whilst the commissaries of his excellency the president, could have departed for the court of Madrid, to present their demands and pretensions before the supreme government of the nation, which alone could decide definitely upon them. His excellency the president was very well informed that my predecessor had no power to do it; and it was upon this information that the ratification of the armistice was grounded: the contents of this treaty alone will sufficiently prove this fact" &c.

In this latter assertion general La Torre was perfectly correct. In the two documents signed at Truxillo, one may search in vain for a passage which would induce the reader to think that the republic had been acknowledged by Morillo or his commissaries.

To cite the whole of La Torre's prolix and verlose letter, would be useless; but he cites some letters and facts which are strongly against general Bolivar. He accuses him and general Urdaneta of having violated the armistice of January 28th in Maracaybo, of which the latter took possession the 8th April during the existing treaty, at the head of a strong division, and entrenched himself, notwithstanding that hostilities were not to commence before the 12th. Before this, Bolivar violated the treaty at Barinas, which, he reinforced with a battalion of troops. In this memoir were also cited some letters which speak strongly against Bolivar, and expose his duplicity.

After having corresponded and lamented much, general Bolivar at last, on the 10th of March, notified La Torre by letter, that hostilities should recommence in conformity to the 12th article of the treaty, at the expiration of thirty days. The war was renewed accordingly.

After receiving this letter, La Torre left Caracas and went to Calabozo, in the beginning of April. He prepared for fighting, by giving out orders, that his officers, after his example, should be confessed and receive the sacraments and absolution. It is reported, by eye witnesses, that La Torre began already to manifest symptoms of the same fever which attacked him at the battle of San Felix in Guayana.

Before La Torre's departure from Caracas, he published two proclamations, one directed to the army, the other to the few inhabitants remaining under his dominion. Both were dated Caracas 23d of March 1821. He made a great display of words, without spirit or vigor. The productions were

characteristic of the man, resembling more a *Capuchinade* than an address of a commander-in-chief.

A third proclamation was issued by general Ramon Correa y Guevara, captain-general of Venezuela, the 28th of March, in which he told the inhabitants, "that one single sentiment should exist; one single opinion; one single cry—the constitution, the king, or death!" But notwithstanding this display of heroic sentiment, Mr. Correa himself preferred flight to death, and set the first example, by retiring from Caracas, after having, in imitation of his commander La Torre, duly confessed himself. Correa, while governor of Caracas, left the city secretly, in the night of the 14th of May, and Bermudes, the next evening, entered the capital, without having fired a musket. He found the city abandoned by all the people of any note. They had retired towards Laguaira and Porto Cabello, to live no more under the government of Bolivar. The greatest part of these inhabitants embarked for the West Indies and the United States of North America.

The entry of Bermudes into Caracas resembled a funeral. In the streets were found a mass of miserable wretches, some begging a cent for charity. Prostitutes mingled in the ranks of the soldiers, amidst the ringing of bells, and the sound of cannon. Bermudes gave a ball, at which, not four ladies of distinction were found; all the others were colored people or blacks. He ordered, under heavy penalties, a general illumination for three nights, gave dinners and festivals, and lived jovially, at the expense of the ruined inhabitants. Bermudes published an appeal to the inhabitants, inviting them to join his troops; and, with great pains, obtained about 300 blacks of the lowest class. Bermudes attempted to raise, by imposition, some money for the support of himself and his troops, but could not obtain so much as 6000 dollars. The rabble broke into some stores and plundered them, and were with difficulty restrained by the troops.

In May 1801, the forces of general Bolivar amounted to 15,000 in Venezuela alone. Among these were more than 2000 European troops, whilst La Torre, (by his own fault, as is said,) had not 6000. Well informed persons have said, that he relied upon the deceitful promises of Bolivar, who flattered him with hopes of peace, (and this appears from La Torre's memoirs,) expecting that the negotiations would end in peace, he remained inactive, whilst Bolivar was reinforcing himself on all sides. In La Torre's memoirs are found fre-

quent expressions of his *good faith* and his love of peace, and his *unbounded devotion to peaceful measures*, (which no one doubted who knew his military character.) The feelings of the Spanish troops towards their leader, are also to be considered. The majority of them were displeased at his being their commander. They said that he was a coward, and that he had done nothing since the first breach of the armistice at Barinos, in December 1820, though from that breach, it was plain that Bolívar did not incline to observe the treaty of Truxillo.

After the action of Carabobo, well informed men asserted, that the loss of the Spanish forces in Colombia, was entirely the fault of La Torre; that instead of uniting all his forces in the little village, he contented himself with the first division, consisting of 2500 infantry and about 1500 cavalry, commanded by himself and Morales, whilst Bolívar, who joined Páez at San Carlos, had about 6000 infantry, among whom were about 1100 European troops, (called the British legion,) and 3000 Llaneros on horseback.

The village of Carabobo, celebrated for the famous battle fought there the 26th of June, is situated about half way between San Carlos and Valencia, six leagues distant from the latter city. There the Spaniards had taken a strong position. This position was judiciously chosen by Morales, who, in all military matters, was, beyond comparison, superior to his commander. The shape of the ground afforded great advantage, or rather a decisive superiority, over any assailant, for if an enemy forced a passage in front, they might retire to the next position, and so for several steps, disputing every inch of ground with advantage, while the assailants, fighting at disadvantage, must suffer considerable loss. It is a plain, interspersed with hills, of which, the greater part were covered with trees, and full of rocks, which defended them on every side. Thirty thousand men might manœuvre on the plain with ease, having in front but one defile, and that, the only passage to Valencia.

The Spaniards confident that their wings were well protected, the left wing, moreover, resting upon a deep morass, posted themselves on the public road. Upon a hill opposite the defile, they placed two pieces of cannon and a squadron of cavalry on their right wing. In this position they waited for the enemy during twenty days, confident of success whenever they should be attacked.

Bolívar knowing that the welfare of the republic depended upon this battle, when he saw the enemy's position, wavered

whether to attack them or not. He assembled a council of war and again proposed an armistice. His subalterns unanimously, and with disdain, rejected the proposal. General Marino proposed to turn the position of the enemy; but after having discussed and rejected various plans and proposals, the majority decided to risk every thing and attack the enemy in his strong hold. Against Bolivar's proposal to try another armistice, Paez and Bermudes spoke with great warmth and in strong terms.

On the 24th of June, the Colombians, about 8000 strong, came before the enemy. When Bolivar saw the passage so strongly guarded, he again hesitated to commence the attack. But Paez and Bermudes warmly insisted upon it. Whilst they were discussing the subject, there stood among Bolivar's retinue, one of his guides, who overheard the conversation. This man, who was perfectly acquainted with the country, came near the Liberator and told him, in a whisper, that he knew a foot path, through which the right wing of the Spaniards might be turned. Bolivar knew the man well, and after consulting with him a short time, secretly detached three battalions of his best troops, and a strong column of cavalry under the command of general Paez, to follow the guide. This pass was one of the most difficult in the country, particularly for the British legion, who made part of the column. They were obliged to go singly, and their shoes were so cut to pieces by the sharp stones that their feet were wounded deeply. These brave men actually tore their shirts and made bandages for their feet, to enable them to go on. They succeeded perfectly, being masked by the forest, but as soon as the enemy discovered them, he was obliged, of course, to direct part of his forces against them.

The royal battalion of Bengos nearly complete, and consisting of European Spaniards, at first, intimidated the Colombian battalion called Los Bravos de Apure, which fell back upon the British legion. Encouraged by this success, they advanced against the legion which they mistook for a Creolian corps, and directed a well aimed fire against it, which was well returned. Soon after the Spaniards charged with the bayonet, and discovered their mistake by being charged in their turn, with the bayonet, by the British legion. This charge was directed with such celerity and force, that the Spaniards began to be discouraged and to give ground. They were at last dispersed, and were followed by the English bayonets. What remained of these Spaniards were nearly all destroyed by a squadron of

Paez, called the sacred squadron. A squadron of the enemy attempted to charge the British legion, but were driven back by their well directed fire of musketry, and forced to retire.

This unexpected disaster upon the rear of the Spanish right wing, so disconcerted general La Torre that he lost all presence of mind. The confusion was soon spread among the Spaniards; their cavalry dispersed without having made one charge. The Spaniards retired precipitately and in perfect disorder, leaving their cannon, train and baggage. General Paez displayed great activity and bravery. He placed himself at the head of the cavalry and pursued the Spaniards, but his men were so badly mounted, and the horses so fatigued and weak, that, though the ground was even, he was not able to break the files of the Spanish infantry. If his cavalry had been good, not a single Spaniard could have escaped.

In one of their unsuccessful charges, general Sedeno, colonel Plaza, and a black man, who, on account of his bravery, was called El Primero, (the first,) were killed. These brave men, finding their efforts to break one of the enemy's infantry lines unavailing, precipitated themselves into the midst of the bayonets.

In this battle the enemy lost more than 500 men. La Torre, with the remains of his forces, shut himself up in Porto Cabello. Spaniards, who were eye witnesses, have assured me, that he was one of the first who came within the fortress. The loss of the Colombians was not great. The English legion had about 30 killed and 100 wounded. Their commander received various wounds, of which he died. The Colombians were obliged to attribute the success of this march to this handful of brave foreigners. These received from general Bolivar the name of *Carabobo*. General Paez distinguished himself highly; but Bolivar, though he kept himself as usual, at a respectable distance from the danger, assumed the principal glory of the victory, and entered Valencia the same day with his troops.

I have these details from the pen of a foreigner, who, at that time, was a superior officer in the service of the republic, and who fought in this action, in the British legion. His report continues as follows: "This affair, such as it is, will form an epoch in the history of Colombia. The two principal actions, upon which depended the welfare, or rather the existence of Colombia, were undoubtedly gained by the valor of the European troops in their service, viz, the action at Boyaca, which

decided the fate of New Grenada, and this at Carabobo, which made the Colombians masters of Venezuela. It is certain that these troops have been rewarded in an ill manner! There exists not, I believe, soldiers more ill treated than those in Colombia; badly clothed and fed, exposed to all the inclemencies of a climate not very healthy, to a scorching sun in the day time, and to cold and rainy nights. To these must be added the forced marches, the fatigues and the continual movements of a partizan war. Such a soldier must have a very robust constitution to exist for any length of time, &c.

In the battle of Carabobo, the Spanish infantry only, fought; and, from the commencement of the action, the two Spanish commanders La Torre and Morales, were not united in regard to the command, and the plan of operations to be pursued. Morales who commanded in chief, the cavalry, 1500 strong, well chosen, perfectly well mounted, and able to beat the 3000 Llaneros, whose horses, unable to resist one well directed charge, had the baseness not to order a single charge; and to remain a quiet spectator of the destruction of the infantry. He was highly displeased at being under the command of La Torre, and, as I am well informed, so jealous, that he disregarded several orders from the latter to charge the enemy. His bitterness and obstinacy were so great, that he heard, unmoved, the most urgent entreaties of the Spanish cavalry officers under his command, to charge, or at least to permit them to charge the enemy, whilst they were in the plain. The officers pointed out to him (which he must have seen himself) the advantageous times and positions for charging. But he expressly refused them permission to move. When they saw his obstinacy, they became discouraged, left their ranks, and were followed by their subalterns, without having made one charge upon the patriot troops. One single squadron, which remained, attempted to charge upon the British legion, but were driven back, as I have stated. The Spanish infantry alone sustained the whole battle, viz, 2500 men against 7600. I have heard from good authority, that if the British legion had not been with the Colombians, they would, in all probability, have lost the battle. The regiment of Valencia about 600 strong, covered the retreat; and at four different times, repelled the cavalry of Paez consisting of 3000 Llaneros, and that in a fine plain, where half the number of almost any other cavalry, would have swept the ground clean of these 600 infantry.

The news of this defeat, spread consternation amongst the Spaniards. Such was the confusion and terror in the fortress of Porto Cabello, that if Bolivar had marched against the place without loss of time, he would have got possession of it. More than twenty Spanish royalists, whom I saw afterwards at the island of Curacao, assured me of this. From that time, above 20,000 inhabitants of Caracas, Lagaira, and Porto Cabello, seeing the royal cause upon the Main completely lost, and cursing the cowardice and apathy of La Torre, embarked for foreign lands.

After the action at Carabobo, the fortress of Porto Cabello was so filled with fugitives, that sixteen dollars a week were paid for the use of a single room; and the price of provisions rose an hundred fold! the apathy of La Torre excited great indignation amongst the most distinguished Spaniards. Of this I will cite, from among hundreds, one proof; a letter dated Porto Cabello June 29th 1821, inserted in the Gazette of Curacao.

“There has been no great change in the situation of this city since my last of the 27th. The unfortunate dissensions between La Torre and Morales are continual. The apathy of the first is so great that the majority suspect him of treachery. He will not consent to the desire of the greatest part, that Morales take the chief command; nor will he listen to any solicitations to permit him to go out of the place with the 2000 chosen troops which remain in it, in order to make a junction with the forces of Pereira and Lopez, who have sent express after express to him for that purpose. But all is in vain. It appears that he fears that Morales, once out of the place, would turn him out, and put himself at the head of the army. We have here in the place more than 4000 men able to serve, and who would enlist themselves with great pleasure, if any body else but La Torre should be appointed commander-in-chief. Could you believe that since he has been in the city he has not ordered any efficacious measures to defend the place in case of attack. Such is in fact the criminal inactivity of La Torre. God grant that we may have a change soon!”

After the battle of Carabobo, general Bolivar published an order of the day, under 13th July, informing that he had given the name of the battalion of Carabozo to the corps before called the British legion; and as colonel Ferrier their commander, had died (of his wounds received in the battle of Carabobo) various promotions took place in the corps.

The news of this victory inspired the congress assembled at Cucuta, with the liveliest enthusiasm. They immediately passed a decree that did honor to their sentiments, and is too well known to need insertion here. In speaking of this decree I must be permitted, deeply to regret that the glorious death of colonel Ferrier was not noticed in it. He died at the headquarters of the British legion. His merit surely entitled his name to a conspicuous place in one of the four columns of a paper devoted to the fame of those who fought for the liberty of Colombia. I must add that notwithstanding the national gratitude decreed by the congress of Colombia, the battalion of Carabobo, which, on the 1st of June 1821, contained above a thousand men; in August 1823, had not fifty men left. The rest, except a very few, perished in the country. The last commander of the battalion, lieutenant colonel Brandt, in Aug. 1823, arrived from Laguaira, at Caracas, in a pitiable condition, his uniform torn in pieces, without a change of clothes, having no boots, only a single pair of old shoes; and not a cent of money in his pocket. He was besides, lame and deaf. He addressed himself to Charles Soublette the Intendant of Caracas, requesting an order for at least a small amount due upon his salary for past services. He could obtain nothing. Soublette was then living in the highest style. Lieutenant colonel Brandt thought that appears, might have perished, but for the hospitality of captain Maitland, commander of the Colombian brig Pinchita and his officers, who kindly received him on board, in the harbour of Curacao. Such is the gratitude of Colombia to her deliverers! Let their conduct towards the foreigners who so ably assisted them in the days of trouble, be compared to that of the United States towards Steuben, Kosciuszko, and La Fayette.

Caracas and Laguaira were lost, whilst Torre, with more than 4000 men, was lying idle, and detested in Porto Cabello. Colonel Peregra a brave and enterprising officer, being left to his fate by La Torre, was forced to surrender by capitulation. This increased the complaints and murmurs against La Torre, who was now hated and despised by all.

On the 29th of June, in the evening, general Bolivar with general Paez and a numerous and brilliant retinue, entered the city of Caracas, and ordered the taking possession of Laguaira. But he found not a white inhabitant in the deserted streets of Caracas. The greatest part of the houses were empty; many of the stores were pillaged; the streets were filled with beg-

gars, and dead bodies. Some miserable negroes cried "Viva Colombia, and begged for cents : destruction, misery and death, had taken up their abode in this once flourishing, rich, populous and joyous city.

Bolivar compared this entry into Caracas with that of August 1813, and was surprised, and not a little frightened. His indignation rose against all who had fled to escape from falling again under his dominion. He immediately ordered a proclamation to be published and fixed to the corners of the principal squares and streets, in which he said : "Caracas shall not be the capital of a republic ; but the capital of a vast government, administered in a dignified manner and worthy of its importance. The vice-president of Venezuela, enjoying all the attributes of a great magistrate, you will always find a source of justice in the centre of the republic, who will spread plentifully his benevolence over all the branches of public welfare in your country. Caraguins ! be thankful to the ministers of the law, who from their sanctuary of justice, have left you a code of freedom and equality.

Caraguins ! lavish your admiration upon the heroes who have given existence to Colombia.

General Liberating head-quarters, Caracas, June 30th 1824.
(Signed) BOLIVAR."

This great Magistrate whom this great General announced to the people of Venezuela as the worthy administrator who would spread plentifully his benevolence over all the branches of public welfare ; his vice-president of Venezuela, (whose title was afterwards changed to that of Intendant) was Charles Soublette ! so well did he administer, that, on three or four occasions, the principal inhabitants of Venezuela exclaimed against him ; and so diffusive was his benevolence, that, on account of his insolence and incapacity, (as has been generally said) his protector was obliged to recal him, and to give this intendency to general Tobar.

In order to remedy in some measure the evils of this general emigration, general Bolivar published the following proclamation.

"Caraguins ! The dissatisfaction felt at this moment from the general emigration which has followed the royal party, has caused me the greatest sorrow. Your flight, and the total abandonment of your property, could not have been the effect of a spontaneous movement ; no—it must have been from fear either of the armies of Colombia, or of those of the Spaniards.

Royalists ! You may rely upon what has been agreed upon, as to the regularity of this war ; and upon the policy of the day, which holds in detestation and horror, the past times when the genius of crimes had arrived at its highest pitch ; shocking to all sentiments of humanity. Royalists, return to your possessions.

Caraguins ! Your emigration is a manifest offence against the Spanish government, which you think to please and flatter. Your fears of the arms of the king, in his terrible reactions, are no longer well grounded, because the Spanish chieftains are the generals La Torre and Correa, and no longer Boves or Morales.

Caraguins ! I know you are patriots, and you have abandoned Caracas ; but could you in conscience fly before the arms of Colombia ? No, no, no ! &c. &c.

San Carlos, July 3d, 1821.

(Signed) BOLIVAR."

The stupor of La Torre, discouraged the royal party. All who were rich and faithfully attached to the royal cause, emigrated. Above 24,000 of them, unwilling to live under either La Torre or Bolivar, departed for the West Indies, Spain and the United States.

The consequences of Bolivar's indignation at this extraordinary emigration, were soon felt. Before he left Caracas he confiscated the houses and lands of the emigrants, to a great amount, dividing them among his chieftains and courtiers. He imposed heavy taxes and contributions upon the few inhabitants who had not emigrated, but had lived retired in the country, and devoted to the royal cause. He adopted two measures which greatly increased the misery of the inhabitants.

1st. The Spanish government had coined a small copper money, which was generally known under the name of the pauper's money. It was intended for the benefit of those who were poor, whether they had become so by the fury of civil war, inability to labor, or in any other way whatever. This money was every where received without hesitation. In Caracas, a Spanish dollar is divided into halves, quarters and eighths. The eighth is called a *real*. The half of each real is called a *medio real*, and this was the lowest coin in value. In this state of the circulating medium the Spanish government emitted a copper coin, called *quartillo*, one of which was worth half the medio real. Four sols were the value of a quartillo ; so that the dollar being divided into 32 parts, as many differ-

ent articles might be bought with it. A poor man, (and the poor were very numerous,) therefore, who earned one *real* a day, could buy sixteen different articles for himself and family. This poor-money, besides enabling the poor to live, kept down the price of the necessaries of life, and thus benefited both rich and poor. An ordinary family might live well with a dollar a day, whereas now they can live but poorly with twice that sum.

When general Bolivar entered Caracas, in June 1823, there was above two and a half millions of dollars, of this *poor-money*, in circulation, in the capital, and in the province of Caracas; and no one hesitated to receive it. He ordered, by a decree, that this money should circulate no longer. The price of every thing rose immediately, and with it, the public suffering; and that, to such height, that many perished of hunger and want.

2d. The second measure was a decree, as an extraordinary war contribution, that the harvests of all the possessions belonging to emigrants, should be collected and put into the stores belonging to the government. This was done in such hurry and confusion, that in the collection many frauds were committed. Such dilapidations attended the collection, that, from all these productions, not more than a sixth part ever found its way into the public stores. He ordered that the land owners, who had remained in the country, should, under pain of capital punishment, give up their harvests of every kind, and deliver them into the public stores. He allowed the owners' one fifth part only.

The loss of the battle of Carabobo, and the stupor of La Torre in Porto Cabello, spread disgust and consternation among the Spaniards on the Main, insomuch that on the 21st September, 1821, the strong fortress of Carthagená surrendered by capitulation.

La Torre was at last removed, and was succeeded by Morales; but it was too late. The strength of the Spaniards, and their confidence that they should eventually regain their superiority, were gone. The expedition of Morales against Coro and Maracaybo, served only to prolong the season of war and bloodshed. Nothing was produced by it of more importance, than that by his usual course of conduct, Charles Soublette obtained the nick-name of Miss, or lady Soublette. Paez and Padilla, fortunately for Colombia, retrieved such of her affairs, as had been thrown into confusion, and well nigh lost by the

timidity and weakness of Soubllette. Maracaybo, which had been in possession of Morales since September 1822, fell again into the hands of the Colombians, after a bloody and destructive naval action, which did great honor to the intrepidity of its commander, general Padilla.

Maracaybo surrendered in August 1823, and, soon after, Morales embarked for Havana. He left the country loaded with the execrations of the inhabitants, which he deserved by his multiplied barbarities and cruelties.

Porto Cabello surrendered at last, on the 16th of July 1824, and this closed the evacuation of the Main by the Spaniards. No armed enemy was now to be feared. This surrender was also the work of Padilla, sustained by general Paez.

CHAPTER XXI.

Conduct of the Dutch Government in the Island of Curacao against the Republic of Colombia and the Spaniards—Of the expedition against Porto Rico, and spoliations committed by the Dutch Government of Curacao, under pretence of the criminality of General D. H.

Since the revolution at Caracas, the island of Curacao had been the head quarters of the Spaniards. It was rendered precious to them by its fine harbors, and its proximity to the Main. Having *gold*, they possessed the means of being provided with every thing requisite to carry on the war, and to furnish the fortresses and places of Porto Cabello, Laguaira, Coro, Maracaybo, Cumana, &c. with provisions and ammunition. The richer classes, members of the government, and merchants, were nearly all in favor of the Spaniards; the people were for the patriots.

In 1822, there appeared an official statement of facts, published by the Fiscal of Caracas, Mr. Narverte, and by the president of the court of admiralty at Laguaira, Mr. Francisco Xavier Yanes, in a pamphlet form, with the following title: "Exposition of the conduct observed by the Dutch government of Curacao, in the pending war of the republic of Colom-

bia with Spain.—Caracas. From the printing office of John Gutienes. 1822." When this appeared, the governor of Curacao, Paulus Rœloff Cantzlaar, whose conscience was not clear, made every exertion to suppress it. But I had friends, who provided me a copy, from which I will extract some curious facts that are little, or not at all known, out of that country. From these, and other facts stated in this chapter, I shall show the corrupt perverseness of these leaders of a government, which Yanes, the president of the court of admiralty, at Lagunaira, designated by the name of "that *gang* called the Dutch government of Curacao;" of which Cantzlaar was at that time the chief. He said also, that "that gang" had treated the Colombians like dogs, particularly after the battle of Carabobo. "Here," said he, "are some proofs: The Colombian privateer, the Valoroso, captain Bernardo Ferreiro, having lost his main-mast, in January 1822, not far from Curacao, was forced, in distress, to enter that port, under protection of the laws and rights of nations. He was allowed to enter, but, soon after, his vessel was seized and illegally condemned under the pretext of reprisal for two Spanish vessels, taken by the privateer Condor, in the territorial jurisdiction of Curacao. This pretext was false, for the court of admiralty at Lagunaira had proved that the two Spanish schooners, Fortuna and Experiencia, taken by the privateer Condor, were seized in latitude 11 degrees 50 minutes north, and longitude 68 degrees 35 minutes west, and consequently without the waters of Curacao. Instead of examining the fort, enquiring of the captain of the Valoroso, or advising the government of Colombia that any reparation was claimed, the government of Curacao passed at once all forms used in such cases, and sold the vessel at public vendue.

"In the course of Dec. 1818, the privateer brig Irresistible, (now called the Venudor,) cruising under the colors of the East Shore of the river Plata, took vessels, two destined to Porto Cabello and Lagunaira, one of which was a Spanish, the other a Dutch vessel, called Armonia, and belonging to Mr. Theodore Jutting, which was retaken by a Dutch frigate in her passage from Bonair to Los Rogues, for Margarita, and restored to her owner. As soon as this was known in Curacao, the government published a *ban*, ordering all the foreigners to present themselves before the Fiscal, who, as soon as he ascertained the persons belonging to the Main, ordered them to leave the island within eight days.

“In the year 1819 the Colombian privateer General English took a Dutch schooner, the *Intrepida*, commanding from Cuchito Curacao, to transport property belonging to the enemy. She was taken in tow by the privateer and conducted to one of the ports of Margarita for adjudication. There was at that time, in the port of Curacao, a Colombian privateer called the *Sosegada*, which on the simple demand of George Curiel,* owner of the *Intrepida* was immediately sequestered by the government of Curacao, by way of reprisal. It was not before this was done, that complaints were made to the government of Colombia asking damages, indemnification and satisfaction, for insults offered the colors of his Majesty, the king of the Netherlands.

“At the time of the invasion of Coro, a citizen, Joseph Amaes, was obliged to shelter himself in the island of Aruba. He took with him a female servant obtained at Coro, not for speculation, but for his own use as a servant. She came from the sequestered property of a Spaniard, Don Manuel Ganzales, who reclaimed her of the government of Curacao. The latter gave an order to seize the servant in the house of Amaes, and to deliver her to the Spaniard, notwithstanding that Amaes, at the time, proved her to be his legal property. This act of the government of Curacao, was, therefore, a plain violation of the law of nations.

After the Spanish commander had taken possession of the city of Coro, in virtue of a capitulation made with colonel Gomez, one of his first measures was to seize the slaves and mules upon the neighboring farms belonging to republicans, who had emigrated. These were ordered to be sold in the West Indies, or exchanged for provisions and warlike stores. Whilst vessels were preparing to transport them, the Dutch slaves were locked up in the prison. When two vessels came from Coro to Jamaica, bringing 380 slaves to exchange for provisions, the British government ordered the vessels to leave the port within 24 hours. They did so ; and steered for Havana.

“But in the island of Curiaco all that were bought were indiscriminately admitted ; slaves have been sold there for three barrels of codfish each !

* This George Curiel is a colored man, a merchant in Curacao entirely devoted to the Spaniards, as is Theodore Jutting and his two brothers Christopher and William. Those and Frederic Lintz, have done great mischief to Colombia, by the powerful support they have given to the Spaniards.

This horrid traffic being now prohibited by all civilized nations, the government of Curiaco, by permitting it in their territory, have violated the laws of nations, no less than those of neutrality.

These facts (and a great many more might be adduced) are sufficient to show the avaricious and cruel conduct of the government of Curiaco, towards the citizens of the republic, who fled from tyranny, and sought shelter in their island. "That government has received into their ports Spanish subjects and privateers, whilst it has refused, or confiscated those of the republic. It has assisted the Spaniards with provisions and munitions of war, in opposition to a cause in which the whole human race is interested; at the same time that it has plundered those who were devoting their property and their lives to the support of that cause. It has moreover, destined to hopeless slavery, many human beings, who, by the existing laws of their country, as well as by those of nature, were entitled to freedom. All this and much more, has been done by the Dutch government of Curiaco, for gold.

"All these facts are inconsistent with a strict neutrality, and are, therefore, in violation of the rights of the Colombians. Dated from the harbor of Lagunaira April 15th 1822.

(Signed) FRANCISCO XAVIER YANES.

*President of the Court of Admiralty.**

In the morning of the 29th October 1823, a prize of a Colombian privateer came into Curacao to escape from the chase of a Spanish armed vessel. The governor, Cantzlaar, ordered her to sail immediately. The prize captain, an American citizen, represented in vain, the danger to which she would be exposed by going out, and requested a delay of two days, which was refused. The captain of the Spanish privateer *Especuladora*, being at the time in the harbour, and informed of the governor's order, sailed out and cruised before the island, to take the prize vessel. The captain's papers were in perfect order, and the actual cruising of the Spanish vessel, affording a strong additional reason for staying in port, he went again to the governor, and told him, that he could not go out without losing his few men, himself, and the vessel. About seven o'clock in the evening, a guard came on board, the commander of which, in the name of the governor, ordered the prize

* Of this document I have given only a short extract,

captain to weigh anchor and set out without delay. The captain and his crew again declared that they could not submit to so unjust an order. They were compelled, by blows with broadswords and muskets ; and favored by the darkness of the night, escaped the enemy lying in wait for them.

Such was the conduct of Cantzlaar, that a second memoir appeared against him, sent from Porto Cabello in the month of January 1824. I endeavoured, but in vain, to procure it. My friends have informed me, that this was more full, stronger and better written, than the former.

Cantzlaar may be considered the *ne plus ultra* of bad governors. He was denounced by the merchants generally, and at length removed, to the great joy of the inhabitants.

Spanish doubloons were exchanged at Caracas, at the rate of twenty dollars in the current money. Mr. George Curiel, a merchant, being obliged to pay eleven thousand dollars in current money, sent the value in doubloons at the fixed rate of twenty dollars, as they were usually taken by the receiver general. But Mr. Van Uytrecht told him, that he had received an order from the governor, not to receive, from that time, a doubloon, at more than sixteen dollars in current money ; and Spanish dollars at only 12, instead of 15, as they had been, received. Mr. Curiel complained of the order ; and wished to take back his doubloons. This was refused ; and he was given to understand that he might have them back, after he had paid his debt in current money. It was at that time impossible to obtain such a sum in current money, without paying very high interest ; and this Mr. Curiel was compelled to do.

This happened in April 1823 ; whereas the 3d of May, then next, was the time fixed by the governor for beginning to receive doubloons and dollars at the treasury, at the rate specified in it. The decree excited the public indignation against Cantzlaar ; but it was not revoked.

In November 1822, a seizure was made of some dye-wood, coming from Maracaybo, and belonging to Mr Curiel. The pretext for the seizure was that an exact declaration of the weight had not been made at the custom house, the exact weight of *four* pieces, among about *two thousand*, not having been declared. Report of this fact being made to the governor, he ordered the wood to be taken from the vessel, and deposited in the Fiscal's yard. There it was weighed again ; piece by piece. Two pieces only being found to vary, Curiel was permitted to take it back. But by the operation, which

occupied seven weeks, the owner incurred great loss in time and expense ; in fact, he was thereby accused of an attempt to defraud the government.

In February 1824 Mr. Samuel Lyon, merchant in Curacao, had a controversy with the Fiscal, who is the chief of the police, about a vessel which the police officer had neglected to visit until it was so late in the day that the vessel could not sail that evening ; Mr. Lyon complained to the governor, who ordered the Fiscal himself to examine the officer and report to him !

The captain of the Spanish privateer Contella, after having, in 1821, pillaged many vessels sailing under Dutch colors, and belonging to inhabitants of Curacao, and having upon the high seas, so ill treated the captain from Curacao, of the Dutch merchant schooner Admiral Vander Capellen, that he died in consequence of it ; a few days afterwards, had the audacity quietly to enter the port of Curacao with his privateer. He was immediately charged, before the governor, with the criminal transactions, and positive proofs were adduced. The governor was entreated to arrest him, and detain his vessel until satisfaction for his crimes should be made by the Spanish government. Instead of complying with this just demand, he permitted the vessel to sail out secretly at midnight of the same day. It was loudly declared, in Curacao, at the time, that the captain obtained his permit to sail, by the power of doubloons. The details of this villainous transaction may be found in the Gazette of Curacao, No. 41, of the year 1821.

During the year 1820 and thence into 1823, of his administration, Cantzlaar issued above one thousand decrees, rules, ordinances, &c. These are carefully bound in six enormous folio volumes, and are to be seen in the office of the Fiscal, or secretary of state. For all purposes of government, they are worse than useless. But they are sure proofs of his obstinate disposition to vex and harrass the small population of 2300 souls committed to his government.

Cantzlaar reduced the salaries of the officers of government so low, that their families could not be supported by them. Many of them were actually forced to ask charity, or to borrow, or to seek illicit means of subsistence ; whilst he took care to provide himself abundantly with every thing. His master, the king of the Netherlands, attributed his reduction of salaries, to a spirit of economy, and was so pleased, that he gave him annually a gratuity of 8000 patagues, in addition to his salary of 1800 florins. This king is an honest man, but he knew noth-

ing of the oppressive system by which the governor enhanced the misery and desperation of the inhabitants of Curacao. Therefore I wrote privately to H. M. the king of the Netherlands, in April 1824, what I now here repeat publicly: "that his governor of the island of Curacao, Paulus Roeloff Cantzlaar, abused the name of his master, and disgraced the Dutch government." The character of Cantzlaar is a compound of hypocrisy, despotism, avarice and meanness. He was, of course, detested by all who were obliged to have any thing to do with him, and obtained the name of "the little Jesuit."

The following are among hundreds of anecdotes current of him:

He made a contract with a colored man named Barien to furnish him a certain number of flat boat (*called puntje*) loads of stone for building a wall; at the rate of two patagues per canot (*one dollar and six pence.*) The stone was delivered according to contract. But when Barien called for his money, the governor told him some of the boats were not well loaded, and that he had not stone enough for his purpose. The other replied that he could furnish more boat loads at the same price. "No, no," said the governor "it is better to weigh the stones and pay you by the pound." Barien eventually got about half his money; which it is to be remarked, was payable out of the public treasury,

The schout or high constable received every month eight patagues, for the purpose of cleaning the prisons, furnishing water &c. In order to receive a good sum at once, he let it lie for 10 months, until it amounted to 80 patagues. Cantzlaar decided upon his claim "that a man who could advance 80 patagues could advance more," and the constable received nothing! The consequence of this villainy was, that the prisoners were wretched sufferers; often without a drop of water; which in Curacao is not obtained easily.

In April 1823, a schooner was lost near Pescaduo, a small port of Curacao. Cantzlaar ordered a clerk of the comptroller's office to go there and take an exact account of the articles saved from the vessel. Mr. Herman Boyer, after having strictly and fully complied with the order, was directed to present a bill of the particulars of his expenses; in this voyage of about five miles. The whole amount was about eight reals (50 cents.) After a fortnight the governor decided, that "as the bill was charged too high, he could not make an order for the payment." Mr Boyer had a wife and children. Mr. Nie-

buhr the comptroller, ashamed of such meanness, paid his clerk from his own pocket.

A young man named Weiss, a clerk in the Fiscal's office, having received no salary for about a year, was in want of a penknife and a small box of wafers, for the use of the office. He mentioned it to the Fiscal, but as the governor had given strict orders that not a quill should go from the public stores without his *fiat*, Mr. Weiss was obliged to draw up a formal request in writing, which was signed by the Fiscal and sent to the governor. After three days' delay the decision of the governor was sent to the office in writing, "that he granted the box of wafers, but refused the penknife."

On Tuesday February 3d, while the governor was in town giving public audiences, as is usual on that day of the week, Mr. Elsevier, the Fiscal, who is second in rank and dignity in the government of Curacao, was in want of twelve sheets of wrapping paper, and a box of sand for his office. He made his demand in writing, and signed it. The governor, with his own hand, changed the figures 1-2 to 1-4, and then signed his fiat "the *Schout by Nacht*, (rear admiral in rank) and governor of the island of Curacao, and its dependencies." Upon this the Fiscal received six sheets of brown wrapping paper, which cost the government of Curacao about three cents.

This second dignity, the counsellor Fiscal, Mr. Isaac James Rammelmann Elsevier, is designated by his favorite words "he moot betaalen," (he must pay.)

The third personage in the island is Mr. Daniel Serurier, president of the tribunal of justice ; so called. He is a corrupt, base, hardened drunkard ; and is the devoted servant of the governor, and of his clerk Hagunga.

That the government of Curacao in 1822—1824, was extremely base, I trust will further appear, from the relation of a transaction which excited great sensation at the time, and in which I was concerned. The proceedings of this government to which I now allude as oppressive, fraudulent and base in the extreme, were against myself, Bantista Troine, and Charles Frangatt Voyel. The projected expedition against the Spanish island of Porto Rico, the object of which was to render its inhabitants *free* and independant of Spain, excited great attention and interest. With two brigs, which were intended to form part of the force of that expedition, I entered the port of Curacao in *distress*. This being a neutral port, I had of course a right to protection, by the laws of nations. The brigs were

laden with rich cargoes ; and Cantzlaar and Compaguree, for the purpose of laying their hands upon this property, caused me to be arrested, while I was in port, and in the condition just stated. For the purpose of covering this outrage and directing the public attention from it, they and their coadjutors took great pains to occupy the columns of various newspapers, with false and calumnious statements relative to my character, and to the objects of the expedition. I will give my statement.

When I took my final leave of the service on the *Main*, my desire was to retire altogether from such scenes as had engaged the greater part of my life ; and to devote my time to my growing family. With this view I engaged in literary pursuits and gave lessons in various branches, with which in the course of my life, I had become sufficiently acquainted to teach them to others. While I was living in this manner, I received, one night, at Curacao, a visit from some rich foreigners who were well settled in the island of Porto Rico. They urged me strongly, to place myself at the head of a numerous party of wealthy inhabitants of that island, for the purpose of expelling the Spaniards from it, and rendering the island free and independent. I had declined various proposals made me to join the patriots in Mexico and Buenos Ayres, and I now declined this urgent one of these inhabitants of Porto Rico, notwithstanding that they assured me, they placed entire confidence in me, and in me alone ; and that they would have nothing to do with any other military chieftain. About a month after, a larger number of them came to me, and gave me such proofs of their spirit and ability to accomplish their purpose, that I consented to their proposal. This happened at the end of the year 1821. I removed with my whole family from Curacao to St. Thomas'. There I left them, and came myself to the United States, where I soon found many enterprising men ready to aid me.

The expedition against Porto Rico, was, as yet, a project, which could not be realized, until I should have received all the powerful means promised me. Proceeding with part of my vessels, from St. Barts to Laguaira, I encountered a heavy storm at sea, and was forced to put into the port of Curacao with the brigs, the *Eondracht* and the *Mary*, in a state of distress, the 16th of Sept. 1822. The 23d I was arrested by order of governor Cantzlaar, in the house of the Fiscal judge. The governor, conscious of the baseness, or rather of the odium of the proceeding, exerted himself to throw the blame of the arrest upon the Fiscal and the tribunal. But the villainy was

his own. He was indeed influenced by advisers, who were interested with himself in the spoils they were to gain. I shall not detail the villanies of these men ; they are too well known. I will say here (what I have authentic documents to prove,) that Cantzlaar, Elsevier, D. Serurier, Hagunga, Van Spengler,* and their accomplices, are a gang of villains, to whom nothing is sacred, but gold.

Had I been sailing with an armament to attack Porto Rico, the government of Curacao, a neutral power, would have had no right to impede me, nor to aid the subjects or allies of Porto Rico in doing so.

I had committed no offence. I came in distress into the neutral harbor of Curacao, and was entitled to such reception as is due to a distinguished stranger in a foreign country. I had done nothing to forfeit my liberty, nor my right to the hospitality of the place. My situation was perfectly known to Cantzlaar ; he knew well that he had no right to arrest me. But, instigated by his own avarice and that of others, he did so ; and thus rendered it necessary for the purpose of covering the spoiliations committed upon the property under my care, to accuse and try me as an offender. Parker, the United States' consul, who died afterwards at Curacao, Van Spengler, who is now governor of the Dutch island of St. Eustacia, and William Prince, the secretary of the government of Curacao, in conjunction with those already named, were busy in procuring the insertion of false statements relative to me and my affairs in many foreign gazettes, and particularly in those of the United States. I could not contradict them at the time, because I did not know of their existence. I found afterwards, that they had prejudiced the public against me, and the honorable motives which had actuated me ; I saw at once, that they were intended to justify the robberies of Cantzlaar and his coadjutors.

Cantzlaar gave orders to institute a cause against me. I protested in strong terms against both the arrest and trial, refused to answer before the tribunal, and demanded to be informed why I was arrested in violation of the rights and laws of nations. Cantzlaar answered me that the Fiscal had caused my arrest ; the Fiscal told me that the governor had done it.

The governor accused me of an intention to attack the island of Porto Rico, and to render it free and independent, after

* Van Spengler is at present, governor of St. Eustacia, and is gravely compromised in the transactions of a pirate, whose crew has been hanged at St. Kitts. See the report of the grand jury, published lately, as a proof of my assertion.

having driven the Spaniards from the island. But as I had no troops nor any means of prosecuting such an expedition, this ridiculous pretext failed. Most of the European and North American gazettes printed in the latter part of the year 1822, contain statements of this Porto Rico affair ; and I believe all who have read them, are satisfied that my views were upright and honorable.

The Fiscal, Elsevier, seeing that the governor's accusation stood no chance of succeeding, set his own genius to work to invent another. He brought forth a grave charge of piracy, or as he expressed it, *similitude of piracy*. The evidence stated in this accusation, in support of this charge, was, that I had caused to be printed, in Philadelphia, various papers filled with liberal and republican principles.

The grand inquisitor Serurier, not satisfied with the form of either of the above charges, himself put the accusation, upon which he afterwards pronounced me guilty and sentenced me to death, into the form of a charge of *high treason against all living sovereigns*. This course of proceeding carries absurdity, outrage and villainy, upon the face of it, and needs no comment. The lawyers generally stood in such fear of the governor, that, for some time, no one of them dared to undertake my defence. At last, the court, *ex officio*, named Mordecai Ricardo, a man in whom, alone, I had entire confidence. M. Ricardo made a bold and masterly defence. But, as my acquittal must have restored to me the brigs and their cargoes ; his defence availed nothing. My fate was indeed decided beforehand. After the hearing was over, my friends, of whom I had a great many, and those of the most respectable inhabitants, came and congratulated me upon my prospect of speedy release. So sure were they that the court would not dare to condemn me. During the trial, which lasted eighteen months, M. Ricardo behaved like a true friend ; and after the sentence, which was sent to me in writing, and which I treated, together with the court, with all the ridicule and contempt I was master of, he insisted upon an appeal to the higher court of Gravenhague in Holland. The appeal was denied. He applied a second time and was again refused.

The inhabitants almost universally understood the cause and the motives of the court, so that the decision excited general indignation. For my part, I kept my pistols and dagger at hand, and in order, determined to defend myself to the last extremity. When the refusal to grant an appeal was known, the

public indignation rose to the highest pitch ; of which Cantzlaar, being informed by his spies, sent for the president of the court, to come and dine with him ; and directed him to grant the appeal. They were seriously alarmed by the excitement among the inhabitants ; and wished also for time to make up a plausible statement of the case, to be sent to the higher tribunal. The appeal, therefore, on a third application, was granted. I had asserted aloud, in presence of the Fiscal, (in whose house I had apartments) his son, and three clerks, that the court were a set of robbers ; and that no one would dare to execute their ridiculous sentence.

After my condemnation, I continued to occupy myself with my usual pursuits, to receive my friends, and to walk abroad as before. I gave out that I would send letters to his highness the Sultan at Constantinople, and to the emperor of China, notifying them of my conviction as a traitor and a conspirator against their lives. Hardened and brutish, as Serurier had become, he could not resist the torrent of general ridicule, and was evidently mortified.

Having declared that I would not go in a merchant vessel, nor without my family, to Holland, Cantzlaar fitted out the brig *Swallow*, a Dutch man-of-war, of 22 guns, for that purpose. In a few days, having made all necessary preparations, we were ready to embark, (Nov. 1823,) when, one morning, the Fiscal entered the room where I was at breakfast with my family, and told me that he came from the governor, who had just received despatches from Holland, in which the minister of the colonies ordered the governor to suspend every proceeding against me, and by no means to send me to Holland, as this affair was not regarded as criminal, but altogether as political. That I must be treated with all the regard due to my rank and education, (an order to the same effect had been given by the governor to the Fiscal at the time of my arrest, and was in force during the proceeding, against me) until his majesty the king of the Netherlands had received the advice of his council of state.

At last came the decision of the king ; which was, that the whole of the proceedings against me should be annulled and destroyed ; that I should be immediately put at my full liberty, and that all my expenses should be defrayed, until I might arrive at whatever place I should choose to go to with my family.

At the time of my departure from Curacao, various rumors were in circulation ; one was, that the governor, and the whole gang had received a very severe reprimand for the whole of their proceedings against me. I know not the fact ; but I know they deserved it.

The above is but a sketch of the cause. The principal rolls (or papers) remain in the hands of Cantzlaar, Elsevier and Serurier. One of the articles of the sentence at large, was that my liberal (I suppose they meant to call them licentious) papers should be burned by the hands of the common hangman, in the public square at Amsterdam fort in Curacao.

The king of the Netherlands is an honest and upright man. It therefore would become him to institute a full and particular inquiry into the conduct of these men, relative to my trial ; and also to inquire why *Leonard Sistare*, who had been convicted of altering the ships papers of the *Endracht*, was suffered to leave the port of Curacao, unpunished. Mr. Van Spanglee, the acting Dutch governor of St. Eustacia, as I am well informed, can give the best information on the subject. The *original acts*, which are kept at fort Amsterdam, will throw light on the subject. There are also, in my knowledge, facts and evidence sufficient to satisfy any impartial man, of the corruption of those who originated and carried on the infamous and groundless prosecution. These facts and evidence shall be produced whenever (while I am living) H. M. the king of the Netherlands, shall call for them.

CHAPTER XXII.

Biographical Sketches of Louis Brion, Francisco Pablo de Sanander and Francisco Antonio Zea.

Louis Brion, of the Order of Liberators, admiral, captain-general, and commander-in-chief of the naval forces of the republic of Colombia, was born in the island of Curacao, the 6th of July, 1782. He was one of the most distinguished chieftains of Colombia, liberal, honest and brave, and an ardent patriot. He was one of the principal supporters of general Boli-

var, to whom he was, unfortunately for the cause of freedom and independence, too blindly devoted. His father, Peter Brion, was a native of Brabant, and a wealthy and respectable merchant. He was a counsellor of the council of state in Curacao, until his death. His mother, Mary Detrox, was born in Luttich. Both came from Holland and established themselves in the island of Curacao, where his father's business became very important and extensive, and greatly enhanced his wealth.

Louis, who was the second son of the family composed of two brothers and one sister, was sent, when very young, to Holland for his education, where he completed his classical studies. He was placed in the office of a notary public for the purpose of studying and learning the laws. But when the conscription came, young Brion waited not to be drawn, but presented himself voluntarily to serve in the foot chasseurs of Holland. When the English and Russians made their descent on the coast of Holland, under the duke of York, Brion distinguished himself by his bravery. He attracted the attention of his superiors, who offered him the grade of an officer, but his parents fearing he might become attached to the military life, caused him to return to Curacao, where his father employed him in mercantile business.

But young Brion was of too active and restless a turn of character to be pleased with the life of a settled merchant. He wished to make voyages, and to enlarge his knowledge and increase his fortune. His father, therefore, granted his request to be sent to the United States, for the purpose of studying navigation. While he was here for that purpose, his father died, and left him a large fortune. Louis bought a vessel, and visited various seas and countries, uniting the seaman with the merchant; and having made large additions to his fortune, returned to Curacao in 1804, where he established himself as a merchant.

The English commodore Murray, having received an order from his government to take possession of the Dutch island of Curacao in 1805, sent a detachment of from four to five thousand men, to the east side of the island. These English troops debarked near a small fort called Caracas Bay, and took possession of a hill commanding the fort, where they placed a battery and heavy guns, which threatened the destruction of the fort. Brion was, that day, accidentally there. As soon as he perceived the intention of the English, he sprang upon his horse, and came full speed to the capital, which is two large

leagues from Caracas Bay. In the capital he had many friends—and it was well known there, that not only he was rich and active, but also, that he had served with reputation in the military line. In a few minutes he was joined by above a hundred young men; his friends who armed themselves, elected him their commander, and marched full speed against the English. With Brion at their head, they ascended the hill, where the English had hastily entrenched themselves. Brion and his friends attacked them with such spirit, that the English were killed with the bayonet and sword, upon their pieces. The battle was turned upon the boats of the English, of whom a few escaped to embark; but all that were not killed on those, were destroyed by the fire directed upon the boats; so that not a soul, eventually escaped.

This heroic deed raised Brion and his companions to the highest estimation. On their return to the capital they were received with demonstrations of joy and gratitude. Festivals were given in honor of them. But the restless disposition of Brion impelled him again to travel. He bent his way to Lagunaira; and coming to Caracas, was received into the most distinguished families, and among others, into that of Montilla, in which he soon became an intimate friend. This was some years previous to the revolution of 1810, at Caracas. From that time he became the patron of the eldest son, Mariano, who, as we have seen, was indebted to him for his reconciliation with the supreme chief at Angostura in 1819, and his promotion to the rank of colonel, in the service of his country.

At the beginning of the revolution in 1810, Brion offered his services to the new republic, and was appointed captain of a frigate in 1811. He accepted the rank, with the condition that he should not be subject to strict service, but should be at liberty to act independently of any chieftain, with his own vessel, in his own way. He, in fact, sacrificed his large fortune and his credit, for the benefit of the cause, and labored incessantly in its service. He would undoubtedly have done much more, had it been in his power to change the ambitious views of general Bolivar, to whom I have heard him a hundred times urge the necessity of having, not a congress alone, but a government established upon legal principles, by which the security of persons and property should be insured to the whole community.

I heard him speak with great warmth to Bolivar, in favor of convening a congress, and adopting a constitution like that of

the United States of America, where the federal system had been proved to be the best and most in conformity with the different laws, customs and character of the people. If Caracas and New Grenada had adopted the federal system, Bolivar could never have obtained the absolute rule over them which he now exercises. Bolivar himself was aware of this ; and, therefore, it was, that he rejected the federal system, under pretence of its being too weak and slow in its operations. A central government has thrown absolute power into his hands. And now that he has acquired the habit of reigning alone, it will be difficult, probably impossible, to introduce a free government, a government of laws, into Colombia, during his life.

Bolivar soon forgot, or at least disregarded all that Brion had done for him, or the cause. The great exertions of Brion, as noted in these memoirs, met only with ingratitude from Bolivar.

When I spoke to general Bolivar one evening at Aux Cayes in very high terms of Brion, and his great exertions, Bolivar said to me, "you are right, my dear friend ; but we must both confess he is a very great fool"—and he laughed heartily.

Brion could never recover the large sums he advanced ; Bolivar put him off by saying there was no money then, but that he should be paid as soon as possible.

The leading traits in the character of a Caraguin, are vanity, pride and jealousy. In prosperity he is vain and insolent ; in adversity, humble, and ready to listen anxiously to any one who is able to relieve him.

When Bolivar came from Jamaica to Aux Cayes, he had not four doubloons in his pocket. He found Brion, listened to him, and followed his advice. But the supreme chief at Margarita, and at Carupano, rejected the wise counsel of Brion, and followed his own whims. Bolivar, when a fugitive from the field of battle at Ocumare, listened to the voice of Brion, who joined him at Bonair, and returned to the shores of Ocumare. Being driven off by Marino, Piar, and Bermudes, and treated as a coward by his own countrymen, the stranger Brion came again to his support, and placed him at the head of the government, at the end of 1816. Bolivar again in power, disregarded his word given to Brion, and the chieftains of Colombia, to assemble a congress. When upon Bolivar's disappearance, and concealing himself in the plains of Cumana, Zea, Marino, and others, had assembled a congress, Bolivar,

the moment it was in his power, annulled their proceedings, and fastened again on the supreme power, and reprimanded Brion and Zea. Brion being deeply engaged with Bolivar, was obliged to submit to his commands. From that time Bolivar became jealous that Brion might supplant him ; and from this jealousy arose the treatment Brion received from him at Savanilla.

I have been assured, that from the time of the transaction at Curiaco, the admiral was no longer treated by the supreme chief as an intimate friend and confidant, as he had ever been before that time, and that he felt this coldness very sensibly. In consequence of that jealousy, which is so strong a trait in the Caraguin character, Bolivar had to struggle not only with Bolivar, but also with Mariano Montilla, and Linode Clemente.

In 1819, Mariano Montilla was sent as colonel from Angostura to Margarita by the supreme chief, with a large amount of money, as has been related. After the taking of Santa Martha, where Brion so powerfully sustained the operations of Montilla, the jealousy of the latter rose high against Brion, who, as admiral, had a right to the command. Montilla, created brigadier general, forgot that Brion was his friend and protector, and refused to recognise his authority. This gave rise to many unpleasant scenes ; and Brion, highly disgusted, retired to Maracaybo, where general Linode Clemente was intendant.

The character of Brion was generally rough and haughty, and this brought him into disagreeable collisions with the general. Under so much trouble, his robust constitution was shaken, and he became so ill that he was obliged to leave his squadron. He retired to Curacao in the beginning of 1821, in a low state of health, and so poor that the captain of the privateer he went in, lent him sixteen doubloons. He was so dejected and tired of life, that he refused medicine, ate very little, and drank what his physician advised him to abstain from. after a long and lingering illness, he died, as he had long desired, the 20th of September, 1821, deeply lamented by all enlightened and liberal men.

All the property he left of a vast estate, was not enough to pay the expenses of his funeral, which was attended by many hundreds of the inhabitants of Curacao. His probity, his generosity, and the great services he rendered to Colombia, will transmit his name to posterity, and exalt it far above the name

of any of his persecutors. The congress of Colombia has passed various decrees in honor of his memory.

Francisco Paulo, or Pablo Sanander, of the order of Liberator, General of division, vice president of the republic of Colombia, &c. &c. was born in 1787, at the city of Bogota, at that time called Santa Fe de Bogota; he was born in a low condition. His high rank and elevation are the result of his own merit. He is brave, active and intriguing, with but little education or fortune. He is the chief of the revolution in which he has distinguished himself on various occasions. His ambition is not so conspicuous as that of Bolivar; but they are great rivals, and Sanander is far the ablest man, and best qualified to be at the head of the government. During the four years of Bolivar's absence in the southern provinces of Colombia, and in Peru, general Sanander or vice president, was charged with the executive; and in the whole of this time there was no commotion, no partial insurrection, no civil war. Affairs proceeded, if not so regularly as could have been desired, certainly much better than after Bolivar's return to Colombia. As soon as the latter returned, civil war began in Valencia, Caracas, and Laguaira; and afterwards at Porto Cabello and Cartagena. It is said not without some foundation, that general Bolivar was the secret instigator of these commotions. This assertion derived credit from the fact that general Paez was only not punished, but was continued by the liberator in his rank, and in his command. Bolivar indeed convened his ridiculous assembly at Ocuna, which was but vapour. Bolivar, with his bayonets, gained his point, while Sanander, the constitution, and those shadows of the republican form, the senate and house of representatives; vanished. This was a struggle of the Caraguin against the Grenadan. The weapons of the former were bayonets, those of the latter, pen, ink and paper.

Antonio Francisco Zea, Dr. Jurisprudentiæ, ex-intendant, ex-president of congress, ex-vice-president of the republic of Venezuela, minister plenipotentiary of the republic of Colombia at London and Paris, &c. &c. was born in 1768, in the city of Bogota. He was one of the first who thought of rendering his country free and independent of Spain. He had devoted his time chiefly to the study of the laws, political economy, history, and general literature, to all, in short, which conduces to form the mind and mould the heart of a gentleman. He devoted himself zealously to the study of botany, of which he acquired a profound knowledge. He was one of those rare

characters that are distinguished by virtue, knowledge and probity.

Zea was the intimate friend of his countryman, Antonio Narino, a young man of ardent and ambitious character, and of a leading family in Bogota. Narino hated the oppressive government of Spain, and by his passionate and energetic conversation, gained his friend Zea, and about twenty other young men of the best families, to unite, for the purpose of exciting the attention of their countrymen to their debased condition, and inducing them to revolt. The imprudent zeal of Narino, however, discovered his plan, and his accomplices. They were secretly arrested in the night, by order of the viceroy, taken under a strong escort to Santa Martha, and embarked for Cadiz, (1794.)

Young Zea had the good fortune to find powerful friends and protectors at Madrid, where he remained for a long time. From there he went to France, whither his parents came shortly afterwards, to establish themselves at Paris, where they remained with part of their family. Zea returned to Madrid and became the conductor of the Gazette of the court, and of the Mercury of Madrid. Soon after, king Charles IV. appointed him director of the beautiful botanic garden of that capital.

In 1808, Mr. Zea was one of the 85 deputies from Spain, convened by order of Napoleon, at Bayonne, to form a new king.

The new king of Spain, Joseph Napoleon, in whose retinue Mr. Zea entered Spain, named him, soon afterwards, his prefect at Malaga, and gave him the decoration of his new order of knighthood. But the new prefect shared the fate of his new king, who, with his good qualities, soon gave way to the cruel and cold hearted Ferdinand.

Mr. Zea returned to France, and resided some years at Paris. Part of his family were with him, and he occupied himself exclusively with science and belles lettres. When, in 1813, the congress of New Grenada sent M. M. Gutierrez and colonel Tules Duncan to London, to procure arms, ammunition and other warlike stores, for the use of the patriots, Mr. Zea joined his countrymen and rendered them great assistance in their business. But they were principally indebted, for their success, to Louis Brion, afterwards admiral of Colombia. He was at that time in London, and offered his large fortune and extensive credit in aid of the object of these patriots. By these means they procured a fine corvette, armed with 28 guns, which

brought a great quantity of warlike stores, and among them fourteen thousand choice muskets, for the use of the patriot army. Brion had beforehand made a written agreement with them, very fortunately, as one of these deputies attempted, in 1816, to deprive him of his property.

In 1814, Mr. Zea passed from London to Jamaica, where he remained until the beginning of 1816. He was joined in 1815, by general Bolivar, after his siege against Carthagena.* General Bolivar returned to Aux Cayes, Mr. Zea joined him some weeks afterwards, and was appointed intendant of the army.

Mr. Zea and admiral Brion, who made their acquaintance in London, became firm friends. The former being of a sweet and accommodating temper, became also the friend of general Marino, who was despised by Brion. In 1817, Brion found himself grievously disappointed by general Bolivar, who had made to him, Arismendy, Paez and others, a solemn promise, before he left Port au Prince, that he would convene a congress. Bolivar, under various pretences, eluded their intimations to him to keep his promise; and, by usurping the title of supreme chief, betrayed his determination to continue in the exercise of the supreme power. Brion, who loved a constitutional government, and hated an usurped military power, spoke frequently with Zea, of his disappointment. When, therefore, Bolivar absconded from Barcelona, the plains of Cumana, Brion thought the moment propitious to the calling of a congress. He spoke on the subject to Zea, and Zea to Marino; and a congress was formed at Curacao, which existed a fortnight; being then dissolved by Bolivar, as before stated. They excused themselves to the supreme chief, and were pardoned; but never regained their former standing in his favor.

In 1817, Mr. Zea was created counsellor of the government of Angostura; as such he proposed the establishment of a gazette, under the title of the *Courier of Angostura*, of which he was, for a long time, the only conductor. After the arrival of doctor Rosina, Mr. Zea was assisted by him. This was the first and only official gazette published after the downfall of Bolivar's dictatorship in 1814.

Bolivar, understanding the pliant temper and timid character of Zea, appointed him, without hesitation, to the office of vice

* See chapter IX.

president of the republic, to exercise the executive power in his absence. We have seen how Arismendy forced him to resign, and how the latter was turned out by Bolivar, and Zea replaced.

Bolivar, knowing that Zea had left part of his family in Paris, and that he had sure and powerful friends in London, sent him, in 1819, as minister plenipotentiary to both capitals. As such, he was sometimes in England, and then in France, as the business of his mission required. He was never admitted in his diplomatic character; but was well received as a stranger; and, by the friends of the South American cause, with distinction. Mr. Zea having been always steady, and discreet in his principles, Bolivar hoped that the moderate party would be re-animated by him, and that by his influence and exertions, a good understanding between the two contending parties might be established. At that time there existed a strong party, so far in favor of Spain, that they desired not to drive these who were attached to the old government, to despair; but wished for the correction of certain abuses, and made this their leading object. This was the plan of the celebrated general Miranda, who was so much calumniated in 1811 and '12. All who knew general Miranda, will agree that he was in every respect a much worthier man than general Bolivar. Miranda was a profound tactician, an intrepid soldier; a man of great ability in civil administration; disinterested in his views, and who never, in the least particular, abused the dictatorial power, which was entrusted to him by congress, during several months. He attracted to him, men of talents and merit, listened to their opinions, and many times followed their suggestions. Bolivar is the exact reverse of all this. Colombia will therefore remain enslaved and miserable whilst the supreme chief remains at the head of her imaginary republic; and her government has, at present, no better foundation than his moderate talents, and his character,—such as it is.

The negotiations, in which Mr. Zea succeeded in London are too well known to be noticed here, as well as the attempts of Mr. Pedro Gual and Mr. Revenga, to degrade his character and his memory. History has already decided between them and the worthy Zea.

Revenga succeeded Mr. Zea as charge des affaires in London; but met with a very different reception. The first was greatly respected and beloved; the latter is now one of the

most devoted partizans of that same general Bolivar, whom, according to report, he not long since hated.

A detail of the negociations respecting the loan, would place the candor, ability and honesty of Mr. Zea in the strongest light, but such detail would exceed the limits of these sketches.

On the 26th November, 1822, while acting in England as minister of Colombia, Mr. Zea died at Bath; deeply regretted by every upright and enlightened patriot.

The persecutions that awaited him, if he had lived to return to his country, are plainly indicated in the official letter of Pedro Gual, dated Bogota, 29th September, 1822.

CHAPTER XXII.

Biographical Sketches of General Paez and Arismendy.

Joseph Antonio Paez, of the order of Liberators, General in Chief of the armies of Colombia, Venezuela, &c. &c. was born in 1786, in the city of Aragua, of Indian parents of a low extraction, whose employment consisted principally in raising cattle, and in cultivating some land. For their stations in life they were in comfortable circumstances. Young Paez was raised amidst the herds of his fathers, and of course received no education at all. He took care of the herds, and could perform any operation used upon cattle or horses, with great skill. He understood all the simples used in the cure of all the disorders of herds in that country and knew how to apply them. He was master at taming wild horses; and had great bodily strength and agility. He was also extremely patient of fatigue of every kind.

When eighteen years old, he offered himself to make a journey from Aragua to the city of Barinas, where his mother was born. She had a lawsuit with her family, which had already lasted for several years. After some objections on the part of his parents, they consented to his taking the journey, in the hope that it would facilitate their law suit. He set off well mounted, armed, and supplied with money. On the road, he met with two rogues whom he had known at Aragua, and

who knew that he had money. They lay in wait to rob him. He was not at all aware of their intentions, and without suspicion came near them. One of them attempted to seize the reins of his bridle, but Paez, who had a vigorous horse, gave him the spur and rode off at full speed, overthrowing both the robber and his horse. The robbers not being so well mounted but knowing a foot path shorter than the road, took that, and at the end of it upon the road again way laid them and endeavored to seize him. When Paez found that all his entreaties were vain, he suddenly killed one of the robbers on the spot; the other fled; neither of them being armed.

Young Paez, fearing the consequences of this encounter to his family and himself, thought it best to return to his parents, and inform them what had happened before the other robber could have time to denounce him. His parents immediately concealed him; and paid money and gave presents to hush up this affair. They placed their son as an overseer of cattle upon the Hato (farm) of a rich and powerful Spaniard in the plains, where he remained, occupied only with his service for several years. Being large, well formed, supple, vigorous and brave he was known for these qualities, and the affair of the robbers being learned in the neighborhood, he became greatly beloved on account of it, and his name was famous.

On the breaking out of the Revolution of Caracas, in 1810, Paez declared himself in favor of freedom and liberty. And the Llaneros placing great confidence in him, he easily persuaded them to join him, and they unanimously called him their chief. He chose from among them 150 mounted men: and this company soon began to be the terror of the Spaniards..

At the death of his mother he inherited her property in Barinas, which he divided with his sisters, who had then fixed their residence in that town. In 1811 the Spaniards had again taken possession of it, and proclaimed a general amnesty for all who should wish to re-enter upon their property, promising to reinstate them in the possession of their fortunes. Paez being informed of this, presented himself well mounted and armed, before the Spanish commandant of the town, in order to profit of the amnesty, and recover his property. As soon as he was recognised by the inhabitants, they came by hundreds to shake hands with and welcome him. But when the Spanish governor heard that he was the famous captain Paez, who had done them so much mischief, they ran to their arms, and raised a cry in the street, for their commander to arrest him,

and shoot him as a rebel and traitor. This commandant, who was aware of the bravery of Paez, and of his ascendancy over the inhabitants of Barinas, thought it not prudent to order his arrest, fearing such a measure would excite a general rebellion. He, therefore, appeased his soldiers, and Paez was permitted to remain with his arms, and to retire into the house of his family. After some days, the governor was informed by his spies, that Paez had gone out unarmed, and this would be a good time to seize his arms, and then to arrest him. The governor approved of the project, and some armed men entered the house and took away his sword and pistols. He returned in the evening, and finding what had been done, walked to the governor's house and told him that he had broken his word. He told him he had come to the place, trusting in the good faith of his promises. He therefore demanded that his arms should be restored to him; not to be used against the Spaniards, but for his personal security. He spoke in so firm a tone, and with such natural warmth, that the governor ordered his arms to be restored. At this moment the whole garrison of Barinas impetuously insisted upon his being arrested, and confined in irons. He was taken in the night, put in irons, and locked up in the prison; where he found about 150 prisoners of war, and among them his friend Garcia, an officer of great strength and courage. Garcia complained to Paez of the weight of his irons, and of the miserable situation of the prisoners. Paez reproached him with pusillanimity, and immediately breaking his own fetters, offered him an exchange. Garcia took heart and ceased complaining. Paez then spoke in a low but earnest manner to the prisoners exhorting them to one common effort for their delivery. This effort was made under his direction, and before morning their limbs mostly were free. When the jailor came to open the door, Paez fell upon him, knocked him down, and threatened him with instant death if he were not silent. They seized the arms of the guard, broke the irons of all that were not yet freed; and the 150 prisoners marched with Paez at their head, upon the Spanish garrison, about 200 strong; many of whom they killed, and routed the rest. Thus was Barinas again set free.

This exploit being very soon made known to the Llaneros, they proclaimed Paez their general.

He rendered great service to Bolivar in 1813 and 14. He was adored by the Llaneros, with whom he distinguished himself in the plains of Apure, Achaguas and Casanare. He be-

came acquainted with general Piar, from whom he learned much ; and, during the absence of Bolivar in 1814, these two chieftains fought unitedly, bravely and without interruption. They became the terror of Bovés, Morales, Cagigal, Yanes, Cevallos, and other Spanish commanders.

In 1820, Paez having fixed his head quarters at Chaguas, had under his command, among others, the British legion, commanded by colonel Bossett, about six hundred strong. At that time, there were attached to this legion, 3 colonels, 2 lieutenant colonels, 5 majors, and many supernumerary captains. Colonel Bossett was a good officer and highly esteemed by general Paez ; who likes foreigners generally, better than does Bolivar, or any other Caraguin chieftain. Paez thought highly of the English troops ; and used to call them, *Mis Amigos Los Inglesis* (my friends the English.) Colonel Bossett, however was disliked by his own officers and soldiers. They attributed to him the miserable state of their rations, their clothes, and the want of their pay. Chaguas being a small place, the officers and soldiers were crowded together. They had nothing but beef for their rations ; no bread, vegetables, nor spirits. The soldiers conspired together and fixed upon St. Simon's day for meeting. This day was celebrated throughout Colombia as a festival or holiday, because general Bolivar bore the name of this saint.

The heat being excessive in these plains, parade was usually deferred until 5 or 6 o'clock at evening, and St. Simon's day falling this year on Sunday, and the Saturday before being given up to the soldiers, that they might have time to clean their arms, the division was excused from parade.

Notwithstanding this, as soon as the clock struck five, the soldiers of the British Legion rushed out of their lodges with their arms, and placed themselves in order of battle, crying aloud that they would no longer be commanded by their colonel, that they would prefer any other, even a Creole. The officers of the legion immediately repaired to the parade and endeavored to pacify them. Among these was a lieutenant-colonel, against whom they had taken offence, and who, as soon as he approached them, received four or five bayonet wounds, and was carried off mortally wounded. Colonel Bossett, hearing what was going on, came before the mutineers well armed, and determined to enforce order among them. But as soon as he began to speak, the soldiers rushed upon him with their bayonets, but were prevented from doing him any serious

injury by the efforts of the officers to appease them. General Paez being informed of the mutiny, ran from his quarters, with his drawn sword in his hand, fell upon the mutineers, killed three of them instantly, and broke his sword upon the body of a fourth. He then seized some of the most rebellious, took them by the strength of his own arms out of their ranks, and ordered them to prison. This spirited conduct so overawed the mutineers, that they separated, and retired hastily to their quarters.

A young lieutenant, and three soldiers, all English, having been denounced as the most seditious, were arrested in the night. The lieutenant was innocent of what had passed the day before, but was denounced by his enemy the adjutant-major of the legion. The next day he and the three soldiers, without any further trial were shot.

General Paez was an excellent partizan officer, and was very useful whilst he confined himself to the plains, where he was perfectly acquainted. But when out of these, he became dull, and appeared to be in a manner lost. He was several times in this state, as the history of the military operations in Venezuela will show.

It must, however, be acknowledged, that of all the Colombian generals, Paez has uniformly displayed the greatest personal bravery, and that in all attacks, he has been at the head of his Llaneros, over whom he has acquired unlimited power. He divides with them his last cent. They call him uncle and father. But as he had no education, and could form himself only by his own exertions, he has no accurate knowledge of tactics, nor indeed of any branch of the military art, of which he has more than once been heard to speak with contempt. His staff officers are Llaneros, and form his regular society. He takes his hammock in the midst of them, and smokes and drinks with them. He talks much, and, like most of the Caraguins, is vain, proud, and boastful.

In 1819, general Paez wished to take possession of Guanare; and on his march, found the Spanish lieutenant colonel Durán at the head of a detachment of 200 infantry, with whom he was retiring towards the *hato* of La Guaz. General Paez had with him 1200 chosen cavalry, all Llaneros, with whom he was accustomed to march, and to whom he gave the name of invincibles. He instantly charged Durán's little party, crying, "destroy them, cut them in pieces." Durán formed a square, and crossing his bayonets, made a successful defence against the

wild attack of the Llaneros. He then, in his turn made a full charge upon them, killed many, and routed the rest. Paez was obliged to fly ; and escaped with but a small part of his invincibles.

His head quarters, since 1813, have been in Valencia ; but he has a beautiful country seat not far from Caracas, which before the revolution, belonged to the marquis of San Leon. When his time permits him, he passes some days at this place, where he fattens a great many cattle, performs operations upon his young horses and bulls, prepares medicines for any diseased animals, and trims and dresses his horses. He is best satisfied when busily engaged in these occupations. A considerable part of his time is employed in lying upon his hammock, smoking, and talking with favorites of his past campaigns.

He has a great predilection for hunting wild bulls, and particularly for the kind of hunt called *colear un toro*. It consists in taking a bull by the tail, and throwing him upon the ground, and is done, particularly by the Llaneros of Venezuela, in the following manner. The hunters are all on horseback, each carrying in his hand a piece of red cloth. At the sight of this color, the bull becomes enraged ; and runs at some one, who dexterously throws his cloth, and fastens it upon the horns of the bull, in such a manner as to blindfold him. While he is roaring and plunging to clear himself of the cloth, the principal hunter, who is designated beforehand, seizes the animal's tail and fastens an end of a strong rope to it. He then makes the other end fast to a tree, so that the bull cannot escape. He now turns the tail with a strong hand, and with such address, that the quick motion the animal naturally makes in turning his head towards his captor, is made to assist in throwing him flat upon his side. The moment he is got into this position, the principal hunter hainstrings him with his sabre, and the rest pierce him with their spears. The carcass is then dressed and prepared for cooking.

At the battle of Ortiz, in April, 1818, where Bolivar commanded, Paez, with his cavalry, made several successful charges against the enemy, who, though inferior in number, were superior in discipline and skill to Bolivar. The general-in-chief had so entangled matters and confounded the line, that his infantry were beaten and nearly destroyed. On this occasion, Paez reproached him personally, and with great freedom and severity.

At Bolivar's request, Paez covered the retreat, and made one or two charges, which saved the remnant of the infantry from destruction. Soon after the last charge, which he led himself, he retired on one side, and having dismounted, was seized with a fit, and lay upon the ground, foaming at the mouth. Colonel English, who related the circumstance to me, was present. He went up to Paez, but was warned by some of his people not to touch him; and by no means to disturb the general. "He will soon be well," said they, "he is often so, and none of us dare touch him until he is perfectly recovered." Colonel English, however, approached, and having sprinkled some water in his face and forced a little down his throat, he soon recovered; and coming to his recollection, he thanked him cordially; saying that he was a little overcome by the fatigue of the day, having with his lance and his own arm, killed thirty-nine of the enemy. He said he felt his illness coming on, as he was running the fortieth through the body. The bloody lance lay by his side, and he presented it to colonel English as a memorial of his friendship and affection. Paez soon recovered and joined his legion, and when colonel English departed, he presented him with three very fine horses from his own stud.

After the refusal of general Morrillo to give quarter, Paez was never known to spare the life of a prisoner. At the battle of Calabozo, having been successful in several charges, by which he forced the royalists to retreat, he was in the height of good humor, when an officer, who had been taken by his men, was brought to him. The officer was mounted. The general asked him a few questions, and then directed his *man of business* to do his duty. The Spaniard begged hard for his life. "Well," says Paez, "ride to yonder tree," pointing to one at some distance, "and when you get there, escape as fast as you can, and take care I do not come up with you." The officer obeyed, and when he arrived at the tree, casting one glance behind, commenced his race. Paez pursued and soon overtook him. He was just going to strike his lance through him, when the officer with some presence of mind said, "general Paez is too noble to take an advantage; my horse was tired; but if you, general, will give me your horse, and the same liberty, I think I could save my life." "Done!" answered Paez; and immediately the Spaniard was mounted upon his horse. The distance was again pointed out. The officer rode to the spot and started afresh. Paez meanwhile

mounted the jaded horse. He started also, gained ground, and in about two miles actually overtook the Spaniard, and pierced him through with his spear. The case was witnessed by hundreds; and the air rang with the applauses of the sanguinary Paéz!

Juan Bautista Arismendy, general of division, of the order of Liberators, ex-governor of the island of Margarita, &c. &c. was born in 1786 in the island of Margarita, of parents in as good circumstances, as this sterile spot could make them; whose inhabitants subsist upon fishing and navigation.

Arismendy is one of those men who are said to form themselves, and who become fit for the station they occupy in the world, by the force of genius or natural ability. He possesses a natural tact or disposition, which no education, though it may direct, can ever give. From his youth, he was devoted to hunting and fishing. The first formed *his coup d'œil* and taught him stratagem. Both hardened his body, by exercise and privation. His figure is broad, strong, and about five feet two inches high. His complexion is tawny and sun burnt. His hair is yellow, his eyes are small and piercing, and he is probably, the most active chieftain in Colombia. He has received no education and can scarcely read or write. His penetrating genius, and his insinuating manners, advanced him in the army; and when Bolívar created himself dictator, he appointed colonel Arismendy governor of the capital, Caracas. In this post he distinguished himself by his vexations and cruelties; and made himself many enemies.

In 1814, when Venezuela was in a declining condition, he left Caracas, and went, as brigadier-general and governor of the island of Margarita, into his native country. He re-established order in this province, fortified those places which afforded a good defence, and built a number of small forts, redoubts and batteries. Here he made himself very popular by his good and just administration, and acquired a great ascendancy over his countrymen; so that after the battle of La Puerta, which was lost by the dictator in June 1814, he was absolute master of Margarita, where he acted without control; insomuch that when the two dictators, Bolívar and Marino, in 1814 came to his island for shelter, he compelled them to depart without admitting them even to common hospitality. He was jealous of his authority, and determined to hold the supreme command of Margarita; and he knew that Bolívar had a right to command him wherever they were together. Bolívar knew well

the character of Arismendy, and did not dare to remain. From that time, general Arismendy remained in quiet possession of his absolute command, and organised and disciplined his army ; and administered much better than Bolivar had ever done. By his kind reception of foreigners, he attracted many privateers to the island ; their prizes were sold there ; and commerce flourished under Arismendy's protecting care of the merchants and their interests. He contented himself with a moderate income, the product of regular duties, and taxes. Margarita was then the entrepot between the Venezuelan and Grenadan patriots, and the commercial world of the West-Indies, and of the United States of America.

In March, 1815, general Morillo's mighty expedition arrived from Cadiz, at the island of Margarita, on the same day with that of general Morales, from Guiria. Arismendy and the inhabitants of Margarita saw the impossibility of resisting this united force ; and therefore accepted the capitulation offered them by Morillo. It was clearly stated in the articles of capitulation that none of the inhabitants should be molested for their political opinions. In direct violation of this stipulation, numbers of the most respectable inhabitants were secretly arrested in the night. Arismendy himself found means to escape, and conceal himself in the mountains. Morillo offered great reward to have him taken and delivered up to him ; and strict search was every where made for him ; but in vain.

As he was perfectly acquainted with all the foot-passes in the woods and mountains, and as the inhabitants were devotedly attached to him, he soon succeeded in uniting about fifty of the bravest of them, who determined to drive the Spaniards from the island, or die. He lived with them some time upon roots and wild fruits, and the produce of hunting. He animated their spirits by his conversation and examples, to such a degree, that they promised to follow wherever he chose to lead. His first object was to procure arms and ammunition, of which his party were entirely destitute. Knowing all the Spanish outposts, he began by surprising one of them, held by a corporal and four men, Arismendy, and twelve of his men armed with clubs and long knives, surprised this post in the night, killed the five men, and took their arms and cartridges. Arismendy proceeded in this manner killing the Spaniards in the night and taking their arms and ammunition, for several months. Before any assistance could arrive, Arismendy and his men were again in the mountains. He continued in this manner to weaken the Spanish force, until he obtained not only a consid-

erable quantity of arms and ammunition, but many recruits also. His successful enterprises reanimated the fallen spirit of the inhabitants.

Arismendy, though already enabled to act upon a larger plan and with effect, was still in want of every thing, but principally of arms and munitions of war. He had nothing to expect from the Main, because, after the flight of Bolivar from Cumana, the remaining patriot chieftains were reduced, like himself, to provide for their troops as they could. But the spirit of patriotism was now so strong in Margarita, that the women joined with their husbands, brothers and friends, in their efforts again to become free. They voluntarily gave their jewelry, pearls, golden earrings, crosses, &c. for the support of the war. They made shirts and other necessary clothing for the troops. Arismendy was unanimously elected supreme chief. Some patriot clergyman offered golden and silver vases of the church, which they had taken the precaution to bury and secrete before the Spaniards landed. These valuables were secretly sent to St. Thomas', to be exchanged for arms and munitions of war. Arismendy is very sanguinary; and now particularly, was extremely exasperated against the Spaniards. Morillo, who had about 3000 men left, lost nearly all these by Arismendy's bravery. There remained not 600 in the city of Assumption, and the forts of Pompatar, when I arrived with general Bolivar, at this island, in May, 1816. The Spanish commander had embarked and gone to the Main, sometime before.

Arismendy constructed long perogues to carry from 150 to 200 men, who were armed with guns taken from the Spaniards. The inhabitants of Margarita, being sailors from their earliest youth, and very brave, soon filled these boats with their best men. Being so constructed that sails and rudders could be used, they took a great many Spanish vessels by boarding, the crews being armed with muskets, swords, (called *manchitas*,) and long knives. In this way they procured important means to carry on the war. They made prizes of great value, and took plenty of provisions. The Margaritans had never attacked, or taken any other vessels, than those with Spanish papers, and under Spanish colors. Arismendy established the strictest order in every thing, and acted with great probity and disinterestedness, living like the soldiers, and among them. The public stores were full and well preserved by the commissaries. Arismendy organised his little republic much better than any of his countrymen had done before. Every one was satis-

fied and ready to assist him. In a short time he received new supplies of muskets and warlike stores. Many privateers came to offer their service, and his seaports were soon filled with prizes.

Arismendy now become powerful and well supported, carried on his attacks more openly. He intercepted a number of convoys, and surprised whole corps and destroyed them. He erected various forts, redoubts and batteries, that he might have different points of attack and defence. Old and young of both sexes worked day and night, exposed to the fire of the Spaniards, who seeing the spirit of their opposers, lost all courage and confidence. General Arismendy pointed out to me various women, who fought like the best of his cannoniers, and who took up from the ground a great many balls and grape shot that came from the enemy, loaded them into their own guns, and returned them to the Spaniards. When Arismendy, Bolivar and myself made the circuit of these forts, the former assured me, that these women were of the greatest service, by animating their friends and relations to fight, and by carrying the sick and wounded on their shoulders. They would not suffer a man to leave his battery, but brought them food and spirits, handed cartridges, and indeed did the work of brave soldiers. Whilst they performed these services, they were chanting patriotic songs, and that amidst the heaviest fire of the enemy.

During my stay in Margarita, general Arismendy, among many instances of the heroism of their women, related to me the following :

The wife of general Arismendy had a rich uncle, who had been many years settled at Trinidad, and had often pressed her to come and visit his family. At the end of 1815, she suggested to her husband the plan of going, herself, to Trinidad, to pay the long desired visit, and also for a more important purpose, which was to solicit from her uncle, by way of loan, a large sum of money for the purpose of aiding the war. Her husband refused his consent to her going, and pointed out the dangers to which she would be exposed in that time of war and trouble, and particularly from the numerous cruising vessels of the enemy, which then filled the seas, in almost every direction from Margarita. She persisted, however, in her purpose, and at length obtained his consent, and a proper commission from him, for obtaining the loan. She was young, handsome and well educated. She embarked in a small

schooner, without even a servant, and when she went on board, was unknown to any one in the vessel. After sailing some days with a fair wind, the schooner was chased and overtaken by a Spanish privateer, and though she sailed under Dutch colors, was sent into Porto Cabello.

As soon as she arrived in this city, she was recognised by a number of persons, as the wife of general Arismendy, and was immediately arrested and put into a dark and damp dungeon in the citadel. Arismendy, who almost always put his prisoners to death, had spared three Spanish colonels and majors, whom he put into one of his forts, that they might serve him as hostages, in case of need. The governor of Porto Cabello knew their situation. They were beloved by their superior officers, and the governor sent one of his officers to Arismendy's wife, with his word of honor, that she should be immediately set at liberty, if she would write a line to her husband, and persuade him to release the three Spanish officers, in exchange for her. She feared that her husband would be weak enough, as she expressed it, to consent to the proposal, and she positively refused to write. By the urgency of the governor, she understood the importance of these officers, and told him plainly that she would not write. She received a number of visits to the same purpose. At length the governor came himself and endeavored to persuade her, but in vain. They then threatened her, but she replied, laughing, that it would be cowardly to torment a defenceless woman, whose only crime was being the wife of a patriotic general. They next employed more rigorous treatment, with regard to her living, but still treated her respectfully, and promised her immediate liberty if she would write to her husband to release the officers. At length she became vexed with their importunity, and told the officer who came to her, that if general Arismendy were informed of their cowardly treatment of her, he would be as mad as a tiger, and would put to death thousands of Spaniards, men, women and children, all that might fall into his power. That, for her part, she was determined never to commit so weak and vile an act as they required of her, and that she would suffer a thousand deaths rather than attempt to persuade her husband to forget his duty.

During three months she was treated with great barbarity, but she remained firm, and constantly gave the same answers. The Spaniards, at last, finding that nothing could alter her determination, permitted her to pass the island of Trinidad, fear-

ing that if her husband should hear of her detention, he would do as she predicted.

Such was the wife of general Arismendy, at the age of 23 years.

General Arismendy now lives retired, at a beautiful country seat, not far from Ocumare.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Recapitulation of Facts—General Bolivar as he is, and not as he is commonly believed to be.

I have shown how general Bolivar acted from 1810 to 1814. His campaigns in Peru do not come within my plan ; but they are well known, as are also his political transactions, his despotism, and the Bolivian Constitution, which is his own work, and by which his principles are fully developed.

The memoir of the late marquis De Torre Tagle, late president of Peru, which will be found in No. 9 of the Appendix, is a remarkable document to show the character of general Bolivar. The marquis has been represented as a traitor, because he stated the truth in a time when Bolivar's power was at a low ebb. The truth, however, will be re-established ; and history will transmit it to posterity.

In the appendix, No. 10, will be found another document, a letter from Mr. Manuel Vidaurre, one of the most distinguished patriots of Peru, which places the character of Bolivar in a just light. I will endeavor to give his portrait.

General Bolivar in his exterior, in his physiognomy, in his whole deportment, has nothing which would be noticed as characteristic, or imposing. His manners, his conversation, his behaviour in society, have nothing extraordinary in them ; nothing which would attract the attention of any one who did not know him. On the contrary, his exterior is against him. He is five feet four inches in height, his visage is long, his cheeks hollow, his complexion a livid brown. His eyes are of middle size, and sunk deep in his head, which is covered thinly with hair, and his whole body is thin and meagre. He has

the appearance of a man of sixty-five years old. In walking, his arms are in perpetual motion. He cannot walk long, but soon becomes fatigued. Wherever he goes his stay is short, seldom more than half an hour, and as soon as he returns, his hammock is fixed, he sits or lies, and swings upon it after the manner of his countrymen. Large mustachios and whiskers cover a part of his face, and he is very particular in ordering each of his officers to wear them, saying that they give a martial air. This gives him a dark and wild air, particularly when he is in a passion. His eyes then become animated, and he gesticulates and speaks like a madman, threatens to shoot those with whom he is angry, steps quick across his chamber, or flings himself upon his hammock; then jumps off it, and orders people out of his presence, and frequently arrests them. There is nothing about them which can inspire respect. When he wishes to persuade, or bring any one to his purpose, he employs the most seducing promises, taking a man by the arm, and walking and speaking with him, as with his most intimate friend. As soon as his purpose is attained, he becomes cool, haughty, and often sarcastic; but he never ridicules a man of high character, or a brave man, except in his absence. This practice of abusing people in their absence, is characteristic of the Caraguins generally. The following is extracted from colonel Hippisly's 'Narrative of the Expedition to the rivers Orinoco and Apure, in South America.' London, 1819. p. 382.

"I had a full opportunity of surveying the general (Bolivar) while he was conversing with captain Beire. From what I had heard of him, I was led to expect in appearance, a very different man from the one I saw before me. General Bolivar is a mean looking person, seemingly, though but 38, (*il falliot dire que 34; parle Col. Hippisly en l'an 1818,*) about 50 years of age. He is about five feet six inches in height, thin, sallow complexion, lengthened visage, marked with every symptom of anxiety, care, and I could almost add, despondency. He seemed also to have undergone great fatigue. His dark, and according to report, brilliant eyes, were now dull and heavy, although I could give them credit for possessing more fire and animation, when his frame was less harrassed. Black hair loosely tied behind with a piece of ribband, large mustachios, black handkerchief round his neck, blue trowsers, boots and spurs, completed his costume. In my eyes he might have passed for any thing but what he was.

Across the chamber was suspended one of the Spanish hammocks, on which he occasionally sat, lolled and swang, whilst conversing, and seldom remained in the same posture for two minutes together," &c.

General Bolivar occupies himself very little in studying the military art. He understands no theory, and seldom asks a question, or holds any conversation relative to it. Nor does he speak of the civil administration, unless it happens to fall within the concerns of the moment.

I often endeavored to bring him into serious conversation on these subjects ; but he would always interrupt me ; ‘ yes, yes, *mon cher ami*, I know this, it is very good ; but *appropos*’—and immediately turned the conversation upon some different subject.

His reading, which is very little, consists of light history and tales. He has no library, or collection of books, befitting his rank, and the place he has occupied for the last fifteen years. He is passionately fond of the sex, and has always two or three ladies, of which one is the favorite mistress, who follows him wherever he goes.

Dining is an amusement of which he is also passionately fond. Whenever he stays two or three days in a place, he gives a ball or two, at which he dances in his boots and spurs, and makes love to those who happen to please him for the moment. Next to this amusement he likes his hammock, where he sits, or lolls, conversing or amusing himself with his favorite mistress, or other favorites, some of whom I have named in the course of this work. During this time, he is inaccessible to all others.

The aid-de-camp on duty says to those who have important business to transact with him : ‘ his excellency is deeply engaged at present, and can see no one.’ When he is out of humor, he swears like a common bully, and orders people out of his presence in the rudest and most vulgar manner. From his habits of life, or rather from his love of pleasure, it happens that many pieces of business are heaped together, and left to his secretary, as his decree of 8th March, 1827, fixing the custom house duties of Venezuela, which is attributed to Ravenga, and which has destroyed the commerce of the country. When he suddenly recollects some business, he calls his secretary, and directs him to write the letter or decree. This brings more to mind, and it often happens that in one day he hurries off the work of fifteen or twenty. In this manner it often hap-

pens that decrees, made on the same day, are in direct opposition to each other.

General Bolivar has adopted the habits and customs of the European Spaniards. He takes his *siesta*, (noon nap) regularly, and eats his meals like the Spaniards. He goes to *tertulias*, (coteries,) gives *refusios*, and always dances the first minuet with the lady highest in rank in the company. This old Spanish custom is strictly observed throughout Colombia.

Inasmuch as general Bolivar is the sport of circumstances, it is difficult to trace his character, while, in the same ratio does it become less worth tracing.

Bolivar, in success, differs, not circumstantially alone, from Bolivar in adversity; but he is quite another man. When successful, he is vain, haughty, ill natured, violent; at the same time the slightest circumstances will so excite his jealousy of his authority, that he arrests and sometimes condemns to capital punishment, those whom he suspects. Yet, under the politeness of a man educated in the so called *beau monde*, he, in a great measure, conceals all these faults. They appear in his fits of passion; but never then, unless he is sure of having the strength on his side, the bayonets at his command.

When he finds himself in adversity and destitute of aid from without, as he often did from 1813 to 1818, he is perfectly free from passion and violence of temper. He then becomes mild, patient, docile, and even submissive. Those who have seen him in the changes of his fortune will agree that I have not overcharged the picture.

The dominant traits in the character of general Bolivar, are ambition, vanity, thirst for absolute, undivided power, and profound dissimulation. He is more cunning, and understands mankind better than the mass of his countrymen; he adroitly turns every circumstance to his own advantage, and spares nothing to gain those he thinks will be of present use to him. He is officious in rendering them little services; he flatters them, makes them brilliant promises; finds whatever they suggest very useful and important, and is ready to follow their advice. A third person suggests something to him, or he meets with some unexpected success. Instantly he resumes his true character, and becomes vain, haughty, cross and violent; forgets all services, and all obligations, speaks with contempt of those he had just courted, and if they are powerless, abandons or sacrifices them, but always manifests a disposition to spare those whom he knows are able to resist him.

At Aux Cayes general Bolivar and I lived very much and very intimately together. Our conversation turned one day upon general Marino, and he said, laughing to me, "Oh I despise Marino. He is a brute and not able to command four men." Marino at that instant came in. Bolivar met him at the door and embraced him warmly, as a dear friend, and we remained together, an hour or more.

Bolivar represented general Arismendy to me as a man without an education, and yet as a very intriguing and dangerous man. He was evidently afraid of Arismendy. He remembered that when he himself, and Marino, came as fugitives to Juan Griego, in 1814, Arismendy had prevented his remaining there at all, and even threatened violence if he attempted to do so. Bolivar had not forgotten this when we came to Margarita after the sea fight in May, 1816, and would probably then have been afraid to venture himself on shore; but that Brion who on account of his wound had been put ashore, and Lad made such representations to Arismendy as had reconciled him to Bolivar, and induced him to come on board our vessel. As soon as Arismendy came on board, Bolivar immediately took him down into the cabin and conversed with him for a good while. He regained Arismendy by giving him a formal promise to convene a new congress, and lay aside his title of supreme chief, which was very offensive to the republican Arismendy. The latter relying on his word, engaged again to recognise him as commander-in-chief. The day after Arismendy's formal recognition of Bolivar as commander-in-chief, he took again the title of *supreme chief*. And when I told him that Arismendy would be offended, he said, "never mind, never mind, I care not much for Arismendy, I have gained him over, and he will do as I wish; and then he is a brute and sees no further than the end of his nose.

But when, in 1819, at Angostura, Arismendy had compelled Zea to leave the place of vice-president, and had taken it himself, Bolivar became so alarmed for his own supremacy, that he left his command to general Paez, and marched about 250 miles with his body guard, against Arismendy, and reinstated Zea, with whom he could indeed do as he pleased. But he could, and did only send him back to his former command, at Margarita.

Whilst general Bolivar stood in need of the military skill of general Piar, he flattered him highly; but when he came to fear his influence, he sacrificed him. He would not at that

time have put Piar to death, if he had not been so advised and supported by others ; not because he was unwilling to have Piar put out of the way, but because ne would not have *dared* to condemn him.

In 1826, general Paez openly raised the standard of rebellion against the lawful authorities ; and he was not only not punished, but suffered to remain in command, as before. His impunity, like that of Arismendy was owing to the strength of his party.

General Bolivar's disposition with regard to money is the reverse of miserly, and he is thought by most people to be very generous. His disposition in this respect cannot be better described than by saying that if he had a hundred thousand pounds to day, he might very probably not have a cent tomorrow. He very seldom gives money to those that are in want, or to those who from delicacy refrain from asking for it, but he bestows profusely on his flatterers.

General Bolivar has been compared to Napoleon Bonaparte. Bolivar in his proclamations imitates, or endeavors to imitate the style of Napoleon. He began with a small body guard and afterwards greatly increased it, like Napoleon. He is ambitious, absolute, and jealous of his command, like the other. On public occasions he is simply dresed, while all around him is splendid, like Napoleon, and he moves quickly from place to place like him. With respect to military and administrative talents, there is no resemblance between them.

Bolivar, when dictator of Venezuela, ordered the execution of 1253 Spaniards and Islenos, prisoners of war and others, who were, in fact put to death in February, 1814. This was done in cool blood, and no entreaties would save them. I have mentioned an instance of his want of feeling, which I witnessed at the port of Juan Griego in May 1814, and another in the naval combat just before.* The first was attended by an additional circumstance of cruelty ; that the prisoners were compelled to dig their own graves ! Admiral Brion was on shore on account of his wound, but as soon as heard of this execution, he sent positive orders, that no more prisoners should be taken on shore even if Bolivar himself ordered it ; and by this means about 120 lives were saved.

* See chapter VII.

The following fact was related to me, by a respectable eyewitness, whom I would name, but for the danger of exposing him to the vengeance of the dictator, liberator. The relator, at the time he stated the fact to me, I presume, had no thought of my writing the history of Bolivar.

During a small skirmish which general Bolivar had with a Spanish detachment, not far from Araure, in 1814, one of his officers came full speed and reported to him, that an isolated company was attacked in a bushy hill, a mile from his head quarters, and that they were in great want of cartridges. Twelve soldiers, who heard the report, immediately offered themselves to carry the cartridges. Bolivar ordered the chief of his staff, Thomas Montilla, to send with each of these soldiers a box of cartridges. But as there was no road at all, they were obliged to seek a passage through a very thick forest, full of briars and thorns, in order to ascend the hill. After having labored to force their way until they found there was no probability of penetrating farther, they were compelled to return to head quarters, with their boxes of cartridges. They explained to the dictator the impossibility of going further and showed him their clothes, torn in pieces, and their bodies covered with blood and wounds. Bolivar, in a furious passion, called them cowards, rascals, traitors, &c. and ordered the three first who arrived to be shot. His major-general, or chief of the staff, Thomas Montilla, who is a great favorite, his commandant of the artillery Joseph Collat, and various other of the surrounding officers of the staff, entreated him to revoke his order. The men fell upon their knees and with pathetic lamentations entreated him to spare their lives, as they were innocent, and fathers of large families. All was in vain. As they came into his presence, two or three together, he renewed his order; and the whole twelve were bound and shot. On various occasions has Bolivar manifested the same disposition, as on this, as I have shown.*

Colonel Hippisley, in his work already cited, says, p. 464, "Bolivar would ape the great man. He aspires to be a second Bonaparte, in South America, without possessing a single talent for the duties of the field or the cabinet. He would be king of New Grenada and Venezuela, without genius to command, consequence to secure, or abilities to support the elevated sta-

* See chapter XII.

tion to which his ambition most assuredly aspires. In victory, in transient prosperity, he is a tyrant, and displays the feelings and littleness of an upstart. He gives way to sudden gusts of resentment, and becomes, in a moment, a madman, and, (pardon the expression,) a blackguard; throws himself into his hammock, (which is constantly slung for his use,) and utters curses and imprecations upon all around him, of the most disgusting and diabolical nature. In defeat, in danger, in retreat, he is perplexed, harrassed and contemptible, even to himself, weighed down by disasters, which he has neither skill or strength of mind to encounter, lighten or remove. In this state he appeared to me at the retreat to, and from, San Fernando, when he looked the image of misery and despair.

“He has (p. 462) neither talents or abilities for a general, and especially for a commander-in-chief. The numerous mistakes he has made throughout the whole of his campaigns, for the last eight years, have nearly desolated the provinces and annihilated the population. The repeated surprises he has experienced from the enemy, (already seven,) prove my assertion, and bear me out in declaring that any one of them would have disgraced a corporal’s guard.

“Tactics, movements and manœuvres, are as unknown to him as to the lowest of his troops. All idea of regularity, system, or the common routine of an army, or even a regiment, he is totally unacquainted with. Hence arise all the disasters he meets, the defeats he suffers, and his constant obligations to retreat whenever opposed to the foe. The victory which he gains to day, however dearly purchased, (of which his list of killed and missing, if he calls for, or keeps such details, must evidently convince him) is lost tomorrow, by some failure, or palpable neglect on his part.”

Thus it is that Paez was heard to tell Bolivar after the action at Villa del Cura, that he would move off his own troops, and act no more with him in command; adding, “I never lost a battle wherein I acted by myself, or in a separate command, and I have always been defeated when acting in concert with you and under your orders.” The native and black troops (freed slaves) can, and do dash on, in their native country. Yet, under the name of courage, they will rush, without order, regularity or discretion, upon the enemy, resolved at that moment to conquer, or to die; and if, in this onset, they are beaten or repulsed, and find themselves “able to go about” and to retreat, “the devil take the hindermost” appears to be the

general cry ; for they all continue to run until they reach a place of safety ; and it is allowed by the royalist troops themselves, that the patriotic army, with Bolivar at their head, was never beaten in this respect." "The final slaughter of the prisoners, after the battle, or during the retreat, is completely acquiesced in by Bolivar, who has himself condescended to witness this scene of butchery, infamy," &c.

These passages are sufficient to confirm what I have said in the course of these memoirs, of general Bolivar and his troops. I could cite various other writers, to the same purpose.

It is true that his flatterers and courtiers have endeavored to compare general Bolivar with Napoleon ; but none of them have suggested to him the idea of aspiring to deserve being compared with Washington. All who have compared him with the latter were either strangers, or those who have seen Bolivar, perhaps, a few hours, or not at all.

Bolivar's conduct as dictator in Venezuela, in 1813-14, as supreme chief in 1816-17-18, his project of a monarchical constitution, in which he proposed the creation of a senate for life, with the titles of dukes, marquises, counts, barons, &c., in 1819, the constitution of Bolivia, the secret history of his *protectorate* in Peru, his behaviour in Venezuela, his famous proclamation directed to the grand convention of Ocuna, and his self nomination as supreme chief or dictator of Colombia, are proofs of his ambition, his hypocrisy, and his secret determination to become an absolute monarch.

A great man would have directed the efforts of the ambitious and ignorant chieftains of Colombia to one point, driving their common enemies from the country, in the first place, and then establishing a free government. Bolivar's object has invariably been his own personal aggrandizement, to the exclusion of every good and noble purpose. He is certainly a rare example of great ambition, unaided by talents, or virtues of any kind. Yet, such are the inhabitants of Colombia, that they are ruled by this man.

In his recently published organic decree, dated August 27th, 1828, in title 1, he says :

"Art. 1st. The attributes of the supreme chief embrace the maintenance of the peace in the interior, and the defence from abroad ; the command of the forces by land and sea ; the negotiations, war and peace, and the treaties ; the nomination of all the officers.

The right to give decrees and the necessary rules, (*reglamentos*;) of whatever nature they may be ; to modify, to reform the established laws, and to alter them ; the execution of the decrees and rules, also of those laws which shall remain in force.

The collection of taxes, the administration of justice, the execution of the judgments, the approbation or the alteration of the sentences in the councils of war ; the commutation of punishments, with the advice of the council of state, and upon the proposal of the courts, or having previously heard them ; the granting of amnesty or pardon, for public or private offences, always with the advice of the council of state.

The delivery of commissions or *lettres de marque*. The exercise of the natural power as chief of the general administration of the republic in all its branches, and in virtue of being entrusted with the supreme power of the state ; finally the presidency of the council of state, when he thinks proper.

Art. 2d. The supreme chief will be assisted in the exercise of the executive power, with the light and the advice of a council of ministers."

This famous decree speaks so much, that I may safely appeal to it, in support of what I have said of its author.

I have adverted to the difficulty of tracing the character of this personage, arising from his being so much the creature of circumstances. He has not sufficient vigor of spirit, nor courage of heart, nor talent, to escape from a critical situation, or to rise from a fall, without help from abroad. His good fortune in receiving such help, has been almost uninterrupted since 1813. But the great secret of his great power lies in the character of the people over whom he rules.

Lieutenant colonel Simon Bolivar, whilst he was governor of the fortress of Porto Cabello, in June, 1812, left the fortress and embarked clandestinely, with some officers, in the night, without giving any previous notice to the garrison, without any order, without any capitulation, without any armistice, or previous treaty with the enemy. He embarked for fear of the prisoners of war who had revolted and taken possession of the citadel. An old soldier might admit the place to be no longer tenable. But here the garrison finding that their commander had deserted without leaving them any order or advice, actually retired in good order, and reached Valencia, by land without losing a man ; and without any attack from the prisoners in the citadel. It is an invariable rule that the commander of a place, in time of war and danger, should never leave those who have

been committed to his care. And this rule is reasonable, and perfectly just. 2d. Simon Bolivar, the dictator, liberator of the West of Venezuela, embarked in the greatest haste in the night of the 25th August, 1814, at Cumana, and fled with San Iago Marino, from the field of war. He so completely lost his presence of mind, that in spite of the warmest representations of his cousin Ribas and many others, he would hear nothing, and remained on board commodore Bianchi's vessel. He sent various messages to Marino, urging him to embark, and as soon as Marino arrived, he ordered the commander to cut his cables and sail. Ribas, and a thousand other brave men, remained and fought for their independence and freedom. We have seen how Arismendy and Bermudes forced them to leave the ports of Juan Gerigo and Ocumare, treating them as fugitives and cowards, and threatening to shoot them if they set their feet on shore.*

3d. General Bolivar came suddenly to the height of power, and was named captain-general of the armies of New Venezuela and New Grenada; because the congress of the latter country was in great need of some authority to subject the province of Cundinamarca and to occupy Santa Martha; (1814 and beginning of 1815.) He felt a second time his absolute inability, and after his ill fated siege of Carthagena, embarked for the island of Jamaica, whilst general Palacio, with the remainder of the army which Bolivar had left, fought bravely and gained advantages over the Spaniards.†

4th. The occupation of Carthagena and Boca Chica, by the patriots, offered a new occasion to distinguish himself. He left Aux Cayes for Margarita, and in the naval combat, (May 2d,) chose his place in the long boat of commodore Brion's vessel, (the only vessel engaged, and which took the Spanish royal brig Intrepida,) through mere cowardice, leaving to another the command of the officers and volunteers, in his stead.‡

In consequence of this action, general Arismendy, ignorant of the part Bolivar had taken in it, not only became reconciled to the latter, but placed himself again under his orders. If Arismendy had been made acquainted with Bolivar's conduct

* See chapter VIII.

† See chapters IX. and X.

‡ See chapter XIII.

in this action, it would be the destruction of the projected expedition against Venezuela.*

5th. At the action of Ocumare, (July 10th, 1806,) the supreme chief left the field in a perfect fright, and rode full speed (he is always careful to have the best runners) two leagues; jumped from his horse, and embarked on board the fast sailing privateer, *Diana*, captain *Debouille*. As soon as he was on board, he ordered the captain to cut his cables; and arrived at the little Dutch island *Bonair*. General *McGregor* assembled the remainder of the troops left by *Bolivar*, and, with them, joined general *Piar* at *Barcelona*.†

When admiral *Brion* arrived at *Bonair*, from *Curacao* he was astonished to hear of the flight of the supreme chief, and reproached him severely. *Bolivar* received his reproaches with great docility, feeling at this time his entire dependence upon the admiral. *Brion*, who was quick tempered, becoming cooler, succeeded at last in persuading *Bolivar* that his honor absolutely required him to return to the Main and rejoin his troops; and he ordered captain *Debouille* to put himself at the disposal of the supreme chief. *Bolivar* directed his course toward the coast of *Cumana*. On his landing, *Marino* and *Piar*, who had left him at *Carupano*, reproached him with his cowardly flight from *Ocumare*, and told him that if he did not embark immediately they would arrest and try him before a court martial. He embarked speedily, and arrived at *Jaquemel*, whence he passed to *Port au Prince*.‡

Brion now employed all his influence to procure *Bolivar's* recall to the Main. After long and great exertions, he succeeded, chiefly by giving his word that *Bolivar* would assemble a congress, and establish a republican government, to which the latter most readily consented. In consequence of this stipulation, he was recalled, and arrived at *Barcelona* in the latter part of 1816. As soon as he was again at the head of the troops he disregarded his promise, resumed his title of supreme chief, and proceeded as he had done before.§

6th. The supreme chief, in the night of the 5th and 6th April 1817, fled from the fortified place of *Barcelona*, aban-

* See chapters xiii. and xiv.

† See chapter xiv.

‡ See chapter xiv.

§ See chapter xiv. and xvi.

doning his aid-de-camp, Chamberlain, and more than 1000 men. The latter perceiving that the Spaniards had gained the walls, killed his wife and himself. All the rest were murdered by the Spaniards. At this time, the supreme chief hid himself in the remotest part of the plains of Cumana, where he remained about seven weeks.

7th. The supreme chief left the scene of war, in 1818, after his unsuccessful campaign in Venezuela. The details of this campaign are alone sufficient to give a correct idea of his military talents. He came for shelter to the strong place of Angostura in Guayana.

These facts, (and many more might be adduced,) sufficiently prove that Bolivar frequently lost his presence of mind, and that the most propitious circumstances concurred to restore his fortune. I have said enough of his talents for administration, and his mode of proceeding in civil matters, in the course of these memoirs.

But how is it possible (the questions naturally arise) that general Bolivar should have liberated his country, and preserved in himself the supreme power, without superior talents?

If by 'liberating his country' it be meant that he has given his country a free government, I answer, that he has not done so; and this question, I think, is thus fairly disposed of. If it be meant, that he has driven out the Spaniards, I answer, that he has done little, or nothing, towards this; far less, certainly, than the meanest of the subordinate chieftains. To the question, how he can have retained his power, without superior talents? I answer, in the first place, that the *reputation* of superior talents, goes a great ways. But I shall not desire the reader to be satisfied with this answer.

Before the revolution of Caracas April 19th 1810, and ever since that time, the Spaniards themselves have constantly and powerfully contributed to assist the patriots in all their enterprises; by forcing the inhabitants to withdraw themselves from an onerous and base submission; by leaving them no other alternative but to resist oppression, cruelty and death, by force of arms, or submit to them. Without any disposition to disparage the bravery, the constancy of the Colombian people, I say that the policy, and the whole behaviour of the Spanish chieftains, during the war on the Main, has operated powerfully towards the freedom and independence of the people. It has been a stimulus applied with very little respite. Their obstinacy, their hypocrisy, their barbarous cruelties, their entire

want of moderation, of even the semblance of liberal policy, of talents, and of courage, have contributed efficaciously to alienate from them the confidence and favorable opinion of the people. These inhabitants naturally chose to be under the dominion of their native chieftains, rather than to perish under the cruelties and vexations of the Spaniards. If these latter had adopted a liberal system for administering the provinces of Venezuela and New Grenada, as soon as the Americans perceived the precarious situation of the mother country, I venture boldly to pronounce, that none of them would have thought of separating from Spain. This opinion is supported by the well known fact, that not one of the patriotic juntas in 1810, had dreamed of detaching itself from the adored king Ferdinand. The stupid management of the Spanish authorities has facilitated all the operations of the patriots. The grievous faults of Bolivar, and some of his generals, have been exceeded by those of his adversaries. It is not strange, therefore, that Bolivar should have been able to do all he has done with very limited talents.

It has been said, long since, that oppression cannot be exercised upon any people beyond a certain point; that passing this point certainly produces resistance, and at length, revolt and revolution. The territory of Colombia has a vast extent of coast. It was impossible that it should be guarded by the Spanish troops that were sent out. Bolivar, when beaten and driven from one place, had only to go to another. The advantage in point of numbers, was vastly against the Spaniards. Their greatest number of troops never exceeded twenty thousand; whereas, on the part of the patriots, there was a great majority of the people of the country containing about two millions of souls. Guiróxa's revolution, in favor of the constitution of 1812, occupied Spain at home, and prevented her sending powerful aid to Morillo. The Spaniards generally, and Morillo among the rest, became tired and worn out; their troops deserted by hundreds. If Morillo had sought to aid Bolivar, he could not have done it more effectually, than by appointing La Torre his successor; for the drooping and sickly state of the Spaniards at that time, La Torre was but a poor physician. A powerful moral cause stood also in aid of Bolivar; I mean public opinion; which, if not unanimously in his favor, was certainly so against the cruel deeds of the Spaniards; and the Colombians, in their choice between two evils, very naturally took that which appeared to be the least.

By examining the conduct of the Spanish chieftains, both in Venezuela and New Grenada, we shall find that they afforded great assistance to the limited talents of the supreme chief, liberator.

In Venezuela, the captain-general Don Juan de Casas, as early as 1808, began to irritate the minds of the inhabitants of Caracas, by arresting, in a very arbitrary and impolitic manner, a great many inhabitants belonging to the first and most respectable families (*mantuanos*) in that province. There was no other motive for his arrest, than ill founded suspicion; and he was compelled to set them at liberty. But the impression remained, and stirred up many enemies to his government.

Captain-general Don Vicente Emparan, his successor, was the victim of his own obstinacy. Without regard to the disposition, or feelings, or opinions of the inhabitants, he blindly followed the orders of the regency at Cadiz, which continued to dictate and maintain laws made in time of Ferdinand the Catholic, and Philip II. Emparan, by refusing to be advised, lost himself and the Spanish cause. His great security, and the idea of his power, joined with his obstinacy, gave occasion to the revolution of the 19th April 1810, in Caracas.

The junta which succeeded him, took the title of Provisional Junta of Venezuela, conservators of the rights of his catholic majesty, Ferdinand 7th, which proved that this junta and its constituents, had no idea of detaching themselves from Spain. Its detailed official report explained this very clearly, and concluded by offering the Spanish government money and support of every description, to maintain the war into which it was driven, against Napoleon. The regency of Cadiz answered their kind offers by a vehement decree, dated Aug. 3d, 1810, by which the province of Venezuela was declared to be in a state of blockade! thus treating its inhabitants like enemies of the nation. The regency ordered every means to be employed to turn out a junta sincerely attached to their king; and to punish them as rebels.

The mission of Don Francisco Cortavaria, by the regency and Cortes of Spain, to the island of Porto Rico, was the consequence of the decree of August 3d. He had a commission to pacify the Main, and to force its inhabitants to receive a new captain-general from the hands of those who ruled in Spain. This mission increased the fire of civil war, instead of extinguishing it.

The weak and cowardly captain-general Millares, who succeeded Emparan, was but an object of contempt and mockery to this subaltern, Don Domingo Monteverde, who treated him like an instrument laid aside, when it becomes useless to our purpose. The latter audaciously put himself in place of the other, and violated the treaty of Vittoria, made July 12th 1812, with Miranda.

Monteverde's government was the reign of Islenos, friars, monks, priests, and intriguers of various descriptions. Boves, Morales, Suasola, Antonanza, Puy, Rosette, and other Spanish Chieftains of this sort, had the upper hand. His administration was a series of perfidies, cruelties, and persecutions; one of the most complete and horrid anarchy.

Simon Bolivar with a respectable force approached the limits of Venezuela, announced its deliverance, and promised the inhabitants relief and freedom. These wretched people, reduced to despair, flocked by thousands to his standard for refuge from misery and death. Desertion became general in the royal army; and these troops united with many thousands of volunteers, augmented Bolivar's legions, and reduced the forces of the enemy, to so small and weak a number, that he had nothing to do, but to march forward, assured of success and victory. The confidence of the country in the Spanish troops, and the dread of them, declined in proportion as confidence in the patriot troops increased. Thus he advanced into the interior of Venezuela, supported by a series of successes, which cost him very little; and thus he entered the capital, Caracas, whence the enemy had fled. Men, money, arms, munitions of every description, were offered him from every corner, and, united with the zeal of about a million of people, desirous in assisting him to destroy the feeble remnant of the enemy, very ordinary talents only were requisite to direct this powerful mass of forces and means, to the utter extermination of Spanish despotism and cruelty.

But the weak Bolivar was so elated with his unexpected success, that, at the height of his fortune, he lost all reflection and imagined that every thing was accomplished. His gross faults were the only cause of his ruin. They brought on the subsequent misery of his countrymen, and the downfall of the cause of freedom in Venezuela.

The year of 1813 saw him upon the summit of human grandeur and glory. The next year saw him a fugitive in danger of being shot for desertion like the meanest soldier, and

forced to seek shelter in a sister republic, Cartagena, whom he afterwards treated as a foe ; laying siege to her capital in 1815.

General Monteverde, being wounded, left Porto Cabello for Curacao, where he lived in high style, from the plunder and vexations carried on against the inhabitants of Venezuela.* He left the command of the remaining royal troops, to colonel Salomon, whose conduct we have noticed.

After Bolivar's flight from Cumana, in August 1814, military despotism began again to hold the reins of the royal government. The captain-general, Cagigal, had the nominal power, but Boves, Morales, Cevallos, and other Spanish chieftains, acted throughout Venezuela, wherever they came, as masters and conquerors. The best proof of this, is the massacre of the most respectable inhabitants of Valencia, which took place in presence of Cagigal, and went unpunished. Similar excesses were committed, unpunished, in all the other provinces of Venezuela, and throughout its whole territory persecutions and the most barbarous cruelties were multiplied and became the order of the day. The only man who had character and firmness enough to preserve the city of Caracas itself, from pillage was the marquis of Leon. And this he did, as the reader will recollect, by overawing a mulatto lieutenant colonel, (Muchado) who had been a slave of the count of La Grange. But the marquis was not a military man ; his authority was personal, limited, and momentary. He was probably, the only man at that time on the Main, qualified by character to re-establish the royal authority. But instead of giving him full powers for that purpose, the king of Spain sent ten thousand bayonets, with a chieftain more capricious, hypocritical, despotic and sanguinary, than any of his predecessors. Such was Don Pablo Morillo, who imagined, that to overawe every one, he had only to present himself. He took the title of " pacificator of the new world," and arrived on the Main with the philanthropic principles, which characterise him in many of his letters. He wrote to the king Ferdinand, that it was necessary to regenerate Spanish America, and to exterminate, by fire and sword " the present population, and create a new one." He began by grossly oppressing the only man capable of rendering him

* He gave to a colored woman in Curacao, the mistress of the hotel where he lived every day, one hundred dollars for the expense of his table only. I have this fact from the woman herself.

great service, the marquis of San Leon. Him he arrested and took with him as a prisoner, on his journey, because the marquis could not, or would not, pay him an extraordinary tax of twenty thousand dollars. Admiral marquis De Euriles, the friend and counsellor of Morillo, greatly assisted Bolivar, by the advice he gave Morillo, after he knew it was impossible for him ever to reconquer the Main.

General Morales, who succeeded La Torre, was better qualified to raise the royal party, but his barbarous cruelty, his ignorance of policy, and his despotic principles, alienated from him the good opinion of both parties. Such was the general state of affairs in Venezuela, from 1810 to 1824, when the last of the Spaniards were driven from the Main by the capitulation of Porto Cabello. Let us now look at New Grenada.

The viceroy Don Antonio Amar, was an honest man and desired the welfare of the country, but he was too old and too weak to hold the reins of government in a time of revolution and trouble. He hesitated, and then gave way.

Don Antonio Soria succeeded him, and did worse. From that time there had been no viceroy worthy of notice. Every province had its junta and its governor or president, who acted only by the province; and these had no union, no understanding among themselves. They died away, one after another.

The reader may perhaps be acquainted with the atrocious deeds of the bishop of Cuenca and his army of death, filled with friars and priests. He was another Peter the Hermit with his fanatical brethren the Crusaders.

In Carthagena, Santa Martha, Porto Bello, &c. the Spanish chieftains, after having pillaged, left the places to their subalterns and fled.

In the eight provinces of Venezuela and the twenty two of New Grenada, the viceroys, the captain-generals, governors, and Spanish leaders, have made every effort to alienate the affections of the Americans, by their tyranny, cruelty, duplicity and their general conduct as impolitic as it was barbarous. The king, the regency, the cortes and the juntas of Spain have powerfully seconded the patriots. Ever since 1810, the Spaniards have done all they could do in favor of the patriots. Besides the conduct of the Spanish chieftains has undoubtedly favored the enterprises of general Bolivar, and assisted his feeble efforts. His generals and subalterns, and all the inhabitants of Colombia have powerfully supported him. Many of his

generals have done far more than he has to free the country from the Spaniards.

Amongst them Louis Brion was distinguished ; as were also the generals Ribas, Villapol, Paez, Zarasa, Piar, Palacios, Arismendy, Gomez, Sanander, Padilla, and others. None of these generals, have ever abandoned, or in any respect behaved so meanly as Bolivar has done. To these brave men Colombia, and Bolivar himself, owe the expulsion of the Spaniards and the salvation of the country ; if their present expulsion may be called so. Of these, Brion, Ribas, Villapol, Piar, and Palacio, live no longer. Sanander and Padilla are arrested, and will probably be condemned to death.*

The brightest deeds of all these generals, were performed in the absence of Bolivar. Abroad, they were attributed to his military skill and heroism, while in fact he was a fugitive, a thousand miles from the scenes of their bravery, and never dreaming of their successes.

What has he done in Peru ? He has destroyed freedom and independence there, as in Colombia.† His protectorate there, answers exactly to his dictatorship in Colombia ; a despotic, military anarchy ; which has driven the best inhabitants from both countries, or rendered them slaves, and which, for many years to come, will be felt as the pernicious effect of Bolivar's incapacity and despotism.

General Bolivar, moreover, has never in person commanded a regiment, nor four soldiers. He has never made a charge of cavalry, nor with a bayonet. On the contrary, he has ever been careful to keep himself out of danger. He has always taken the precaution to provide himself with excellent horses and good guides, and whenever the fire approached him, has made use of both. The plain narration of fact composing these memoirs proves this assertion.

General Bolivar's expedition in 1813, against Monteverde, and its complete success, has made him famous abroad. I have shown how easy, in his situation, success was ; that he had only to go forward. The merit, whatever it may be, of consenting to go forward with a hand full of men after the depiction of colonel Castillo, is general Bolivar's. The expedition

* Written November 10th, 1828.

† The two battles fought in Peru were gained in his absence ; in the one he was a hundred miles from the field of action ; in the second at Ayachuco ; he was sick. General Sucre gained both, and Bolivar had the honor and the name.

was conceived and planned, not so much by Bolivar as by his cousin Ribas, who was not only the soul, but the friend also of Bolivar. He and colonel Brizeno persuaded Bolivar to persevere and go forward, when, as respectable eye witnesses have assured me, Bolivar himself wished, upon the defection of Castillo, to return to Carthagena.

This entry into Venezuela was the most brilliant epoch in the military career of general Bolivar. I have shown how easily it was made. Very little talent, surely, was requisite to drive a handful of Spaniards out of the country, and by so doing, give liberty to the Venezuelans. He did neither, but fled for shelter to New Grenada. But the memory of his grandeur remained, and having been the tyrant of his country, he was regarded as her *Liberator*. His fame procured him a good reception at Tunja, in November, 1814, and the congress of New Grenada named him captain-general of the armies of Venezuela and New Grenada, the highest military charge in the Spanish American armies. But this was trifling when compared with his dictatorship in Venezuela.

Congress, and all true friends of liberty, now entertained sanguine hopes, that Bolivar had acquired wisdom by experiencing adversity, and that he felt an ardent desire to retrieve his faults and deserve the confidence of congress.

These hopes were founded upon his verbal promises made to his friends in Tunja, and upon his numerous proclamations, and solemn promises, to give freedom, liberty and welfare to the Grenadans. But he had acquired the habit of acting as master, and of following the impulses of his vain and haughty disposition. He entirely disregarded the confidence placed in him, and the obligation he was under to the congress of New Grenada, which placed him at the head of a strong army, that he might be enabled to fulfil the important and double commission given him. He took, with perfect ease, the open and undefended capital of Bogota, but suffered his troops to plunder it, during 48 hours. The most important task assigned him, was the conquest of Santa Martha, which, at the time, could have been easily completed; but he preferred the gratification of his own revenge, in besieging Carthagena, which had received him within her walls, with distinguished hospitality whilst he was a fugitive, and proscribed by Arismendy and Bermudes. His principal aim, in besieging, and endeavoring to take Carthagena, was to avenge himself upon Castillo, who commanded

in the place. The dreadful consequences of this siege have been detailed already.

In the assembly of patriots, held in the beginning of 1816, in the city of Aux Cayes, (Hayti,) its members named general Bolivar as their commander-in-chief, because commodore Brion, upon whom the expedition depended, had, formally and openly, declared that if Bolivar should not be appointed the commander-in-chief of the projected expedition, he would not advance a single dollar. Brion was, at that time, the principal supporter of the patriots; commodore Aury was the next; but the former had more money, and a more extensive credit than the latter, and was animated, by the great promises of Bolivar, to act in his favor. The president of Hayti, Alexander Petion, was also in favor of general Bolivar, and assisted him powerfully in the projected expedition. Besides all this, Bolivar had sacrificed his fortune in favor of the cause, and had been the most elevated chieftain, in rank, since 1813.

Commodore Aury was the only member of this assembly who opposed, not the nomination of Bolivar, but his assuming the civil and military power, alone. He proposed a council of government of three or five members, over which Bolivar should preside. Bolivar rose and spoke vehemently against a division of power, and concluded by saying that he would rather resign than consent to Aury's proposal. Bolivar was well aware that Brion and Petion would do little or nothing, if any other chieftains were elected; and, therefore, ventured to speak of resignation. Not a voice was heard in support of Aury; and Bolivar proposed a loud and individual vote; which was given for his being commander-in chief of the projected expedition. The proceedings were reduced to writing beforehand, and were signed by every member except Aury; upon whom Bolivar avenged himself, as we have seen.

From the time that Aury expressed himself so strongly against the absolute and undivided power of Bolivar, the latter began to fear that others might follow Aury's example. Since 1813, Bolivar had been accustomed to have all around him acknowledge and submit to his authority and obey implicitly all his orders, however arbitrary or despotic. When the dictator ordered the execution of the 1200 Spaniards in February, 1814, more than a thousand inhabitants of Caracas and Luguaira, murmured deeply against this cruel and sanguinary deed; but no one dared to oppose, or even to speak openly against it.

When Bolivar heard from me that general San Iago Marino had given a secret commission to captain Bouille, a colored man, to recruit 300 choice soldiers from Hayti, he became very uneasy, and said to me that Piar had certainly advised Marino to do so. He added that Piar being a colored man was a very dangerous one, and that he had the greatest influence over Marino, and that Piar's object was to enable Marino again to become his rival, as he had been in 1813 and '14. He then requested me to find some means of defeating Marino's object, without having it known that he, Bolivar, cared about it. This was done as I have already related.

As soon as the supreme chief arrived at Carupano, from the island of Margarita, his body-guard was organised. Twenty-five men, with an officer, were daily placed before his headquarters, and relieved every twenty four hours.

In December, 1817, when Bolivar arrived at Barcelona, he again organised a body-guard. This was repeated at Angostura, and since that time this corps has been augmented so much that he appointed the general of division, Raphael Urdaneta, the commander-in-chief of it. He had various generals of brigades under his orders; but principally general Anzoatigui, who was always blindly devoted to him. Since that time this body-guard has accompanied him every where.

There can be no doubt that the institution of this body-guard has been the ruin of liberty in Colombia; because the bayonets have supplied the place of both military and administrative skill, ever since the Spaniards were driven from the territory. These alone have kept the weight of argument and opinion on his side. In imitation of the famous motto, "*Ultima Ratio Regum*," engraved upon the cannon of Frederick 2d of Prussia, Bolivar should engrave upon the muskets of his body-guard, "*Ultima Ratio Dictatorum*." Their bayonets, supported by the money supplied by English stock jobbers, have given him a supremacy over the congress, which, in the latter times of his presidency, has been the slave of his will. I may ask, has any one of the distinguished patriots ever opposed the least hint, to his known will? These patriots, having nothing to oppose to the bayonets of Bolivar, have always the majority of members against them.

Bolivar has several times offered his resignation, but never unless he knew beforehand, that no one would dare to appear in favor of accepting it. He has a great many enemies, but the bayonets are all on his side.

In order to preserve his usurped power, he is careful to treat all his guards well, and to attach their officers to him by paying great attention to them, and making them large presents. He took his Colombian body-guard to Peru; and when he left Peru, in 1826, he brought back a body-guard along with his Colombian troops, 1500 Peruvians, under the plausible pretext of having troops sufficient to march against the rebels at Valencia.

His being in power simply, attaches many to him. A great source of his influence is, his having the disposal of all the offices of Colombia, in the civil and military departments, and those who flatter and please him best, get the best offices, without the least regard to their qualifications. He is a great dissembler, and possesses such easiness of manners, that he charms those whom he wishes to gain to his purpose, seldom refusing their requests, and never meeting them with rebuke. The most common actions of men in power, under whatever name they may rule, are generally regarded as generous and extraordinary deeds. Far nobler deeds of private men pass unnoticed. This is the case with Bolivar. He spends 20 or 100,000 dollars, without hesitation, when he can immediately have what sum he pleases. He knows well that so long as he reigns, he shall not want money.

The great mass of the people are ignorant, bigoted, and rude, to a degree not easily conceived by one educated in almost any protestant country, particularly in the North American states. Hence it is, that Bolivar's speeches, proclamations, promises, conversations, are thought of so highly. These people once getting a notion into their heads, keep it fast. They think Bolivar a great man, and believe that his monstrous faults are in fact the faults of others, because he tells them so. Besides, he generally shows only the fair side of any event whatever.*

Whenever he is about to appear, on solemn occasions, before the public, he is careful to prepare his friends and creatures, by informing them what he intends to do, and how they are to act. He then goes, surrounded by a numerous body of officers, all devoted to him, and a large number of troops, who remain without, under arms. Surrounded by this force, he is

* See his memoir justificative published at Carthagena in Sept. 1814; his proclamation before he embarked for Jamaica, in May, 1815; that published after the execution of general Piar, in 1817, &c

always sure of the strongest party. This military show imposes upon all, and so overawes his boldest and most decided enemies, that they are forced to be silent, knowing his vain, vindictive and treacherous character, and being sure that, if they opposed him, they should, sooner or later, become the victims of his vengeance. A more striking proof of his vindictive spirit need not surely be required, than his siege of Carthagena, carried on for the purpose of taking vengeance on Morillo, for an insult received two years before, and to avenge Pineres' defeat, (and his own) in his effort to be elected president of the government of that province.* What senator or representative could be rash enough to oppose him? He could not be opposed, with any chance of success, but by some military chieftain, who should have at command a force equal, at least, to his own. All the present chieftains are in favor of Bolivar, and all hold offices of a high grade, under him. The power and the wealth of the country are in the hands of those who are interested deeply in supporting the power of Bolivar.

It is by means of all these advantages united, that general Bolivar has preserved his power since 1813. His security is now so great that he feels himself above dissembling any longer. He has thrown off the mask, and acts the part, and speaks the language of an independent and powerful sovereign. He will preserve his power as long as those who surround him remain attached to him, probably as long as he lives. His removal, whether it happened by his death or otherwise, would produce a civil war.

All well informed men who are acquainted with the different manners and habits of thinking, and with the heterogeneous characters of the provinces, and the chieftains now composing this colossal mass, called a Republic; will agree with me that it is impossible, so to unite these parts, that the body may enjoy that liberty which is necessary to the existence of a republic. If, therefore, Bolivar should be suddenly removed, these ambitious chieftains, each of whom has his partizans and admirers, would place themselves at the head of armed men, and march one against another. The hatred of which I have spoken in my introduction, which exists in a very high degree between the Caraguin and Grenadan government; and the jealousy existing among all the chieftains, would soon overturn the state.

* See chapter VIII

Colombia would be the theatre of a desperate and bloody war. The strongest would reign just when and so long as he continued to be so.

I speak freely of the characters of the principal chieftains in Colombia ; and I have a right to do so, for I know them well. My acquaintance with them has been sufficient to give me a knowledge of the degree to which their minds have been cultivated and enlightened, as well as of their distinctive characters, and their actual worth. It is absurd to suppose that a people kept in ignorance, slavery, bigotry and superstition, for three centuries, can be raised at once to the degree of light, knowledge and virtue, possessed (for example) by the people of the United States, who, perhaps are the only people ripe for the blessings of true liberty, which is grounded upon wise laws, and supported by a liberal and virtuous population. Time alone, and that well improved, by giving the Colombians good schools, and affording them good examples, and a frequent intercourse with enlightened strangers, can by degrees introduce among them the elements of knowledge, and raise them to that high state of mind which is capable of appreciating freedom.

Who, in Colombia, is able to give wise laws? Who is able to make the people see their use, or to persuade or compel them to obey such laws? Who can be found there to support such laws in opposition to his own individual interest? Bolivar's example, had he been capable of setting it, would have gone a great way toward producing the happiest results. But unfortunately for Colombia, and indeed for all the other Spanish republics, Bolivar has neither virtue, firmness nor talent to raise himself above his own sphere of mediocrity, passion, ambition and vanity. He is far from being competent to lay a foundation for good laws, schools, useful institutions and a flourishing commerce. Had he been fit for these things, he would long since have invited and protected strangers and encouraged agriculture, in a country where soil and climate combine to lighten the labour of man, and to multiply the comforts of life. He would have encouraged commerce, instead of depressing it. He would have made it the interest of the clergy to inspire the people, who are devoted to them, with the principles of a just education, of morality, union, and patriotism. He would have insisted upon the freedom of religious opinion, and have protected the people in the use of all the means necessary for the enjoyment of it. He would have consulted men of expe-

rience and virtue ; and surrounded himself with men of talents and probity.

But what has this man done during the last four years, that is, since 1824, when Colombia was cleared of the last Spanish soldier ! Instead of remaining in his native country and employing all the means in his power to establish a solid government, we see him, even as early as 1822, seeking a new field for his ambition, a new scene of what he deems glory. He goes to the South, overruns a new country, destroys the congress in Peru, and places himself there, at the head of a despotic military government, and there renews the dictatorial villainies of 1813 and 14 in Venezuela. By force of arms he detaches a portion of Peru, calls it the republic of Bolivia, giving it a monarchical constitution, of which he is the president and protector. When he saw that his protectorship was going the wrong way, he thought of no remedy, but a timely retreat ; the same he had always been accustomed to resort to.

He retired to Guayaquil, whence, as I have been well informed, he secretly sent out emissaries to Valencia, Caracas, Porto Cabello and Carthagena. Paez having openly raised the standard of revolt against the existing constitutional form of government, Bolivar adroitly seized this pretext, named himself dictator, annulled all congressional forms, and took all the powers to himself ; and passing over to Valencia, held secret conferences with Paez, and his old and intimate friend, Dr. Miguel Pena, and not only left Paez unpunished, but confirmed him in his post.

Bolivar is suddenly struck with conviction of the necessity of a reform and a change in the constitution of Colombia ! The national convention assembles at Ocana. During their session, Bolivar, some leagues off, with an anxious and jealous eye, surveys their operations. The result is too well known. The convention expires, and Bolivar, become its heir, is compensated for all his restless nights and his sorrow ; and sits upon his throne, with the title of " Supreme Chief, President Liberator ! " *

Such is the political life of the cunning Simon Bolivar. His favorite rule is, to do every thing by himself ; and he has acted upon it, overturning or transforming every thing. At the head of the twelve departments, he placed, under the name of

* See Appendix, documents Nos. 11 and 12.

intendants, military chieftains, the greatest part of whom were totally unacquainted with any kind of administration whatever. He made Soublette intendant of Caracas; Marino, of Maturin, and so on. He has destroyed the little commerce of the country by heavy imports, by his famous decree on patents, by his not admitting of the Colombian *vales* in the public treasury, by imposing arbitrary taxes upon merchants, by incarcerating foreigners, which he did at Laguaira and Caracas in the beginning of 1816, and refusing to hear their just representations. Agriculture and national industry have been destroyed by his campaigns in Peru, and by the numerous levies, recently made, by way of preparation against a new attack of the Spanish, expected from Cuba, against Colombia.

The finances are so ruined that Bolivar knows not how, any longer, to pay the interest of the English loan, and keep the national credit even up to its present sunken state. Thus has Bolivar destroyed the welfare of Colombia, and ruined Peru, and should he appear elsewhere, his appearance would produce the same result.

But the worst of Bolivar's acts is the last, where he has impudently thrown off his flimsy mask, and declared that "bayonets are the best, the only rulers of nations." This pernicious example, it is to be feared, will be followed by other chieftains, in the new Spanish Republics.

APPENDIX.

NO. I.

FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA.

The sovereign Congress of Venezuela, whose authority has been voluntarily recognized by the people of New Grenada, liberated by the arms of the republic, considering,

1. That the provinces of Venezuela and New Grenada, united in a single republic, possess all the requisites for attaining the highest degree of power and prosperity :

2. That if formed into distinct republics, and even united by the closest ties, far from profiting by their great advantages, they could, with difficulty, give stability to, and command respect for their sovereignty :

3. That these truths, being deeply impressed upon the minds of all men of superior talents, and sound patriotism, have determined the governments of the two republics, to agree upon their union, hitherto obstructed by the vicissitudes of war.

Wherefore, actuated by necessity and mutual interest, and conforming to the report of a special committee of deputies from New Grenada and Venezuela,

In the name, and under the protection of the Almighty, they have decreed, and do hereby decree, the following *Fundamental Law* of the republic of Colombia :

Art. 1. The republics of Venezuela and New Grenada are henceforth united in one, under the glorious title of the Republic of Colombia.

2. Its territory shall comprehend the former captain-generalship of Venezuela, and the viceroyalty of New Grenada, comprehending an extent of a hundred and fifteen thousand square leagues, the precise limits whereof shall be fixed hereafter.

3. The debts contracted separately by the two republics, are hereby consolidated as a *national debt of Colombia*, for the payment of which all the property of the state is pledged, and the most productive branches of the public revenue shall be appropriated.

4. The Executive power of the Republic shall be vested in a President; and, in the case of vacancy, in the Vice-President, both to be provisionally appointed by the present Congress.

5. The Republic of Colombia shall be (*pro tem.*) divided into the three great departments of Venezuela, Quito, and Cundinamarca, comprising the provinces of New Grenada, which denomination is henceforth abolished; and their capitals shall be the cities of Caracas, Quito, and Bogota, the adjunct, Santa Fe, being annulled.

6. Each department shall have a superior administration, with a chief, to be appointed for the present by the Congress, and entitled a Vice President.

7. A new city, to be called Bolivar, in honor of the assertor of the public liberty, shall be the capital of the Republic of Colombia. The place and situation to be fixed on by the first general Congress, upon the principle of adapting it to the exigencies of the departments, and to the future grandeur to which nature has destined this opulent country.

8. The General Congress of Colombia shall assemble, on the first day of January, 1821, in the town of Rosario de Cucuta, which, from various circumstances, is considered the most eligible situation. It shall be convened by the President of the Republic, on the first day of January, 1821, who shall communicate such regulations concerning elections, as may be found by a special committee, and approved by the present Congress.

9. The constitution of the republic of Colombia shall be formed by the general congress; to which shall be submitted, in the form of a plan, the constitution decreed by the present congress, which, together with the laws enacted by that body, shall be provisionally carried into execution.

10. The arms and flag of Colombia shall be determined on by the general congress, and in the mean time those of Venezuela being most known, shall continue to be used.

11. The present congress shall adjourn on the 15th January 1820, after which the new elections to the general congress of Colombia shall be made.

12. A committee of six members and a president shall replace the congress, whose particular power and duties shall be regulated by a decree.

13. The republic of Colombia shall be solemnly proclaimed throughout the towns and armies, accompanied by public festivals and rejoicings, and this ceremony shall take place in the capital on the 25th of the present month, in commemoration of the birth of the Saviour of the world, through whose especial favor this wished for union, regenerating the state, has been obtained.

14. The anniversary of this political regeneration shall be perpetually celebrated with the solemnities of a national festival, at

to citizens distinguished by their virtues and their talents. The present fundamental law of the Republic of Colombia shall be solemnly promulgated throughout the towns and armies; inscribed on all the public records and deposited in all the archives of societies, municipalities, and corporations, both clerical and secular.

Given at the Palace of the Sovereign Congress of Venezuela, in the city of St. Thomas de Angostura, on the 17th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1819, and ninth of independence.

FRANCISCO ANTONIO ZEA, *President of the Congress*; Juan Germar Rosico, Antonio M. Briceno, Ignacio Munas Manuel Seden, Eusebio Afanador, Onofre Bazal, Juan Martinez, Francisco Conde, Domingo Arzura, Jose Espana, Diego Bautista Urbaneja, Jose Thomas Machado, Luis Thomas Poraza, Juan Vincente Cardoso, Ramon Garcia Gadiz. *Diego De Vallenilla*, Deputy and Secretary.

NO. II.

FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE UNION OF THE PEOPLE OF COLOMBIA.

We the Representatives of the People of New Grenada and Venezuela, in general Congress assembled,

Having carefully considered the fundamental law of the Republic of Colombia, passed by the Congress of Venezuela at the city of St. Thomas de Angostura, on the 17th day of December A. D. 1819, are of opinion,

1. That united in one Republic, the provinces of Venezuela and New Grenada, possess all the means and faculties necessary to place them in the most elevated state of power and prosperity.

2. That constituted into separate Republics, however closely bound by the ties of union, they would find it difficult to give stability to their sovereignty, or inspire respect for it.

3. That deeply penetrated by these advantages, all men of superior intelligence, and distinguished patriotism, have declared, that the governments of the two Republics should form an union, which the vicissitudes of war have hitherto prevented.

4. Finally, that the same considerations of reciprocal intercourse, and a necessity most manifest, had made it obligatory on the congress of Venezuela, to anticipate this measure, which has been approved in the most authoritative manner by the unanimous votes of the people of both countries.

In the name, and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, they have decreed, and do boldly decree, the solemn ratification of the *Fundamental Law of the Republic of Colombia*, which has been before mentioned, in the following manner :

Art 1. The people of New Grenada and Venezeula, being united in one national body, founded on a compact, which determines that the government is now, and ever shall be, *popular and representative*.

2. This new nation shall be known and denominated, by the title of the *Republic of Colombia*.

3. The Colombian nation is, and shall forever be, irrevocably free and independent of the Spanish monarchy, and of every other foreign power or domination; nor shall it ever be the patrimony of any family or person.

5. The supreme national power shall always be separately exercised, and divided into legislative, executive and juridical.

5. The territory of the Republic of Colombia shall comprehend all that was within the ancient captain-generalship of Venezuela, and the viceroyalty of New Grenada; but reserving for a more suitable time their precise demarcation.

6. For the more advantageous administration of the Republic, its territory shall, for the present, be divided into six or more departments, each bearing a particular name, with a subordinate administration, dependent on the national government.

7. The present congress of Colombia shall form the Constitution of the republic, in conformity with the sentiments here expressed, upon those liberal principles which have been consecrated by the wise practice of other free nations.

8. They recognise *in consolidum* as the national debt of *Colombia*, all the debts which the two people have separately contracted, and for which they make responsible all the property of the republic.

9. The congress shall, in the mode that may be found convenient, appropriate the most productive branches of the public revenue, the taxes, and a special sinking fund created for the purpose, for the redemption of the principal, and paying the interest of the public debt.

10. In more favorable circumstances, there shall be erected a new city, with the name of the Liberator, *Bolivar*, which shall be the capital of the republic of Colombia. The plan and site shall be determined by congress, founded on the principle of accommodation to the convenience of the different parts of this vast territory, and the grandeur to which this territory is destined by nature.

11. Meanwhile, until congress shall establish the distinctive insignia, and the flag of Colombia, the actual flags of New Grenada and Venezuela shall be continued in use.

12. The ratification of the establishment of the Colombian Republic, and the publication of the Constitution shall be cele-

brated in the towns and in the armies, with festivity and public rejoicings, making known in all places, the solemnity of the day on which the Constitution is promulgated.

13. There shall be, perpetually, a national festival, for three days in each year, upon which shall be celebrated the *Anniversary* :

1, Of the *emancipation and independence* of the people of Colombia :

2, The *union* in one republic, and the *establishment* of the constitution :

3, To the great *triumphs* and splendid *victories* by which we have *conquered* our enemies, and *secured* these blessings.

Art. 14. The national festival shall be celebrated every year on the 25th, 26th and 27th of December, consecrating each day to the special remembrance of one of those three glorious causes, and in particular, to that of the *virtues*, the *intelligence* and the *services* rendered to the country.

The present fundamental law of the union of the people of Colombia, shall be solemnly promulgated in the towns, and in the armies; inscribed on the public registers and deposited in all the archives of the cabildos and corporations, civil and ecclesiastical, and shall be communicated to the supreme executive power by a special deputation.

Done in the place of the general Congress of Colombia, in the town of Rosario de Cucuta, the 12th of July, A. D. 1820, twelfth year of independence.

JOSE IGNACIO MARQUES, *President*,

ANTONIO M. BRICENO, *Vice President*.

Felix Restrepo, Manuel M. Guijano, Pedro F. Carbajal, Jose Cornelius Vallaria, Casimiro Calvo, Miguel Ibanez, Francisco de Orbegogo, Carlos Alvarez, Diego F. Gomez, Lorenzo St. Ander, Juan B. Esteves, Jose Antonio Yanes, Andreas Rojas, Bernardino Tovar, Jose Antonio Paredes, Gabriel Briceno, Louis Ignacio Mendoza, Toaguin Plata, Jose Prudencia Lanz, Jose Manuel Restrepo, Francisco Jose Olero, Miguel Tobar, Jose J. Borrero, Salvador Camacho, Jose A. Mendoza, Vincente Azuero, Nic. Balen de Guzman, Sinforoso Mutis, Domingo B. Briceno, Jose Felix Blanco, Ildefonso Mendez, Vincente Borrero, Mariano Escobar, Diego B. Urbaneja, Francisco Coade, Jose M. Hinestrosa, Arbellon Urbina, Jose Ignacio Balbuena, Jose Gabriel de Alcala, Francisco Gomez, Miguel Pena, Fernando Penalver, Ramon Ignacio Mendez, Toaguin F. Soto, Pacifico Taime, Juan Ronderos, Manuel Reuiles, Policarpo Uricoichea, Alexandro Osorio, Pedro Gual Miguel de Zarraga.

The Deputy and Secretary, Miguel Santamaria,

The Deputy and Secretary, Francisco Soto.

This instrument was further signed by the ministers of the interior, and the Vice President, H. Ander, and so promulgated—the constitution being formed in conformity thereto.

NO. III.

The territory of the Republic of Colombia, is divided by the last law of Bogota, June 23, 1824, in 12 departments, 49 provinces, and 218 cantons, which division is maintained until the present day, namely :

<i>Department.</i>	<i>Capital, or residence of the Intendant.</i>	<i>Provinces.</i>	<i>Residence of the Governor.</i>	<i>No. of Cant.</i>
1 Orinoco	Cumana	Cumana Barcelona Margarita Guayana	Cumana Barcelona Asuncion Angostura	25
2 Venezuela	Caracas	Caracas Carabobo	Caracas Valencia	21
3 Apure	Barinas	Barinas Obispos Mijagual Guanarito Nutrias San Jaime Guanare Ospinos Araure Pedraza	Barinas	4
4 Zulia	Maracaybo	Maracaybo Coro Merida Trujillo	Maracaybo Coro Merida Trujillo	21
5 Boyaca	Tunja	Tunja Pamplona Socorro Casanare	Tunja Pamplona Socorro Pore	4
6 Cundinamarca	Bogota	Bogota Antioquia Mariquita Neyva	Bogota Antioquia Mariquita Neyva	25
7 Magdalena	Carthagena	Carthagena Santa Martha Rio Hacha	Carthagena Santa Martha Rio Hacha	23
8 Cauca	Popayan	Popayan Choco Pasto Buenaventura	Popayan Quibdo Pasto Iscuande	21
9 Istmus	Panama	Panama Veragua	Panama Veragua	10

<i>Departments.</i>	<i>Capital, or residence of the Intendant.</i>	<i>Provinces.</i>	<i>Residence of the Governor.</i>	<i>No. of Cant.</i>
10 Equator	Quito	Pinchinca Imbabura * Chimborazo	Quito Ibarra Riobamba	13
11 Assuay	Cuenca	Cuenca Loja Bracamoros y } Mainas }	Cuenca Loja Jaen	11
12 Guayaquil	Guayaquil	Guayaquil Manabi	Guayaquil Puerto Viejo	9

NO. IV.

Decree to unite, in the departments and provinces, the military command with the civil authority, &c. in one and the same person.

SIMON BOLIVAR, &c.

As it is highly requisite, for the solidity and the honor of the Republic, to avoid expenses in the present state in which the public revenues suffice not to cover the public expenses of the administration, and wishing to end, or put a stop to disputes which embarrass the public service, and the good administration in the departments, and both aims being attainable, by assigning the military command to the individual entrusted with the civil authority in the departments and provinces, and in virtue of the extraordinary power granted to the executive of the Republic by the decree of the 23d inst. ; I have decreed the following :

Art. 1. The military command shall be united to the civil authority in all the departments and provinces, in which the government judges it to be convenient.

Art. 2. If the government should not have named the person who should have the civil authority in the departments and provinces, in which case the laws name the receivers of the departments, and the political chiefs (*gefes politicos*) in the capitals, as authorised to take the military command ; if they should not exist, then the civil authorities shall be conferred on the judges, or in their absence, on the political chiefs of the capital, &c.

NO. V.

Decree by which Simon Bolivar assumed the dictatorial power.

Simon Bolivar, Libertador, President de Colombia, &c. Teniendo in consideracion :

1. El estado de agitacion en que actualmente se encuentra la Republica despues de los sucesos de Venezuela, dividida en opiniones

sobre el regimen politico y alarmada con el temor de una guerra civil, y de una invasion exterior de parte de los enemigos comunes;

2. Que positivamente hay datos fundados para temer que el gobierno espanol intente renovar las hostilidades con las fuerzas que reune en la isla de Cuba.

3. Que la mayor parte de los departamentos ha manifestado su opinion, de que el Presidente de la Republica se revista decuantas facultades extraordinarias sean indispensables para restablecer la integridad nacional y salvara Colombia de la guerra civil y de la guerra exterior.

4. Que ya el poder ejecutivo ha declarado en el caso del articulo 128 de la constitucion, y, en consecuencia ha convocado oportunamente el Congrero; y descando par una parte corresponder a la confianza de los pueblos, y por otra conservar la constitucion actual, hasta tanto que la nacion por los medios legitimos y competentes provea a su reforma, oido el consejo de gobierno; venido en decretar y decreto.

Art. 1. Desde en adelante, estoy como presidente de la republica, ea el caso del articulo 28 de la constitucion y en el ejercicio de todas las facultades extraordinarias que de el emanan, tanto para restablecer la tranquilidad interior como para asegurar la republica contra la anarquia y la guerra exterior.

Art. 2. En mi ausencia de esta capital, el vice presidente de la republica, como que queda encargado del poder ejecutivo, ejercerá dichas facultades extraordinarias, en todo el territorio en que yo no las puidiere ejercer inmediatamente.

Art. 2. Fuera de los objetos, y casos que se determinaran para el ejercicio de las expresadas facultades extraordinarias, la constitucion y las leyes tendran su debido cumplimiento.

Art. 4. Se dara cuenta al Congreso proximo de todo lo que se ejecutare en virtud del presente decreto segun lo dispone el mencionado articulo 128 de la constitucion.

El secretario de Estado del despacho del interior queda encargado de comunicarlo y de velar en su ejecucion.

Dado y firmado de mi mano y refrendado por el secretario de estado del despacho del interior en Bogota a 23 de Noviembre de 1826. *Simon Bolivar.*

El seeretario de estado del despacho del interior, *Jose M. Restrepo.*

NO. VI.

SIMON BOLIVAR, &c.

No bastando las rentas de propios de los diferentes cantones de la Republica para los gastos ordinarios, *y no conviniendo por ahora gravar a los pueblos* con nuevas imposiciones municipales

que *excitan quejas por todas partes*, en uso de las facultades extraordinarias que residen en el Gobierno, he venido en decretar lo que sigue :

Art. 1. Queda suspenso el establecimiento de jueces letrados de primera instancia en todos los cantones de la Republica y los nombrados por el Poder Ejecutivo cesaran en sus funciones.

2. Los Alcaldes municipales continuaran con arreglo a la ley administrando la justicia civil y criminal en primera instancia, lo mismo que lo hacian antes de que hubiera jueces letrados, y conforme a lo prevenido en la ley de 11 de Mayo de 1825, para el caso de que no los haga.

3. Los Alcaldes municipales pondran el cuayor cuidado en administrar pronta, y cumplidamente la justicia tanto civil como criminal y en perseguir los reos para que se les imponga el condigno castigo, sobre lo cual velara may cuidadosamente el Poder Ejecutivo para que se les castigue a los omisos o negligentes.

4. El presente decreto se cumplira sin embargo de cuales quiera disposiciones que sean contrarias.

El secretario de estado del despacho del interior queda encargado de la ejecucion de este decreto. Dado en Bogota a 24 de Noviembre de 1826. Simon Bolivar. El secretario de estado del despacho del interior. Jose M. Restrepo.

NO. VII.

Decree urging the execution of the law of 22d May, 1827, in favor of the public credit.

SIMON BOLIVAR, &c.

Siendo uen deber sagrado en que esta constituida la Republica es de asegurar el pago de los intereses de su deuda para restablecer su credito y contribuir a su prosperidad y engrandecimiento y teniendo en consideracion que nada puede contribuir tanto a la consecucion de estos fines saludables como el llenar a efecto la ley sancionada en 22 de Mayo de este ano, que ha mandado hacer una anticipacion a los fondos del credito nacional ; he venido en decretar y decreto lo que sigue.

1. La ley de 22 de Mayo de este ano sera exacta y rigidamente ejecutada en todos los departamentos de la Republica, de modo que las sumas mandadas anticipar esten entegramente colectadas en todo el mes de Diciembre proximo, a mas tardar.

2. Los intendentes y gobernadores cuidaran de evitar en sus respectivos distritos, todo fraude contra la ley, y toda parcialidad en las asignaciones.

3. Los encargados de su ejecucion en todas sus partes, sufriran en el caso de no llenar sus respectivas obligaciones las penas contenidas en decreto de esta fecha.

El secretario de estado del despacho de Hacienda queda encargado de la ejecucion de este decreto. Dado en Bogota, capital de la Republica, a 23 de Noviembre de 1826. Simon Bolivar. El secretario de estado del despacho de hacienda. Jose M. del Castillo.

NO. VIII.

Decree to suppress the frauds committed against the public treasury.

SIMON BOLIVAR, &c.

Siendo como son tan comunes y escandalosos los fraudes que se cometen contra las rentas nacionales, y conviniendo refrenar una propension que tanto relaja la moral publica y disminuye tan considerablemente los ingresos del tesoro; he venido en decretar y decreto lo que sigue.

Art. 1. Todo defraudador de las rentas del Estado queda sujeto a la pena de perdimiento de las mercaderias, generos defectos en que haga o pretenda hacer la defraudacion, y en la de presidio de seis hasta diez anos con las costas del proceso.

Art. 2. Son defraudadores en el sentido del articulo anterior :

1st. Los que importaren, exportaren o internaren mercaderias, frutos y efectos extranjeros, eludiendo su presentacion en las aduanas para no pagar los derechos establecidos.

2d. Los que introdujerén por los puertos le la Republica mercaderias, frutos o efectos de prohibida introduccion.

3d. Los que, contra la prohibicion de las leyes, pretendan exportar furtivamente los metales prohibidos.

4th. Los cultivadores, vendedores y conductores de tabacos contra las instrucciones del ramo, o sia los requisitos que ellas prescriben.

5th. Los destiladores clandestinos, y sendedores por menor de aguardientes, sin las licencias que determina la ley.

Art. 3. En la pena de perdimiento, se comprende el buque, carruage o caballerias, y la de los utensilios, vasijas y apara. Los en que se cometa el fraude. Los encubridores, fautores o receptadores del fraude estan sujetos a las mismas penas.

4. Los aprehensores de cualquiera clase, sean o no empleados, hacen suyo quanto aprehendan, deduciendose unicamente las costas procesales, y los derechos de aduanas. Si fuere tabaco lo aprehendido, lo tomara la renta al precio a que cueste en cada administracion, el cual sera pagado fiel e inmediatamente al aprehensor.

5. Los juicios pa la imposicion de estas penas, seran sumarios: e instruirá los procesos el administrador, o colector del ramo, o el comandante, o uno de los ayudantes del resguardo; y se reducira al acto de aprehension debidamente calificado con un numero

plural de testigos, debenser examinados en un solo acto.

Art. 6. En virtud de estas, delinquencias que se pasaran inmediatamente al juez de hacienda, pronunciara este la sentencia que sera ejecutada, y llevada a efecto.

Art. 7. Todo descuido o connivencia de parte de los empleados o del juez, sera viremisiblemente castigado con las penas que perscribe el decreto de esta fecha.

El secretario de estado del despacho de hacienda queda encargado de la ejecucion de este decreto. Dado en Bogota, capital de la Republica a 23 de Noviembre, de 1826. *Simon Bolivar*.

El secretario de estado del despacho de hacienda, *Jose M. Del Castillo*.

NO. IX.

*Memoir of the Marquis of Torre Tagle, late President of Peru.**

The public man is not master of his actions; he is obliged to answer for his proceedings, and give an account of his conduct. The country in which he has served, is deserving of his consideration, and of his best wishes. Mine will always be directed towards the felicity of Peru.

At the time when I received the supreme command of Peru, called independent, many remarkable circumstances took place, for the explanation of which it is painful to my feelings of delicacy to find it indispensable to publish some confidential communications of general Bolivar, which never would have been divulged, had the attempt not been made through them to sully my honor. In such a case I am not constrained to maintain a reserve and delicacy which would dishonor myself, and which has not been observed towards me. I shall not detain myself in showing the strong interest I have felt in endeavoring to prevent the misfortunes of Peru. I received the supreme military command in Callao, in July, 1823, and this was the greatest proof of my devotion to the felicity of the country. I considered it absolutely a sacrifice, from the time general Bolivar ordered forces to occupy it, before they had been required by Don Jose de La Riva Aguero, since, on the arrival of general Portacarrero at Guayaquil, transports were ready with troops to be disembarked at Callao, without consulting the wish of the Peruvians. From that time the extermination of the country was decreed, and it was my duty to omit no means to free her from slavery. I accepted on this

* This remarkable document will prove by facts, how general Bolivar has acted in Peru. The author is generally known as an honest, upright, and respectable man, whom Bolivar and his adherents have tried to pass as a traitor, and an agent of the holy alliance.

account, provisionally, the command, although there were scarcely any resources in the capital to maintain the troops, or sustain the civil list, notwithstanding I attended to every thing in the best manner possible. I was exceedingly desirous that the congress, selecting a worthy citizen, would relieve me from the administration, from which it had exonerated Don Jose de La Riva Agüero. But this body having been violently dissolved in Truxillo, I conceived it my duty to continue at my post, in order to re-establish, at all hazards, the legislative assembly.

But how could this be effected without Peruvian forces, and only with auxiliaries, who would take no part in internal dissensions? I was persuaded that it should be done, and immediately effected it, without any other protection than that of my own courage and that of my friends. I re-established the congress, I saved several of the deputies, and I secretly gloried in actions which I conceived to be good, and at that time most useful to the country.

Bolívar arrives at Callao the 1st September, and the torch of civil discord is immediately lighted; every thing appears to him wrong, and he does not hesitate to declare to the committee of the congress, who wished to congratulate him, that "*general and radical reform was necessary*;" that is to say, that he considered himself capable of dictating the law to the congress. He did not deceive *himself*; terror is disseminated, and this body only thought of discovering the will of Bolívar, in order to comply with it. He is invested with the supreme, military, civil and dictatorial command, degrading the authority which the same congress had conferred upon me, and scattering the seeds of division between the executive power, and a foreign and absolute authority. Large contributions are decreed beyond the capacity and fortune of the inhabitants; extensive loans are received, which are all employed in procuring excellent clothing for the auxiliary troops, and supplying punctually their wants and their pay, these troops being constantly attended to in preference to the Peruvians.

It would be difficult to conceive how much I had to suffer and dissemble, from the imperious and overbearing manner of Bolívar, in carrying into effect all his ideas, without regard to the means; and how much I was compelled to tolerate, not only from him, but colonels Heres and Perez, the two springs which he constantly moved to molest, at every moment, the government, studious to observe towards him the greatest obsequiousness.

Notwithstanding I conceived myself obliged to make these sacrifices for Peru, in order to preserve a semblance of her proper authority, which might hereafter be opposed to the dreadful measures which were commencing against the natives of the country, and which every day would increase.

Before Bolívar went to the northern coast to pacify those provinces, he verbally charged me to be most rigorous towards all the party of Rivas Agüero, and to spare none of their lives; he ordered

that all this party should instantly disappear, to avoid the evils resulting from delay.

Don Jose de La R. A. being taken with some others, in Truxillo, by colonel La Fuente, he imparted the event to the government, who transmitted it to the congress, without asking any punishment. The congress, by their reply and former decrees, placed me under the necessity of giving an order for the execution of R. A. and some of his principal followers; but I consoled myself with the idea that they would have left Truxillo before the order would have reached there.

I communicated my sentiments to Bolivar on this subject, in a letter which I wrote him the 5th of December, and which is amongst the justificatory documents, No. 1.

The resolutions on the fate of De La Riva Agüero, and the other prisoners, emanated from congress, and not from myself. I gave them sufficient opportunity to reverse the decree, which the legislative body had passed on the 8th of August, and I did not oppose the idea of La Fuente, that they should be banished to Chili. The congress resolved to enforce the punishment of a crime which had been classified by the law, and it was not in my power to prevent it.

On this occasion I shall merely state that the imputation cast upon the government of having sent an individual to Truxillo, for the purpose of poisoning R. A. is false. Whatever this individual said, or was compelled to say, is false, and no member of the government had any share in it. The said individual was only known by his activity in introducing communications, as he had done in Lima, when Callao was besieged by the Spanish army. He was afterwards sent for to convey four letters to Truxillo, for the purpose of exciting an insurrection in that city, for which he received only fifty dollars, drawn from the public treasury.

Who could believe that for so small a sum he could be induced to undertake such an enterprise as this? who could believe that the government would for a moment suppose that an individual unknown to R. A. could obtain an easy introduction into his domestic service. This very contemptible calumny did, notwithstanding, at the time, obtain general currency.

General Bolivar having been informed of the immediate execution he had commanded of the orders of congress against R. A. and the other principal persons taken with him, replied to the minister of war, who at that time also filled the department of state, on the liberal terms which appear from paper No. 2, dated Caxamarca, 14th of Dec. 1823.

From this letter we will make the following observations; that general B. wished not only all the partizans of R. A. but all the Spaniards who should be found in the capital to be immediately put to death."

Secondly, that he ordered the battalion of Vargas to march out immediately to the mountains, and to be replaced in Callao by that of the Rio de La Plata. That body was in the mountains where the negotiations commenced with the Spaniards. General B. suggested the idea, but did not wish to appear publicly in it, perhaps in order to induce the belief that the government was selling the country, and he saved it by triumphing over the Spaniards, without fulfilling any promises towards them. But the government sustained its character of justice, honor, and interest for Peru which might be expected.

Under date of the 18th of January, general Bolivar wrote me the letter, number 3, by which he recommends to my notice most strenuously, a very important affair which he had communicated, under the same date, to colonel Heres. It was this that was contained in the letter of his then secretary, Espinar, number 4, the original of which was confided to me by the said colonel, in confidence, and which was returned to him after being copied.

As soon as I was informed of all, the minister of war, colonel Heres, and myself endeavored to carry into effect the project of general Bolivar, as he did not wish to appear publicly in it; I wrote with their common consent, to the president of the congress, the note number 5, which was replied to by a note of approbation, under the supposition that the government was acquainted with the wish of Bolivar in this particular. The letter which I wrote to Bolivar on the 16th January, refers to this circumstance, and is marked number 6, and that of colonel Heres of the 15th of the same month, number 7, is a farther corroboration of all that has been said, and shows my wish to agree with him in this business, even in the most minute points.

Under such circumstances, and charged with accelerating the said negociation, colonel Perez arrived at Lima from Pativilca, the secretary of general Bolivar, who had a conference with myself and the secretary of war, on the 17th of January, according to the document number 8. He then observed, if the Spaniards should not wish to treat on the preliminary convention of Buenos Ayres, the said general proposed a particular one with Peru; and thus it was confidentially resolved upon. In consequence of all this, the respective persons were delegated under this date, and the official letter, number 9, written to general La Sorna, and instructions were given to the minister plenipotentiary, as appears from the papers number 10 and 11.

The minister set off to Xauja at that time, and entered that town on the 26th of January. He learnt there from field-marshal Don Juan Antonio Monet, that on the following day, general So-

* This corroborates perfectly what I have stated in chapter vii. of these memoirs, of cold blooded butchery of more than 1200 Spaniards and Isleno in Lagunaira and Caracas, executed by Bolivar's order. AUTHOR.

riga, chief of the staff, would come from Ituancaayo, from the commander-in-chief, to have an interview with said minister, and to receive the despatches, two of which were in fact delivered to him, for the viceroy La Serna, number 9 and 12, accompanied by the official despatch and letter for his Excellency general Canterac, numbers 13 and 14, the replies to which are numbers 15 and 16.

The conference with general Soriga was altogether of a private nature, as he declared from the beginning, that La Serna alone could give a definitive answer. In this conference, as in all the others, the minister proceeded to establish negotiations exclusively on the basis of independence, and he there solicited, as had been proposed by general Bolivar, in case of being refused an assent to the preliminary convention of Buenos Ayres, a particular treaty of union and friendship, might be concluded with Peru, on the basis of independence.

Having punctually given an account of all that had been doing to general Bolivar, he wrote me a letter of approbation, number 17. By this letter, it appears that all that I did on this subject was with his knowledge and concurrence; and all that the minister proposed had been previously arranged without his deviating in the slightest respect from his instructions.

There was only one difference, general Bolivar was not desirous that a convention should be formed with the Spaniards, even upon the basis of independence; he wished to propose a thing that was not to be fulfilled, whilst I was always resolved to proceed with good faith, to comply exactly with my duty and to restore peace to Peru by the sincere union of Spaniards and Peruvians.

Who would not esteem this conduct the most honorable and beneficial to the country? If the end of this war was to gain independence, if this could be obtained without the effusion of blood, and without aggerating the sacrifices of a devastated territory, why did general Bolivar wish to risk the object by the uncertain result of a battle? Why was the greatest part of the Peruvian army to perish, which should serve as the defence of this soil? Why, in case that the forces of Colombia should triumph, should this country remain at the mercy of Bolivar, for him exclusively to decide on its fate and destiny? What honorable man, in my case, would have performed so rash and desperate a part?

My desire was to terminate the war. The congress wished the same thing, manifested sufficiently in the order of the 14th of last January, number 8.

I am certain that my conduct in this particular could only appear bad to general Bolivar, and to his ambitious satellites, but to no other people or inhabitant of the world. Before God and man, my conscience tells me I have proceeded with rectitude. I owed much to the people for having reposed their confidence in me. I fulfilled my obligations on this account, by exerting myself for their good and prosperity, at the expense of a thousand risks and

sacrifices. At some future period, my actions will be properly estimated, and an impartial posterity, not agitated by the passions of deluded, ungrateful and intriguing men, will do me justice.

I was anxiously expecting a reply from his excellency the viceroy, on the negociations above mentioned, when the troops, which garrisoned the castles of Callao, refused obedience to the independent authorities. This happened three days after the minister of war had returned from Xauja to Lima; and the enemies of order, well satisfied that the government had no part in this revolution, endeavored to throw the suspicions on him. As I had no previous intimation of this charge, I confidently believed, and many others believed, that it was a political and military stratagem general Bolivar made use of, with the double object of overthrowing the government, which he could not decorously attack, and to beat the Spanish forces which might advance to the assistance of the castles.

Many circumstances concurred to give plausibility to this presumption. General Bolivar not only charged me expressly from Caxamarca, under date of the 12th of last December, that the battalion Vargas, should leave Callao to be replaced by that of Buenos Ayres, but in his letter of the 7th of January of the same year, No. 19, in which he mentions his having been informed of the insurrection of the grenadiers of that body in Lima, he orders the battalion Vargas, to be ready to march, as was afterwards done, and that Callao should be defended by the troops of Peru and the Rio de La Plata.

Colonel Heres, on the 9th of the same month, in his letter, No. 20, recommends to me very particularly from Bolivar, his orders contained in his official letter of the 14th December, from Caxamarca, that is to say, the same orders with regard to the charge of battallions; and that all the royalists, all factious individuals, and the followers of Riva Aguera, should be shot—not only were the troops distributed according to the directions of general Bolivar, but some days previous to the insurrection at Callao, general Alvarado was named by him governor of that place. Colonel Aldivieso, who was really the governor, was removed, without cause, or any just motive. The same thing had happened a few days previously at the request of the general-in-chief of the army of the centre, Don Henriquez Martinez, to the commander of one of the forts, Don Francisco Cabero and Sifuentis.

This extraordinary combination of simultaneous changes, offered presumptive evidence to my suspicion; and other things occurred to confirm it. Not being able to conceive that there was any neglect in the service of the castles, or in the administration of the corps, I was astonished, at not having received any information of it from the governor of the place, and that no commander or officer had made any discovery on this subject; and finally, that the generals of the Andes were constantly encouraging expectations

of recovering the castles. All this induced the belief that the two fold object of the revolution was to depose the government, and to beat the Spaniards; but principally so, when the Colombian officer, Ugarte, the aid to colonel Heres, in passing over to the Spaniards, was found, with either a true or forged passport from his colonel. Such a casualty induced a suspicion that Ugarte was carrying over an insidious and detailed information, and that the Spanish forces were speedily coming to Callao. Ultimately it has become notorious, that the authors of the movements in Callao were only colonel Moyano, and lieutenant colonel Oliva, who had formed their plan without depending on any external assistance to realise the undertaking. After the loss of Callao, general Bolivar, trampling upon my authority, commissioned general Martinez to execute the premature measures which are contained in the copy No. 21, directed to the ministers at war, with the note, No. 22. As, according to received orders, Martinez was to cause the infantry to march instantly, the capital remaining unprotected and without the power of being garrisoned in a proper manner, I summoned a Junta of generals; and after having read the said instructions, I was of opinion the troops should not march, which was agreed upon by the Junta. I thus saved the capital from the dreadful catastrophe which it would have suffered from the revolutions of general Bolivar—a service which is, perhaps, not properly appreciated, from its not being generally known.

In the meantime Bolivar, separating himself entirely from the conduct of the government, which still subsisted, and without any regard to the congress, directed, under date of the 10th of February, to general Martinez, the scandalous note, No. 23, which he sent to the government with the official note, No. 24. The congress being consulted in all that had occurred, resolved upon what is contained in the order, No. 25.

The fulfilment of the determinations of Bolivar, was still suspended, when general Gamarra appears, commissioned to carry into effect the orders given to Martinez. The legislative body was informed of this circumstance, the only superior authority whom I would acknowledge, and they issued an order of suspension, which appears in the paper No. 26. There was no remedy; the president of Colombia required his mandates should be obeyed in Peru; and it was to be done. Invested now with a dictatorial character, without paying the least attention to the sanction of the representative authority, he names general Necochea, civil and military chief of the capital, commanding him to fulfil his orders; in virtue of which appointment, with the consent of the congress, I delivered up the command to Necochea on the 17th of February, after having received the note No. 27.

I thus terminated my career in the supreme government of Peru, called independent, which I had maintained with so much repugnance, and with the object alone of freeing the country from

an obstructive authority. It was on this account I received the command at Callao from general Sucre, and that I did not renounce it on the arrival of Bolivar, although I was strongly urged to it by the deputy Carrion.

When the congress, in naming Bolivar dictator, sent to know my wish, by Don Arce, I replied, that, as a public man I would fulfil immediately, whatever the Peruvian congress should resolve upon, in order that they should not think me ambitious of the command. In fact, I preserved the command whilst I thought it indispensable to preserve the country from being sacrificed. Lastly, when the government of the capital was offered me by the Spanish authorities, I refused it, since there is at present no danger whatsoever, or absolute necessity, for my services.

I, being separated from the government, Bolivar determined to crown his works, by ordering me to be arrested and shot, as well as many illustrious and respectable Peruvians, who, according to his opinion, might oppose his design. The Supreme Being has saved us and placed us under the protection of the national army. We will continually exert ourselves for the felicity of our country, always contributing to its increased prosperity, and to prostrate the progress of the tyrant. His immeasurable ambition shall find no aliment in Peru, nor shall he ever domineer over its illustrious citizens.

It is as true that Bolivar has endeavored to persecute, without cause, every Peruvian of talents, or who could make a figure, as that, when general La Fuente caused the last change in Truxillo, and was called the Pacificator of the North, Bolivar immediately determined to destroy him. La Fuente caused the Peruvian cuirassiers to sustain themselves against the hussars of the guard of Bolivar, who wished to trample upon them. From that time he determined to deprive him of the Presidency of Truxillo, separate him from the army, and send him to Chili, under the miserable and puerile pretexts which appears in his letter, No. 28. In this letter he also disapproves of the conduct observed towards Riva Agüero; yet it had his entire approbation, and he ever wished it more rigorous, as appears from his official letter of the 14th December, No. 2. As to general Santa Cruz, the said letter evinces sufficiently the ancient hatred that the president of Colombia felt for him, and which he has after expressed and manifested, by the repeated entreaties that general Sucre has made to me, to cause himself and Santa Cruz to be tried by a council of war, on account of the late events of the South. The object of this was the destruction of Santa Cruz; and on this account I refused acceding to the proposal. I cherish the flattering idea that, during my government, in the most turbulent times, and in the midst of a civil war, Providence has not permitted a drop of human blood to be shed. Some rigid measures were indispensably taken to prevent our being devoured by anarchy; but every

Peruvian was set at liberty, and restored to his house before I gave up the command. I maintained this without receiving a real of salary as supreme chief, in order that the most necessitous might be relieved, and assisting many with my own fortune, and burthening myself to sustain the lustre of the rank which I had obtained. I believe my administration has been marked by mildness, justice and disinterestedness, and if my government was not the best, my intentions were perfectly correct and pure. United now to the national army, our fates will always be the same. I shall never be dazzled by the false glare of chimerical ideas, which bewilddering the deluded people only lead to their destruction, and to make the fortunes and satiate a horde of adventures. On every side we see nothing but ruin and misery. In the course of the war, who but those who called themselves defenders of the country had ruined our fortunes, devastated our fields, relaxed our morals, oppressed and distressed the people? What has been the fruit of this revolution. What is the positive good that has resulted to the country? The total insecurity of property and individuals. I detest a system which has not for its object the general good, and which does not conciliate the interests of all the citizens.

Oh Peru! peaceable country, in which I first beheld the day; delightful country! that appears destined for the residence of the Gods! Do not permit temples to tyranny to be raised within your limits, under the false pretext of liberty. Do not believe that your happiness is intended by a show of a false equality.

From the instant that you shall succumb, a colossal power will oppress you with the weight of a most cruel despotism. Already the people governed by Bolivar, groan under it; and if fate is favorable to him, all the other states of America will follow their unhappy example.

From the cordial and sincere union of Spaniards, every good may be expected; from Bolivar desolation and death.

THE MARQUIS OF TORRE TAGLE.

Lima, March 16, 1824.

JUSTIFICATORY DOCUMENTS.

No. 1.]—Extract of a letter, of the 5th December, 1823, written by Don Jose Benardo de Tagle, to general Simon Bolivar.

I laid the communication of La Fuente before the congress, without giving any opinion respecting Riva Agüero, but only requesting their resolve in order to communicate it. The congress does not approve that Riva Agüero, should go to Chili; and says that you and myself should determine on this subject. The law is clear, and the crimes of this unfortunate man determine his punishment. I complied with what is due to justice, but I assure you that, after having been for many years a public character, and experienced the pain of being obliged to decide upon the fate of men, a day of greater unhappiness than was occasioned by deciding upon that of Riva Agüero, I have never in my life experienced. I believed

that he must have set off for Chili; for certainly he would not have thought it prudent to wait there (Truxillo) the determination of the congress. Anxiously do I wish to know the fate of that man.

No. 2.]—Head Quarters of the Libertador Caxamarca, December 14, 1823. *To the minister of war.* As I arrived yesterday without my secretary, he having been taken ill on the road, I addressed myself directly to your Excellency. I last night received the communications of his Excellency to the 30th of last month by which I have learnt the dislodgement of the expedition of Arica, and the suspicion that was entertained against the vice admiral of Peru.*

As the brig Boyaca, with captain Coro, has arrived on the west of Huanchaco, with the object of sending assistance to the party of Riva Agüero, there is not the least doubt that hopes are entertained of keeping that party alive, which appears almost extinct. Consequently, I have dictated measures for securing the vessels of Peru and Colombia, which might be attacked by the partizans of Riva Agüero, or by the Spanish squadron, consisting of four sail, of which I have been informed by the captain of the port of Callao, and by an original letter from his Excellency, the president of the Republic. The communications of yesterday have not failed to produce a very disagreeable impression upon me; they show me that obstacles are multiplying on every side to the liberty of Peru. The expedition of Chili is dispersed, and even returned to its country. Santa Cruz and his partizans entertain very sinister ideas; Guise the same. The factions of Lima are making great progress in Canta and Huarochiri. The expedition of Herrera, sufficiently manifests the royalist party that predominates in Lima, in the most extraordinary manner.

Finally, the combination of yesterday's news is terrible, and scarcely leaves me any hopes of a favorable result to be wrested from misfortune, even by force; every thing threatens ruin in this country. Whilst I advance towards the North, the South falls into confusion; and when I return to the South, I am certain this part of the North, will inevitably be thrown in the utmost disorder, because Peru has become the camp of Argamant, where no one is understood. Whatever direction I take, I meet with opposition. Who would have conceived that the party of Riva Agüero, should be able to recruit accomplices by the attraction of an infamous piece of treason? Yet such is the situation of things. *It is my opinion, that if the government does not establish terrible measures against the royalists, and against factious individuals; that Peru will be the victim of its own clemency.* The orders of the government upon Riva Agüero, and his accomplices, are very just and very much to the point, and ought to be rigorously complied with; besides, *I am of opinion that the same orders should be extended to the other accomplices of Lima, and others of Riva Agüero's party, or that of the Spaniards. The government should demand from the congress terrible laws against conspirators, of whatever party they may be; and the government should cause these laws to be executed with inexorable rigor.* Peru is undermined by her enemies, and only a counterminc can save her. I do not venture to dictate measures which I judge salutary, because I am not a Peruvian; and every thing I do is attributed to Colombia and sinister views. Let the relation of Herrera speak for itself, which declares that the contributions create enemies to Colombia, as if the contributions were for the use of Colombia alone, and did not belong to the expenses of Peru and its authorities. Before now I have repeated that I wished that the government of Peru would incur the odium which will fall on me for these strong measures, and that I would do the rest. In proof of which, I have taken charge of this civil war, which certainly has been attended with its share of odium and calumny; but it was my duty to take charge of it,

* The government of Peru always entertained the best opinion of the vice admiral. He was not accused of any thing in the communication to general Bolivar. It was only stated to him that a serjeant-major, who had come from the Chili expedition at Arica to Lima, had reported that the vice-admiral had burnt the provisions at that place, and was on his way to Huanchaco, with general Santa Cruz.

in order to save this country. Thanks to God ! it has had a speedy result ; but there will certainly be a reaction, if strong caustics are not applied to the gangrene that this domestic war has left. *To destroy the hostile and factious guerrillas, the battalion Vargas should immediately march from Callao, towards Canta, to be replaced by the battalion of Rio de La Plata, or Chili, or by both, for the better preservation of the castles.* Let colonel Cordero take the command of the guerrillas of Sierra, against Xauja and Pasco, and let every assistance be given him for the subsistence and movement of his troops, or ample orders to supply wherever he may be.

In this way the parties of Mancebo, Rinavilca, Carreuo, and Vidal, will be destroyed, and the opponents of Villar will be silenced, who on account of the hatred which is borne to him, in the country, have been found by Rinavilca, the opponents of legitimate government. I always thought Mancebo and Villar were bad men, and prejudicial to the country. If colonel Cordero does not find subsistence for his battalion, let him scour the country to Caxatamba, and leave the force necessary to maintain order. From Huarochiri, some troops of the line from Chili, should proceed with the same object, which would also prevent the destruction of the Chilian in the climate of the coast. It is incredible how necessary it is to throw all our army amongst the mountains, to accustom them to march, and to the climate of the country, which is to be the scene of war. On the same account I ardently desire that all troops of Chili, which may arrive on the coast of Peru, should move towards the mountains in any way and in any direction. Afterwards they can be reunited and organised in the most convenient and best way possible. By this operation the salvation of the Chilian troops will be obtained, and an expense saved the government which it is not able to sustain on account of its present state of penury. As to Messrs. Santa Cruz and Guise, the government will take such measures as will be dictated by their wisdom—for my part, I shall soon be in Truxillo, from which place I can communicate to the government whatever occurs to me upon these and other subjects of much importance. Before terminating this official letter, I must add, that the corps commanded by Raboa have now acknowledged the legitimate government, who were the most obstinate; they are in this city in a most lamentable state, on account of their small force and miserable condition. But I shall attempt to improve it as far as lies in my power. Within six days I shall be in Truxillo, and there I shall dictate measures to regulate every thing according to the views of the congress, and the government. The promotion of general La Fuente has appeared to me just and proper on account of his good conduct in such critical circumstances. May God preserve your Excellency. (Signed) BOLIVAR.

No. 3.]—PATIVILCA, January 11th, 1824. My dear President—At last I am convalescent from my indisposition, which appears terminated, and has only left me a little debilitated. I cannot exactly mention the day when I shall set off for the capital, but it will be as soon as I am a little stronger. Colonel Heres will speak to you about a very important affair, which I communicate to him, under this date. I think it is of the greatest importance, and recommend it to you most earnestly. I charge you with secrecy and promptitude in the execution of it. I am your affectionate friend and servant,
BOLIVAR.

To His Excellency Don Jose Bernardo Tagle.

No. 4.]—PATIVILCA, January 11th, 1824. *To Colonel Heres.* My estimable Colonel—On account of the arrival at Lima of Mr. Alzaga, and the pressing requests which have been made to the government to commence negotiations on the convention, celebrated between the commissioners of his Catholic Majesty and the government of Buenos Ayres, His Excellency, the Liberator, thinks that an armistice can take place between general La Serna and the government of Peru, which, lasting six months or more, shall protect us from being invaded by the Spanish army, which, at present, has a great numerical preponderance over that of Colombia. In effect, His Excellency desires that the convention of Buenos Ayres should be ratified with the Spaniards of Cuzco before it is ratified by our side, because it will be the means of obtaining more favorable terms; when, on the contrary, if we ratify it before La Serna, he being sure of our assent, would

increase his pretensions excessively, and all the disadvantages would fall upon us. The Libertador is of opinion, that the government, in accordance with the congress, should send a flag of truce to Cuzco, or wherever La Serna may be, inviting this general to enter upon a conference, the basis of which shall be the said armistice. This being agreed to by La Serna, he will send commissioners to Xauja, fully authorised to treat with us upon the armistice, a rule of demarcation, and other particulars, which his excellency proposes. His excellency desires that the language which the government makes use of, may be in these, or other similar terms, indicating frankness of principle, liberality of ideas, and absolute confidence in the liberating armies and its chiefs. La Serna must be addressed with noble pride, and without discovering, in any manner, our state of present debility. The Libertador is so satisfied with the result of this negotiation, that his excellency is responsible for the liberty of Peru, after an armistice of six months. All the difficulty rests in the affair being well managed, in order that its motive may never transpire.

His excellency, the Liberator, does not wish to give his countenance to the commencement of this negotiation, because it would indicate a state of debility in the army, and a want of confidence in our own forces, that would cause the illusion of opinion to vanish, which the Spanish now entertain of his excellency, and every thing would fall through. La Serna, and the other chiefs, would not consent to any thing to accelerate their march towards us, and the result of a battle would be uncertain. As soon as the auxiliaries arrive, which his excellency has asked from Colombia, and which he expects within six months, the fears which at present surround us, will be dissipated. The greatest address is necessary in the management of this affair, and the most inviolable secrecy. The proposal which the government will make, always in its own name, (*and by no means in that of the Libertador,*) may be divulged to a few persons, but the causes from which they originate must remain absolutely a secret, even to those who assist in the negotiation. On this account, his excellency has not permitted me to reply, officially, to the government, respecting the arrival of Mr. Alzaga, his presentation to the convention, &c. &c. and you will mention this to his excellency, the president, in the name of the Libertador. The president must write with a certain frankness to the chief, of the vanguard, or to the viceroy, La Serna, in these or similar terms: "that he has been informed that La Serna, animated by the most noble sentiments of philanthropy, was desirous of terminating the war of America by a pacific negotiation; that there has been sufficient blood shed; that the enlightened world is scandalized at this fratricidal contest; that the cannons have thundered long enough; that American blood has flowed too long by the hands of brothers; that being all sons of liberty, and defending the rights of humanity, it appears that this sanguinary war is more monstrous from its inconsistency, than from the disasters which it causes; that we are men, and should employ reason before force; that, let us once come to an understanding, and the good of America, and that of Spain, will concentrate in the same point; the peninsular government, the Cortes, and the king, have acknowledged the independence of all America; that Buenos Ayres has already concluded her treaties, Mexico the same, and Colombia has already set on foot at Bogota a negotiation with the Spanish agents, on the preliminaries of an armistice and peace. It thus appears that Peru alone is unfortunate in not enjoying repose, as the contending parties have not come to an understanding; that the government of Spain could derive many advantages from the actual position of Peru; and that human prudence would dictate that Spain should make use of the last hope which remains to her, of treating advantageously with us." La Serna must farther be told, "that, on account of the mission of Mr. Alzaga, from the government of Buenos Ayres, and that a convention having been proposed, which has been concluded between the commissioners of his Catholic majesty and Buenos Ayres, his excellency, the president, invites general La Serna to declare, explicitly, his intentions, his will, his assent, or his rejection, of these treaties." The government should make it appear, in directing this communication, that the Libertador has no concern in it; that he has not merely withheld his assent, but that he has not even the least knowledge of the beneficent intentions of the government. In fine, not a word must be spoken in the said communication, of his excellency, the Libertador. Adieu, my dear friend; this letter, al-

though private in its form, has virtually all the character of an official letter. Let it be considered so in case of necessity. I am entirely yours,

JOSE DE ESPINAR RABRICADO.

No. 5.]—LIMA, January 13th, 1824. Most Excellent Sir—I believe most firmly, that every step towards a convention with the Spaniards, will be useless, until we shall know from them whether they are disposed to negotiate. To this effect, I think it of immense importance, that all responsibility resting upon me, a chief of Peru, whom I shall name, possessing distinguished civil and military knowledge, shall proceed to general Cantarac, or to general La Serna, in case the former shall not possess sufficient power. This previous step, I think, very important to the salvation of Peru; it will mark out the path we are to pursue in our ulterior arrangements, and I am resolved upon it. I only wait for the approbation of the sovereign congress, which is to be obtained by your excellency, to whom I reiterate the assurances of my high consideration and esteem.

(Signed) JOSE BERNARDO DE TAGLE.

To the President of the Congress.

No. 6.]—LIMA, January 16th, 1824. *To the most excellent Simon Bolivar.* My dear Libertador and friend—In consequence of what you informed me in your estimable letter of the 11th of the present month, and by the letter under the same date, directed to colonel Heres, by your secretary, I proceeded to lay before congress the communication, a copy of which I transmit to you, marked No. 1, with the reply, which is marked No. 2. I have, in accordance with colonel Heres, determined to direct a communication, in which, besides the general points, which are contained in the letter of your secretary, are comprehended those which have been suggested and almost dictated by the said colonel, and are copied and marked No. 3. The plenipotentiary of Buenos Ayres, to whom it was suggested by the minister of war, that general Guido should convey this communication, on account of its importance, and in order better to explore the political attitude of the chiefs of the Spanish army, as appeared most proper to Heres, he refused his consent to the nomination, thinking it would be better to send some Peruvian of character, designating, at the same time, the said minister of war. Colonel Heres told me, that, in case of necessity, he should approve of this nomination; and I am now seeking a person to whom I can entrust this important commission; under the determination that, should I not meet with any other Peruvian than the minister of war, who could fulfil this commission, I shall send him, notwithstanding the great loss he will be to me. Colonel Heres tells me, that the express must immediately set off, so that I have no time to write more fully. Your most affectionate friend and obedient servant,

JOSE BERNARDO DE TAGLE.

No. 7.]—*To the most excellent Don Bernardo Tagle.* My general and my friend—After I left your house, I reflected at my leisure on the letter which you should write to La Serna. The minister of war is right in his opinion. It is better to say nothing of the transmission of the papers. It appears to me all those should be sent which are received from Europe, merely saying that they are enclosed; but as you have more judgment than myself, you may resolve upon what you may think most proper. I am your affectionate friend.

(Signed) J. DE HERES.

No. 8.]—4 o'clock P. M. of the 17th of January. My esteemed general—Have the goodness to defer our interview with Mr. Berindoaga to this night, at 7 o'clock, in your palace, as I am at present occupied with Mr. Alzaga. I am, general, your obedient servant,

J. G. PEREZ.

No. 9.]—LIMA, January 17th, 1824. Most excellent sir—General Heres, named by the government of Buenos Ayres, to convey to your excellency, in behalf of the deputies of Spain on this continent, the preliminary convention, must have reached you about the same time that Don Felix Alzaga, the minister plenipotentiary, arrived here, soliciting the government of Peru to accede to this convention.

This government has been informed of the favorable desire of your excellency to terminate a sanguinary war, more monstrous by its inconsistency than by the disasters which it occasions. The enlightened world is scandalized at this fratricidal contest, in which the sons of liberty, in both hemispheres, fight against each other, without the Spaniards on their side being able to determine the object. Cannon have resounded too long ere the imperious voice of justice and humanity have been heard, through the means of a formal negotiation. The Cortes and the king, far from revolting at the independence of America, have authorised their commissioners to the northern and southern continents, to treat with them on this basis. Buenos Ayres and Mexico have already concluded their treaties. A negotiation in Bogota is already set on foot by the Spanish agents, on an armistice and preliminaries of peace, with respect to Colombia. Why, then, shall Peru alone be the scene of the most dreadful war, when the Spanish troops in her territory are directed by your excellency, whose sentiments of philanthropy, as well as the liberal principles which animate the chiefs of your army, are so well known? Let the effusion of blood, then, cease; let reason regain her rights; and let us preserve those forces which should give subsistence and life to the country. The government of Peru invites your excellency to declare explicitly your intentions and will, respecting the preliminary convention, celebrated between the commissioners of his Catholic majesty and Buenos Ayres. To this effect your excellency might appoint deputies to proceed to Xauja, the same thing taking place on the part of this government. In order to commence a conference, and to establish some points which may contribute to give formality to this negotiation, the brigadier-general, Don Juan de Berindoaga, minister of state, of war, and marine, and also charged with the department of foreign relations, is now despatched to your excellency. Peru may hope, that the day will soon dawn, which is to behold the Spaniards and Peruvians again linked together with the indissoluble ties, produced by good faith, perpetual friendship, and the advantageous union formed by reciprocal rights. I have the honor to offer to your excellency the sentiments, &c.

From the most excellent Jose Bernardo Tagle to the most excellent Don Jose de La Serna.

(*This is a copy, Tagle.*) HIPOLITO UNANUE.

No. 10.]—Instruction which the president of the republic of Peru gives to Don Juan de Berindoaga, brigadier-general, minister of state, of war and marine, and charged with the department of foreign relations, for the fulfilment of his commission, to the most excellent Don Jose de La Serna, or to his excellency Don Jose de Cantarac, in the case pointed out in these instructions.

1st. General Don Juan de Berindoaga, must proceed to the most excellent Don Jose de La Serna, or to his excellency general Don Jose Cantarac, should he possess all the necessary powers, with the object of declaring the favorable disposition of the government of Peru, to terminate the present scandalous war in which we find ourselves engaged.

2d. The commissioned general can make the necessary explanations on this matter, and regulate every thing according to the manner he may deem most proper, in order that deputies may be named by the chiefs of the Spanish troops, to treat on the armistice that is mentioned in the preliminary convention of Buenos Ayres, keeping always in mind, that in this, as in every other negociation with the Spaniards, the independence of America must be the basis.

3d. The deputies being nominated, the said general Berindoaga can return to Lima, or communicate from Xauja, there waiting the orders which may be forwarded to him.

4th. The contents of the note under this date, which is directed to his excellency Don Jose de La Serna, and the copy of which accompanies these instructions, will be the guide of his proceedings.

5th. In all that may occur, not comprehended in these instructions, he will proceed conformably to the peculiar circumstances which may present themselves, and according to the previous knowledge that he has of the government of Peru, always consulting its greatest advantage. JOSE BERNARDO DE TAGLE.

Lima, January 17th, 1824. Hipolito Unanue.

No. 11.]—An additional and very confidential article to the instructions given under this date, to the minister plenipotentiary, Don Juan de Berindoaga.

In case the Spaniards should be averse to treating on the preliminary convention of Buenos Ayres, the minister can propose to them on the basis of independence a particular treaty with Peru.

JOSE BERNARDO DE TAGLE.

Lima, January 17th, 1824.

No. 12.]—XAÚJA, 27th January 1824. Most Excellent Sir—Having yesterday arrived at this town, with the credentials of minister plenipotentiary of independent Peru, near your excellency, or his excellency Don Jose de Cantarac, should he possess powers to commence a negotiation, this general yesterday sent to the said town field-marshal Don Juan Loriga, and general-in-chief of the staff, with instructions to have an interview with me and to receive the letters directed to your excellency, and that I should wait a reply in Lima, or some intermediate point, without your jurisdiction; since in your excellency alone the powers of fulfilling my commission reside. These things having taken place in pursuance of the philanthropic ideas of my government, and, I being obliged to proceed to Lima, as I am not permitted to speak to your excellency, it is my duty to propose a suspension of hostilities for the necessary time to treat on the expediency of the preliminary convention of Buenos Ayres, and other reciprocal interests: Your excellency will please to command, if you should think proper, two deputies to proceed to Xauja, or any other point, where the same number will immediately be sent by Peru. I hope that your excellency penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to the war, opposed to the views of this enlightened age, and to all liberal principles, will be pleased to accede to these measures proposed by my government, anxious to enjoy peace, as the greatest good that any triumph could obtain. I have the honor, &c.

From the most Excellent Juan de Berindoaga, to the most Excellent Don Juan de La Serna.

No. 13.]—XAÚJA, 27th January 1824. Most Excellent Sir—To field-marshal Don Juan Loriga, general-in-chief of the staff, sent by your excellency to have an interview with me, and to receive the letters I had to deliver to him, I have shown my credentials as Minister plenipotentiary, near your excellency, or near his excellency Don Jose de La Serna. Not having the pleasure of speaking to your excellency, as I am obliged to return to Lima, or wait for a reply in some intermediate point without the territory occupied by the Spanish arms, I enclose to your excellency two parcels for the most excellent La Serna, one from his excellency the president of the republic of Peru, the other to me, opened, relative to the objects of my commission; will your excellency order that they be sent to their direction, and accept the particular consideration, &c.

From the most Excellent Juan de Berindoaga to the most excellent Don Jose de Cantarac.

No. 14.]—XAÚJA, 27th January 1824. *To the most excellent Don Jose Cantarac.* Most excellent Sir—Much have I regretted not having spoken with you in Huancayo, as I expected, I think my mission would have had a more speedy and satisfactory result to our reciprocal interests. Notwithstanding, I flatter myself that your excellency will contribute as much as is in your power to the conclusion of all the differences that subsist between Spain and Peru. Until this happy day shall arrive, it is with pleasure I assure your excellency of the consideration, &c. From the Most excellent Juan de Berindoaga.

No. 15.]—I have received the letter, under date of yesterday, which your excellency directed to me from Xauja, enclosing two parcels for the viceroy of Peru, Don Jose de La Serna; one from Don Bernardo Tagle, and another, open, from your excellency, which will be forwarded to day, by express, to their destination. As I am not authorised to commence any negotiation, your arrival at this place would have been useless. I will esteem it as a favor if your excellency will cause

the parcel to be delivered which I send to you for colonel Aldunati. May God preserve your excellency many years. (Signed) JOSE CANTARAC.

Head-quarters at Huancayo, January 27th, 1824.

No. 16.]—HUANCAYO, January 28th, 1824. *To Don Juan de Berindoaga.* Esteemed sir—I reply to your excellency's letter of yesterday, by assuring you that my desires are, and always will be, for the conclusion of the disagreement, now existing between some parts of Peru and the mother country; and I shall take a particular pleasure in co-operating to this end. As I have already officially informed your excellency, not being empowered to commence any negotiation, your desire would be of no avail in personally proceeding to my head quarters.

Yours, &c.

JOSE CANTARAC.

No. 17.]—PATIVILCA, February 7th, 1824. My dear president—I have seen, with the greatest satisfaction, the result of the mission of general Berindoaga, as it was perfectly well managed by the negotiator. By this step we have been able to sound the feelings and state of the enemy. General Berindoaga has done very well in giving the enemy the idea of a new treaty, which might be favorable to them; thus they may be led to expect something from the negotiation. On the whole, every thing has appeared to me perfectly right. I understand that you have desired to have a document from me, showing my approbation of the measure of entering into the negotiation with the enemy. This document is justly desired, and I am ready to give it in the most solemn manner; but I will observe to you, with frankness, that a doubt of my probity has never yet occurred but to my enemies, and I have never considered you as one of them. The proposal of Carrion, for a minister, was a piece of forgetfulness on my part, not recollecting, at the time, that there was a minister appointed, and in the exercise of his functions. I knew that Mr. Valdiviero was in the territory of Riva Agüero, and that before, he had been minister, and nothing more. I have, for Mr. Valdiviero, the esteem and consideration which he deserves. Have the goodness to make this public. To general Berindoaga, to whom I am going to write very fully, have the goodness to present, in the mean time, the expressions of my satisfaction for his excellent conduct in the mission he has just fulfilled. Accept, for yourself, the expression of, &c.

BOLIVAR.

No. 18.] Secretary General's office of the Constitutional Congress }
of Peru, Lima, January 14th, 1824. }

To the acting Secretary of His Excellency the Libertador. Mr. Secretary—We have the honor of directing to your excellency, for the information of his excellency the Libertador, the annexed notes, originals and copies, forwarded on account of the arrival of the minister plenipotentiary from the state of Buenos Ayres, near this government, Don Felix Alzaga, with the principal object of soliciting the accession of this government to the preliminary convention, held between Buenos Ayres and the commissioners of his Catholic majesty, on which important affair the sovereign congress has determined to suspend their resolution, until they learn the opinion of his excellency the Libertador. Touching this matter, the congress have vacillated between conflicting reasons; for if on one side they are urged by the primary object of securing the independence and liberty of the republic against the intrigues of bad faith, and the spirit of domination profoundly rooted in the breasts of all Spaniards, who are always ready to violate the most sacred stipulations;—on the other side, they are urged by the desire of terminating a contest, which, infallibly, must be very bloody, not only on account of their prosperity and repeated success, during the two preceding years, and the improper conduct which many of our countrymen have pursued in the towns they have occupied, and in the incursions they have made; which conduct, according to report, has alienated the minds of the people, to the prejudice of themselves, as well as to the great American cause. To which may be added, the state of annihilation of the public treasury, wholly unable, at present, to give assistance and activity to a numerous army, which is required in order that the result may not be doubtful, and this deficiency of the treasury can only be supplied by violent extortions, which would probably be frustrated on account of the poverty of indi-

vidual fortunes. Under these circumstances, and because the congress have intrusted to the Libertador the salvation of the country, and deposited in his military skill, prudence and knowledge of the human heart, unlimited confidence, they hope to hear his thoughts on this delicate subject before proceeding to any resolution. May God preserve your excellency. (Signed) MANUEL TERREYROS.

To Joaquin Arrese, Deputy Secretary.

No. 19.].—Copy of the articles 2d and 9th, of the letter of the 7th of January, 1824, from general Bolivar to Don Jose Bernardo de Tagle.

2d. Much do I regret the affair of the grenadiers of the Rio de La Plata, since it indicates a continued state of anarchy. Have the goodness to tell general Martinez, from me, that I should be much pleased, if, for the honor of the arms of his country, an exemplary punishment should be made among the accomplices in this affair. That if they belonged to Colombia, I would show him how they ought to be punished, as I did, when a military tumult took place in Truxillo, between the cuirassiers of general La Fuente and the hussars of my escort, a few hours before I left that place. This all happened on account of the hatred borne us by all those of the party of Riva Agüero, who always look upon us as the usurpers in Peru, having previously calumniated their government to us as guilty of corruption.

9th. I am desirous of having a great army near Huanuco, to prevent the enemy from getting to Lima. On this account, I desire that the battalion Vargas should be ready to march to the mountains, in order that our troops may be augmented on that side. The troops of Peru and the Rio de La Plata, are more than sufficient to defend Callao. Let new recruits be made in Lima, and the coast of its department, to augment the battalion of Pardo Zelo, which should reside in Callao to secure the recruits. This battalion should not be less than a thousand strong, and he is decidedly the best chief, that is, as I have been informed by every one. Let all the recruits be from the coast, or else they will die. You can send recruiting parties to this department, or that of Lima, to raise troops to augment the defence of Callao. I should observe to you, that all Peruvian troops, not employed in a fortress, will infallibly desert, and thus all the expense and trouble will be lost. You cannot imagine the difficulty I have had, to retain in the ranks the troops of the north. Every day the battalions are renewed, and are always composed of recruits. Whenever they sleep in the open air, or perform long marches, they all desert. Such troops are not worth a groat. Their own chiefs proposed to me to send them to Callao, but as they were all mountaineers, I know that they would die. I prefer sending them to Caxamarca, where their subsistence will cost nothing, and they will be in a good climate. Their muskets are good for nothing. Finally, I frankly tell you, that I only depend upon the troops of Colombia, and, on this account, I am obliged to draw the last which remain in Callao and Lima, to enable me to do something of importance.

No. 20.].—Extract of a letter from colonel Tomas Heres, to Don Jose Bernardo Tagle, of the 9th of January, 1824: "The Libertador enjoins me very particularly to write to you about having carried into effect the measures which he communicated to you in his official letter of the 14th of December, from Caxamarca. In the state of this diseased body, amputations only can save it."

No. 21.]

General Secretary's office, Head-quarters, }
Pativilca, February 8th, 1824. }

To the general-in-chief of the army of the Centre. General—The army of the enemy may approach the capital, and your excellency, on account of the inferiority of the forces under your command, find yourself unable to make any resistance. Under this impression, his excellency, the Libertador, commands me to communicate to you what follows, which is to contribute to the liberty of Peru.

1st. Your excellency will cause all the corps of infantry, without any exception, to commence their march to this place, by the route which you shall esteem most expedient, either through Chancay, by old Frapiche to Retes, thence to Huawza, and thence to Pativilca.

2d. The corps of cavalry ought to form the vanguard, and the guerilla parties ought to be nearest the enemy, as corps of observation.

3d. Your excellency will despatch, at any expense, some confidential and daring men to Callao, to go on board all the armed vessels there, but most particularly the armed vessels Guagas, Venganza and Balcarce, and others of this description, with orders to bore holes in them, either to sink them completely, or render them useless.

4th. His excellency commands that all horses and mules shall be taken from the capital and its vicinity, and all articles of war, which are there to be found, all merchandise which may be employed to clothe the army; finally, all that may be useful to us and which would assist the enemy.

5th. The transportation from the capital of these articles of war, clothing and the rest, must be effected in any way, and that your excellency may judge most convenient.

6th. On no pretext whatever, should any thing be left in Lima which could be of any use to the Spaniards.

7th. To this effect his excellency, the Libertador, empowers you (keeping only in view the safety of the country and the army, and the necessity of removing resources from the reach of the enemy) to proceed to demand from the government, and from individuals, all articles of war, every thing useful in magazines, all moveable objects, and all merchandise which may be applied to clothing the army.

8th. His excellency authorises you, in case of refusal, or any resistance, in giving up the articles asked for, to take them by force, and thus prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.

9th. Finally, general, his excellency, the Libertador, desires that your excellency should be impressed with the importance of this commission, and that it should be fulfilled by your excellency, with all the zeal, activity, and all-sufficient energy and skill necessary in the unfortunate event of an invasion of the capital, by the enemy's force, which is to be feared.

10th. In order that the third article of these instructions may take effect, your excellency will offer, to those employed, a great sum of money, which must be paid.

11th. For this, and other expenses, which are absolutely indispensable under these circumstances, and to fulfil many other objects, his excellency empowers you to lay a contribution on persons of property, strenuously exacted, and see that it is immediately complied with.

12th. Your excellency will publish a proclamation in the capital, and in all places through which the army will pass under your command, in order that every man, and every slave, who may wish to follow the army, may present themselves, and become incorporated into it, without any fear of being returned to their masters.

Your excellency has nothing to expect from the inhabitants voluntarily; you must demand and take every thing by force. This method, in truth, is hard, but in the present state, it is indispensable. May God, &c.

(It is a copy, *Espinar*.)

(Signed) JOSE DE ESPINAR.

No. 22.]

General Secretary's office, Head-quarters, }
Pativilca 8th February, 1824. }

To the minister of war. Mr. Minister—I send you a copy of the note under this date, which I directed to Don Henriquez Martinez, by order of his Excellency the Libertador. May God, &c. To the minister of war, from

JOSE DE ESPINER.

No. 23]

General Secretary's office, Head-quarters, }
Pativilca, 10th February, 1824. }

To the General of the army of the centre, Don Henriquez Martinez. Mr. General—I send you a duplicate, by order of his Excellency, the Libertador of my communication of the 8th of the present month, charging you again with its fulfilment. Callao is lost; and do not doubt but this is a work of the Spaniards. The capital will share the same fate, and you are exposed to be involved in its ruins. Your Excellency is authorised to save yourself, and to save the remains of the army, the marine of war, and of commerce, for all which his Excellency not only

delegates to you the ample and extraordinary power of which he is possessed, but at the same time he makes you responsible for any omission in the fulfilment of his instructions, which no human power can resist.* Your Excellency will not only have the measures executed which I communicated to you in my note of the 8th, but, also, you will order a communication to be had with vice-admiral Guise, in these, or similar terms; that vice admiral Guise must enter Callao with his squadron, seize upon and take out all vessels, without exception, and those which he cannot remove he must sink or set on fire; and all those vessels which he shall succeed in removing, shall be considered as enemies property, be condemned as good prizes, agreeably to the laws on that subject; and that he shall proceed afterwards with his squadron to the North, to receive the orders of his Excellency the Libertador. You will endeavor, general, to save every thing that is possible; and to remove from the capital every thing which may be of use to the army. Your Excellency will proceed as a delegate of the Liberator, who invests you with his powers to do every thing which his Excellency would do, were he present. Your Excellency must imagine that the country being lost, all the ties of society are broken, *that there is no authority, nothing to be regarded*, that you must deprive the enemy of the immense resources of which he is about to take possession. For all which his Excellency has received sufficient authority from the congress, which he transfers to you. May God, &c. To the general from

JOSE DE ESPINAR.

(It is a copy, Hurrero.)

No. 24.] LIMA, February 12th, 1824. Mr. Minister—I have just received the official letter of his Excellency, the Libertador, a copy of which I transmit to your Excellency in the order that, placing the contents of it before his Excellency, the President, he may be pleased immediately to send me a reply, that I may in consequence guide myself by what the said most excellent gentleman shall determine.

HENRIQUES MARTINEZ.

To the minister of war.

No. 25.] General Secretary's office of the Constitutional Congress }
of Peru, Lima, February 12th, 1824. }

Mr. Minister—The sovereign congress being acquainted, through the notes of the 8th and 9th of the present month, directed by the Libertador to general Martinez, have resolved,—that a committee should be named from this body, who, with due instructions, shall proceed to his Excellency, the Libertador to make some necessary representations to him, in order that proper measures may be adopted for the salvation of the country; and that the effect of the said notes shall be suspended, as far as regards the security of the capital, till a reply shall be received from the Libertador, the government still continuing to remove the munitions of war; and in case the enemy should advance upon the capital, every thing which would assist them to the prejudice of the cause, and the army of the country.

By orders of the congress, we communicate this to your Excellency, in order that, having the goodness to lay it before the President of the republic, he may cause the same to be fulfilled.

May God, &c.

From Joaguin and Araese, deputy secretary; Jose Bartolome Sarate, deputy secretary, and minister of state in the department of the government.

Lima, February 12th, 1824. Let the previous order of the sovereign congress be observed and fulfilled; let a certified copy be made of it, and let it be transmitted to the minister of war for its fulfilment in the part which appertains to him.

TAGLE.

(It is a copy, Urnanua.)

* What respect and obedience to the congress! What consideration for the Executive power! When this was said from general Bolivar did he think himself omnipotent? What delirium!—what sacrilege. Note of TORRE TAGLE.

No. 26.]

Department of War and Marine, }
Lima, February 15, 1824. }

H. S. Minister—At the request of his Excellency, the President of the republic, I had the honor of transmitting for your information and consequent effects, the order, which under this date, the deputy secretaries of the congress have directed to me. The sovereign congress being informed of the note of the Secretary of his Excellency, dated the 11th of the present month and directed to general Don Agustin Gamana, in which he confers upon him the powers which he had before given to general Don Henriques Martinez, should the latter not have fulfilled them, which note was presented by the minister of war, the congress have resolved, that carrying into due effect what was before sanctioned, in consequence of the commission conferred upon general Martinez, the result of the committee despatched from that body to the Libertador shall be received before any innovation is admitted.

By order of the same, we communicate this to your Excellency that by your transmitting it to the President of the republic, it may have its due effect. May God preserve, &c.

JOAGUIN DE ARRESE, Deputy Secretary.

JOSE BARTOLOME SARATE, Deputy Secretary.

I offer to your Excellency, the sentiments, &c.

(It is a copy, Unanue.)

No. 27.]

General Secretary's office, of the Congress, }
Lima, February 17th, 1824. }

The congress having been duly summoned, and only twenty-seven delegates having been assembled, which number is not sufficient, according to law, to constitute a quorum, the said gentlemen formed themselves into a private junta, when the reply of his Excellency the Libertador was laid before them, and the request of general Necochca, and in consequence of the urgent necessity which connects the state of the castles of Callao, with the protests of responsibility again repeated, have agreed—that the charge thereon being accepted by his excellency, the Libertador, the government should be told, that the moment has arrived, in which the decree of the 10th of the present month must be published; and if, by that authority, any chief should appear, with sufficient credentials, demanding the civil and military command, in virtue of which it shall be given him, the said chief must be informed, that the congress, to prevent the abandonment of this city, has sent a committee to his excellency, the Libertador; and it is hoped that he will prudently await the reply before carrying into effect this measure. All which you will have the goodness to communicate to the president of the republic, for his information and consequent orders. May God, &c.

JOAQUIN DE ARRESE, Dep. Sec'y.

JOSE BARTOLOME SARATE, Dep. Sec'y

No. 28.]—*To the minister of state in the department of the government.*
LIMA, February 17th, 1824. Observe it and fulfil it, and in consequence, let the decree, of the 10th of the present month, of the sovereign congress, be proclaimed; and afterwards, let the civil and military command of the capital be delivered up to Don Mariano Necochca, on whom it has been conferred by his excellency, the Libertador, after having accepted the supreme dictatorship given by the sovereign congress. (Signed) TABLE.

(It is a copy, Unanue.)

No. 29.]—PATIVILCA, January 29th, 1824. My dear president—This morning I received the note, from the government, enclosing me the proposals, or rather the orders of general La Fuente, that despatches should be sent to his companions in arms. The tone of La Fuente with the government, has shocked me, though previously I had reasons to be surprised at nothing. He says, very plainly, that the despatches must be sent; that is to say, he orders it. This general, my dear President, is more absolute than the congress, yourself, or I. Will you believe, that whilst he commanded at Truxillo, he retained those persons in the

service, whom the government had ordered to be shot? Colonel Devalos commanded the day of the night of my arrival at Truxillo, and sent to me for orders. He has, furthermore, set Silva Novoa, and Mancebo at liberty, who had robbed the state of more than a hundred thousand dollars; and this same La Fuente knows it by the declaration of Riva Aguero. I gave orders for these men to be arrested; and I added, in conversation, that I would set them at liberty, in order that they might leave the country whenever the money should appear. Silva offered to make important disclosures, but nothing was done, all through the management of La Fuente. He, besides, excites jealousies among the troops, by his unjust preferences. His pride is such, that he sent me the countersign by his aid, I being with my staff at Truxillo; as if he were the chief, and not myself. At the dinner table, he placed himself at my right. He came no farther than the door of the drawing room to receive us;* he never came to my house to consult me about any thing, as you have done so often, the minister of state, and others. I know this was owing to your excessive goodness, but I also know the distance between yourself and him is immense. I will add, that these things made no impression upon me till this moment, but the insubordination of La Fuente is so great, that we cannot depend upon his obeying any thing that is ordered. You must understand, that I reproved him very much for his disobedience to the government, respecting the execution of the criminals, who were ordered to be shot, and I exhorted him to submit to the laws and the authorities. He replied, that he was commanded to commit an assassination, since the order was for the secret execution of the men, without trial and without witnesses. I replied to him, that I did not doubt that this all originated from Berindoaga; and that you were too good, and too much of a gentleman, and that, occasionally, Berindoaga's advice was not the best, as in this case; for a secret execution, without trial of *persons of consequence*, was a shocking thing, and had always been disapproved of. Permit me, my dear president, to avail myself of this opportunity, to give you my opinion, frankly, on this affair. Finally, I have many reasons for believing that general La Mar will experience much disgust from general La Fuente; he told me so himself before leaving that place, and expressed his regret that there was not another *Prefect* to this department. If general La Mar should be appointed Prefect of this department, with the power of nominating a *Sub-Prefect*, to take charge of the Prefecture, he only retaining the authority and title, I think the service would proceed rapidly, and the embarrassments would be diminished. If this idea appears good to you, you can propose it to the congress from me. Let Mr. La Fuente go to Chili, to relieve Mr. Salazar, and every thing will be right (*reserved but certain*.) General La Fuente is really opposed to Riva Aguero and Herrera, but entirely devoted to the other accomplices of this conspiracy. He loves general Santa Cruz passionately; so much so, that he wished me meanly to stoop to him. The purport of all this is, that the altar has remained entire, and that the idol alone is wanting, which was thrown down to make room for the successor, who is expected. This successor may be Santa Cruz, La Fuente, or any other ambitious person. The altar must be destroyed. Adieu my dear president, I am cordially yours,

BOLIVAR.

* These ridiculous and whimsical observations of general Bolivar, show plainly, not alone his vanity, but his mediocrity of mind. A man of superior talent, even general George Washington, would have never made these remarks, and much less in an official letter.—*Note of the Author*

NOTE.—The originals of the papers which have been printed in this manifesto, will remain in the secretary's office of the city council, till the 13th of the present month, in order that all who doubt their authenticity may be convinced by ocular demonstration.

TORRE TAGLE.

NO. X.

Extract of a letter from a communication of Senor Manuel Vidanre, published in the Massachusetts Journal of August 19th, 1828.

Bolivar called a convention, because he thought he should have a majority in it. He dissolved it by the scandalous method of causing some of the representatives to separate themselves, so that a quorum should attend the sittings. Briseno Mendes was the commander of this disorganising faction. Briseno Mendes, the political offspring of Bolivar, his creature, his confidant; he who with very little reserve discovered in the congress of Panama the depth of the ambitious ideas of the American Napoleon. Let the impartial judge. Is not the case of Colombia entirely similar to that of Peru? There he convoked the congress, hoping that he should be able to dispose of the deputies at his pleasure. His success was not commensurate with his intentions. There were infamous traitors, but the majority were sound. He impeded the installation of the congress, making the ignominy of the transaction fall on those pusillanimous persons who signed a pathetic petition, alleging these same reasons of agitation and disturbance. He protracted the dictatorship, and he did so in order to give a code repugnant to the will of the people; a code which deserves to be called the energetic expression of *absolutism*. Is not this precisely equivalent to the resolution of the householders of Carthagena, of the Canton of Ubate, and to the documents from the executive departments?

Enlightened nations know that the powers of those who command, are not enlarged except by intrigue, seduction or force. It is impossible that change of this sort should proceed from a will that is free and regulated by reason. Who would be a slave if he could be free? Who is not satisfied that he will be a slave, if he concedes extraordinary powers to a man of war? I ask whether Bolivar would have dispersed the convention, if a majority had been favorable to him? Would he have thrown obstacles in the way of the Peruvian congress, if a great number of faithful men had not manifested their sentiments in the preliminary meetings. Briseno Mendes feigned himself oppressed in Colombia; some unprincipled Peruvian alleged the same in my country. Oppressed, they who have on their side the armed force! Oppressors, I called them and grievous oppressors! enemies of order, aspiring criminals against God and human nature. Can men read with moderation and sufferance, the following sentiments in the Redactor?

Carthagena rests the entire exercise of the sovereignty in the person of the Libertador.

Ubate authorises, so far as may depend on her, the Libertador to be president, in order that he may take upon himself the absolute command.

He unites the three powers, and proceeds to establish absolutism in the world of Columbus! and are these acts and these maxims de-

tailed, without fire flashing in the eyes, and the blood leaping to the cheeks? Be Bolivar absolute, but let him remember that all the thrones where despots have seated themselves, have been stained with their own blood. There was a poinard for Henry IV. of France, the least wicked of kings, a dagger ——— —.

XII.

Organical decree of general Bolivar in virtue of which he has assumed the supreme power in Colombia, dated Bogota 27th August, 1828.

TITLE 15th,—OF THE SUPREME POWER.

Art 1. The attributes of the supreme chief are to maintain peace in the interior and the defence against foreign invasions; to have the command of the land and sea forces; to negociate with foreign powers, to make peace and declare war, and to make treaties; to name all the civil and military officers.

The supreme chief has the right to render the decrees and ordinances necessary, of whatever description they might be, to modify to reform the established laws and to alter them entirely; to look upon the execution of the decrees and ordinances, as upon laws to be maintained.

To recover the taxes; the administration of justice the execution of judgments; the approbation or the reform of the sentences of the Court Martials; the commutation of punishment with the advice of the council of state, and upon the proposal of the courts or after having heard them previously, the right of amnesty, or to grant the pardon of public or private faults, always with the advice of the council of state.

To give commissions to privateers.

To exercise the natural right as the chief of the general administration of the republic in all its branches, and as being entrusted with the supreme power of the state; finally, to preside in the council of state, when he pleases.

Art 2. The supreme chief will be assisted in the exercise of the executive by the council of ministers.





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